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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON THE PHILEBUS.

(From a Lecture delivered October, 1855 *.)

When Horace named Plato "the learned[1]," he used no idle or conventional epithet, but one culled with his usual "curious felicity." This learning is a source of frequent perplexity to the student of the Platonic Dialogues. In many of these we may read plain traces of a double purpose, a purpose of refutation and a purpose of construction. But it is characteristic of Plato's philosophical genius that he is ever seeking for truth amid heaps of seeming error—ever trying to detach the gold from the dross, and to recast it in the mould of his own comprehensive system, anticipating in his practice the celebrated maxim of the German Plato: "Philosophers are usually right in what they assert, but wrong in what they deny." With this view and this conviction, he seems to have made it matter

* This lecture was not written for publication, and was designed for beginners in the study of Plato. It is now given to the world solely in deference to the opinion of competent though friendly judges, who think it may be of use to the class for whom it was originally designed. Whether it is worth completing or not is a question I do not pretend to answer, but I would fain have made it more complete than it is if the state of my health made any serious exertion possible.

[1] Pythagoran Anytique reum *doctumque* Platona.

of conscience to acquaint himself with whatever had been written before, and whatever was published during his own life, by any one pretending to the name of sophist or philosopher. And he was not only the most comprehensive, but all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, one of the most candid of readers. There were in fact very few—I doubt if there was more than one—of his more considerable opponents with whom he does not to a certain extent agree; or more than one to some portion of whose speculations he has not assigned its due place in his own philosophical structure[1].

This very comprehensiveness is, as I have already intimated, a cause of much perplexity to an unpractised student. One would be curious to know how many are the readers of the Theaetetus who do not rise from the perusal of that dialogue impressed with the belief that among the many theories hard to be understood which are there refuted, that dark—if not dangerous—dogma of Heraclitus, that "all things flow" has at any rate received its death-stroke. And yet Aristotle informs us that this opinion was the first embraced by the youthful Plato, and one which with a certain qualification he continued to his life's end to maintain. And this notice there is in the Theaetetus nothing which contradicts, but much on the contrary to confirm. So of the Protagorean *dictum* πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος—which is professedly—and the kindred though not identical knowledge-theory of Aristippus—which though without mention of its author—is really reviewed in the same dialogue. Both are half and only half rejected: for of both, after all the analysis to which they are submitted in the dialectical laboratory, there survives a residuum of what to

[1] The only named exception is Democritus, whose books we are told that Plato collected, in order not to read but to burn. Diog. Laert. III. 919; LX. 7. 8 πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔνθ' ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δέοι. The story of the burning comes from Aristoxenus (ἐν τοῖς ἱστορικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν), of whom, a disciple of Aristotle and a Peripatetic, see what Cicero says Tusc. I. 10. 20. From that passage we gather that Aristoxenus, in addition to the general reason that he was a Peripatetic, had a special reason for disliking Plato, being the author of a psychological theory which Plato had anticipated and refuted. He forgot that Democritus was the contemporary of Plato, who never names the contemporaries whom he is refuting.

Plato seemed true, and of what—whether true or not—formed an integral part of his general theory of knowing and being.

These remarks on the Theaetetus form a fitting introduction to what I have to say on the Philebus. This latter dialogue is less read and probably not better understood than the Theaetetus. Like the Theaetetus it is full of more or less recondite learning which nature's light alone is not sufficient to enable us to decipher. Though professing—and here it is unlike the dialogue with which I am comparing it—to furnish a positive solution of what to a Greek philosopher was the most important of all ethical problems, this end is attained by a series of marches and counter marches of which it is difficult to divine the object or assent to the utility. Περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων, "Of the transitions from subject to subject in the Philebus" was the title of a now lost treatise of the great physician Galen: whose extensive knowledge of the literature of philosophy must have enabled him to treat the subject in an interesting if not in a perfectly satisfactory manner. And the difficulty which he felt to be so great as to call for a special enquiry is to us heightened by the circumstance that many works, Pythagorean and Socratic, which were entire in his time, are now either utterly lost, or survive only in fragments or excerpts. For as usual Plato is not content to decide the question at issue, without previously disposing of a multitude of other questions, which to a cursory observer appear but remotely connected with it. What, it may be asked, has the theory of the One and Many, of the Limit and Unlimited to say to the question propounded at the outset of the Dialogue, Is Pleasure or Wisdom the better? How is this—a practical question if there be one—dependent on formulae so abstruse as these? The difficulty is one which no man need be ashamed to avow. It has been felt by the acutest modern critics, it was felt by the most learned ancients. Some of the obscurities of the Philebus, we shall find, are due to this circumstance: though it must be confessed that the frequent changes of subject, and abrupt transitions from one subject to another, constitute, as Galen perceived, the special difficulty of this dialogue as compared with others.

In one respect indeed the Philebus is favourably distinguished from the majority of the Platonic discourses. It is tolerably clear not only what is the question proposed, but also how the philosopher answers it. The real difficulty is to account for what intervenes: to map out the country which the disputants traverse in passing from one to the other of the extreme points. We know from the first whither the author intends to lead us, but are at a loss to account for the circuitous route he forces us to take. The 'filum labyrinthi' is what I invite you to seek: but I have first a few remarks to make upon the question which forms the subject matter of the Dialogue.

Those who have but a smattering of Greek or Roman philosophy know that the nature of the *ἀγαθόν* or summum bonum, or Finis bonorum as Cicero names it, was much and warmly debated by the rival schools of antiquity, especially by those which traced their lineage either in the direct or collateral line from Socrates and his contemporaries. In Plato's time, as you are aware, those who with him had been disciples of Socrates ranked themselves under three principal denominations, the Cyrenaic, the Cynic and the Megaric, which were represented by Aristippus, Antisthenes and Euclides respectively. To these are added two minor schools, of whom it is not necessary to say anything at present. Each of these principal schools had an ethical system of its own, not only different, but in some point or other diametrically opposed to those of the remaining two. These ethical differences are in effect summed up in the compendious formulae by which they expressed their several notions of the *ἀγαθόν*, the Supreme Good of man.

We will begin, where Plato begins, with the characteristic formulae of the schools of Cyrene and of Megara, so called from the cities which produced Aristippus and Euclides. Aristippus, whose opinions[1], as there seems no reason to doubt, and as

[1] Euseb. Praep. Evang. p. 764, says *ἦν δ' ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ὑγρὸς πάνυ τὸν βίον καὶ φιλήδονος· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μὲν οὗτος ἐν τῷ φανερῷ περὶ τέλους διελέξατο, δυνάμει δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδοναῖς κεῖσθαι.* He proceeds to quote Aristocles, who attributes to *ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς* Κυρήνης opinions like those described in the text. But to this statement respecting Aristippus

most commentators since the time of the English translator, Sydenham, are disposed to assume, are represented in the present dialogue by Philebus, scrupled not to assert that Good and Pleasure were convertible terms [*ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου ξύμφωνα*, Phileb. init.], that nothing but Pleasure was Good and that Good was nothing but Pleasure. This dogma, startling as it may sound, was perfectly consistent with its author's general philosophical system. It was in fact a corollary from that view of the nature of human knowledge, which is the subject of a searching dialectical scrutiny in the Theaetetus. Not only did the Cyrenaics hold with Theaetetus that knowledge consisted in sensuous perception; they accepted also the inference which Socrates draws from that dogma, that sensuous perception perceives nothing but itself: *τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται*[1]: "the feeling of which in sensation we are the subjects reveals to us nothing beyond itself." All sensible qualities, and all so-called sensible objects are simply affections, motions (intimae permotiones, as Cic. says), or, as we should say, modifications of our own consciousness. In these *πάθη*, they said, we do recognize a distinction, and the distinction is threefold. They are either painful, pleasurable, or indifferent; beyond this they are incapable of classification. This psychological theory tends inevitably to the inference that pleasure is of all things best: for if our choice lay between sensations that are painful or indifferent and those that are pleasant—all other things being by the hypothesis equal—we could not help preferring the last. With equal consistency this school maintained that pleasures differ not in kind but in degree only: *μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς...πολὺ μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι*, Diog. L. 11. 990. You will remember that Philebus in the dialogue willingly consents that the *τὸ μᾶλλον* shall be predicated of pleasure[2], while he stoutly resists the insinuation

all other testimonies, as Zeller says (Gr. Ph. 2. 12), are directly opposed. e.g. Plutarch adv. Colot. (ap. Euseb. ib. p. 24 *b*). *Ἀρίστιππος τέλος ἀγαθῶν ἡδονήν, κακῶν δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα.*

[1] Sext. Empir. de Cyrenaicorum dogm.

[2] P. 28 E compared with p. 13 D.

that one pleasure may differ from another in kind. I hold this as a conclusive proof that Philebus had learnt in the school of Aristippus, and that Plato in arguing against the intractable disciple is in fact refuting his master.

To this system of pure Hedonism—a gross perversion, if it is not rather to be called a subversion, of the authentic teaching of Socrates,—is opposed a system of what may be called pure Intellectualism, which, though alien from the spirit of the Socratic morality, bears some resemblance to it in the letter. Socrates, we know, identified virtue with knowledge or wisdom, calling *ἀρετὴ* an *ἐπιστήμη*, a *σοφία*, or a *φρόνησις*. That by these predicates he meant insight into the nature of actions, as they tend to produce solid happiness, we learn from the testimony of Xenophon. But practical as was the bias of Socrates's mind upon the whole, his philosophy had also its speculative aspect. His dialectical acumen attracted the regard of men who had been accustomed to the thinnest abstractions and most rarefied subtleties of the Eleatic school of Zeno and Parmenides. Many of these worshippers of logic attached themselves to Socrates, and among them Euclides of Megara, apparently an estimable man and sincere seeker of truth, but a schoolman in grain: a man whose mind while it was sharpened had been cramped and narrowed by overmuch syllogizing. This man naturally seized and appropriated that portion of the Socratic teaching which fell in with the bent of his own genius and seemed to harmonize with the tenor of his previous studies and speculations, and, we may add, with the lessons of his early teachers[1]. Virtue, said Socrates, is Science; Science, argued Euclides, is therefore Virtue. *Τἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ* (Phileb. init.)[2]. At other times it is true Euclides spoke the language rather of Elea than of Athens, but he was doubtless able to reconcile his old with his new notions, for Cicero, who tells us that the Mega-

Compare Diog. Laert. II. § 87, *μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς.*

[1] *οὗτος τὰ Παρμενίδεια μετεχειρίζετο.* Diog. L. II. § 106.

[2] Comp. D. L. ib. *ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν καλούμενον, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν κ.τ.λ.*

rians[1] defined the Good as that "quod esset unum et simile et idem semper"—the *τὸ ἕν* of Parmenides—proceeds to identify their doctrine with that of another Socratic sect (the Eretriac), "quorum omne bonum in *mente* positum et mentis acie, quâ verum cerneretur[2]." Acad. Qu. II. 42.

This account of the ethical views of two of Plato's principal philosophical contemporaries—elementary as it is—will enable us I think to begin the study of the Philebus from a right point of view, and to appreciate one at least of the ends Plato proposed to himself when he wrote that dialogue. I have only further to request your attention to a passage of the Republic which, as you will at once perceive, is highly illustrative of the first part of the Philebus, and confirmatory of the view here taken of its object. It will be found in the sixth book (p. 505 A). After enlarging on the vast importance of the Idea of the Good, *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα*, as that which lends to all other ethical ideas their value and utility (*ἦ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται*), as that without which all other knowledge profiteth nothing (*ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος*), Socrates proceeds to signalize two opposite theories of the Good, which he shews to be alike untenable. The vulgar, he says, hold that the Good is Pleasure, the more refined that it is Knowledge and Intelligence (*τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις*[3] *φρόνησις*). The latter position he refutes by shewing that it tells us nothing, for when asked "Of what is the Good the knowledge?" the respondents have no choice but to reply "The Good is the knowledge of the Good," *καὶ μάλα γελοίως* as the interlocutor naturally exclaims, but very logically as we cannot but perceive, for had they specified any third thing as the object of *φρόνησις*, then that third thing would be better than the supreme Good, which is absurd.

[1] He does not however name Euclides. Possibly the Eleatic may have overpowered the comparatively feeble Socratic element of this philosophy.

[2] Parmenides had already said (or sung),

ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστι νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα
οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστὶ
εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

[3] This epithet in Plato usually denotes philosophical ingenuity, and is applied to the more abstruse schools, as Theaet. 156 A, to the Ephesian (Heraclitic) as distinguished from the

With the advocates of pleasure Socrates adopts a method not unlike that used with Philebus in this dialogue; constraining them to admit that though some pleasures may be good, others are undoubtedly evil, and therefore that Pleasure *per se* cannot be the Good. I cannot doubt that in both the passages quoted from the Republic and in the opening scene of the Philebus the same two schools are pointed at, the Cyrenaics on the one hand, and the Megarics on the other.

With the Cynical school it is not so easy to say how much the Philebus has to do. Of their views of the highest Good we have confused and inconsistent notions. From some expressions in Diogenes Laertius, historians of Philosophy have inferred that they with the Megarics held Wisdom or Reason to be the *summum bonum*[1], and the final fusion of the two schools at a later period which took place in the person of Stilpo, lends colour to this hypothesis. But this we do know, that Antisthenes and his followers violently opposed the Pleasure theory of the Cyrenaics, not only denying that Pleasure is a good, but denying also that Pain is an evil. It is highly probable, if not absolutely certain, that the δυσχεράσματα which are the subject of some graceful raillery in a later portion of the Philebus (p. 44), point to the dogmas of this morose school of moralists, the "Capuchins of antiquity," with whom, by the way, we find Plato skirmishing in several other dialogues.

From these remarks you will gather that one of Plato's objects in composing the Philebus was to point out the falsehood of these extremes, to extract from each any lurking element of truth which it might contain, and to place the theory of the Good, and with it Morality itself, on a broader and less insecure basis.

This purpose reveals itself very early in the discussion; in what I will call its second stage,—that which commences[2] immediately after the parenthetical exposition of the One and Many which succeeds the first or introductory portion of the Dialogue. It is here assumed that the Supreme Good must

ruder Cynics (ἀντίτυποι, ἄμουσοι), and in Politic. 285 A to the Pythagoreans.

[1] See the passages in Zeller Ph. d. Gr. II. p. 112, note 3.

[2] P. 20.

possess the attributes of perfect *αὐτάρκεια*—that it is, *ex vi termini*, the ultimate end, the *τέλος τέλειον*, as Aristotle calls it, of all desire and all effort. It is then shewn that neither pleasure denuded of intelligence, nor intelligence drained of every element of pleasure, can be held to fulfil this condition, and it is inferred—not as some have carelessly asserted[1]—that "the chief good consists in the temperate enjoyment of *both*"—but that the perfect life must contain both, and that the life which does contain both is at least nearer to perfection than either of its rivals: *πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν*, p. 22 A. It is this result and this only which is attained at this stage of the discussion. A certain concession, you will observe, is made to each of the contending sects. Aristippus and Euclides are allowed to contribute each his contingent to the sum of human perfection, but the amount of their respective quota has yet to be determined. Plato's perfect man was assuredly not an intelligent man of pleasure; for Aristippus—wiser than his theory—was already that. In fact had this been all Plato has to tell us about the Chief Good, Protarchus must be held to have deserved ill of posterity: for Socrates handsomely proposes that at this point the dialogue shall end, in order, as he says, that Philebus and his goddess may have no further molestation; and it is only at the urgent instance of Philebus's inquisitive friend that the philosopher can prevail on himself to shock her divinity by exhibiting his engines of dialectical torture, p. 23 A[2].

For it is evident that two important questions remain to be disposed of, one only of which has hitherto dawned upon Protarchus: after it has been agreed that the third or mixed is better than either of the simple lives, the second prize still remains to be disposed of, and it is even hinted that the fascinating goddess may not only fail in winning it, but may deem herself fortunate if she obtain any prize at all. It may also happen—though here Socrates for the present keeps his own counsel,—that the hitherto successful candidate, the Mixed

[1] Vid. G. Burgess in his introduction to this dialogue.

[2] *οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἥδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;*

Life, may require a third ingredient to be added besides those of Pleasure and Wisdom, before it is fairly entitled to the place it arrogates.

We now come (p. 23 D) to a part of the Dialogue which is certainly not without its difficulties. Socrates himself betrays a humorous consciousness of the elaborate character of the machinery he is about to use, "a fresh set of weapons," he says, "are needed by the champion of Reason, if he would vindicate her right to the second place of honour." These weapons were not of home-manufacture, but forged by certain Italian craftsmen, of whose skill Plato well knew how to avail himself.

It is a hackneyed tradition that the Platonic philosophy contains both a Socratic and a Pythagorean element; that after the death of Socrates, his disciple began a series of journeys, and that in the course of his peregrinations he visited and conversed with the great lights of the Pythagorean sect, who resided in the cities of Magna Graecia or Sicily: that the result of the conversation and of the studies to which they led was apparent in the altered form of his philosophical speculations, which, without ceasing to be Socratic, acquired a tincture of Pythagorean mysticism: so that Plato may be styled a Pythagorizing Socrates, and Platonism a kind of amalgam of the doctrines of two successive masters. In this, as in many other popular notions of this philosophy, there is some truth mixed with a good deal of error: and it is a subject of congratulation to historians of philosophy that dialogues have been preserved which help us in separating the error from the truth. Among these the Philebus is perhaps the most important. That it is imbued with Pythagorean phraseology and to a considerable extent with Pythagorean modes of thinking will be evident to any one who will take the trouble of comparing that portion of the dialogue which we are now considering, first, with the fragments of the Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus[1]—the only

[1] When this was written, the fragments of Philolaus were generally reputed genuine, they are now, notwithstanding the able apologetic treatise of Boeckh, regarded as at least doubtful. It is admitted however that they have a better claim to our respect than the reputed remains of other so-called Pythagoreans.

remnants of genuine Pythagorism that we possess (for of pseudo-Pythagorism we have enough and to spare); and these again with the accounts of that singular school which Aristotle has handed down to us.

And here let me call your attention to a remark of Socrates preliminary to the abstruse enquiry on which he is entering. "The weapons I am going to use, he says, are different from any hitherto adopted, though perhaps not so entirely different[1]." This latter clause contains an evident reference to that exposition of the One and Many which immediately follows the introductory part of the Dialogue, the consideration of which I have reserved for this place. You will observe that in this earlier passage (beginning 14 c—p. 19) Socrates enunciates a formula (*ἓν καὶ πολλά*) which he affirms to be of universal application[2]. This One and this Many, we are further informed, involved the ideas of a Limit (*πέρας*) and of an Infinite or unlimited principle (*ἄπειρον*)[3]. These latter terms (*πέρας* &c.) reappear in the second of the two passages which we are considering, and which begins p. 24. But instead of a twofold, we have in this latter a fourfold distribution, or, as we may venture to say, a tetrad of principles, consisting of (1) a limit (*πέρας*); (2) an unlimited or infinite (*ἄπειρον*); (3) a compound essence, of which the two former are the factors, and which is styled *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*, a birth or coming into being, an actualization (so to speak); and (4) a causative principle or *αἴτιον τῆς ξυμμίξεως*, which is to operate the combination denoted by *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*.

Before endeavouring to illustrate either this tetrad or the duad which precedes it, let me draw your attention to the two different purposes which they are designed respectively to subserve. The dualistic formula is introduced by way of answer to the position obstinately maintained by Philebus, that though pleasure may be the result of various causes, it cannot be distin-

[1] *ἔστι δ' ἴσως ἕνια καὶ ταὐτά*—some of them are possibly even the same, p. 23 c.

[2] *ἔστι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν*: this formula expresses one of the necessary and invariable conditions of rational discourse.

[3] *πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἔχοντα*, Phil. p. 16 c.

guished into different kinds; it is, *qua* pleasure (*καθ' ὅσον ἡδονή*) the same and homogeneous. Of this position, actually held, as we have seen, by the Cyrenaics, the formula *ἓν καὶ πολλά* is an *a priori* refutation, for if unity implies plurality, and plurality on the other hand implies unity, then pleasure, though one, is also many—in modern language it is a fit subject of scientific classification. So Protarchus perceives, for he intreats Socrates to apply his principle in the enumeration of the different kinds both of pleasure and of knowledge[1]. Instead of immediately complying with this request, Socrates introduces, as we have seen, the description of the mixed Life, and its comparison with the other two; being curious to know who the third candidate, *μικτὸς βίος*, really is, before proceeding to a closer inspection of the rival competitors. It is in what I shall denote as Part 5 of the dialogue that the formula is first applied to its avowed purpose, the accurate enumeration of the varieties of pleasure and knowledge. Meanwhile it is not difficult to divine Plato's reason for importing the investigation of the *ἓν καὶ πολλά* thus early. It is *related* to the tetrad, as will be evident presently, and yet not identical with it. The tetrad is introduced for a different purpose; not in order to the distribution of the genus Pleasure into its species, or of the genus Science into *its* species, but in order to refer each to a still higher genus, as an important step towards determining the final order of precedence of the various forms of the Good.

I have insisted on this point, though at the risk of wearying you—for it is important towards tracing the plan of this work through mazes in which many a student has lost his way. I must now ask your indulgence, while I try to explain to you the different senses in which the formula One and Many was used by Plato. It may be conveniently viewed in two aspects, a metaphysical and a dialectical. In its metaphysical sense the formula denotes the relation between intelligibles and sensibles, between the idea and the phenomenon, the form and the matter, the permanent and the changeable. It was adopted by Plato as a counter symbol[2] to the well-known

[1] *βουλεύου πότερον ἡδονῆς εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον*, p. 20.

[2] See Sophist. p. 242 D, *τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος* κ.τ.λ.

formula of the Eleatics, ἓν τὰ πάντα, by which Parmenides expressed his conviction that the only reality in nature was the Idea of Being itself in its purest and most abstract form. To the outward world, the sensible objects which *seemed* to be, the Eleatic philosopher denied all reality. Nothing, he says, is or will be save Being: for fate has decreed that to the All belongs, sole and unchangeable, the name to Be (οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθειν τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι), notwithstanding all that mortals[1] in their blindness have assumed as coming into existence and perishing, as being and yet not being, as undergoing change of place or change of aspect. With the reasoning, subtle however fallacious, by which Parmenides was led to deny first the reality of the Many or outward nature, and secondly that of all Ideas except the highest of all, Being itself, I will not now trouble you. Strange as such speculations seem to us, they gave infinite trouble[2] to some of the acutest intellects that Greece, and therefore the world, has produced, and if you would know how much trouble they occasioned to Plato, you have only to turn to those two dialogues which he has entitled Parmenides and Sophista[3]. You will there perceive that the formula ἓν καὶ πολλά expresses his dissent from the Eleatic or as it is sometimes called Unitarian doctrine, and his conviction that "One and Many" are terms which do not exclude, but rather presuppose one other; ὅτι τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν as he says in the Philebus, or as I have ventured to express it, that unity implies plurality and plurality implies unity. This (metaphysically considered) may mean, either that one idea may be analysed into a plurality of other ideas, as in the Philebus, the idea of Good is found to include the three ideas of the True, the Symmetrical and the Beautiful—while each of these "many" again may be said to include the one, the Good—the κοινωνία τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας:—or it may denote that participation in the idea—the μεθέξις τοῦ

[1] ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι.
κ.τ.λ. P. V. 97. Karst.

[2] Ξενοφάνης δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς κινήσαντες λόγους πολὺν μὲν ἐνέβαλον ὒλιγγον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπόρισάν γε τινὰ βοήθειαν, Aristocles ap. Euseb. Praep. Ev. XI. 3.

[3] See Soph. l. l.

ὄντος—which Plato accords to the sensible, phenomenal or Becoming (*αἰσθητὸν, φαινόμενον, γιγνόμενον*)[1].

But this formula has also what may be styled a purely dialectical, by which I mean a formal or logical application, which, as we may conceive, might commend itself even to those who repudiate the ideal theory altogether as an explanation of the metaphysical relations of Being and Knowing. In this aspect the *ἓν καὶ πολλά* denotes a method of scientific classification, consisting of two antistrophic or corresponding processes which in the Phaedrus, p. 265, are styled *συναγωγὴ* and *διαίρεσις*, and by Aristotle and succeeding logicians *ἐπαγωγὴ* and *διαίρεσις* (induction and division) respectively. The *ἐπαγωγή* is that process frequently exemplified, though nowhere formally explained by Xenophon and Plato, by which the enquirer ascends from individuals to species, from the many to the one, or as we read in the Phaedrus, *ἐς μίαν ἰδέαν ἄγει τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα.* The counter process, that of division, dissects the *ἰδέα*—not into individuals again, but into subordinate species—*πάλιν κατ' εἴδη τέμνει, κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκε*, according to a natural as opposed to an arbitrary principle of classification. The same processes are described in the Philebus, p. 16. We are there directed first to seek the one in many—which if we seek aright we shall surely find—*ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν, εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.* This found, we are not to rest in the discovery of the one, but proceed straightway to seek in it for the How Many, in other words we are to divide the *ἰδέα* or "summum genus" into a number (supposed to be definite and ascertainable) of subordinate genera, each of which is again to be dealt with

[1] The "One and Many" is thus a symbol of the Platonic faith. It means that Plato steered a middle course between two opposite doctrines: between that of Parmenides, which refers all things to the *ὄν*, and that of Heraclitus or his followers, who include all under the *γιγνόμενον*. With Plato the sensible is real so far forth as it is the vehicle of the intelligible (*est quatenus intelligitur*), the followers of Heraclitus annihilate the intelligible, those of Parmenides the sensible; the one school depriving science of its form, the other of its materials. According to the Heraclitics natural history, the registration of phenomena; according to Parmenides, logic is the only legitimate exercise of the human faculties.

in the same manner, until the *infima species* in each case is reached. This in Pythagorean language is to "find the number of the many," and he who possesses this accomplishment is characterized as so far forth a dialectician. This you will observe amounts to saying that a method of accurate scientific classification is an integral part of the science of logic: a position I suppose which no one nowadays will dispute—for science can evidently take no cognizance of individuals—to which, in Platonic language, she attaches the idea of the illimitable, *τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος προσφέρει—εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθεῖσα χαίρειν ἐᾷ*, 16 E, her task is done when she has ascertained the lowest species or subdivision of the genus, individuals as such necessarily defying enumeration.

As I have before said, Socrates furnishes us with examples of this process of classification in the 5th Part of the Dialogue, which commences immediately after Part 4, which I am now to consider. If the *ἓν καὶ πολλά* dialectically considered constitutes the essentially Socratic element of the Platonic Dialectic, the Tetrad exhibited in Part 4 bears on the contrary plain marks of its Pythagorean extraction. I presume you are already so far acquainted with the leading tenets of this remarkable school as to be aware that the idea of Number and its relations plays a principal part in their system of the universe. The Pythagoreans were the parents of mathematical science, and they seem to have presaged the future triumphs of their illustrious progeny while yet in the cradle. Number, they declared, was the condition of all knowledge, the sole intelligible factor of the universe: *πάντα τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ ὁτιῶν οἷόν τε οὐθὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτω.* Boeckh, Philol. p. 58. For the nature of number, they continued, is that of a law and a guide: she it is who instructs us in all that is doubtful and all that is unknown, *νομικὰ γὰρ ἁ φύσις ἁ τῶ ἀριθμῶ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῶ ἀπορουμένω παντός καὶ ἀγνοουμένω παντὶ*, but for number and her properties we could know neither things as they are in themselves nor as they are related to one another (*οὐ γὰρ ἦς δῆλον οὐθενὶ οὐθὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὑτὰ οὔτε ἄλλω*

ποτ' ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἥς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἁ τούτω ἐσσία, Philol. fr. 11, Boeckh, p. 141).

Considered in relation to the material universe—and the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle, knew nothing of the distinction between mind and matter—this is evidently a true theory and fruitful idea. The laws of Physics are resolvable into numerical relations—mathematical formulae—and it may be said that no physical phenomenon is thoroughly understood, until it is brought within the grasp of the mathematician. Law is the object of science, and physical laws are expressed as numerical relations.

This prophetic dream the seers who dreamed it were not destined to realize or to see realized: but it is *a priori* impossible that it should have failed to make a profound impression upon the mind of Plato when first clearly placed before him. But as his manner was, he did not accept the conclusions of his Pythagorean teachers without scrutiny: for even in his only physical dialogue where one would expect that his Pythagorizing fancy would have full play, he puts words into the mouth of Timaeus which that sage certainly never heard from his Italian teachers[1]. Still further was he from the vain attempt to bring the province of ethics and psychology under the sway of mathematical relations. He never speaks of justice as a square number, or of the Deity as the number one, or of the soul as a tune or a harmony: and though, as we shall presently see, such Pythagorean phrases as *πέρας μέτρον ἁρμονία* occur not unfrequently in his ethical speculations (both in the Philebus and elsewhere), he was well aware of the wide interval between the original and the applied, the material and the spiritual sense of these primarily mathematical terms. If any doubt existed upon this point, there is a

[1] Whence Boeckh (p. 75 of Philolaus) derives what he thinks a conclusive argument in favour of the genuineness of the Philolaic fragments. "Die Darstellung des Philolaus...weicht so weit von der Platonischen ab, dass niemand auf den Verdacht gerathen kann, das Philolaische sei von einem Betrüger aus dem Timäos geschöpft." The resemblance of the spurious Timaeus, the so called Timaeus Locrus to the genuine, on the contrary, is palpable. It is evidently much "too good to be true."

passage in the dialogue called Politicus (p. 284 E), which is sufficient to remove it. The science of metretic numeration, he declares, is not one but twofold—there is a metretic which includes all the arts employed in measuring numbers and lines and surfaces and solids—another to which belong the arts that relate to the ideas of moderation, and the becoming, the fit, the proper: "wide is each several domain, and great the difference between them" (*μέγα γ' ἑκάτερον τμῆμα, καὶ πολὺ διαφέρον ἀλλήλοιν*). That these words are intended by Plato as a censure of his Pythagorean masters, and the crudity of their ethical notions, the sequel of the passage abundantly proves. "Many ingenious speculators" (*κομψοὶ*), he observes, "imagine they are saying something profoundly wise, when they assure us that the art of measuring is applicable to all subjects indiscriminately—but this error," he proceeds, "arises from the want of that distributive skill which enables us rightly to distinguish compound ideas into their elements," and to avoid all hasty and inconsiderate generalizations. Plato himself may not have been exempt from this latter fault, but his sins, however aggravated by greater knowledge, are still light compared with the enormities committed by the Pythagoreans. The closer consideration of the terms which compose the tetrad confirm and illustrate this view. It consists, as we have seen, of four principles; *πέρας*, *ἄπειρον*, *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*, *αἴτιον*. Into the third of these the two first enter as factors into a product. By *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* we may understand concrete, actual, phenomenal being—organized nature, that in fact which the Pythagoreans have the merit of first designating as the *κόσμος*. This created or concrete (*μικτὸν*) or actual resolves itself into a material and a non-material element. To the latter of these, Plato gives the name of Limit, to the former that of the Unlimited. If from the mixed or concrete nature we abstract the element of Limit, Law or order, the residuum is evidently a chaos—a 'void and formless Infinite'—an *ἄπειρον*: if on the contrary we abstract the material element, we remain in possession of an intelligible principle, an idea or essential form, a Law apprehended only by the reason. "That," says Hooker, "which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth *moderate*

the force and power, that which doth appoint the *form and measure* of working, the same we term a Law," Eccl. Pol. I. II. 1. This passage may serve by way of illustration of the πέρας or limiting principle, which may be expressed in more technical language as the Platonic Idea considered in its *quantitative* as distinguished from its qualitative aspect, as a ποσὸν not a ποιόν. I say quantitative, for such ideas in the physical universe are expressed by relations of quantity, and hence Plato speaks of ἡ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ διπλασίου γένναι καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, ξύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν, ἀπεργάζεται, p. 25 E.

We will now consider more particularly the second term of the Tetrad—the unlimited—indefinite—in-finite. Aristotle informs us that Plato affirmed two ἄπειρα, an ideal and a sensible, whereas the Pythagoreans knew only a sensible or material ἄπειρον. I will not discuss the question, whether of the two is meant here, but will refer you at once to Plato's definition of his own term. The ἄπειρον he tells us Phil. p. 24, is that with which the idea of μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον—more or less—is inseparably connected. It is therefore quantity or magnitude abstracted from number: "more and less" implying the possibility of indefinite remoteness from the zero-point both in the positive and negative direction. This I conceive to be the idea of the ἄπειρον in its broadest generality[1].

"More and less" thus imply contrariety, and hence the ἄπειρον is described as the region of warring contraries, τῶν ἐναντίων, τῶν διαφόρων. Hot and cold, moist and dry, high and low in sound, are among the instances of this contrariety which Plato specifies, instances which remind us of that Miltonic chaos:

> "where length breadth and highth
> And time and place are lost, when eldest Night
> And Chaos, ancestors of nature, hold
> Eternal anarchie, amidst the Noise

[1] Thus pleasure and pain are each susceptible of indefinite increase and decrease, as pleasure decreases it passes into indifference, and the moment it falls below that point it lapses into pain which is its contrary, standing to it in the relation of negative to positive as I have said. See Phileb. p. 43 D, compared with 27 E.

> Of endless Warrs and by confusion stand.
> For hot cold, moist and dry, four champions fierce
> Strive here for Maistrie, and to Battel bring
> Thir embryon Atoms. P. L. II. 896.

This, *minus* of course the atoms, is the Platonic ἄπειρον in a poetical dress, and it is out of this wild and wasteful chaos, when subjugated by the eternal laws of Number, that the goodly fabric of organic nature is supposed to spring. I sum up the whole in three heads, but in words better and briefer than my own [1].

1. All that admits of increase and decrease, greater or less, hotter or colder, &c., in a word all undetermined quantity—this is the ἄπειρον.

2. All that determines quantity, as equality, duplicity, and whatever relation number bears to number and measure to measure—is the ἡ τοῦ πέρατος γέννα (the progeny of the limit). And lastly the third or mixed comprises all created things, in which the infinity of matter is by number and measure reduced to proportion.

As far as we have hitherto gone, Plato and Philolaus speak nearly the same language. Ἀνάγκα, says the Pythagorean philosopher at the opening of his book, περὶ κόσμω, ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὴ μόνον οὐ κα εἴη, [ἀρχὰν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ γνωσούμενον ἐσσεῖται πάντων ἀπείρων ἐόντων.] ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλόν τ' ἄρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. See Stob. Ecl. I. c. 22, exc. 7, p. 454 Heeren[2]. "All things that exist must needs be either limiting or unlimited, or else both limiting and unlimited. Now unlimited alone they cannot be, for were all things unlimited, knowledge would be impossible. Seeing then that existence cannot arise out of the limiting alone, or the un-

[1] If we refer to the Timaeus, the object of which dialogue is to shew how the ideal became realized, how the γένεσις—the actual phenomenal universe arose as a κόσμος—we find the ἄπειρον described in terms identifying it with pure space—τρίτον δ' αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί.

[2] Ritter and Preller, § 104, and Boeckh, Philolaus, p. 49.

limited alone[1], it is plain that the κόσμος, the universe and all it contains were composed, put together, out of the limiting and the unlimited." This compound or concrete universe, Plato, as we have seen, designates as the γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, a phrase of his own concoction, but answerable in meaning to the Pythagorean κόσμος—organized nature as we call it; that which Plato elsewhere calls ἡ γεγενημένη οὐσία, τὸ μικτὸν ἐξ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀπείρου, and by many other analogous appellations with which I need not now trouble you[2].

Had Plato stopt at the third term of the tetrad, his agreement with the Pythagoreans would, so far as appears on the surface, have been complete. But he is not satisfied without postulating a fourth principle which he calls τὸ αἴτιον, of which we hear nothing from his Italian Master. The πέρας and ἄπειρον, Form and matter, Law and that which is subject to Law, Proportion and its terms, are presupposed in every created thing, every concrete whole, whether in nature or art. They are contained in it as elements, factors, constituents. But says Plato, p. 269, πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεται. Creation supposes not only constituent elements but an efficient constituting cause: τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν. Here I say the chasm between the Platonic and the Pythagorean way of thinking is manifest. The Pythagoreans recognize no principle apart from nature and its elements, with them numerical unity is the highest principle, number is their god; they were a sect of mathematical pantheists, for the essence of pantheism consists in the identification of God with Nature or with one of its elements. Those whom the magnificent language applied in the Republic to the Ἀγαθὸν, may have tempted to believe that the God of Plato was, if not a number, an Idea, will find I think a corrective to that misapprehension in the passage quoted from the Philebus, (p. 26 E, seq.). The language is indeed so explicit as to seem designed for the purpose of obviating the very inference I have alluded to. Ἄλλο ἄρα, he proceeds,

[1] This does not follow from the premisses, we must suppose therefore a clause omitted in which he proved that πέρας μόνον οὐ καὶ εἴη.

[2] See Timaeus, pp. 46—49.

καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ. The cause is one thing, that which in creation is subject to the cause is another. The three principles we have been considering supply us, he continues, both with a created universe and its elements. *τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα, τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη.* But that which constructs all these we pronounce to be a fourth principle [we do not identify it with any of the foregoing], for it has been demonstrated to be different from them (*τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον*). Human language could hardly have expressed more clearly the proposition that the created and the creator, the universe and its supreme cause, are not the same.

We now come to the fifth Division of the Dialogue, commencing immediately after the passage on which I have just commented, p. 27 C. Socrates having constructed his dialectical machinery, now proceeds to exhibit its working; in other words, to determine on *à priori* grounds the order of precedence as between *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις*. The mixed Life to which the palm has already been adjudged is by an obvious analogy referred to the category of *γένεσις*, which includes all organized existence. Ἡδονή and *φρόνησις* it is assumed belong each to one or other of the four categories distinguished in the Tetrad. With the goddess Socrates makes short work—*εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθεὶς χαίρειν αὐτὴν ἐᾶ*—at least for the present; and Philebus, who is but half aware of what is going on, gives a precipitate assent to the arrangement. Pleasure and pain, for we must consider them together, says Socrates, are susceptible of the "more and less." But the "more and less" was the characteristic of the unlimited. Ergo, Pleasure is to be relegated to the same category, &c. A deep ethical meaning doubtless lies in this thought, but we should have been glad had Socrates shewn us more clearly the path by which he arrived at it. Meanwhile a passage from an English writer has been referred to, which it is worth while to quote, as it throws light upon Socrates' meaning, and that from an unexpected quarter. "Happiness and misery," says Mr Locke, "are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not: but

of some degrees of them we have very brief ideas" (Locke's chapter on Power quoted by the poet Gray). With his own Νοῦς Socrates deals more circumspectly: and the argument by which the affinity of the human Intelligence with the Supreme Causative principle of the universe is demonstrated, strikes me as characteristic of Plato and worthy of him. Whatever the force of the argument, it proves at least one thing, that Plato regarded the Supreme Cause as possessed both of life and intelligence, and to feel sure of that will be esteemed no inconsiderable result by those to whom the philosopher's reputation is dear.

W. H. THOMPSON.

ON SOME EPIGRAMS OF THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY.

v. 27.

THE poet is addressing a reduced ἑταίρα, Melissa.

Ποῦ δ' ὀφρύες, καὶ γαῦρα φρονήματα, καὶ μέγας αὐχήν,
καὶ σοβαρῶν ταρσῶν χρυσοφόρος σπατάλη;
νῦν πενιχρὴ ψαφαρή τε κόμη παρὰ ποσσὶ τραχεῖα.
ταῦτα τὰ τῶν σπαταλῶν τέρματα παλλακίδων.

V. 5 is emended by Hecker *νῦν πενιχρῇ ψαφαρή τε κόμη παρὰ ποσσί τ', ἀχρεία*, 'nunc, o stulta, tibi pauperi imminet nota illa sors magnifice uiuentium meretricum.' But the nominative *πενιχρὴ* is better and should be retained: *παρὰ ποσσί τε χρεία*, 'want is close upon you' would be an easy and not improbable correction. The Planudean Anthol. has *παρὰ πᾶσι βραχεῖα*.

v. 211.

Δάκρυα καὶ κῶμοι, τί μ' ἐγείρετε, πρὶν πόδας ἆραι
ἐκ πυρός, εἰς ἑτέρην Κύπριδος ἀνθρακιήν;
λήγω δ' οὔποτ' ἔρωτος· ἀεὶ δέ μοι ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης
ἄλγος ὁ μὴ κρίνων κοινὸν ἄγοντι πόθος.

Possibly *ὁ μὴ κρίνων καινὸν ἄγων τε πόθος amor qui nouum non secernit a priore adducitque:* I never cease from love; ever by Aphrodite's will I find a pain in the longing which brings on a new one not distinguishable from the former.

v. 213.

Πυθιάς, εἰ μὲν ἔχει τιν', ἀπέρχομαι· εἰ δὲ καθεύδει
ὧδε μόνη, μικρὸν πρὸς Διὸς ἐκκάλεσαι.

εἰπὲ δὲ σημεῖον, μεθύων ὅτι καὶ διὰ κλωπῶν
ἦλθεν, Ἔρωτι θρασεῖ χρώμενος ἡγεμόνι.

Pythias is, as Dilthey saw[1], obviously the maid-servant to whom the lover is giving the message. Hence Jacobs' change of the MS reading ἔχεις, *καθεύδεις* seems necessary. The name is familiar from the *Eunuchus* as well as from Horace A. P. 238, where Acron says the Pythias there alluded to was a character in one of Caecilius' comedies. ἐκκάλεσαι or at least ἐκκαλέσαις seems perfectly defensible, 'call her to come out to me, if she is not engaged with anyone else, but is alone as you say (ὧδε μόνη). If she asks for a token, say "he came drunk and through the midst of thieves (two considerable dangers), with daring love to guide him."' ἦλθεν is generally altered to ἦλθον; but if regarded as standing in close connexion with εἰπὲ δὲ σημεῖον, seems at least defensible. Besides it would be quite in character with the modest form assumed by the lover to keep his individuality in the background, to speak of himself in the distant third, rather than in the self-asserting first, person.

VII. 302.

Τῶν αὐτοῦ τις ἕκαστος ἀπολλυμένων ἀνιᾶται.
Νικόδικον δὲ φίλοι καὶ πόλις ἥδε †πολλή.

The last word is corrected in the MS to πόλη.

Salmasius thought the Istrian city Πόλαι or Πόλη was meant, and Dübner prints this, but with an asterisk. Putting aside as unimportant the cacophonous assonance, I find a difficulty in explaining the accus. Νικόδικον, and in the weakness of the antithesis thus resulting: 'each man is pained by the death of his own relations: but Nicodicus was deplored by his friends and this city.' We look for 'the *whole* city.' Possibly then, the line ended with ὅλη; if so, the previous word was perhaps ἥδεθ', by which we should get a construction for the accus. Νικόδικον, and the epigram would, as Bergk believed when he conjectured ἥδ' ἐχάρη, be a παίγνιον or *jeu d'esprit* like the

[1] Ind. Scholar. Gottingens. 1878—1879, p. 13 note.

Latin epitaph written by a husband on his deceased wife *in die mortis gratias maximas egi apud deos et aput homines* (Orelli Inscriptt. Lat. 4636).

VII. 413.

Οὐχὶ βαθυστόλμων Ἱππαρχία ἔργα γυναικῶν,
τῶν δὲ Κυνῶν ἑλόμαν ῥωμαλέον βίοτον.
οὐδέ μοι ἀμπεχόναι περονήτιδες, οὐ βαθύπελμος
εὐμαρίς, οὐ λιπόων εὕαδε κεκρύφαλος·
οὐλὰς δὲ σκίπωνι συνέμπορος, ἅ τε συνῳδὸς
δίπλαξ, καὶ κοίτας βλῆμα χαμαιλεχέος.
ἄμμι δὲ Μαιναλίας κάῤῥων †ἀμὶν Ἀταλάντας
τόσσον, ὅσον σοφία κρέσσον ὀρειδρομίης.

Hipparchia had adopted the Cynic rule, the wallet and the staff, the δίπλαξ or doubled cloak affected by the Cynics in imitation of Diogenes (*τρίβωνα διπλώσας πρῶτος κατά τινας διὰ τὸ ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ ἐνεύδειν αὐτῷ* Diog. L. VI. 22), and the sleeping on the floor. Hence in v. 7 there can be little doubt that neither λῆμ' ἦν (Jacobs) nor μναμεῖ' or μνάμα (Hecker) is the word which has been corrupted into ἀμὶν, but ἔρμὶν 'the bed-post' (Od. VIII. 278), 'To us the couch of the huntress Atalanta on the cold ground is as much better (than the soft bed on which most women lie) as philosophy is superior to coursing over the mountains.' If the love of hunting could induce Atalanta to sleep on the ground, the pursuit of philosophy will *a fortiori* lead its votaries to do the same.

IX. 142.

Κρημνοβάταν, δικέρων, Νυμφῶν ἡγήτορα Πᾶνα
ἁζόμεθ' ὃς πέτρινον τόνδε †κέκευθε δόμον.

Perhaps τέτευχε a rare perfect of τεύχω, but found in Anth. P. VI. 40. 2 Τὼ βόε μοι, σῖτον δὲ τετεύχατον, ἴλαθι Δῆοι and IX. 202. 6 Ἄμφω δ' ἀμοιβὴν τῶν λόγων τετεύχατε. (Dindorf in Steph. Thesaur. s. v.) τεύχειν δόμον is found in Pindar P. VII. 12.

IX. 430.

Τῆς οἷός γενεὴ μὲν Ἀγαρρική, ἐντὸς Ἀράξεω
ὕδωρ πιλοφόροις πίνεται Ἀρμενίοις,
χαῖται δ' οὐ μήλων, ἅτε που μαλακοῖς ἐπὶ μαλλοῖς,
ψεδναὶ δ' ἀγροτέρων τραχύτεραι χιμάρων.

So Salmasius, who first edited this epigram, de Homonymis p. 165, writes the first four verses of it. The MS however in v. 3 has *μήλοις*, probably an error caused by the two following datives *μαλακοῖς μαλλοῖς*. 'Ovium genus invisitatum describit ex Agarria, quam circa Araxem collocare videtur, et Armeniae regionem facere.' Salmasius, who however goes on to a less probable view, viz. that the sheep were *transferred* from Sarmatia to Armenia, and that this was contained in some previous verses now lost. This view Salmasius was led to adopt by the want of a connected construction in vv. 1, 2. For this I think a not improbable remedy may be found in altering Ἀγαρρικὴ ἐντὸς to *ἀγαρρικόεντος*. The passage of Strabo 495 quoted by Salm. *τῶν Μαιωτῶν δ' εἰσὶν αὐτοί τε οἱ Σινδοὶ καὶ Δανδάριοι καὶ Τορεᾶται καὶ Ἄγροι καὶ Ἄρρηχοι* compared with the scholion affixed to the epigram, *καὶ νῦν εἰσι τοιαῦτα πρόβατα οὐκ ἐν Ἀρμενίᾳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν Σκυθίᾳ* seems to justify this opinion: for in the combined names Ἄγροι Ἄρρηχοι we can scarcely fail to trace the etymology of the fungous plant *agaricum*. Translate 'the sheep is of a breed that drinks the water of agaricum-growing Araxes, to clothe the felt-wearing Armenians.' This *need* only imply that the Armenians wore garments of the rough wool supplied by Maeotic or Scythian sheep: but it is not impossible that the epigrammatist regarded the country of the agaricum as identical with the region of the Araxes, and, as this was usually called Armenian, with Armenia.

X. 28.

Τοῖσι μὲν εὖ πράττουσιν ἅπας ὁ βίος βραχύς ἐστιν,
τοῖς δὲ κακῶς μία νὺξ ἄπλετός ἐστι χρόνος.

This epigram nearly reproduces the idea of Soph. fr. 398

Τῷ γὰρ κακῶς πράσσοντι μυρία μία
νύξ ἐστιν· εὖ παθόντα θ' ἡτέρα θανεῖν.

x. 59.

Καὶ στάχυς ἁρπαμένης ἴχνια Περσεφόνης.

ἁρπαγίμης seems an obvious correction. Callim. Cer. 9

Ἁρπαγίμας ὅτ' ἄπυστα μετέστιχεν ἴχνια κώρας.

x. 73.

Ἥμισυ μὲν ψυχῆς ἔτι τὸ πνέον, ἥμισυ δ' οὐκ οἶδ'
εἴτ' Ἔρος εἴτ' Ἀΐδης ἥρπασε· πλὴν ἀφανές.
ἦ ῥά τιν' ἐς παίδων πάλιν ᾤχετο. καὶ μὲν ἀπεῖπον
πολλάκι, Τὴν δρῆστιν μή τι δέχεσθε, νέοι.
ουκισυνιφησον· ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ἡ λιθόλευστος
κείνη καὶ δυσέρως οἶδ' ὅτι που στρέφεται.

Jacobs conj. *οὗ κίε νῦν δίφησον*, Schneider Θεύτιμον *δίφησον*, from Gell. XIX. 9. But as Callimachus in another epigram (A. P. XII. 71) mentions *Euxitheus* in a similar way Ἔγνων· Εὐξίθεός *με συνήρπασε*, I think this is the name here. This conj. I have already communicated to Mr Wordsworth, who has published it in his Fragments and Specimens p. 325. The name is written Εὐκσίθεος on vases (Birch, Ancient Pottery, p. 340).

XII. 150.

This like the preceding is by Callimachus, 47 in O. Schneider's edition. I quote in full to show the connexion more clearly.

Ὡς ἀγαθὰν Πολύφαμος ἀνεύρετο τὰν ἐπαοιδὰν
τὠραμένῳ· ναὶ γᾶν οὐκ ἀμαθὴς ὁ Κύκλωψ.
αἱ Μοῖσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα κατισχναίνοντι, Φίλιππε·
ἦ πανακὲς πάντων φάρμακον ἁ σοφία.
τοῦτο, δοκέω, χἁ λιμὸς ἔχει μόνον ἐς τὰ πονηρὰ
τὠγαθόν· ἐκκόπτει τὰν φιλόπαιδα νόσον.
ἐσθ' ἁμῖν χάκαστας ἀφειδέα πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα
τουτιπαικειρευ τὰ πτερά, παιδάριον.

οὐδ' ὅσον ἀττάραγόν τυ δεδοίκαμες· αἱ γὰρ ἐπῳδαὶ
οἵκοι τῶ χαλεπῶ τραύματος ἀμφότεραι.

'Song is the panacea of love, as the Cyclops found when he sang to Galatea: hunger too has the same advantage. Eros, you may as well clip your wings; I have no fear of you; song and hunger are both mine, and will heal the painful wound you deal.'

The fifth and sixth lines have been emended in innumerable ways, for which see Schneider. Ernesti, Eldik, Ruhnken, Reiske, Hecker all agree in considering *χάκαστας* to conceal *ἄκος ἄκεσμα ἀκεστύς* or some similar word meaning *cure*. Haupt, differing from them in this, emended

ἐσθ' ἡμῖν χἄκαστα σάφ' ἤδεα πρὸς τὸν Ἔρωτα,

the last part of which I have always regarded as certainly right. But *χἄκαστα* for 'both,' viz. love and hunger, could never, I think, have been written by Callimachus. May not the word have been *ἄκεστρα* 'drugs'? Hesych. *ἄκεστρον· φάρμακον. Σοφοκλῆς Παλαμήδῃ.* 'I was sure of it, if love attacked me, I had my drugs against his attack' (*καὶ ἄκεστρα*). The sixth line I would read, as I proposed many years ago in my review of Schneider's first volume (*Academy* for 1871, p. 547)

τοῦτ' ἴσα καὶ κείρει τὰ πτερά, παιδάριον.

'This is as good as clipping your wings, Love': unless indeed *κείρευ* is retained as an imperative and *τοῦτο* like *ταῦτα* is 'therefore.' 'So then, Love, consider your wings as good as clipt.'

IX. 240.

Βαιὸν ἀποπλανίην λιπομήτορα παῖδα Καλύπτρης
κριὸς ἑλιξοκέρως θεῖνε θρασυνόμενος.
κάπρος δ' Ἡράκλειος ἀποῤῥήξας ἀπὸ δεσμῶν
ἐς νηδὺν κριοῦ πᾶσαν ἔβαψε γένυν,
ζωὴν νηπιάχῳ δ' ἐχαρίσσατο. Ἦρ' ἀπὸ Ἥρης
Ἡρακλέης βρεφέων ᾤκτισεν ἡλικίην;

For *ἆρ' ἀπὸ Ἥρης* we may perhaps read *τὼς γὰρ ἀφ' Ἥρης*. *το* of *ἐχαρίσσατο* would cause the following syllable to

be absorbed. The sense is 'For so, by reason of Hera's cruelty, did Herakles compassionate the young children.'

IX. 744.

Ὠγινόμοι Σώσων καὶ Σίμαλος, οἱ πολύαιγοι,
οἷα βαθυσχίνων, ὦ ξένε, †παρολκιδαν
Ἑρμᾷ τυρευτῆρι καὶ εὔγλαγι τὸν χιμάραρχον
χάλκεον εὐπώγων' ὧδ' ἀνέθεντο τράγον.

Perhaps *πὰρ λοχμάδων* 'thickets.' Hesych. λοχιάδες (λοχμάδες Meineke) *αἱ ὗλαι.* The he-goat was represented by the artist as he appeared coming from the mastich-thickets. The short *o* of *λοχμάδων* is proved by Bacch. 957.

XII. 53.

Meleager addressing some ships sailing from the Hellespont past Cos bids them, if they see Phanion his love on the beach, give her this message:

τοῦτ' ἔπος ἀγγείλαιτε, καλαὶ νέες, ὥς με κομίζει
ἵμερος οὐ ναύταν, ποσσὶ δὲ πεζοπόρον.
εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴποιτ' εὖ τέλοι αὐτίκα καὶ Ζεὺς
οὔριος ὑμετέρας πνεύσεται εἰς ὀθόνας.

V. 7 was thus emended by Haupt:

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴποιτ' εὔπλοι' ἔσετ' αὐτίκα, καὶ Ζεὺς

Dilthey (Ind. Schol. Gottingens. 1878, p. 16)

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴποιτ' ἔπος εὐτελές, αὐτίκα καὶ Ζεὺς

I fancy the corruption was more complex and would propose to write the line thus:

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴποιτε τέλος τ' ἔχοι, ἀ. κ. Ζ.

'for if you were to say this and the message should have its consummation,' viz. by my reaching Phanion safely as a land passenger.

Hermesianax 35—40 (Athen. 597, 598).

Μίμνερμος δέ, τὸν ἡδὺν ὃς εὕρετο πολλὸν ἀνατλὰς
ἦχον καὶ μαλακοῦ πνεῦμ' ἀπὸ πενταμέτρου,
καίετο μὲν Ναννοῦς, πολίῳ δ' ἐπὶ πολλάκι λώτῳ
κνημωθεὶς κώμους σίχε συνεξαμύη·
ἤχθεε δ' Ἑρμόβιον τὸν ἀεὶ βαρύν, ἡδὲ Φερέκλην
ἐχθρὸν μισήσας τ' οιαν ἔπεμψεν ἔπη.

The point which at once makes itself felt in this corrupt passage is the recurrence of the same sound πολλὸν πολίῳ πολλάκι, again ἤχθεε ἐχθρὸν. It is difficult to believe that either πολίῳ (which ought to be πολιῷ) or ἤχθεε, a form which seems known only as occurring here, can be right. Ilgen conj. σκολιῷ, Meineke πλαγίῳ: perhaps it was κοίλῳ. Hermann (Opusc. IV. 244 where the whole fragm. is edited) emended v. 38 as follows:

κημωθεὶς κώμους στεῖχε συνεξανύειν.

Meineke gives

πολλῷ δ' ἐπὶ πολλάκι λώτῳ
κημωθεὶς κώμους εἶχε σὺν Ἐξαμύῃ,

the last word after Dindorf. But what is this extraordinary name? If it is a proper name, it can only, I think, be the name of the flute. On this view it might be written Ἑξαμύη, and be supposed to describe a flute with six perforations, which possibly from being partially stopt with wood or other material, might look like half-closed or blinking eyes. There would at least be nothing strange in a poet giving such a name to the invariable attendant of his musical journeyings. I would then retain Hermann's στεῖχε, and construct ἐπὶ with κώμους, 'and often, mouth-piece on, would hurry with his hollow lotus-flute, Hexamya, to the revel-song.' The passages quoted by Bailey in his edition of the fragm. p. 46 prove that ἐπὶ κῶμον (ἰέναι βαδίζειν ἐλθεῖν) was regular in this sense. In v. 39 possibly ἤκαχε 'vexed,' or κήλεε 'charmed,' for either view seems possible. On the latter hypothesis I would explain τοῖ' or οἷ' ἀνέπεμψεν ἔπη of the verses which Mimnermus chanted, 'and soothed

Hermobius his constant foe and Pherecles whom he had hated as an enemy, so sweet were the songs he chanted.' It seems to me incredible that ἔπη should refer to the bitter words of Hermobius and Pherecles, as Bergk must have thought when he wrote *ἀνέπεμψαν*.

53—56.

Φοίτα δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν λείπων Σάμον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὴν
οἰνηρὴν δοῦριν κεκλιμένην πατρίδα,
Λέσβον ἐς εὔοινον· τὸ δὲ μυρίον εἴσιδε Λεκτὸν
πολλάκις Αἰολικοῦ κύματος ἀντιπέρας.

Schneidewin altered δοῦριν to ὄρεσιν, which Meineke adopts. Hermann conj. δούρει, but doubtfully: Bailey δόρεσιν, Burges ἠνορέῃ δούρων. All these are obviously wrong. Hermesianax is doubtless using Homeric language, and κεκλιμένην must therefore mean not 'upset' but 'sloping.' In v. 55 μυρίον seems to be a corruption of Μύσιον (Wensch), if so δοῦριν may be an error for (ϝ)δαριν into which (ϝ)δασιν had passed. Teos, the home of Anacreon, might well be described as 'sloping to the waters.'

67, 8.

Εἰσόκε [σοὶ] δαίμων Εὐριπίδη εὕρετ' ὄλεθρον
ἀμφὶ βίου στυγνῶν ἀντιάσαντι κυνῶν.

If Hermann's conj. *ἀντὶ βίου* 'death instead of the life thou soughtest in the court of Archelaus' is not accepted, it is just conceivable that ἐν or ἀμ Φοίβου may be the right reading. The ἄλσος in which, by one account, Euripides was torn by dogs, may have been a sacred τέμενος of Apollo. See my note on Ibis 477.

79—84.

Οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' ὁπόσοι σκληρὸν βίον ἐστήσαντο
ἀνθρώπων σκολιὴν μαιόμενοι σοφίην,
οὓς αὐτὴ περὶ πικρὰ λόγοις ἐσφίγξατο μῆτις
καὶ δεινὴ μύθων κῆδος ἔχουσ' ἀρετή,

οὐδ' οἶδεν ὃν (οἱ δὲ τόν, Pal.) ἔρωτος ἀπεστρέψαντο
κυδοιμὸν
φαινόμενον, δεινὸν δ' ἦλθον ὑφ' ἡνίοχον.

In v. 81 πύκνα (Porson) for πικρὰ must I think be right, as Hermesianax is speaking of philosophers, and any such meaning as Hermann gave the line 'quos anhelans (αὐὴ) cura disputando de rebus amoris macilentos reddidit' is alien to the passage. It remains a question whether περὶ is to be constructed with πύκνα, 'whom wisdom's self held in the tight grasp (constraint) of reasonings about subtleties,' or, as is more likely, πύκνα is adverbial and περὶ to be connected with ἐσφίγξατο, 'held close in the constraining grasp of arguments.' In the following line κῆδος is not to be altered, 'awful Virtue careful of legendary lore,' alluding to ethical discussions in which the ancient legends of mythology were treated with due respect as embodying some truth even when they ran counter to morality, or perhaps to apologues such as that of Prodicus about virtue and vice, or that introduced in the *Cebetis Tabula*. The first words of v. 83 were altered by Weston to οὐδ' οἷδ' αἰνὸν, a conj. which seemed 'perfectly right' to Porson. Better it certainly is than οὐδ' οἳ δεινὸν of Ald., but it is difficult to believe that δεινὴ δ' αἰνὸν δεινὸν could follow each other in three consecutive lines, and I would suggest that the real reading is οὐδ' οἳ δηρόν, 'even they *did not long keep aloof* the tumult of Love's arising.'

95, 6.

Ἄνδρα Κυρηναῖον δ' εἴσω πόθος ἔσπασεν Ἰσθμοῦ
δεινός, ὅτ' ἀπιδανῆς Λαΐδος ἠράσατο
ὀξὺς Ἀρίστιππος, πάσας δ' ἠνήνατο λέσχας
φεύγων οὐδαμένου ἐξεφόρησε βίῳ.

If ἀπιδανῆς is genuine, it may perhaps be explained as *Thessalian*. There was a story (Athen. 589) that Lais followed a Thessalian named Pausanias into Thessaly, and was there killed from jealousy by the women of the country in the temple of Aphrodite. Her tomb was shown by the Peneius, with an

inscription, the last two lines of which may have been known to Hermesianax.

> Λαίδος, ἣν ἐτέκνωσεν Ἔρως θρέψεν δὲ Κόρινθος.
> κεῖται δ' ἐν κλειναῖς θεσσαλικοῖς πεδίοις.

The Apidanus was a tributary of the Peneius, and the adjective would be formed from it just as Horace speaks of *Rhenum flumen, Metaurum flumen,* Catullus *mare Oceanum.* If this seems too artificial, χλιδανῆς (Bailey) is a better emendation than the prosaic ἀπιθάνης (Herm.) or εὐπιθάνης (Ruhnken).

The last verse was perhaps Φεύγων οὐδὲ μένων (Dobree) ἐξ Ἐφύρης ἐβίω (Porson), in the sense, 'and he shunned all places of philosophic meeting, an exile from Athens, and refused life on condition of remaining at a distance from Corinth'. ἐβίω perhaps conveys the idea of finding life tolerable.

R. ELLIS.

M. GUYAU ON THE EPICUREAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL AND ATOMIC DECLINATION.

One of the most valuable contributions to the history of ancient philosophy made in recent years is M. Guyau's brilliant work entitled "La Morale d' Épicure" (2nd Edition, Paris, 1881). This work, first published in 1878, was at once welcomed as important and eminently fresh in its treatment[1]. M. Guyau has devoted the whole of a masterly and admirably-written chapter (pp. 71—102) entitled "Contingency in Nature the condition of Free-Will in Man" to a study of the Epicurean doctrine of Free-Will and Atomic Declination. Unquestionably the forcible way in which M. Guyau has grasped and stated this question will make it attractive, the more so as this very important point of Epicurus' teaching has hitherto been touched on by almost no other writer. M. Guyau justifies the length at which he has treated it by pointing out its importance. He speaks of it, justly we believe, as "*the central and truly original point of the Epicurean system*, namely the relation of Free-Will to Atomic Declination[2];" and again, "It is with regard to this point in particular that Epicurus might truthfully claim to owe his philosophy to himself alone[3]." This chapter, evidently con-

[1] Comparatively few notices of M. Guyau's work have appeared in this country. We extract the following from a lengthy one in the Athenæum.

"This work of M. Guyau's is full of suggestiveness, originality and value, and is based on a complete and masterly appreciation of the data existing. * * As a study in ancient philosophy it is in many respects worthy to take its place beside even such a work as M. Ravaisson's 'Métaphysique d'Aristote.' * * Those interested in the history of moral philosophy would be ill advised to overlook it, and no one can read it without profit."

Athenæum, Aug. 30, 1879.

[2] p. 99 (note).

[3] p. 73. With reference to the anecdote in Diog. Laert. x, 13.

sidered by the author to be among the most valuable portions of his contribution to a true understanding of Epicureanism[1], is the part of his work which we now propose to examine. M. Guyau's explanation of the subject is in several respects a novel one, and is especially so in regard to one point, viz. his account of Epicurus' doctrine of Chance and the very important part which M. Guyau supposes it to play in the Epicurean philosophy. According to him, Epicurus believed that the element of Chance which we see at work in the world every day is the manifestation and outcome of a principle of "Spontaneity" existing in Nature. This "Spontaneity" is the consequence of the power of Declination possessed by the atoms. Thus Epicurus conceived both Free-Will in man and the element of Chance in the world around him to be the result of the same power of Atomic Declination in its twofold working. We shall first state M. Guyau's theory, which he develops in a very subtle way, and then attempt to examine it. If his explanation be correct, it works a strange transformation in the accepted notions of Epicurean doctrine, and Epicurus, who is generally held to be a hard and bare materialist, must have attributed to Nature powers which in some respects remind us of the Fairy tales of our childhood or of the wilder dreams of Pantheism.

Epicurus, says M. Guyau, after having combated the religious idea of Providence or Divine caprice, found himself confronted with the scientific idea of Necessity. Thus his main philosophic aim was to escape from the notion of the gods interfering with Nature on the one hand and to steer clear of the doctrine of Fate on the other. "It is better," said Epicurus, "to believe in the fables of the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosophers. The myths allow us the hope of bending the gods by honouring them, but we cannot bend Necessity."

"To imagine the gods above the world," M. Guyau goes on, "was to make oneself a slave: but to explain all things, oneself included, by necessary reasons which exclude our per-

[1] See p. 7 (note).

sonal Free-Will, would be to do still more, it would be to suppress oneself. Absolute power of the gods or absolute power of the eternal laws, this is the alternative, while the impotence of man is the conclusion." Epicurus was thus placed "between the gods of Paganism and the Necessity of the Stoics or of the Natural Philosophers." This was the dilemma which confronted him.

Epicurus was able to solve it only by adopting an entirely new philosophical position, taking his stand on which he was able to destroy Necessity and the power of the gods at the same time. "To introduce into phenomena sufficient regularity that miracle may not be able to find place, and sufficient spontaneity that Necessity may no longer have any absolute, primitive, or decisive power—such is the double aim pursued by Epicurus." How did he succeed in attaining it?

It is well known that Epicurus solved the difficulty in a way satisfactory to himself by assigning to the atoms the power of Declination. But for this power the world could never have come into existence, for otherwise the atoms could never have come into contact and produced the earth or the life upon it. It is the same power of spontaneous movement in the atoms of the soul which alone originates and renders possible the Free-Will of man. Thus Epicurus had solved the difficulty. "If all beings had within themselves naturally, instead of borrowing it from without, a spontaneous power whence their own movements should originate, might one not thus escape from the universal enchainment of cause and effect? Might not nature be conceived to be, essentially, at the same time without the gods and without Necessity?" Thus "Democritus and Epicurus are as logical the one as the other: the first, admitting Necessity everywhere in the world, placed it in man also; the second, admitting Free-Will in man, saw himself compelled to introduce an element of contingency into the world too."

"It is commonly thought," M. Guyau continues, "that Contingency, placed by Epicurus at the origin of things, existed according to him at the origin alone and then disappeared in order again to leave room for Necessity. The world once made, the machine once constructed, why should it not go on by itself

without any need of henceforth invoking any other force than Necessity?" The chain of destiny has been broken once, but closes again ring upon ring and clasps the universe afresh. "According to this hypothesis Epicurus must have introduced declination into nature only as a kind of dialectic expedient and immediately made haste to withdraw it."

This conclusion has been drawn from Lucretius' often-repeated statements that phenomena take place according to fixed conditions, and in particular that men, animals, trees are produced each after their kind from fixed germs, developing according to fixed methods. No organism can be produced at haphazard, without its proper germ and necessary conditions, for, says M. Guyau, translating Lucretius, "each being is produced from fixed germs which are the object of scientific *certainty*" (seminibus quia certis quidque creatur). M. Guyau refers specially to the use of *certus* with reference to organic life, and continues, "It is on this use of the word certus, several times repeated in reference to the germs of organisms, that the conclusion has been based that in the Epicurean system an unalterable fixedness of effects succeeds the freedom of the first cause, that "[after the world has once been formed]" this vast universe obeys and will eternally obey the laws of necessity, and that henceforth declination is incapable to break the enchainment of causes[1]."

Such a conclusion however runs beyond the thought of Lucretius. "Would certain philosophers of our own day who, like Epicurus, admit—rightly or wrongly—contingency in the universe, believe on that account that an apple-tree may produce an orange, or an orange-tree an apple?"..."It is one thing to believe that the universe, in its first principles, is not submitted to an absolute necessity, and another thing to believe in the sudden derangement of all natural laws or results. The spontaneous and initial movement cannot be calculated and determined beforehand (nec ratione[2] loci certa), but the com-

[1] The confusion of ideas implied in this paragraph is remarkable. See below, § 2. (Of course, certus means much more than "what is known with scientific certainty.")

[2] Here and at p. 78 M. Guyau reads by some strange mistake ratione instead of regione in the line "nec regione

binations of movements once produced can be calculated and determined; they constitute a fixed material which things require in order to come into existence (materies *certa* rebus gignundis)." It is not true that Epicurus supposes Declination to disappear from the world after it has been formed and henceforth to cease to exist in it. He holds the very reverse of this. "Wherever the Epicureans speak of Declination, they consider it not as ended and done with, not as mere accident, a fortuitous exception to the order of things occurring once and never to be reproduced, but as a very real power which both the atoms and the individuals formed from the union of these atoms still retain."

Man calls this power into use every day, nor does it exist in man alone, but in all forms of matter. M. Guyau quotes the famous passage on declination as the origin of our Free-Will, and continues, "Another passage relating not now to the declination of souls but to that of heavy bodies (non plus à la déclinaison des âmes mais à celle des corps pesants) is no less decisive. Evidently, says Lucretius, the heavy bodies which we see falling do not in their descent follow an oblique direction, but "who could distinguish that they absolutely to no extent decline from the perpendicular,"

> sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
> declinare, quis est qui possit cernere sese?

Thus, following this somewhat simple conception of Epicurus, even before our eyes, even in the coarsest aggregations of matter, spontaneity might easily still retain a place; it might manifest itself by an actual, though imperceptible movement, by a disturbance of which the effect will appear only after centuries[1]. *Everywhere then where the atom is found, in ex-*

loci certa nec tempore certo." Lucr. II. 293.

[1] Assuming "Spontaneity" to be a fact, we take leave to question whether the result of its working would, in consistence with the Epicurean doctrine as to the action of Declination, always be so imperceptibly small and slow as M. Guyau supposes. It is a principle of Mechanics that a very slight force may let loose a very great one, just as the huge boulder poised on a mountain-ledge may be finally cast down by some tiny rush of water. The spontaneous movement of a mass of matter, however slight, might still be able to

ternal objects as in ourselves, there will exist more or less latent the power of breaking necessity, and since, outside the atom, there is only void, nowhere will an absolute necessity reign: the Free-Will which man possesses will exist everywhere, in inferior degrees, but always ready to awake and act.

"Can it be said that in placing Spontaneity everywhere, Epicurus placed everywhere a kind of miracle and thus returned without wishing it to the conception of a marvellous power like that of the gods? No! and Epicurus always thought himself able to reject the idea of miracle while at the same time defending the hypothesis of declination, which was dear to him. That there may really be miracle, two conditions must be realised; first, we must suppose powers existing outside of nature, then we must attribute to them a potency over nature large enough at once to modify, after a preconceived plan, an ensemble of phenomena. On the contrary, the spontaneity of the atoms is a power placed in the things themselves, not outside them, and on the other hand this power is exercised only over a single movement, it oversteps the necessary laws of mechanics (ulterior and derivative laws) only on a single point and in a quite imperceptible manner. Spontaneous movements can have results only at length, by accumulation, by permitting new combinations, by thus aiding the march of things instead of hindering it: *spontaneity, if it exists, works to the same purpose as nature;* to believe Epicurus, we do not really disturb the laws of nature when, by a decision of the will impossible to determine, we resolve in such or such a way, we take such or such a direction. Miracle, on the contrary, is in direct and formal opposition to nature: it is a violent arrest of the march of things....*Spontaneity, on the contrary, precedes, follows and completes nature, hinders it from being a pure mechanism incapable of improvement:* it is for this that Epicurus maintains it: he hopes, rightly or wrongly, thus to counterbalance necessity, yet without disturbing the order of things" (pp. 91, 92).

Fragments of Epicurus' own writings and the statements of ancient writers shew, says M. Guyau, that Epicurus believed

give the initial impulse required to let loose a mighty force. Thus "Spontaneity" might easily produce important results in Nature.

"Chance" or "Fortune" to play a very important part in the world. "Those external events which are not originally submitted to a necessary law, but to spontaneous causes the effects of which we cannot foresee, are referred to Chance." Epicurus believed this principle of Chance or Accident which we see at work every day around us, to be the manifestation and outcome of the power of Spontaneity which resides in Matter.

"Chance does not mean for Epicurus the absence of cause: for we know nothing is done without cause, nothing comes from nothing: it is on this very principle that Epicurus rests in order to induce our Free-Will on nature. Nor yet is Chance, as has been often said, the same as Free-Will: for Epicurus always places the two terms of chance and liberty parallel, without confounding the one with the other (ἃ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς). Chance in fact is exterior, liberty is interior." "Chance is a manner in which things appear in their relation to us: it is the unforeseen, the undeterminable which occurs at an uncertain time and place. *But this element of the unforeseen is the result of a cause which hides itself behind Chance. This cause...is, in fact,* as we have seen, *the spontaneity of motion inherent in the atoms.* Chance is only the form under which this spontaneity reveals itself to us." This, says M. Guyau, completely explains the passage of Plutarch which we can now better understand, "Epicurus assigns the power of declination to the atoms...in order that Chance (τύχη) may be produced and that Free-Will (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) may not be destroyed." "Τύχη *and* τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν *are the two modes of a Spontaneity identical at bottom,* to which Epicurus has just told us[1] that the destiny of the natural philosophers is reduced."

All this has a practical bearing on man's life in the world. This external Chance when once manifested becomes a power more or less hostile to us,—Fortune. "Fortune, it is true, is no longer a power absolutely invariable and unconquerable as destiny was. With changing and variable Chance, hope is

[1] Epicurus merely says (Diog. L. x. 133) that instead of Necessity being the mistress of all things, events are in reality due partly to Chance and partly to our own Free-Will.

always permitted, nay more, always enjoined.... Since no inflexible destiny can now impose itself upon us either without or within, nature cannot now have dominion over us;—we on the contrary ought to command her by our Will. The wise man who might have been reduced to despair and helplessness before the Absolute of necessity or of divine caprice will recover all his strength when confronted with Chance, that is to say, at bottom, with spontaneity, that is to say with a power which is no longer terrible like the unknown, but which he knows, nay more, which he carries within himself. He will then stand up like a wrestler against Chance and will struggle with it hand to hand;—a noble contest in which the wise man sure of his superior liberty is sure of his final triumph." Thus according to M. Guyau, in the struggle of man with nature, seeing that man has a high degree of Spontaneity and also Life and consciousness, while he fights against things which possess Spontaneity only without life, man has an enormous advantage.

M. Guyau has now conducted us to the moral bearing of the question. He has shewn how the Epicurean wise man need not tremble at Fortune with her turning wheel. "Fortune or Chance has so little empire over the wise man that it is better," said Epicurus, "to be unfortunate according to reason than to be fortunate without reason." In conclusion, he points out (pp. 99—102) "the close solidarity established between man and the world which the doctrine implies." "Nature and man," as he has before said, "are so *solidaires* that we cannot find anything absolutely new in the one which should be wanting in the other: if we wish to recognise a principle of Spontaneity and liberty in ourselves, do not let us entirely withdraw it from things. We cannot speak of Necessity and say, It reigns all around us, but it does not reign over us." "We naturally imagine that the whole universe may be subjected to Fate, without our Free-Will, if it does exist receiving any prejudice from it. But then, asks Epicurus, whence could this Free-Will come? unde est haec, fatis avolsa, potestas? how could it be born and subsist in a world absolutely under the sway of necessary laws?...No, all causes are natural,

and since "nothing comes from nothing," our Free-Will comes from nature itself. It is curious to see Lucretius thus invoking in favour of Spontaneous Declination the famous axiom ex nihilo nihil, which has so often been urged precisely against this hypothesis." According to Lucretius, what is in the effect exists already in the causes: if we can move at will, "all the parts of our being which, by gathering together, have formed us, must possess an analogous power, more or less extensive, more or less conscious [! cf. Lucr. II. 972, primordia...haut ullo praedito sensu] but real."

"The adversaries of Epicurus attempted, as we have seen[1], to escape from the dilemma which he laid down for them—either spontaneity in things or necessity in the soul, but it is doubtful whether they succeeded. In our own day the same dilemma still meets us....Let there be a single being, a single molecule, a single atom in the universe in which spontaneity does not exist, and beyond doubt Free-Will will no longer be able to find place within us: all existing things are *solidaire.* Inversely if Free-Will exists in man, it cannot be absolutely foreign to nature." "Hypothesis for hypothesis, we a hundred times prefer the Epicurean *clinamen* to the vulgar doctrine of Free-Will restricted to man."

M. Guyau does not examine how far "this universal spontaneity, this element of variability introduced into the universe, may agree with the theories of modern science as to the equivalence of forces and the mechanical laws of evolution." His task has been "simply to look for the true meaning and to shew the historical importance of one of the chief theories of Epicurus."

Most students of ancient philosophy will be astonished at the entirely new light which this chapter of M. Guyau's pours over Epicureanism. So reasonable and consistent with the

[1] M. Guyau refers to the ingenious argument of Carneades, who taught that declination was unnecessary, since both the atoms and man have power to move without any external cause in virtue of their own *nature.* (ipsius individui hanc esse naturam, ut pondere et gravitate moveatur, eamque ipsam esse causam cur ita feratur...similiter ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa; motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet ut sit in nostra potestate, nobisque pareat, nec id sine causa, ejus enim rei causa ipsa natura est. Cicero, *De Fato,* XI.)

logical results of some part of Epicurean doctrine is his explanation, so forcibly does he grasp and express it, and so skilfully does he handle and combine the evidence which seems to support his opinion, that we seem at first compelled to admit its historic accuracy. And if so, is not Epicureanism the very reverse of what it has been thought? how much of the marvellous it must have included? If "Spontaneity" exist even in brute-masses of matter, if the stone which I hold in my hand—not merely its individual atoms, as Epicurus did indubitably assert—but if the mass of stone itself possess "Spontaneity" and Will so that it can move in any direction at pleasure, what matter though its movements be so slight as to be imperceptible to the human eye,—does not this remind us of those Fairy-tales, which shew how in simpler ages than this men found it easy to credit all sorts of magical powers in Matter, and looked upon all objects of the outer world as animated with a life resembling their own[1]. This tendency is seen in such stories as that of the rocks which the early Greek mariners believed had the habit of dashing together so as to crush unwary ships, of the good ship Argo which has sunk so deep into the sand that she cannot be launched, but when the prophet sings to his lyre, she rises out of her sandy bed and rushes forward into the sea, of the fairy's bean which in one night grows into a beanstalk higher than the tallest tree, of the automatic cudgel which can beat a man at its owner's bidding, or a hundred others. We are even reminded of Hans Andersen's delicious stories, where everything in the world, from the Fir-tree, the Rose-bush and the Daisy down to the Old Lamp and the Silver Shilling, possesses personality and consciousness each after its own degree and kind. True, Epicurus asserted for his atoms and, according to M Guyau, also for masses of matter in

[1] Comte has described this under the name of "Fetichism" as a necessary stage of human development. It is the tendency of man, as seen in the history of every race, to look upon the world around him as animated like himself in greater or less degree. Comte's language on this subject strikingly reminds us of M. Guyau's description of "Spontaneity,"—"pur fétichisme constamment charactérisé par l'essor libre et direct de tendance primitive à concevoir tous les corps extérieurs quelconques, naturels ou artificiels, comme animés d'une vie essentiellement analogue à la nôtre avec des simples différences mutuelles d'intensité."

every form, *Will* and consequent power of motion *without Life* and consciousness. But the common mind is utterly incapable of drawing such a distinction, and where Will is, it must without fail conceive Life and all its attributes to be also. "Everywhere where the atom is, in external objects as well as in ourselves, will exist more or less latent the power of breaking necessity." ... "The Free-Will which man possesses will exist everywhere in inferior degrees, but always ready to awake and act."...The atoms which have formed our bodies must possess a power of Free-Will "analogous to our own, more or less extensive, more or less conscious but real." And if this "Spontaneity" residing in what we call dead Matter, has such power as to produce the fortuitous and unexpected in Circumstance, that which we cannot calculate upon and which happens at times and in places where we do not look for it, coming either to baffle us or to grant us success, so that what we call "Chance" in the affairs of daily life is the direct result of the long-continued blind-working of "Spontaneity" in Matter, does not a conception like this bring us nearer to the world of Fairy-tale than to that of Science, still less to that of Materialism?—What strange results might come of such a potency in Matter! One cannot help thinking how a power like this, were it possible for it to exist in a world such as ours, which is under the domain of natural law, would in many ways render Nature far more terrible to man than she is. How easily might such a force set the avalanche sliding on the mountain-side, or bring down the hanging rock upon the passer-by, or set the tempest brewing! And "Spontaneity" would be the more dangerous since, unlike the other forces of Nature, we cannot forecast its working which has no fixed methods but manifests itself incerto tempore ferme Incertisque locis.—But it is now full time to examine M. Guyau's evidence. Is his explanation of this important Epicurean doctrine historically accurate, or is it not?

1. If there was anything for which the world was indebted to Epicurus, it was probably his clear and distinct enunciation of the principle of Law in Nature. His disciple Lucretius grasped the fact with equal vigour and asserts it over and over

again in the most emphatic language. "*It is absolutely decreed,*" he says, "*what each thing can do and what it cannot do according to the conditions of nature.*" Lucretius connects this principle of natural law with the indestructibility of the atoms:— were the atoms not unchangeable, the productions of nature would not obey definite unchanging laws. "For, if the first beginnings of things could in any way be vanquished and changed, it would then be uncertain what could and what could not come into being, *in short on what principle each thing has its properties fixed and its deep-set boundary-mark*[1]." How does M. Guyau reconcile the existence of 'Spontaneity' in things with the leading Epicurean principle of the constancy of natural laws, a principle grasped as strongly by Lucretius as it is by any modern man of science?

2. In the first place, M. Guyau appears to us never fully to realise or give account to Epicurus' distinct and decided grasp of the fact of Law in Nature. Indeed he appears actually to contradict it. He objects (pp. 87—89) to our supposing that according to Epicurus, "contingency existed solely at the origin of things and afterwards disappeared in order again to make

[1] These words are often repeated in the poem and are intended to carry a very weighty meaning. Lucretius first uses them at the very outset of his task to express the triumphal and crowning result of Epicurus' intrepid researches into nature, viz. the knowledge of natural laws. It is this supreme discovery which, he tells us, finally delivers men from their bondage to superstition—

unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri,
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens.
quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim
opteritur, nos exaequat victoria coelo. I. 75—79.

We may compare the passage where he sums up the aim of his poem and, in order to do so, simply restates this one great principle which he has throughout been endeavouring to establish as holding good through the whole of nature, and on which he feels that his own and his master's philosophy is based,

cuius ego ingressus vestigia, dum rationes
persequor ac doceo dictis, quo quaeque creata
foedere sint, in eo quam sit durare necessum
nec validas valeant aevi rescindere leges. v. 55—58.

At the close of the paragraph he recapitulates the same principle

quid queat esse,
quid nequeat &c. v. 88—90.

way for necessity," and that "this universe now obeys and will obey eternally the laws of necessity, and that declination is henceforth unable to break the enchainment of causes." This part of M. Guyau's chapter involves a rather intricate confusion of ideas, and is in one respect entirely false. According to Lucretius and his Master, Law reigns everywhere in Nature and "Necessity" is a name given by both[1] to the order of Nature resulting from natural law, though Lucretius[2] uses the word in this sense comparatively seldom. Lucretius firmly believes that nowhere in Nature can you escape from law. In this sense Epicureans *did* conceive the world after its origin "to obey the laws of necessity," to be "subject to an absolute necessity."

3. M. Guyau has referred to those passages in which the word *certus* occurs, and frequently with reference to the germs of organisms, e.g.

[1] Epicureans would probably have assigned the movements of the heavenly bodies as the readiest instance of that which has "Necessity" for its cause. Epicurus does so in his letters (Diogenes Laertius x 77 and 113) and similarly he speaks of Necessity (ἀνάγκη) as a possible First Cause of the movement of the heaven or of the stars (ibid. x. 92. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει ἀνάγκην ἀπογεννηθεῖσαν ; cf. also x. 93).

[2] As at v. 309, 310,

nec sanctum numen *fati* protollere *finis*
posse neque adversus naturae foedera niti,

where fati finis "the limits of fate" refers to the same thing as naturae foedera. So the famous passage on Free-Will, if correctly understood, distinctly implies that the world outside man is absolutely governed by fate (cf. the context of II. 254, fati foedera: 257, fatis avolsa potestas) and here evidently Lucretius shews that he conceives the laws of nature as fate.—Occasionally Lucretius uses vis in the sense of "necessity" instead of fatum or necessum, as at II. 289, where externa vis is opposed to necessum intestinum. The passage VI 29—32, which touches on the source of evil in human affairs,

quod fieret *naturali* varieque volaret
seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset

seems to mean that it is indifferent whether you call the cause of evil from one point of view "natural chance" seeing that, as concerns us, it is not fixed or decreed whom it is to injure, or from another standpoint "natural necessity," since if we come into collision with it, it will and must according to nature's law inevitably injure or crush us. The passage of course implies that you must *not* ascribe evils either to Divine Providence or to Fate. Here vis naturalis certainly refers to the "necessity" which is the consequence of natural laws. But cf. Munro's note on v. 77 and on VI. 31.

Lucr. I. 169. seminibus quia certis quaeque creantur.
172. atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni,
quod certis in rebus inest secreta facultas.
189. omnia quando
paulatim crescunt, ut par est, semine certo.
203. si non materies quia rebus reddita certa est
gignundis[1] e qua constat quid possit oriri.

He might have added many other passages, e.g. II. 707—710.

omnia quando
seminibus certis certa genetrice creata
conservare genus crescentia posse videmus.
scilicet id *certa* fieri *ratione* necessust.

III. 787. certum ac dispositumst ubi quicquit crescat et insit.

Cf. also v. 669—679: v. 923—4: v. 1436—9.

M. Guyau (pp. 88—9) appears to us considerably to misunderstand the force of certus in these passages. It refers to the *fixity* and *unchangeableness* of law as manifested in natural productions. Things which are entirely subject to natural law, such as the growth of trees and plants, and the development of living bodies, animals and men, each after its kind and from its own proper germ, are "fixed" (certus) in respect of the time, place and conditions of their coming into being and continuing in existence. On the other hand, the will of man is not thus predetermined by causes outside himself; it acts

nec tempore certo
nec regione loci certa.

M. Guyau does not by any means sufficiently distinguish between the two Epicurean principles of absolute fixity of law (sometimes called "Necessity" in Epicurean language) as seen everywhere in the world and perfect Spontaneity of Free-will action as seen in man.

[1] At p. 89 M. Guyau seems to misunderstand this. He renders "une matière certaine dont les choses ont besoin pour naître." But materies certa refers to the atoms and their unchanging character. Similarly at p. 69 when M. Guyau translates finita potestas denique cuique Quanam sit ratione, "par quelle raison chaque chose *n'a qu'une puissance limitée*," he misunderstands finita and misses the idea which is the fixity and definiteness of natural laws. Cf. also p. 70.

4. The question now very naturally occurs to us,—If Matter everywhere possesses "Spontaneity" and is always exerting it, how can this be without interfering more or less with the constancy of natural law, the principle upon which all Epicurean science was based? However slight and gradual such declination may be, if all bodies everywhere are exerting it, they must inevitably more or less disturb the orderly sequence of natural phenomena, if not destroy the conditions under which Law is possible. M. Guyau appears to think that the slightness of the amount of such motion (une perturbation dont l'effet n'apparaîtra qu'après des siècles) will produce a variation so small and slow as not to interfere with nature, but as we have already pointed out, if we assume "Spontaneity" to be possible, the amount of its action cannot be counted on. At one time, its working in some huge mass might be imperceptibly small, at another it might chance to be enough to let loose and set a-going some vast atomic machinery with far-reaching consequences, or if it chanced to combine with a series of other spontaneous movements in other bodies and from other sources, its results might be enormous and speedy enough.—In any case, however, if such a power be exerted by Matter, there can be no fixed laws of Nature, no *foedera certa*, no *terminus alte haerens*. A far less shrewd thinker than Epicurus could hardly have failed to see that "Spontaneity" in the various forms of Matter cannot exist side by side with absolute laws of Nature.

5. M. Guyau has foreseen this and tries to guard against it by assuming that "Spontaneity" cannot disturb natural order, because it ("va dans le sens de la nature") works in harmony with nature. The assumption is baseless, and rather a bold one. Why should not "Spontaneity" as well work *against* natural order?

6. But supposing atoms to possess the power of movement in any direction at will, does it follow that any body formed out of atoms, say a mass of stone, can *as a body* possess such power of movement which its atoms have *as atoms?* Certainly not, according to Epicurus' conception of the atoms: rather would one of its component atoms move in one direction, another in the other, and thus they would counteract each other, and the

body remain inert. M. Guyau (quoted above at p. 38) states that one passage (II. 249—250) decisively shews that Lucretius believed in "the declination of heavy bodies" as well as in "the declination of souls". But M. Guyau has entirely misunderstood the passage in question,—

> quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necessest
> corpora; nec plus quam minimum,—*ne fingere motus*
> *obliquos videamur et id res vera refutet.*
> namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,
> pondera, quantum in sest, non posse obliqua meare,
> ex supero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis;
> *sed nil omnino recta regione viai*
> *declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese.* II. 243—250.

We allow that this passage comes in in such a way as to be most easily misunderstood and at first and even second reading it certainly appears to bear the meaning which M. Guyau has given it. But really it amounts to this,—'We never see falling bodies swerve, it is true,' says Lucretius, 'but that does not prove it to be against nature and impossible for such a thing to happen. The human eye is incapable of deciding that falling bodies move in an *absolutely straight* line. A stone falling to the ground may slant to an exceedingly small extent for all that we can tell. Therefore, *so far as the evidence of sense is concerned*, it is not impossible that the atom should swerve (nec plus quam minimum) to a very slight extent.' It is well known what stress Epicurus laid on the principle that the senses cannot deceive, and it is the apparent testimony of sense, of observed facts (res vera) which Lucretius is combating in these two lines.

7. This passage is M. Guyau's main evidence for the assertion that according to Epicurean belief masses of matter have the power to decline as well as atoms. What other proof does he bring forward? Out of all the authorities quoted, only one passage from Plutarch contains anything at all distinct enough to appear to support M. Guyau's theory, but so skilfully does he lead up to his conclusion that the evidence seems stronger than it is. The bearing of the passages referred to on the present

subject is of the vaguest kind. They simply assert that Epicurus assigned Fortune as a cause of events. But most ancient philosophers speak in the same way and assign more or less power to Fortune in ordering what comes to pass. M. Guyau quotes one passage of Plutarch, translating it as follows—"Epicurus assigns declination to the atom...in order that chance may be produced and free-will may not be destroyed:—*ἄτομον παρεγκλῖναι* (spontaneity of declination)...*ὅπως τύχη παρεισέλθῃ* (external chance which is the form of it) *καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴ ἀπόληται* (inward liberty which is the feeling of it.)" This commentary builds a good deal on Plutarch's incidental and sarcastic reference to Epicurus, even were the sentence exactly as M. Guyau has quoted it. Plutarch does not refer to Epicurus at all in the context but simply makes a fling at him in passing, as follows: "The philosophers do not allow Epicurus, in order to account for the greatest things, to assume so small and unimportant a matter as the least possible declination of a single atom[1] in order that the worlds and living creatures and Fortune may be smuggled in[2] and that our Free-Will may not be destroyed." (In the next sentence Plutarch passes on to a quite different subject.) Instead of saying that Epicurus introduced the doctrine of Atomic Declination principally or solely to account for Chance, as M. Guyau's quotation would certainly make us suppose, Plutarch is stating correctly enough the general objects which Epicurus thought to affect by Declination, viz. to allow the origin of the worlds and of man and to render Free-Will possible (*ὅπως...τύχη παρεισέλθῃ* meaning simply "to get rid of Necessity").

8. There is no doubt that the Epicurean writers spoke much of Chance. In the Epicurean system which rejected all and any Providence, Chance must from the very facts of human

[1] Plutarch. De Solertia Animalium, c. vii. Probably the words *ἄτομον παρεγκλῖναι μίαν* are not intended to be understood literally in the sense that Epicurus required the declination of "a single atom" only to begin with: but Plutarch's statements as to Epicureanism are not always strictly accurate, as in the passage (De Plac. Phil. I 7) where, in speaking of the fourth incorruptible element of the Epicureans, he certainly confuses it with the *ὁμοιομερείαι* of Anaxagoras.

[2] *ὅπως ἄστρα καὶ ζῷα καὶ τύχη παρεισέλθῃ*; (*παρεισ·* "may slip in at the side," used sarcastically).

nature have come to be an important item in every-day calculations about human affairs. Epicureans refused to own any Divine agency in the world, but practically they had set up a new Divinity, Chance, which was for them a real enough one. Chance must have been often in the mouth of an Epicurean[1] just as naturally as Providence was in that of a Stoic, or "the hand of God" in that of a Puritan. It was simply natural that Lucretius should pray that the abstraction Fortuna gubernans might avert the end of the world.

Lucretius not merely opposed the notion of Gods from time to time interfering with nature, but he like other Epicureans would have combated with equal ardour the belief, held in a very noble form by the Stoics, in a universal Providence ordaining each and every event of human life as well as maintaining all the ongoings of nature. Such a conception would have appeared to him only another form of Necessity and almost equally objectionable. In human affairs Providence (according to the Pagan notion of it, as represented by Virgil's gods and goddesses who bitterly persecute the human beings who have unwittingly and often innocently given them offence) had come to be dreaded. Chance seemed less formidable.

It is very difficult for us, accustomed to modern phraseology, to understand the exact meaning of such words as Chance and Necessity in the Epicurean as also in other systems of ancient philosophy. For example Stobaeus (I. 206) tells us that "Epicurus distinguishes among Causes, that by Necessity, that by Free-Will and that by Fortune," Ἐπίκουρος (*προσδιαρθροῖ ταῖς αἰτίαις τὴν*) *κατ' ἀνάγκην, κατὰ προαίρεσιν, κατὰ τύχην*[2]. Perhaps we may best explain this by taking an instance,

[1] Cf. the opinion ascribed by Hippolytus (Ref. haer. I. 22) to Epicurus,—*ὅλως πρόνοιαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ εἱμαρμένην ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ αὐτοματισμὸν γίνεσθαι*:—"There is neither Providence at all, nor yet Destiny, but all things take place by Chance" or "happen of themselves." As the Lucretian parallel for *πάντα κατὰ αὐτοματισμὸν γίνεσθαι*, we might quote

natura videtur
ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis
agere expers.

[2] Plutarch (De plac. phil. I. 29) and Stobaeus (I. 218) both assert that Epicurus held Fortune to be *ἀσύστατον αἰτίαν*;—the expression may be Epicurus' own or not. Epicurus himself in a letter preserved by Diogenes Laertius (X. 134) distinctly says that Fortune is

such as the incident used as an illustration by Lucretius of the Roman admiral and his fleet destroyed by the tempest. Here there would be, according to the phraseology just quoted, three "Causes" at work. (1) "Necessity," or as Lucretius once calls it *vis naturalis*, "natural Necessity," i.e. the laws which produce storms and which cannot do otherwise than produce them at their given time and place,—certo tempore, certo spatio. At the present day we should call this, far more appropriately, Natural Law[1]. (2) Free-Will, which works incerto tempore ferme Incertisque locis. The admiral was free to have taken another course or to have delayed his voyage till a safer time, but he chose to sail then and in the direction where the tempest was to burst. (3) Chance, that is to say the way in which the natural forces of the outer world bear on man. It might easily have been otherwise. The storm might have raged over another portion of the sea, or the admiral might have chosen a different course and time, but as he chose to sail then and there, nature could do nothing else than destroy him. Chance comes into play where the forces of nature come to bear for good or evil on human affairs[2].—These three principles do not by any means stand in the same category. "Necessity" and Free-Will are both causes, but Fortune is in no sense a cause, and can only be called so by a popular and unscientific use of language.

neither *θεόν* nor yet *αἰτίαν*.—M. Guyau attributes to Epicurus the saying found in Sextus Empiricus (p. 736, ed. Bekker, 1842) *τῶν γινομένων τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς*. There is no ground whatever for assigning this to Epicurus on the authority of Sextus Empiricus, who does not in any way refer to him.

[1] See notes on § 2, p. 46. Epicurus boasted that he had cast out Necessity from the moral world. Here he claimed to have substituted for it the two notions of Chance and Free-Will. (Diog. L. x. 133). He still called the laws of nature, in so far as they absolutely govern the world outside man, "Necessity," but in the physical world also the principle of Law which he had done so much to establish, was really destined to substitute for the notion of Necessity a higher Idea, though neither Epicurus nor Lucretius had any anticipation of this.

[2] The words *ἀνάγκη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον* occur in somewhat strange collocation in the interesting fragment published by Gomperz (Neue Bruchstücke Epikur's. 1876. pp. 8—11) *ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατα τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκῃ*. Here Epicurus is evidently defending the freedom of the mental processes in reference to his theory of Perception by Images.

9. While for the reasons given we cannot allow that M. Guyau's theory of "Spontaneity" is correct or that there is evidence to prove that Epicurus or any of his followers held such a doctrine, still it might be asserted with some reason that it is an entirely logical inference from the doctrine of Atomic Declination. Supposing the power of declining to exist in atoms, and that they exert it, if we endeavour by an effort of imagination to conceive the effect, would it not be something like "Spontaneity" which might naturally enough manifest itself in the accidental and unforeseen of circumstance and human affairs. But even though it were a logical deduction from one principal Epicurean doctrine, this would not be enough to prove it historically correct. It would merely prove Epicurus again guilty of inconsistency. We certainly cannot agree with the remark which M. Guyau somewhere makes that "in Epicureanism there are no inconsistencies but only a few false deductions."

10. It may very naturally be asked, How did Epicurus who allowed so remarkable a power as Declination to exist in atoms, suppose it practically to disappear after these atoms have combined to form matter? He supposes it still to remain and work within them while confined in the various forms of matter, but how comes it to exert no farther influence? We have given one reason above (see § 6) which may partly explain this. It seems to us, so far as we can make out, that Epicurus assumed, whether reasonably or not, that the power of Declination while still remaining and working in the atoms, would be virtually nullified by various counteracting causes,—by the conditions of the world which, when once it is formed, tend to hold things together[1] (the same forces which when atoms have united in the manner necessary (concilium) to form any kind of substance (res), compel them to remain thus united and keep matter from

[1] In particular Lucretius conceives the plagae extrinsecus undique (I. 1042) or ictus externi (I. 1055) to act in this way. The ocean of ever-tossing atoms not combined in matter, which constantly beating against the barriers of the world, tend by their continual shocks from without to hold things together and to keep the world in existence

summam
conservare omnem quaecumque
est conciliata.

These plagae of course imply the con-

dissolving into atoms), and partly, he would no doubt have said, by gravity which would have a resisting influence[1]. Such considerations must naturally have kept Epicurus from allowing that masses of matter can decline as the atoms can. For one thing, Lucretius is very conscious (and naturally enough) that an atomic chance-made world (such as he conceives ours to be) is exceedingly liable to destruction and may any day in a moment fall into ruins and be dissolved. It is curious how often he reminds us of the many possible causes which might bring this about. Would it not probably have appeared to him that the existence of such a power as "the declination of heavy bodies" would render it impossible for a world, formed like ours, to hold together for a day? But certainly a thinker so shrewd as Epicurus could hardly have conceived such a power to exist in bodies *without also seeing that this would interfere more or less with those laws of nature, the existence of which he so firmly and thoroughly grasped.*

M. Guyau has made a vigorous endeavour to grasp the whole subject from every side and from all possible points of view[2], and even while disagreeing with him, few will read this very remarkable chapter, without feeling that he has flashed light round him. Aided by his wide knowledge of both ancient and modern philosophy, he makes us vividly realise the philosophical difficulty which Epicurus had to encounter and also the solution offered by him. If M. Guyau's explanation of one leading Epicurean theory has been shewn to be in part unsatisfactory and unfounded, it must not be supposed that the rest of his book is open to similar charges with the chapter which we have been examining. This would be unjust indeed. In reality, the picture of Epicurus as a teacher which M. Guyau's work gives us is drawn not merely with wonderful literary skill but with equal vigour and grasp of philosophic penetration. Certainly Epicureanism owes much to French scholarship, from Gassendi

stant streaming in of fresh atoms from the infinite void without which the world could not remain in being.

[1] We may contrast the influence assigned to gravity at II. 288—9.

[2] Notably however M. Guyau omits to touch in any way on the subtle adaptation between Atomic Declination and Epicurean psychology, a subject which we attempt to explain elsewhere. (British Quarterly, April, 1882, p. 329. ff.)

to M. Martha's "Étude sur Lucrèce," an admirable study of the *De Rerum Natura* in its poetic and moral aspects, and finally to M. Guyau. Both the latter writers have done much to redeem the philosophy of Epicurus from the base estate in which it has so long lain, hopelessly covered and hid with abuse and misrepresentations in many respects utterly undeserved.

Although the theory of "Spontaneity" so ingeniously set forth by M. Guyau was no part of Epicurean belief, and is thus historically incorrect, it is still interesting and a memorable one[1]. After the notion of Spontaneity working in the material substances everywhere around us and having power to produce all that in daily life we call Chance or accident, has entered into the mind, it is a thought which, however unreasonable in some respects, one cannot help recurring to. Whatever distant suggestion of truth it may contain, we instinctively reflect that Nature is terrible enough and the world hard enough for man without the interference of a blind uncontrollable power like this, whose laws we could never hope to master and which would ever and again transform the regular order of Nature into a mere "Come what will." Still M. Guyau's theory has even a certain philosophical value—and, whether in its supposed connexion with Epicureanism or for its own sake, it will, we believe, from time to time be returned to and discussed afresh.

[1] Does not the notion of "Spontaneity" in things remind us a little, of course merely in certain aspects, of Goethe's "Daemonic Principle"? In Goethe's own words, "the Daemonic is that which cannot be explained by reason and understanding." It "resembles Chance, for it evolves no consequences." It manifests itself not in man merely but "in all corporeal and incorporeal things." "It is particularly perceptible in events and indeed in all which we cannot explain by reason and understanding."—It is needless to point out the close relation of M. Guyau's doctrine to the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Guyau conceives "Spontaneity" and Schopenhauer "Will" to exist everywhere, in Matter under its every form, in greater or less degree. Schopenhauer supposes "Will" to exist as a blind tendency in Matter, but to mount up by degrees through vegetable and animal life till it appears in man, in its highest degree of objectivation, as intelligent and distinctly conscious of itself. *It is remarkable that Epicurus and Schopenhauer both conceive Will to be essentially unconscious* and to exist everywhere in Matter as a blind Force but to emerge in man as a conscious one.

JOHN MASSON.

FURTHER NOTES ON HOMERIC SUBJECTS.

Mr Sayce having replied to my criticisms of his 'Appendix' on the language of Homer, the readers of this Journal are now in a position to judge between us on most of the issues raised. It is only where Mr Sayce introduces essentially new matter that I think it desirable to prolong the controversy. In one or two instances however he has thrown his argument into an interrogative form, or has expressly asked for further explanation of the objections which I had made. In such cases I may be allowed a few words of reply.

1. In the article 'Homer' in the Encyclopaedia Britannica I pointed out, as one of many evidences of the antiquity of Homeric language, the circumstance that there are many more second aorists in Homer than in later Greek. I did not say, as Mr Sayce quotes me, that there are many more 'as compared with the number of sigmatic aorists,' although I mentioned the sigmatic aorists in order to explain the relation between the two types. Mr Sayce now says that I 'forget that both aorists existed in the Parent-Aryan, and that there was no reason except custom and analogy why tenses should have continued to be formed on the one type more than on the other.' The relative antiquity of the two aorists appeared to me, and still appears, irrelevant to my point: which is simply this, that second aorists had practically ceased to be formed in Greek, and therefore tended constantly to diminish in number. The fact that sigmatic aorists continued to be formed bears indirectly on this, as showing how the need of an aorist formation was supplied. But the *antiquity* of the sigmatic type has no bearing on it whatever. The second proposition which I am accused of

'forgetting' is of an extremely general, not to say trite, character. The question however is not so much whether custom and analogy are the causes at work in language, as how they have worked in the particular case before us. I confess I should have thought that there could be no doubt either about the fact that the sigmatic formation of aorists was the only one which subsisted as a *living* formation in Greek, or about the meaning of that phenomenon. Mr Sayce says that "if there are more weak aorists [what men call strong aorists Mr Sayce calls weak and *vice versa*] in Homer than in Attic prose, all we are justified in inferring is that they suited the metre better than the sigmatic aorists, or seemed to have a greater flavour of antiquity about them." The former inference is contrary to plain facts[1], and therefore refutes the argument by which it is obtained; the latter suggests the damaging question, how could these second aorists acquire this flavour of antiquity unless the *type* at least was ancient?

2. Mr Sayce having given πεφεύγω as a Homeric present formed by analogy from the perfect πέφευγα, I pointed out that the only evidence for it consists of the optative πεφεύγοι. He now says: 'πεφεύγοι implies πεφεύγω, so I do not see the force of the objection.' Has the *perfect optative*, then, been 'discredited by critical science'?

3. Mr Sayce asks: 'why could the perfect πέφραδα not be formed?' For the same reason, I suppose, for which τέτυπα, γέγαα, and similar monstrosities, are not admitted. Custom and analogy have decided against them. Surely Mr Sayce, who occasionally quotes De Saussure, is aware that ἐπέφραδον contains the *weak* verbal stem, whereas the perfect (except in some post-Homeric forms, such as γέγραφα) invariably shows a *strong* stem. In using the argument that ἐπέφραδον implies πεφράδω because the second aorist and the imperfect are 'originally' the same, Mr Sayce forgets that this does not apply without restriction to Homer. Even when we are 'dealing with philology, not with history,' we cannot neglect chronology so far as to treat

[1] Sigmatic aorists are far more common in Homer than second aorists: and the numerous double forms (such as ἧλασα and ἤλασσα) are especially convenient for the metre.

every Homeric second aorist as the imperfect of a *Homeric* present. Besides, Mr Sayce had produced *πεφράδω* as an example of a *late* form, due to the analogy of the (supposed) perfect *πέφραδα*. If it is the present of which *ἐπέφραδον* is the imperfect, it is not a late form, but on the contrary a very ancient and curious form indeed.

4. For the well-known phrase *λιποῦσ' ἀνδρότητα καὶ ἥβην* Clemm has proposed *λιποῦσα δροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην*, which Mr Sayce accepts. He now observes that I do not say why this 'can hardly be right.' I thought it enough to indicate dissent, as I was addressing readers who are probably better acquainted with metre than is common in Germany. The objection of course is the caesura.

5. "If the Edda is not an epic, what in the world is it?" Mr Sayce asks this question in reference to the argument in favour of a gradual formation of the Homeric poems derived from the supposed analogous history of other epics. Now the Edda is not 'an epic,' because it is a collection of 37 distinct poems. And if Mr Sayce replies that some of these are epic in character, and might very well have been aggregated into great epics like the Iliad and Odyssey, does he thereby help the proof that the Iliad and Odyssey were formed by such a process? On the contrary, the instance is a negative one: it is an instance in which an epic (in the proper sense of the term) did *not* grow out of fairly promising materials.

Mr Sayce does not enter fully into this subject—and of course there was no reason why he should do so — but as he has made the sweeping assertion that the evidence in favour of his view is 'notorious' &c., I feel bound to state very shortly the *prima facie* reasons for some degree of scepticism. In the case of the Nibelungenlied it is (I think I may say) 'notorious' that the origin and formation of the poem has been a subject of lively controversy, hardly yet concluded, and that the amount of support which it gives to Mr Sayce's theory of Homer depends mainly on the issue of that controversy. In Lachmann's mind his dissection of the Iliad and his dissection of the Nibelungenlied were intimately connected, and if it is too much to say that they stand or fall together, it may at least

be affirmed that unless Lachmann's view of the Nibelungenlied, or some modification of it, is accepted, the argument from analogy is not favourable to Mr Sayce's or any similar view of Homer. Now, does Mr Sayce mean to lay it down, as something 'well known even to Greek scholars,' that the controversy has ended in favour of Lachmann's school? If so, the Greek scholars have been misinformed[1].

As to the Kalevala, the case is different. I cannot claim any acquaintance with the learning on this subject: but I will mention one or two facts that seem to be undisputed. The Kalevala consists of a great number of poems, collected and arranged by the Swedish doctor Lönnrot, surnamed 'the Homer of Finland.' It has none of the unity of structure which we find in Homer, but ranges over the whole life of the hero, from his birth to his disappearance in extreme old age. Still it may be quoted as an example of a great national epic, formed out of many originally distinct poems. The only but (I fear) fatal difficulty in the way of regarding it as a *spontaneous* aggregation of 'lays' is this. The Kalevala was published in 1835—just forty years after the publication of Wolf's Prolegomena. Can we be sure that Lönnrot's great work was not suggested by the desire to do for Finland what Pisistratus was then almost universally supposed to have done for Greece?

Mr Sayce asks some other questions which I am unable to answer. "If πίσυρες is not an Æolic form, what is it?" My contention is that I do not know. We have no evidence whatever about the Greek dialects of the time of Homer: and until we know what dialects there were, it must be impossible to

[1] On this point I would refer to M. Paul Meyer, who shows (in his *Recherches sur l'Epopée française*, p. 65 ff.) how the theories of Wolf and Lachmann led to similar speculations about the French epics. As to the *Nibelungenlied* he says briefly, 'le système est détruit.' Prof. Bonitz, like Mr Sayce, maintains that there is historical evidence of the formation of epics from short poems; but his examples are different. He does not attach much weight to the *Kalevala*, or the *Nibelungenlied;* and he does not mention the *Edda*. Indeed the only instance which he specifies as 'undoubted' is the *Chanson de Roland;* as to which he is at issue with M. Paul Meyer. The whole argument, in short, is 'in the air.' Analogy is very well when we argue from the known to the unknown, or less known; but the resemblance of one hypothesis to another does not prove both.

refer forms *with certainty* to one or another. Again, Mr Sayce asks how I explain the τε in Il. 10. 466. I confess that I am unable to do so, and can but suggest that in other sciences, if not in philology, a difficulty is often felt before a satisfactory solution has been discovered.

It only remains to say that although I have confined myself to these questions, I do not therefore admit Mr Sayce to be in the right in the more numerous points as to which his attitude is not one of doubt or enquiry. These however I must leave to the reader's judgment: and with them the corroboration which Mr Sayce seems to derive from the gradual manner in which his views have been formed, in contrast to the 'previous assumption' which has influenced mine. We are all, I fear, apt to imagine ourselves exceptionally unprejudiced. But I need not go into this *argumentum ab autobiographiâ*.

D. B. MONRO.

[This article was in type ready to be inserted in the last number of the Journal, but was omitted through inadvertence. Edd.]

NOTES.

(1) On *νηγάτεος*.

BUTTMANN'S explanation of *νηγάτεος* as produced by transposition from *νεήγατος* (lit. *new-born*) is unsatisfactory on every ground: and the word does not occur in the index to Curtius' *Grundzüge*.

It is an epithet of a chiton (Il. 2. 43), and of a veil (14. 185). The ending *-εος* suits an Adjective of Material, such as *δουράτεος* *wooden*. Accordingly we should look for a noun **νῆγαρ*, Gen. *νήγατ-ος*, going back to a verbal stem *νηγ-*. May there not have been a verb **νήγ-ω*, related to *νέω to spin* as *τμήγ-ω* to *τέμνω* (*τμη-*)? If so, *νηγ-άτ-εος* would mean 'made of spun-work,' a meaning which suits the passage in which it occurs.

(2) On the origin of the construction of the Infinitive with *πρίν* and *πάρος*.

It may now be regarded as certain that the Greek Infinitive is in *form* the Dative of an Abstract Noun (*δόμεν-αι for giving*), and in *meaning* a Dative of Consequence. Most Homeric uses of the Infinitive lend themselves readily to this view: thus *ἐθέλει δόμεναι*, '*he is willing for giving*,' *δύναται δόμεναι*, '*he has power for giving*,' *εὔχομαι εἶναι*, '*I boast for (in respect of) being*'; *μοῖρ' ἐστὶ δαμῆναι*, '*there is fate for being subdued*,' &c. The chief exception is the use with *πρίν* and *πάρος*. How did *πρὶν ἐλθέμεν*, lit. '*earlier for coming*,' come to mean 'earlier than coming'?

The explanation is suggested by comparison of the Sanscrit usage. The Infinitive in Sanscrit is in a less formed state than

in Greek, and in particular there is no restriction of infinitival uses to a single Case (as in Greek to the Dative). Now among the other Cases used to form Infinitives (or on the way to be so used) is the Ablative, which is found especially with the Prepositions *â* 'until' and *purâ* 'before' (Whitney's Sanscrit Grammar, § 983; Max Müller, *Chips*, vol. IV. p. 53). The Ablative is of course used with *purâ* as with Comparatives. In Greek, therefore, it is probable that the Dative Inf. with πρίν has taken the place of an older Ablative. The process by which one Case-*form* concentrates uses belonging to several Cases, is one of which many examples can be produced. In this instance it was doubtless accelerated by the loss of the Dative form in other Nouns: so that the Infinitive ceased to be regarded as a Case-form.

(3) On πλέες and χέρηες.

The forms πλέες (Il. 11. 395) and πλέας (Il. 2. 129) occur each in one place only, with the meaning of the Comparative πλέονες. No probable explanation of them having been proposed, the following suggestion may be worth making.

The Comparative form in -ιων may be presumed to have been originally inflected with at least two different stems, answering to those which are seen in the corresponding Sanscrit declension, viz.:

Nom.	*çreyān*	*garīyān*	cp. Gr. πλείων.
Acc.	*çreyāńs-am*	*garīyāńs-am*	Lat. graviōr-em.
Gen.	*çreyas-as*	*garīyas-as*	

The fact of a variation between *ān* and *ă* perhaps shows that the short vowel is the 'nasalis sonans,' usually represented in Greek by *ă*. Assuming this to be so (though the argument will hold equally well if it were ε), we obtain as the original declension, Nom. πλείων or πλέων, Gen. πλείασ-ος or πλέασ-ος, by loss of σ, πλείαος or πλέαος; and similarly Plur. Nom. πλέαες, Acc. πλέαας. From these forms again we obtain, by a not infrequent 'hyphaeresis,' the forms πλέες and πλέας (cp. ἀκλέες, ἀκλέα, for ἀκλεέες, ἀκλεέα: and κρέα for κρέαα).

The fact that the Nom. Plur. is one of the 'Strong Cases'—i.e. using the longer form of the stem—is not fatal to this hypothesis. The extension of the weak stem is the usual method of arriving at uniformity: thus we have Sanscr. *çvân*, Acc. *çvân-am*, Gen. *çun-ás*: but in Greek *κύων*, *κύν-α*, *κυν-ός*.

The relation of *χέρηϊ* (Il. 1. 80), *χέρηες* (Od. 15. 324), and *χέρεια* or *χέρηα* (Acc. Sing. in Il. 4. 400, Od. 14. 176, Neut. Plur. in Il. 14. 382, Od. 18. 229, 20. 310) to *χερείων* is the same as that of *πλέες* and *πλέας* to *πλέων*, except that *η* appears for *ει* in the first two forms. The form *χέρεια* is supported by the MSS. The question whether *η* or *ει* is the original sound cannot be determined: apparently the MSS. in such cases follow a phonetic rule (as *ἐϋρρεῖος* and *ἐϋκλεῖας*, but *ἀκληεῖς*; also *βλεῖο*, *θείομεν*, &c., but *βλή-εται*, *θήῃ*). Passing over this, we may (as before) infer from the Sanscrit forms in *yān*, Gen. *yas-as*, an original Greek inflexion *χερείων*, Gen. *χερείασ-ος*, Dat. *χερείασ-ι*, &c., by loss of *σ* *χερεία-ος*, *χερεία-ϊ*, &c., from which, by the loss of the middle vowel, we obtain *χέρειος*, *χέρειϊ* or *χέρηϊ*, &c.

The circumstance that the Gen. of this form (*πλέος*, *χέρειος*) is not found lends unexpected support to the account of the matter now proposed. For the Gen. is equally wanting in the examples of hyphaeresis: viz. *κλέα*, *νηλέϊ*, *νηλέα*, *ὑπερδέα*, *ἀκλέες*, *ἀκλέα*, *δυσκλέα*, *κρέα*, *κέρα*, *γέρα*. Thus the want of the Gen. is an exception which tends to prove the rule.

D. B. MONRO.

ON THE HISTORY OF THE WORDS τετραλογία AND τριλογία.

[Read before the Oxford Philological Society on May 13th, 1881.]

I VENTURED some time ago[1] to question an established theory as to the composition and representation of tragedies at Athens, the theory that they were always or for a long time composed and put upon the stage in tetralogies. Without maintaining positively that this was a mistake, I adduced a considerable number of reasons that might lead us to think so. But, whatever arguments could be brought forward on that side of the question, and however many difficulties the ordinary belief could be shown to involve, there still remained the remarkable fact that some writers of antiquity, far removed certainly in point of time from the age in which the plays were written, but supposed to have been recipients of an unbroken tradition, believed tragedies to have been produced in this way; and there remained also the actual words 'tetralogy' and 'trilogy' to be accounted for. To stop short at a denial of the fact, without going on to offer any explanation of the origin of either the words or the belief was, as I felt at the time, to leave my position somewhat weak at an important point. I do not feel at all confident that I am really able now to supply what was wanting then, but, such as my simple and in a way obvious suggestion is, I think I may submit it to more competent judges for their consideration.

In addition to the points telling against the current theory upon which I laid most stress before, there are two others on which I must briefly insist. Putting aside all the want of evi-

[1] See the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. VII. p. 279.

dence in its favour, all the evidence that goes directly against it, and all the perplexities in which its acceptance entangles us, we ought to notice that no adequate explanation of the supposed fact has ever been given. Why were the tragic poets required to compete with four plays? Why was the number four, and not one or two or three or five or six? This question has remained, I believe, practically unanswered: for even if we can persuade ourselves that on aesthetic principles a particular poet might come to compose trilogies and add the satyrical play for a different reason, this would still be a very different thing from a regulation of authority, or a custom having the force of law, by which all competitors for the tragic prize were bound to compose in a given way. To say nothing of the fact that no good aesthetic ground has yet been indicated, it is almost impossible to believe that, if there ever was such a rule or custom, it can have rested on grounds of pure art. It would be very much like accounting for the existence of the chorus by saying that the 'ideal spectator' was a beautiful and natural addition to the Greek drama, instead of giving its real historical origin, and adding that the poets, finding it in existence, used it for the purposes of their art in this or that way.

There is a further difficulty about the second part of the words τετραλογία and τριλογία. When we find it in compounds like μυθολογία or αἰσχρολογία, of which there are many, it is simple enough: but how can τετραλογία have come to mean a group of four plays? How can λόγος mean a play? Welcker tells us we must suppose that at some point in the early history of tragedy there were three speeches to a play and that Aeschylus developed the three speeches into three plays. Now it appears from Themistius that Aristotle perhaps spoke of a stage in the development of tragedy when there were two speeches, for he ascribed to Thespis the invention of the πρόλογος and ῥῆσις. I do not think we can be at all sure that Aristotle meant speeches to the exclusion of dialogue. But admitting that he did so, we know nothing of any time at which there was a fixed number of three, and one so memorable as to have given a name to the performance: nor is it

very probable that tragedy once started on its course would make any considerable pause when it chanced to come to the number three. Further, even if we assumed this, it would only show that τριλογία might be a name for a single tragedy, connoting that it contained three speeches. The word would be a complete misnomer for a group of three plays containing in all nine speeches. Welcker would have us believe that a tragedy was spoken of as a 'three-speech-piece,' and that when Aeschylus composed a work of nine speeches the name was at once transferred from the composition it did describe to the composition it did not.

It follows also from his theory that τριλογία and τετραλογία must be very old words in this sense, and date from the very infancy of the drama. Yet it is in the writings of Diogenes Laertius and the Scholiasts that they are used of the drama for the first time, and neither of them can be traced as a dramatic term above the grammarians of Alexandria, nor indeed with anything like certainty so far. The Scholiast on Aristophanes' *Frogs*, 1155, says τετραλογίαν φέρουσι τὴν Ὀρέστειαν αἱ διδασκαλίαι, Ἀγαμέμνονα, Χοηφόρους, Εὐμενίδας, Πρωτέα σατυρικόν. Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος τριλογίαν λέγουσι χωρὶς τῶν σατυρικῶν. But we cannot be sure that in using the word τριλογία he is not putting into his own language what was said by Aristarchus and Apollonius: they may only have said that the three plays went together in some way. In any case the words are certainly not found in this sense until quite late. Can we believe that we should not have found them in Aristophanes, if they had been current in his day?

If then we discard the common account as in every way unsatisfactory, can we refer τετραλογία to anything that would explain in a natural manner both parts of the word? An answer seems to me suggested by a fact to which critics have not hitherto attached any importance. The word is also found as a term of rhetoric or oratory, denoting a group of four speeches on the same subject. In this sense it is that we find three 'tetralogies' in the extant speeches of Antiphon, three groups of four speeches apiece on the same

subject, which have come down to us under the designation of 'tetralogies' though they are also referred to as λόγοι φονικοί or speeches in murder cases. They seem to be rhetorical exercises, the form of which is determined by an undoubted historical fact, and it is to this that I draw particular attention as fully explaining the use of the number four.

It appears to have been the practice of the Athenian courts in many kinds of cases, if not in all, that both parties should be heard twice. This is shown in particular cases by such passages as Antiphon, περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ 770, 5: Demosthenes, κατὰ Ἀφόβου β′ 836, 6; πρὸς Ὀνήτορα β′ 876, 1; πρὸς Μακάρτατον 1052, 22; κατὰ Ὀλυμπιοδώρου 1181, 20; and a passage in the Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (1432, b 37) implies that, if not a universal practice, it was at any rate general. The author recommends a speaker who has any difficulty in obtaining a hearing to say 'Is it not unreasonable that, when the law directs that each party be heard twice, and when you have sworn to judge according to the law, you will not hear me even once?' The normal number of speeches was therefore four, and Antiphon wrote groups of four accordingly, which deal with fictitious cases and were no doubt intended as models for students.

There are three other features of Athenian procedure, which, while they have to be carefully distinguished from this double set of speeches, may perhaps throw some light on our inquiry. In the first place, if there were more persons than one directly concerned in the proceedings on either side, each of them was or might be heard separately. Thus two on each side would give four speeches, supposing each speaker to have spoken once, and two on one side with one on the other would give three speeches. In the second place a party to a suit might be accompanied by a friend or friends who spoke in his support, following as our phrase goes on the same side. Thus two parties, each supported by an advocate, would give four speeches, or three if only one advocate was employed. The speech of Demosthenes on the Crown is of this kind, and the speeches of Aeschines, Ctesiphon, and Demosthenes would form a group of three. In the third place, when the court had given judgment on the case before it, the parties had often to be

heard again on the question of the penalty. Two speeches on the case and two on the penalty would form another group of four[1].

The words *πρωτολογία* and *δευτερολογία* are used in extant works to express, in reference to several of these various cases, both the act of speaking first or second and the first or second speech. Demades, 178, 25, uses *πρωτολογία*. The Greek arguments to the speeches against Leptines and Androtion use both words. Several of our extant speeches are *δευτερολογίαι*, and that the word was a good deal used we may infer from the several discussions of it, besides that in the Scholia to the Androtion, which we find in the *Rhetores Graeci* (Walz II. pp. 33 and 378: III. p. 433: VII. pp. 330 and 1310). In the first of them the writer gives as one meaning of *δευτερολογία* the case of each party being heard twice, and illustrates it by *ὡς εἶχον αἱ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος δευτερολογίαι*. There is also an interesting passage in the *Προλεγόμενα τῶν στάσεων* (Walz VII. 11, or Spengel's *Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν*, p. 215), in which the writer bears witness to the practice of writing fictitious orations on both sides of a question: *ἀμέλει εὑρίσκομεν τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ ἀπολογίας καὶ κατηγορίας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιουμένους, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν ἔχει τὴν δευτερολογίαν ὑπὲρ καὶ κατὰ καὶ πάλιν [ὑπέρ] περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*. In this passage there is the various reading *τετραλογίαν* for *δευτερολογίαν*.

δικαιολογία is another term of like origin and use. (Demades, p. 179: *Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον* 1432, b 37: second argument to Leptines; and several times in Polybius: *δικαιολογεῖσθαι* in Aeschines, Lysias, Hyperides, &c.) I need hardly mention *ἀπολογία* and *ἀντιλογία* as similar forensic formations, and there are probably others.

It seems to me extremely probable that Antiphon's tetralogies did not stand alone, but that compositions of this kind were not uncommon in the rhetoric schools of Greece. I may refer on this point to the authority of Spengel in his *Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν*, who after expressing an opinion that the tetralogies of Antiphon formed part of his treatise on the art, goes on

[1] On these points see Schömann and Meier's *Attische Process*, pp. 707–713.

to say 'certo Antiphon primus non erat qui res in utramque tractatas sententiam contrariis exponeret orationibus, quod disserendi genus posthac veluti proprium quoddam sibi vindicabant philosophi Academici.' He thinks the sophists started the practice and has no doubt that Tisias and others adopted it. He compares the speeches in Thucydides. Apart from the express statement of the Greek writer cited above and the parallel afforded us by what we find in the Suasoriae and Controversiae of the elder Seneca (which prove for Rome the practice of rhetoricians arguing both sides of a question), the immense importance attached to speaking renders it, I think, almost certain that Antiphon's example, if indeed he set the example, would be followed by others, and that many exercises intended for models in the art would be published. Nor need groups of speeches always have had the fictitious character of Antiphon's tetralogies. Two or more that had been actually delivered in any suit might be published together. Indeed we have pairs of speeches among those that have come down to us as written by Demosthenes. It is likely enough too that the rhetorical exercises published in this way were not confined to forensic matters, but dealt also with questions that had come, or might be supposed to come, before deliberative bodies: and into these, as into the others, answers and rejoinders might be admitted. Among speeches actually delivered we find two natural groups of a somewhat different kind from any I have mentioned, the three Olynthiacs and the three or four Philippics.

Now any group of four speeches, whether identical in character with those of Antiphon, or connected together in one of the other ways suggested by the practice of the courts, or formed on any principle of unity, might properly be called a tetralogy: and it deserves, I think, to be considered whether this may not have been the original use of the word. We cannot say for certain that Antiphon himself made use of it, but there is certainly nothing to make us say that he did not. He must have needed some word to express the thing, and there is no improbability in his having used a word which answers the purpose so well, and which was unquestionably used for it afterwards. The analogy of the other words I have

cited shows it to be a very natural formation, and if it really came from this source both parts of it are explained in the most simple and satisfactory manner.

As to the word τριλογία, there is, no doubt, no such instance known of its application to speeches as there is of τετραλογία so used in the case of Antiphon; and it is not quite easy to find so natural an occasion, real or imaginary, for a group of three speeches as that which the regular practice of the courts afforded for a group of four. In the Athenian ecclesia it seems not to be known whether any one at all had the right of speaking more than once. From the practice of modern assemblies we might think it likely that the introducer of a measure would have the right of reply, but there seems to be really no information on the subject. A speech in favour followed by a speech against, and enforced by a rejoinder, would be a natural exercise for young rhetoricians, and might well be called a trilogy. Nor again do we know that in courts of justice it was ever open to the prosecutor to make a second speech without the defendant being allowed the same privilege; but here again our own practice suggests that in some cases such a rule may very well have existed. We ought also to take into account that the practice of assemblies and law-courts in these respects was not necessarily uniform in all Greek states, and the rules I have mentioned may have existed elsewhere, if not at Athens, and thus served to produce or suggest groups of three speeches. Even however from the known practice of the Athenian courts we can conceive such occasions arising; whenever, that is, there were two persons engaged on one side of a suit and one on the other, whether the two were both actual parties to it or one of them appeared only in the character of an advocate. In such a case, when neither party had the right of speaking twice, there would be three speeches in all, and that this right did not exist in all cases[1] is shown by the words of Demosthenes, περὶ παραπρεσβείας, 407, 14, who distinctly says that he will not have the power of speaking again after Aeschines has

[1] It has been suggested that it existed only in private suits.

replied to him (*οὐδ' ἐγχεῖ μετὰ ταῦθ' ὕδωρ οὐδεὶς ἐμοί*). There were for example, as I have already said, the three speeches of Aeschines against Ctesiphon, Ctesiphon in reply, and Demosthenes technically appearing as advocate of Ctesiphon. Any three speeches composed as an exercise in this way might be called a trilogy, and if the speeches actually delivered on both sides in any case came subsequently to be published or even only criticised together, they too might get the name. There were also undoubtedly groups of political speeches delivered on different occasions, but connected in subject. A trilogy of this kind we have in the Olynthiacs, and a trilogy or tetralogy in the Philippics.

It is then no unreasonable supposition that the critics of the third and following centuries were familiar with groups of speeches. If there were no others of the kind, at least they knew those of Antiphon, and very probably knew them by the name of tetralogy. Is it too bold a conjecture that this natural arrangement of speeches suggested to them a convenient arrangement of plays, or that at any rate they may have borrowed from oratory the words by which groups were described; that the earlier of them put together and criticised together the various tragedies that a poet had written on different parts of the same subject, and that this passed gradually into a belief that the plays had been actually composed and acted together? If the words *τριλογία* and *τετραλογία* were really used of plays by Aristarchus and other comparatively early critics, this need not imply that they thought the plays were put on the stage together. It might very well mean only that the plays had a certain connexion of subject. But when they had been thus classified, when they were spoken of as forming tetralogies and trilogies, when perhaps in some cases special names like Oresteia, Oedipodeia, Lycurgeia, had been given to the groups, the by no means critical scholars of a later day came to fancy that the group had been the original composition of the poet and not the artificial arrangement of their own predecessors.

If we may trust our information, this is exactly and step for step what happened in the case of another kind of literature.

Diogenes Laertius III. 61 tells us that some authorities, of whom Aristophanes the grammarian was one, distributed many of the dialogues of Plato into trilogies, while they left others standing by themselves without any arrangement. There is no reason to think that they meant this for more than a convenient classification or had any idea of asserting that Plato published his dialogues in threes. He tells us also (III. 56) that Thrasyllus, who lived probably about the beginning of our era between two and three centuries later, arranged the works of Plato (as he did also those of Democritus, IX. 36) in tetralogies. But Thrasyllus went further than this; for, if Diogenes is to be believed, he said that Plato had himself published them in tetralogies (*κατὰ τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν ἐκδοῦναι αὐτὸν τοὺς διαλόγους*). If we suppose Diogenes to be misrepresenting him, the passage still proves how easily the mistake might be made, and that Diogenes himself had no idea of scouting as preposterous the theory which he attributed to Thrasyllus.

This parallel between the works of Plato (with whom perhaps Democritus may be joined) and those of the tragic poets in respect of the treatment they received at the hands of late critics may perhaps be carried a little farther, and that in a somewhat curious way. We notice that Aristophanes arranged the dialogues in trilogies and Thrasyllus in tetralogies. Now the scholia to Aristophanes the poet have a curious and at present unexplained passage about the Oresteia of Aeschylus, on which it is possible that this may throw light. Commenting on *ἐξ Ὀρεστείας* in *Frogs*, 1155, the Scholiast says in the words already quoted for another purpose *τετραλογίαν φέρουσι τὴν Ὀρέστειαν αἱ διδασκαλίαι Ἀγαμέμνονα, Χοηφόρους, Εὐμενίδας, Πρωτέα σατυρικόν. Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος τριλογίαν λέγουσι χωρὶς τῶν σατυρικῶν.* When we set this side by side with the two arrangements of Plato, does it not suggest that various arrangements of tragedies were made at different times by various authorities with or without the belief that they corresponded to real representations on the stage? It looks also as if earlier critics had grouped together in trilogies the tragedies only and later ones had added satyrical plays: but this is perhaps too much to build on a few words, though it would be a

strict parallel to what seems to have been done in the case of Plato, where the trilogy system preceded the tetralogy.

I must anticipate one objection that may be made to the theory now put forward. It may be said, 'if you suppose the critics to have distributed the tragedies into groups and the belief to have grown up afterwards that the groups were acted, how do you account for the statement in Suidas that Sophocles produced single plays and not tetralogies? If it had been merely a matter of subsequent classification, the tragedies of Sophocles, for instance the two Oedipuses and the Antigone, might no doubt have been distributed into groups as much as those of Aeschylus. As they were not, we must infer that the grouping was done not by the critics but by the poets themselves.' This argument is not as strong as it seems. Without pressing now the point, which would be a perfectly legitimate one, that an unsupported statement in Suidas is worth very little, I may point out that the passage is generally misinterpreted, as Suidas does not say that Sophocles never produced tetralogies. His words are *ἦρξε τοῦ δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ τετραλογίαν*. 'He began the practice.' Now to say that a man was the first to do a thing does not amount to saying that he never did anything else. If we had been told that Phrynichus was the first tragic poet who wrote what we should call a historical play, by what logic could we have inferred that all his plays were historical? Aristotle says Agathon began the practice of having mere *ἐμβόλιμα* by way of choral odes: are we to understand necessarily that all his odes were of this character? Sophocles, it is said, introduced the third actor: does it follow that three actors must have been needed for all his plays? The statement in Suidas then need not prevent us from thinking that many and perhaps most of the plays of Sophocles were supposed to have formed parts of tetralogies. It is a difficulty in the way of the ordinary theory, but it presents no difficulty to a new one, because we can easily imagine that some of the tragedies declined to come into a symmetrical arrangement and were left by the arrangers to stand singly, exactly in the way in which according to Diogenes Laertius some of the dialogues of Plato were put into trilogies

by Aristophanes and others, and the rest put 'one by one and without order.' The imperfect classification was afterwards transformed into a dramatic innovation on the poet's own part.

One remark remains to be made. It would be wrong to estimate the probability of any such suggestion as this paper contains without allowing for the enormous difficulties involved in the common theory. I have not been trying to discard a theory against which nothing can be said in favour of one which (I freely admit) rests on but scanty evidence. The question we have to consider is this: supposing the common theory to be a mistake, can we account for the origin of the mistake in any plausible manner, and can we trace to any more probable source the words round which the myth has gathered?

HERBERT RICHARDS.

NOTES ON PLACIDUS (ED. DEUERLING).

II. 13. *Altilitate ab alendo, id est ipsa res quae alitur.*

For *altilitate,* which can scarcely be right, Koch proposed *altili dote,* from Nonius, but this does not seem to suit the interpretation. I would suggest that this is one of those instances, which frequently occur in glossaries, where two glosses have been confused into one, and read,

Aetatem, diu.

Altile, ab alendo, &c.

Aetatem and *altile* being much alike might easily be confused, and the compound word *altilitate* arise out of the two.

This is, I think, supported by Nonius LXXII. 15, where we have *Aetatem, positum pro saepe ac diu,* with a quotation from the Asinaria of Plautus, followed immediately by the gloss *Altile, non solum pingue, ab alendo, verum etiam opulentum,* illustrated from the Cistellaria of Plautus. A large number of the glosses in Placidus are Plautine, and it seems possible that this may be the case here.

IV. 19. *Accipitres, equos celeres.*

Is it possible that we should read, *Accipitret equos, laceret,* said of some wild animal attacking a team of horses? Gellius 19. 7. 11, tells us that Laevius used *accipitret* for *laceret,* and if the gloss had run originally as I suggest, it would almost infallibly have been corrupted into its present form.

XXXIX. 20. *Equirium, multitudo collecta et in unum congregata.*

I would suggest that this is another instance where two glosses have been confused. We find in Paulus 81. 12, a gloss beginning, *equiria ludi,* in Varro L. L. VI. 13, another *equiria ab equorum cursu.* Again Festus 330. 19 has a gloss on the

word *spira, Ennius quidem hominum multitudinem ita appellat, cum ait: spiras legionibus nexunt.*

Might not the glosses in Placidus have run?

Equiria, ludi.

Espira, multitudo collecta &c.

Spira is written *espira* with the prosthetic *e,* and placed under the letter *E,* as in Isid. x. 153, *Iscurra* comes under the letter *I,* and as in Placidus himself *caculabor* and *lactatus* have been corrupted to *jaculabor* and *jactatus,* and placed under *I,* Plac. 58. 17 and 59. 22.

The Mss. vary between *Equirium, equiniam, exquinam, equininam* and *ecquina.*

XLII. 1. *exte, esse.*

Might the correct reading be *exte, exi; exte,* meaning, take yourself off? cf. Plac. 8. 14, *Apaxte in dierectum.*

ib. 2. *Falla,* [*facili*] *fallacia a fuco dicta.* For *fuco* the Mss. vary between *fuco, fauco, faueo,* and *faneo.* I propose a *fando dicta,* which is nearer the Mss., and is the etymology given by Isidore x. 105, *Fallax, quod fando, id est loquendo, decipiat.*

L. 22. *Heliton heros apud Latinos nullus est. Helicon* should, I think, be read. Isidore XVI. 8. 11, says, *Haec juga* (of Parnassus) *a duobus fratribus Cytheron et Helicon appellantur. Nam Helicon dictus ab Helicone fratre Citheronis.*

LV. 10. *Incubitus, dicitur ab incumbendo, sive jacendo, sive aliena optando.*

The Mss. vary between *alieno* and *aliena; optando, aptando* and *cupiendo.*

I propose, *Incubus, dicitur ab incumbendo, sive jacendo, sive mulieres stuprando.*

Isidore VIII. 11. 103, has, *Incubi, dicuntur ab incumbendo, hoc est stuprando. Saepe enim existunt etiam mulieribus.*

Mulieres is palaeologically almost the same as *aliena, u* and *a,* and *n* and *r* being constantly confused, while *m* is often dropped, and *es* or *is* changed into *a*; *stuprando,* also would explain the variants *aptando, optando* and *cupiendo.*

LIX. 5. In *fermento est iter infermentari id est taciter dissimulanter intra serunt.*

May the true reading be? *In fermento est, dicitur* (?) *ira fermentatur, id est tacite et dissimulanter intra se fervet. In fermento est,* is used by Plautus in the sense of being in a passion, Cas. II. 5. 17,

Nunc in fermento tota est, ita turget mihi,

ira and *in* are confused in the Harleian Ms. of Nonius, where *deorum inmissum* stands for *deorum ira missum, fermentari* may well have arisen from the abbreviated form of the passive *fermentat'*, and *fermentum* is derived by Isidore from *fervor*, XX. 2. 19, *Fermentum a fervore nuncupatum.*

LX. 22. *Lacessam, vocabo.* I would suggest that we should read *Lacessam provocabo,* which was read as *pro vocabo,* and the *pro* then omitted. Non. 133. 29, has, *Lacessere, positum provocare,* and Serv. *on pugnamque lacessunt,* Aen. v. 429 has *provocant potius quam gerunt.*

ib. 26. *Limitasses, conlocasses.*

The Mss. have *Limasses, conlocasses,* which is right. Non. 334. 12, has, *limare etiam dicitur conjungere, Caecilius Pausimacho, Hoc a te postulo Ne cum meo gnato posthac limassis* (*limasses* Mss.) *caput.*

LXVI. 19. *Masio, malo.*

The Mss. vary between *Masio, Massio* and *Matiano;* and *malo, malio* and *mallo.*

Paulus 136. 1 has a gloss, *Maesius, lingua Osca mensis Maius,* and Isid. XVII. 7. 3 has *Malum Matianum a loco vocatum, unde prius advectum est.* I conjecture that the two glosses have been confused in Placidus, and that we should read, *Maesio, maio,* and *Matiano, malo,* which would account for the forms *malio* and *mallo.*

NOTES ON GELLIUS (ED. HERTZ).

III. 3. 5. *Nam* [*olim*] *me puero venter erat solarium.* The Mss. have, *Nam me puero.* Bentley, in his copy of Gellius, preserved in the British Museum, conjectured *nam me puerulo,* which is, I should think, certainly right, as diminutives are constantly changed in Mss.

III. 6. 2. *Non deorsum palma cedit nec intra flectitur,* for *intra* I would read *in terram,* i.e. *intrā,* the abbreviated form.

V. 12. 1. *in antiquis spectationibus.*

For *spectationibus* I suggest *comprecationibus,* i.e. *c̄precationibus,* cf. Gell. XIII. 23, *Comprecationes deum immortalium.*

VI. 3. 30. *vel occupandi vel deferendi.*

Should not *defendendi* be read for *deferendi,* which makes no sense, while *defendendi* would naturally be used of maintaining, as opposed to *occupandi,* seizing, a position?

ib. 9. 17. *descendidit.* Bentley suggests *descecendit,* on the analogy of *scicidit,* and 18 infra,

quomodo mammae mihi Descecenderant.

ib. 17. 10. *fortiterque innoxium vocare adversum adversarios.* Bentley suggests *innoxium stare,* which restores the metre, and makes sense.

VIIII. 1. 6. *quo motus a te datus tulerit.* Bentley's Mss. give *modus,* which would seem to be right; cf. supra, *Sed cum modus et impetus.*

XII. 5. 7. *exploratior commodorumque dilectus.* Should we not read *commodorum incommodorumque dilectus?* The present text will hardly construe, and the eye might easily pass from the first to the second *commodorum.*

ib. 12. 4. *ἀκοινονόητοι,* Bentley conjectured *ἀνοικονόμητοι.*

XIII. 8. 2. *in rebus comminus noscendis.*

Bentley's Mss. give *communum* (*comunû*), from which I conjecture *communibus* (*comunib.*), the *res communes* of daily life being opposed to the *rhetoricae* and *dialecticae disciplinae.*

ib. 23. 16. *Cum quidem Marti es in conubium data.* Should we not read *Mavorti,* which corrects the metre, and might readily be corrupted to *Marti?*

ib. 25. 20. *miranda mortis iteratione.* Bentley suggests *miseranda* for *miranda.*

ib. 30. 6. *Specie venusta ore* [*aeque*] *atque oculis pernigris.* The Mss. have *ore atque oculis pernigris* both here and Plaut. Poen. v. 2. 151, from which the passage comes. Bentley conjectured *crine atque oculis pernigris,* which seems convincing.

XV. 22. 1. *et utendi regendique exercitus.* Should we not read *eludendi regendique?* A slight alteration, which seems to suit the context much better than the present reading.

ib. 29. 2. *nomen est Julium.* Bentley suggests *Gellium* for *Julium.*

XVI. 1. 3. *priore tempore antiquiorque est.* Bentley's Mss. have *prior tempore,* rightly I should think.

ib. 2. 6. *Nam qui facere non desinit, non id necessario etiam fecit.* Bentley's Mss. have *desiit,* which seems right.

ib. 10. 15. *Assiduus dictus aut ab assiduis ab aere dando.* Hertz omits *ab assiduis.* I would suggest that we should read *aut ab asse, id est, ab aere dando.* Paulus 9. 10, has a gloss on *assiduus, alii eum ab asse dando vocatum existimarunt.*

XVII. 8. 7. *sensim atque summissim rideremus.* Bentley's Mss. give *summussim,* which is, I should fancy, right. Paulus 299. 3, has a gloss, *summussi murmuratores,* from which *summussim* might be easily formed.

ib. 21. 36. *sub jugo missi.* Bentley's Mss. give *sub jugum.*

NOTES ON NONIUS (ED. QUICHERAT).

II. 16. *emigrarunt.* The Harleian has *emigrarent* as the first reading. Is not this right? The husband is saying, if my wife would only go, what a number of annoyances would go with her.

III. 9, and 12. *velitari.* The Harleian has *velitare,* which Ribbeck also reads.

IV. 7. *edixi.* Ribbeck reads *em dixi,* rightly, I should think. The Harleian has *ê dixi,* which would stand either for *em* or *est.*

V. 11. *helluo πιῶν δέπας.* The Harleian has *helio πιοαετις* (?). Bentley, in his copy preserved in the British Museum, conjectures *heliopolites.*

ib. 22. *lib.* II. The Harleian has *lib.* I, which L. Mueller also reads.

VIII. 5. *dicta a nautis.* The Harleian has *dicta a nauciis.* May *nausea* be the proper reading? Festus, 165, has *Nauteam —a nave ductum nomen, quia nauseam facit.*

x. 3. *βραδεῖς*. The Harleian has *burdos*. I propose *βαρδεῖς*, which corresponds more closely to the quotation from Homer, *βάρδιστοι μὲν γάρ*, &c.; and Paul. 34. 10, has *Bardus a Graeco, quod illi βαρδύς dicunt.*

ib. 21. *cum indomitis* [*his*] *moribus.* I conjectured *indomitis cum moribus*, which Ribbeck has.

xi. 12. *torialim et torialium* [*dici stragulum*] *designator est.* Is not the proper reading? *Toralium proprietatis designator est.* This formula occurs often in Nonius.

ib. 15. *lecticam quis involvebant segestria appellabant.* The Harleian has *qui involvebant.* I suggest *lecticam qui involvebant, segestriam appellabant;* cf. Varro L. L. v. 166, *qui lecticam involvebant—segestriam appellabant.*

xii. 1. *uva passa pensili.* The Harleian has for its first reading *una passa pensili.* May not this be right?

ib. 18. *novi non inscitulam,* &c. The Harleian has *novi non instituram ancillunam vespere et vestispicam.* Ribbeck reads

novi non inscitulam
Ancillulam vestrae hic erae vestispicam.

I suggest

novi non inscitulam
Ancillulam unam vestrae erae vestispicam,

which would account for the reading *ancillunam.*

ib. 21. *torqueat vestispicam.* The Harleian has *torqueat, ut vestispicam*, which should be right.

xv. 13. *enodat patri.* The Harleian has for its first reading *pater.* Should we not read? *Gnato ordinem omnem ut dederit enodat pater.*

xvii. 11. *pennata.* The Harleian has *pinnata*, which is also read by Ribbeck.

ib. 19. *seneca.* The Harleian has *senica* here, and line 22, which Ribbeck also reads, in 20 however it has *seneca.*

ib. 30. *potest.* This is the first reading of the Harleian.

xviii. 21. *Una affert.* For *una* the Harleian gives *unum*, which was also conjectured by Scaliger.

XX. 7. *tractum a κλέπτω.* The Harleian has *a clope.* Is not *a κλοπή* right?

XXII. 4. *lib.* VII *jactari.* The Harleian has *lib.* VII *actari.* We should read *lib.* VI *jactari* with L. Mueller.

ib. 12. *glisco gaudio.* The Harleian has *gliscor,* which Ribbeck also gives.

XXIII. 2. *canes ferarum.* The Harleian has *canes dicuntur ferarum.*

ib. 9. *non a largitia* [*quae*] *ignota erat.* The Harleian has *nonam largiatia ignota erat.*

ib. 11. *tum largitio multis ignara.* The Harleian has *ignota.* Sallust, Bello Jugurthino CIII, has *tum largitio multis ignorata erat* (Dietsch.). I propose *non a largitia, sed consentientes,* omitting *ignota erat,* and below, *multis ignorata erat,* like Sallust. The *ignota erat* in 9 is inserted, I believe, from 12, and the two forms *ignara* and *ignota* represent the original *ignorata.*

XXIV. 6. *tantum in nomine.* The Harleian has *tantum modo in nomine* with Orelli.

XXV. 1. *cauponem.* The Harleian has *coponem.* May not this be right? Varro is fond of the forms in *o* instead of *au.*

XXVII. 8. *non rediret.* The Harleian has *ni rediret,* which L. Mueller also reads.

ib. 14. *κώνειον in exodio.* The Harleian has *κώνειον exodium.* Should we not read *κώνειον ad exodium?* Placidus 9. 14 has a gloss on *ad exodium.*

ib. 19. *putus purgatus est dictus.* The Harleian has *putus est dictus,* with a marginal note, *putus, purgatus,* from which *purgatus* has found its way into Quicherat's Paris Ms.

XXVIII. 11. The Harleian has *dianaretae,* not *dianarctae.*

XXX. 27. *lib.* XXVIII. The Harleian has XXVIIII, which Mueller also reads.

XXXI. 21. *lib.* XVIIII. The Harleian has XXVIIII, as also Mueller.

XXXIV. 17. *vacillare,* 20 *vacillante.* The Harleian reads *vaccillare, vaccillante,* which Lachmann proposes, Lucret. III. 503.

ib. 18. *fessi.* The Harleian has *defessi.*

XXXVI. 22. *lib.* XVIIII. The Harleian has XXVIII, Mueller XXVIIII, rightly, I should think, as this suits the order of quotation generally adopted by Nonius.

XXXVII. 6. *Malthas veteres,* &c. 8. *quem Maltham.*

The Harleian reads *Maltas* and *Maltam,* so Paul. 135, *Malta dicitur a Graecis pix cum cera mixta.*

ib. *quasi μαλθακούς.* The Harleian reads *malacus.* I propose *μαλακοὺς.* Cf. Porphyrio, Hor. Sat. 1. 2. 25, *Maltha enim μαλακὸς dicitur.*

XXXVIII. 11. *dicti Lucilius.* The Harleian has *dicit Lucilius,* which should be right.

XXXIX. 22 and 25. The Harleian has *ordiri* as the first reading.

XL. 12. The Harleian has *tintinire* here, and in line 14; in line 16, *tintinat.*

Should we not read *Tintinire et tintinare? Tintinare* is presupposed in *tintinnaculum* and *tintinat,* and is supported by Paul. 365, *Tintinnire et tintinnabant Naevius dixit pro sonitu tintinnabuli.*

XLII. 9. *quia vitae.* The Harleian has *quae vitae* as the first reading, which might be right.

ib. 25. *mulctaeque dictione.* For *dictione* the Harleian has *ditione* as the first reading. In the parallel passage in Isidore, Origines X. 156 (Arev.), two 9th century Mss. in the British Museum have respectively *multaque editione,* and *multamque editionem,* and Professor Nettleship tells me that *editione* is read in a Ms. of Isidore in the Oriel Library. May not *multaeque editione* possibly stand, as meaning by the publication or proclamation of a fine?

XLIV. 8. *loqueris aut a balatu.*

I suggest, *aut* [*a Graeco βλάξ aut*] *a balatu.*

Paul. 34 has *Blaterare—quod a Graeco βλάξ originem ducit.* Professor Nettleship has also made the same suggestion.

XLV. 3. *regione.* The Harleian has *religione.*

ib. 5. *Nolo illam causam habere.* The Harleian reads *Nolo illam habere causam,* with the editors of Plautus.

ib. 6. *sed a verbis.* The Harleian has *sed et a verbis.*

XLVI. 1. *unde inferum recte dici potest.* For *inferum* the Mss. have *infertur*, or *quod infertur*. The Harleian *quod infertur*, which I believe to be right. This agrees with the sense required by the example from Varro, and is supported by Paul. 112. 5, *Inferiae, sacrificia quae dis manibus inferebant;* and Isidore, Orig. XIV. 9. 10 and 11, *Inferus appellatur eo quod infra sit. Philosophi autem dicunt—quod animae hinc ibi ferantur.* I would suggest that we should read either, *Inferum ab imo...nihil; vel quod infertur, unde recte potest dici,* in which case an example corresponding to the first explanation has fallen out; or *Inferum, quod infertur, unde,* &c., omitting the first explanation altogether, which may be a marginal gloss, introduced possibly from Isidore.

XLVIII. 5. *quod senibus exhibetur.* Is it possible that *silentibus* should be read for *senibus?*

Senibus makes no sense, and *silentibus* is supported by Paul. 295. 2, *Silicernium, dictum quia—is jam silentium cerneret.*

ib. 14. et ἀπαλαντοισος.

The Harleian has something, which may be EIAΠΑΑΑΝΤΟΙ *cocedones*, the first three letters of the second word, though written in Roman characters, being part of the Greek word. It is impossible to say definitely what the Greek letters may be, as A, L, M are made precisely alike in the Harleian, AA might stand for two A's, two L's, or one M. Buecheler suggests φιλανάλωται which I can scarcely believe to be right. I am inclined to suggest ψαμμακόσιοι, the EI may represent ψ and the other letters fit in very fairly. ψαμμακόσιοι occurs again in a passage from the same Satire of Varro, Non. 214. 26, written *ipsam marcosioe* in Roman characters, which approaches still more closely to the Greek characters here, and a word of this meaning seems to be suggested by the expression, *ut turba incendant annonam.* Cf. also Varro, Sat. Inc. 585 (ed. Buecheler).

ib. 17. *lixem.* The Harleian has *lixam* here, and 61. 6, below, which is surely right. This form also occurs Isid. 20. 2. 22, *Lixa enim aqua dicitur.*

ib. 21. *'Οχήματα enim,* &c. Should not this be rejected

as a gloss? The expression, *quod vehicula praebeat,* seems to suggest that Nonius connected *parochus* with *παρέχειν.*

ib. 23. *erat.* The Harleian reads *erit.*

XLIX. 1. *Trossuli dicti sunt torosuli.* The first reading of the Harleian is, *Trossuli equites Romani dicti trossuli dicti sunt torosuli.* I suggest, *Trossuli, equites Romani, dicti sunt torosuli.* The words *dicti trossuli* represent a marginal gloss *Trossuli equites Romani dicti,* part of which has been absorbed into the text. Cf. Paul. 367. 20, *Trossuli equites dicti,* &c. Professor Nettleship has also suggested this.

L. 3. *utuntur rustici cum tritae fruges eriguntur.* The Harleian reads *rustici utuntur cum tritas fruges erigunt.*

ib. 12. *rerum humanarum.* The Harleian reads *rerum divinarum,* rightly, so Gellius I. 18. 1.

ib. 13. *atras furentur.* The Harleian has *atras facilius furentur,* again agreeing with Gellius l. c.

ib. 19. *νότος dictum ab.* The Harleian has *qui graece νότος dicitur ab,* rightly it would seem.

LI. 3. *peni, penus, vel penoris.* The Harleian has *peni vel penoris,* omitting *penus.* So Gellius IV. 1, 2.

LII. 21. *antiquitas prudens.* The Harleian has *antiquitatis prudens.* May not the right reading be *posuit antiquitatis prudens, Plautus?*

The words from *ut ab aspectu—facies,* as also *πρόσωπον id est os,* are, I believe, a gloss introduced from Gellius XIII. 30. Gellius has *quidam faciem putant os tantum . . . quod Graeci πρόσωπον dicunt, quando sit forma omnis—a faciendo dicta, ut ab aspectu species, et a fingendo figura.*

LIII. 8. *dici.* The Harleian has *dicta.*

ib. 10. *constitionem.* The Mss. have *consitionem.* Gellius XVI. 5. 10 (Hertz), *consistionem,* which I would suggest here.

ib. 16. *dixerint.* The Mss. have *dixerit,* which is surely right.

ib. 20. *bidentes.* The Mss. have *bidentis.* I conjectured *bidenti,* which Ribbeck has.

LIV. 3. *et quasi* [*a*] *fetura quadam.* The first reading of the Harleian gives *et quasi fetura quadam,* which is surely right.

ib. 5. *fetus fecunditas.* The Harleian has *fetus et fecunditas* rightly.

LV. 4. *solebant.* The Harleian has *solent.*

ib. 19. The Harleian has *erat,* not *erant.* In this line alone it gives *colina,* elsewhere *culina.* May not *colina* be right here, as Varro is connecting it with *colere?*

LVI. 3. *quod dici.* The Harleian has *quod aut dici,* which should be right.

LVII. 17. *Plaut. in Amph. uno.* The Harleian gives *Plaut. in Amph. id probat dicens, uno.*

ib. 20. *Remulco trahere.* The Mss. give *remulcare.* I would suggest *Remulco dictum. Remulco,* was, I believe, taken for a verb, and altered into the infinitive. This is supported by Fest. 279, *Remulco est cum scaphae* (?) *remis navis magna trahitur.* There is a still stronger instance of a similar corruption, Non. 98. 9, where Ribbeck has restored *devoro* for *devovero,* the fut. perf. of *devoveo,* in place of the corrupt *devorare, absumere, eripere.* I would call special attention to this, as a striking instance of the way in which the text has been depraved by marginal glosses.

LVIII. 27. The first reading of the Harleian is *adolet cum,* not *adoletque.*

LIX. 3. *accersiti.* The Harleian has *accensiti,* by the first hand, which is surely right.

ib. 20. *manu assuetum.* The Harleian has *mansuetum.* I suggest *manu suetum.*

LXI. 11. *Heredii.* All the Mss. give *heredioli,* which I would suggest to be right, and would alter *heredium* in the passage from Varro to *herediolum.* The diminutive is much more likely to have been altered than *vice versa,* and is supported by Columella praef. § 13, *ad quatuor jugerum avitum herediolum redierit,* and Plac. 52. 3, *Herediolum, possessiunculam.* Paul. 99. 19, has *Heredium, praedium parvulum.* Should we not read *Herediolum* here? The *praedium parvulum,* like the *possessiunculam* in Plac., seems to suggest a diminutive.

LXII. 6. *lixem.* The Mss. rightly give *lixam.* Cf. supr. 48. 17.

ib. 16. *confluges ubi.* Buecheler conjectured *Conflugae.*

Ribbeck reads *conflugae cubi.* I can scarcely believe the change to be right. Festus 40. 10 has *Conflages dicuntur loca, in quae venti confligunt.* Isid. XIV. 8. 27, *Confrages, loca, in quae venti sese frangunt.* Would it not be rather rash to change all three, and if one will stand, why not the others?

LXIII. 5. *ad normam.* The Harleian reads *ad lineam.*

ib. 23. *pastillos.* The Harleian gives *pastillas.* May not *pastilla* be right? This is supported by Fest. 25. 1, *Pastillum in sacris libi genus rotundi,* and Charisius, p. 37 (Keil), *hoc pastillum, ut Varro dicit.*

LXIV. 15. *lib.* v. The Harleian gives IIII. The passage is Varro L. L. VI. 47.

ib. 26. *contextus.* The Harleian has *contextum,* rightly, I believe. Ribbeck reads *contextumst.*

ib. 27. *vel juge ducta.* The Harleian gives *vel longe ducta.*

ib. 28. *propagare, id est, genus.* The Harleian gives *propagare genus,* omitting *id est.*

LXV. 2. *promicare extendere.* The Harleian gives *promicare est extendere.*

ib. 7. *Hunc genuit.* The Harleian reads *Ut genuit,* by the first hand.

ib. 27. *pisciculosque.* The Harleian gives *pisciculasque* not *pisculosque.*

LXVI. 4. *Excordes concordesque.* The Harleian gives *excordes concordesvae.* I suggest, *excordes, concordes, vaecordes.* The first hand also omits *vecordes* in line 9.

LXVII. 12. *Parectatoe,* &c. The Harleian has *parectatum.*

ib. 14. The Harleian reads, *unde parectato et calumiac barbula prima.* The Leyden Ms. *unde parectato ecalami ac b. p.,* with an erasure of three or four letters after *calami.* Should we not read *calamistra ac?*

ib. 16. *parectaton.* So the Harleian.

ib. 17. *parectatoe.* Here the Harleian has *parentacte.* The Leyden Ms. has *praeutactae,* here, and *praeutacton* line 16. I believe *parentactoe* to be correct. *Parectatoe* gives no adequate sense, and Suidas has the following gloss on the word παρένταξις; ἡ τῶν ἀνομοίων παρένθεσις, οἷον ὁπλιτῶν πρὸς ψιλούς.

ἢ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὁπλίτας. It might thus be naturally used of young men newly admitted to the society of their seniors. I would read then *Parentactoe*, &c. Lucilius, lib. VIIII,

Unde parentactoe calamistra ac barbula prima,

which restores the metre.

Idem XXVIIII. (XXVIII, L. Mueller, XX *tuum*, Mss.)

Ephebum quendam quem parentacton vocant.

Varro, *Parentactoe adsunt*, &c.

LXVIII. 12. *hostium tum jam.* The Harleian has *hostium jam*, omitting *tum.*

ib. 18. *abstemius est.* I would read *abstemius est vino abstinens ... Abstemius imo scit*, the eye of the copyist passing from the first to the second *abstemius.* Cf. Gell. x. 23, *aetatem abstemias egisse, hoc est vino semper abstinuisse.*

LXIX. 4. *quasi adipatae.* The Harleian has *tanquam.*

ib. 8. *Assentiri.* The Harleian has *assentire.*

LXXI. 1. *deportatum.* The Harleian reads *portatum.*

ib. 20. *abortiat.* The Mss. have *abortu*, for which I propose *abortet.* This form is found in Varro R. R. II. 4. 15, *fieri ut abortet.*

LXXIII. 7. *Amolimini*, &c. The Mss. have *amolimini est recedite vel tollite*, which I believe to be right. Cf. 75. 28, *age, age, amolire, amitte, cave vestem attigas*, where *amolire* means *recede*, and here too the first three examples correspond to the meaning *recedite*, which stands first in the gloss.

LXXIV. 3. *Lib.* XXVIII. *Lib.* XXVIIII is the reading of the Harleian, and is adopted by Mueller.

ib. 23. *Possim.* The Harleian reads *Possum.*

ib. 29. *accepso.* The Harleian has *accepso* not *accepto.*

LXXVI. 4. *exta.* The Harleian reads *exta* not *extra.*

ib. 14. *praesentibus nobis et absentibus nobis.* The Harleian reads *praesentibus et absentibus nobis.*

LXXVIII. 7. *omnis in una Res hominis bulga*, &c. The Harleian gives *omnis in una seti homibus bulga haec devincta certo est.* I conjectured, *omnis in unast Spes homini bulga, bulga haec devincta lacerto est*, and Mueller has the same.

ib. 30. *quid est istuc.* The first reading of the Harleian is

Quid prodest istuc te blaterare atque obloqui, which completes both sense and metre.

LXXIX. 2. *Desine blaterare.* The Harleian has *Caecilius, imnide, sine blanditie.* I conjecture that *Blandities* has vanished after *blateres*, and that we should read, inserting a new gloss,

Blandities. Caecilius Hymnide,
Sine blanditie nil agit
In amore inermus.

ib. 15. *bipennis ut.* The Harleian gives *bipinnis et.*

ib. 17. *at nos.* The Harleian reads *unnos*, with an erasure of one letter before the *u.*

ib. 18. *bipennes.* The Harleian has *bipinnis* here, and *bipinnem* line 20.

LXXX. 9. *Baiulum.* The Harleian has *baiolum* twice, rightly I should think. Cf. Paul. 35. 8, *Baiolos dicebant*, &c.

ib. 18. *Vergilius burim.* The Harleian has *in burim*, which is supported by Plac. 57. 11, *In burim, in curvationem.*

LXXXI. 15. *Rem disperdit* is the reading of the Harleian.

ib. 37. *Troginū calix.* Bentley conjectured *ἀνδρόγυνος πάλλαξ.*

LXXXII. 24. The Harleian has *Varro columna.*

LXXXIV. 5. *observabam pallium adservabam.* The Harleian has *adservabam pallium observabam.* I suggest *In conspicillo adservabam pallium*, omitting *observabam* as a gloss on *adservabam.*

ib. 6. *Colustra*, &c. The Harleian, first hand, has *Columnum lacconere giumere mammis.* Lucil. lib. VIII., *Beram insulam fomento omnicolore. Colustra, Laberius*, &c. I believe that no less than three glosses are confused here, and propose as the first gloss

Columna, a columine. Lucil. lib. VIII., *Beram (?) insulam (?) fomento (?) omnicolore* [*columna*]. *Omnicolore colustra* must surely be wrong. Mueller gives *Beram* as the first reading of the Leyden Ms. Glosses on *columna* are found, Paul. 55. 5, *Columnae dictae, quod culmina sustineant.* Isid. XV. 8. 14, *Columnae, quibus pondus totius fabricae erigitur.* Plac. 19. 1, *Columen, sustentaculum, quia a columna fit.*

The second gloss will be

Colustra, lac concretum in mammis.
Laberius in Virgine,

Siquidem, mea colustra, fretus fecisset. This is also Ribbeck's reading. The *lac concretum* has been confused with the *a columine* above. The Mss. give after *Virgine*

Si quidem mea colustra fretus terris studere
Fecisset sumere aquam ex fonte.

Comparing Non. 547. 23, *Creterra est quam nunc situlam vocant. Naevius Lycurgo,*

Nam ut ludere laetantes inter se vidimus
Praeter amnem creterris sumere aquam ex fonte,

I conjecture that the third gloss may have run

Creterra [a cratere], Naevius Lycurgo,
Ludere...creterris sumere aquam ex fonte.

Studere seems to represent the *ludere, terris* the *creterris* of 547. May *fretus* also be a dittography of *creterris?* A gloss on *creterra* occurs Paul. 53. 10, *Creterra vocabulum trahitur a cratere, quod est vas vini,* from which I borrow *a cratere.*

ib. 26. *Quaeve Adrasto.* The Harleian has *Que u eat graio,* which rather supports Ribbeck's *Quaeve adgnatio.*

LXXXVI. 2. *quid sit.* The Harleian gives *que* corrected to *qui.* We should read *qui sit,* with the Edd. of Plaut.

ib. 4. *populi Romani.* The Harleian reads *populi Romani lib.* I.

ib. 9. *oculi mihi.* The Harleian, first hand, has *oculi mei.*

ib. 12. The Harleian has *succussatoris.*

ib. 18. *Casnares senes.* The Harleian has *carnales sedulas,* and this is pretty much the reading of all the Mss. Is it possible that two glosses have been confused here again? May it originally have run? *Carnalia edulia.* Lucil. Satyr. lib. II.,

Ut lurcaretur lardum et carnalia furtim
Conficeret,

cf. Non. X. 27, where the Harleian reads *carnalia* as also 545. 11.

Casnares senes, &c. Just above, LXXXVI. 11, there is a quotation from Lucilius, Satires, book II., followed by two from Varro, as would be the case here.

ib. 21. *hebete stulto.* The Harleian gives *hebeti et stulto.*

LXXXVII. 14. *reddimus.* The Harleian gives *reddidimus.*

ib. 18. *cognomine est.* The Mss. have *cognomen est.* Should we not read *cognomines, ejusdem nominis?* This is supported by the example where the Mss. give

leti unum genus,
Cognominationis morborum cognominis.

Ribbeck

plebeium genus,
Cognationes morborum cognomines.

LXXXVIII. 4. *Sed hi.* The Harleian gives *est haec.* May the true reading be *isti?*

ib. 17. *canicas a pulte et.* Should we not read *canicas ac pultem e?* For *mangonis* the Harleian gives *magconis.*

LXXXIX. 11. The Harleian, first hand, gives *his.*

XC. 11. *extemplo.* The first reading of the Harleian is *exemplo,* which Scaliger suggested.

XC. 18. *conjuncti congermanitate.* The Harleian has *conjuncti et congerminati,* which is surely right.

XCI. 24. The Harleian has *puppis* not *poppis.*

XCII. 7. *cis Rhenum atque mare.* The Harleian has *cis Rhenum atque inter mare.*

ib. 15. *concalefacerit.* The Harleian has *concalfecerit.* We should read *concalefecerit.*

ib. 17. *concalefecimus.* The Harleian reads *calfacimur* for which we should substitute *concalfacimur,* i.e. *c̆alfacimur.*

XCIII. 1. *relinquentur.* The Harleian has *relincuntur,* rightly, I should think.

ib. 11. *in cubiculo meo dormire.* The Harleian has *in cubiculo dormire,* omitting *meo.*

XCIV. 8. The Harleian has *oleam,* not *oleo.*

XCV. 1. *lenonem aedibus absterrui.* So the Mss., rightly, I believe. May not the *bus* of *aedibus* be scanned as a long syllable?

XCVI. 1. *Domitionem.* The Harleian has *domuitionem* here, *domuictonem*, altered to *domuitionem*, 357. 11. *Domuitionem* is surely right, cf. Plac. 31. 7, *Domuitionem, domum reditum.*

ib. 10. *plenus.* The Harleian has *plennus.* Surely *blennus* is right; in the same line the Harleian reads *deplaterant* for *deblaterant.*

ib. 19. *dixit.* The Harleian has *dicit.*

ib. 33. *dulcitudine.* The first reading of the Harleian is *dulcedine.*

XCVII. 27. *hunc cubuisse.* The Mss. have *hoccubuisse.* May not *accubuisse* be right?

ib. 29. *de noctu.* The Mss. have *de nocte,* rightly, so Macrob. I. 4 (ed. Jahn and Eissenhardt).

XCVIII. 29. *unquam jam.* The Harleian has *unquam eram*, which Bothe conjectured.

XCIX. 8. *fautores.* The Harleian has *favitores.*

ib. 24. *desabulare.* The Harleian has *desubulare* here, and *desubulasse* in 26, rightly it would seem.

CI. 27. *unanimitatem.* The Harleian has *unianimitatem.*

ib. 29. *ea omnia.* The Harleian, first hand, has *et omnia.*

CII. 1. *vallum ducam.* The Harleian has *vallum mittam.*

ib. 13. *deripere.* The Harleian, first hand, has *diripere,* which must surely be right.

ib. 18. *et varias.* The Harleian has *ut varias.*

ib. 33. *sanguen.* The Harleian has *sanguinem* here and 479. 21. So the Edd. of Plaut.

CIII. 16. The Harleian has *emungere.*

ib. 23. The Harleian, first hand, has *maulta,* altered to *matà,* for *multa.*

ib. 25. *si hic.* The Harleian, first hand, has *sibi,* rightly, I should think.

CIV. 2. *scelera.* The Harleian, first hand, has *scelerato.* May not the true reading be *sceleratos?*

27. *sera parecte.* The Harleian, first hand, has *sera perrectae.*

CV. 17. *et dejurare.* The Harleian has *ut,* rightly, I believe.

CVI. 1. *viam conducerent.* The Harleian has *viam qua ducerent* here, *viam quam ducerent* 451. 5. Surely *viam aequam ducerent* is right, which Quicherat has 451.

ib. 10. The Harleian has *sussilimus.*

ib. 27. The Harleian, first hand, gives *ecum* as almost always.

CVII. 4. *liberti atrati.* The Harleian has *liberti semiatrati.*

ib. 14. *donari.* The Harleian, first hand, has *donare.*

CVIII. 3. *ebriacus.* The Harleian, first hand, has *ebriatus* here, and line 7. So Ribbeck from a conjecture.

ib. 5. *hilaram.* The Harleian has *hilariam arripuit,* so apparently the other Mss. Ribbeck reads *hilaria arripuit,* rightly, I should think.

ib. 13. *serens in pectore.* The Harleian has *ferens in pectora.*

ib. 14. The Harleian reads *excisatum,* and *excisatis* in line 15.

ib. 17. *cum primores cibo.* The Harleian reads *pro cibo,* so apparently the other Mss. The Mss. 480. 3 have *cum primoribus de potione.* Surely, *cum primo cibo* should be read, as Quicherat 480.

CIX. 5. *voluptati.* The Harleian has *voluntati* not *voluntatis.*

ib. 32. *naturam fidam.* The Harleian gives *fidam naturam,* rightly, so Ribbeck.

CX. 18. *Fulgurivit.* The Harleian, first hand, has *fulgoravit,* so line 19.

ib. 21. The Harleian reads *Luporum exauctorem malvanum et fulguritarum arborum.*

I propose, *Fulgoravit, et fulgurivit, fulgorem fecit vel fulmine afflavit, Naevius Danae;*

Suo sonitu claro fulgoravit Jupiter.

Lucil. lib. XXVI.

Lucorum exauctorem Albanum et fulguritarum arborum.

For *Lucorum exauctorem,* cf. Verg. G. I. 27, *Auctorem frugum,* and for *fulguritarum arborum,* cf. Paul. 92. 17, *Fulguritum, id quod est fulmine ictum, qui locus statim fieri putabatur religiosus, quod eum deus sibi dicasse videretur.* In 18, *fulgoravit* refers to

fulgorem fecit, fulgurivit to *fulmine afflavit, fulgurivit* has disappeared in the Harleian, *fulgoravit* in the other Mss.

ib. 30. The Harleian has *fligi affligi* (om. *pro*).

CXII. 4. *Frustatim.* The Harleian, first hand, has *frustritim* or *frustratim,* but two letters have been erased before the *tim,* from which I conjecture that the original reading was, *Frustulatim et frustillatim.*

ib. 7. *Et te objectes,* &c. The Harleian reads *Ei te objectes frustratim,* for which I propose, *Ei te objectes frustulatim,* as in line 4, which restores the metre.

ib. 10. *Fastidibiliter.* The Harleian, first hand, has *fastidiligenter,* so twice below. Should we not in each case read, *Fastidienter?* This word occurs in Apuleius a great imitator of old Latin. In line 10 the Harleian also reads *Cras credo,* as elsewhere.

ib. 20. *Fax pro faces,* i.e. the use of the singular for the plural, cf. inf. 114. 1, cf. also Paul. 87. 8, *Faces antiqui dicebant, ut fides,* which surely means that *faces* originally was only used in the plural, like *fides fidium.*

ib. 21. *initia.* Should we not read *initio?* Varro seems to be speaking of the marriage ceremony, and arguing that it was originally celebrated at night, in memory of which torches are still used. In the same line should we not read *nunc spinea* for *nunc pinea,* cf. 25.

ib. 25. The Harleian, first hand, has *foco.* In the same line for *ex pinu alba* should we not read *e spina alba?* The Harleian has *ex pinalba.*

ib. 27. *Flavissas.* The Mss. have *flavisas,* as also CXIII. 1, rightly. So Gellius II. 10.

CXIII. 3. *et quod ipsum formidet.* The Harleian, first hand, has *eo quod ipsum et formidet.*

The Harleian, first hand, has *formidolosum,* and also *formidolosus,* line 4.

ib. 6. *atque.* The Harleian has *aequa* corrected to *aeque.* Surely *aeque* is right forming the end of a Hexameter.

ib. 7. *quosque.* The Mss. have *quoque.* Should we not read with Gellius 17. 2. 5, *quemque,* i. e. *quéque?*

ib. 8. The Harleian has *parco* corrected to *pareo.*

ib. 14. *ex illa.* The Harleian has *ex ea,* so Madvig.

ib. 17. The Harleian has *fabellarumque.*

CXIV. 1. *Frons pro frondis. Frons pro frode,* the Harleian, first hand, *pro fronde* the other Mss., so, including the Harleian inf. 486. Should we not read *frons pro frondes,* i.e. the singular for the plural? Cf. *fax pro faces,* 112. 20. Is not this supported by Charis. 36. 7. K? *Sunt quaedam, quae singulariter non in omnibus casibus cadunt, verum pluralem declinationem sollemnem admittunt, velut frondem et fronde, sicut apud Verg. Fronde super viridi, frugem et fruge potest, vicem et vice,* where he seems to mean that the only cases of *frons* used in the singular are *frondem* and *fronde.* On the other hand, Serv. on Verg. G. II. 372, has *Frondis vera lectio est;* the Harleian too has a marginal note, *quia frons et frondis dixerunt veteres.*

Again, Charis. 130. 30. K. has, *Fros sine n littera . . .* Varro *rerum rusticarum, libro* I, *ulmos et populos unde est fros,* which would look as if we should read here, *Fros, pro fronde.* On the whole I am inclined to lean to the first theory, unless the explanation should rather in each case be omitted. Cf. *Nex, pro nece,* inf. 145. 20. What can *pro nece* mean here?

ib. 26. Cf. Diomed. 384 K., *Hinc quoque Grundiles lares dictos accepimus, quos Romulus constituisse dicitur in honorem scrofae quae triginta peperat.*

CXV. 2. *semina concipere.* The Harleian has *seminare incipere.* Is not the right reading *semina recipere?*

ib. 17. The Harleian reads *gravidinosos quosdam torminosos.* So also 32. 14.

ib. 18. *calobathrarii.* The Harleian has *colobathatrari.* We should read *colobathrarii,* cf. κωλοβαθριστής in Hesychius.

ib. 19. *quibus innituntur.* The Harleian has *qui mituntur.*

ib. 20. *ligneae συνάρθμιοι et.* The Harleian, first hand, has *lignae finare molet.* Buecheler reads *ligna φύσει ἀκίνητα et.* I would suggest, *ligneae inanimae et,* which comes nearer to the Mss.

ib. 21. The Harleian, first hand, reads *quiinistatagitantur.*

CXVI. 8. The Harleian, first hand, reads *Protesilatidamia.*

ib. 25. *fugam pars.* The Mss. read *fugam sparsi.* I would suggest *alii . . . occultam fugam sparsi, pars globis.*

ib. 33. The Mss. read, *Suas manus,* which is surely right as it completes the metre.

CXVII. 20. *lib.* III. The Harleian, first hand, reads *lib.* IIII.

ib. 24. The Harleian reads *defraudans,* and *defraudet,* line 27.

CXVIII. 2. *illae gumiae.* The Mss. have *gemiae illiae.* May *illotae* be the true reading?

ib. 3. The Harleian has *frumentarii.*

ib. 22. *gratificari, gratum facere.* The Harleian reads *gratificare re gratum,* altered to *se gratum.* May not *se gratum* be right?

CXIX. 24. *genius generis deus.* The Harleian has *genius generis Laberius,* omitting *deus.*

I suggest, *genius, Laberius,* omitting *generis,* which seems to have been inserted from the example.

ib. 27. *Habentia ut industria.* The Harleian, first hand, has *Habentia industria.*

CXX. 8. *Halophantam ut sycophantam.* The Mss. have *aut sycofantam.* I propose *Halophantam, hominum,* omitting *aut sycofantam,* which I believe to have been inserted from the example, where the Mss. read *Halofantam, aut sycofantam.*

CXXI. 13. The Harleian reads *recedere ab hostia,* omitting *dictum.*

ib. 20. *Hallucinari.* The Mss. have *halucinari* here, and *halucinationes* in line 23. Gellius XVI. 12. 3, and Fest. 24, *alucinari,* which I would read here.

CXXII. 3. For *asinis* the Harleian reads *innullis* altered to *mulis.*

CXXIII. 10. *ignavum fecit.* So the Harleian.

ib. 21. For *ad incitas,* the Harleian reads *ad incitam,* altered to *ad incita.* So also line 23. May not *ad incitam* be right in line 21? Cf. Plac. 7. 2, *Ad incitam, ad extremam fortunam.*

CXXIV. 8. The Harleian has *Demandatis* (*sic*).

ib. 11. The Harleian, first hand, has *animam.*

ib. 17. The Harleian, first hand, has *quondam.*

ib. 19. *At qui,* so the Mss. and Lucian Mueller.

ib. 24. The Harleian has *quod agitur,* omitting *num.*

ib. 29. The Harleian has *Liberne es? non sum liber verum inibi est quasi,* which is clearly right as it completes the metre. The second *liber* and *quasi* are dotted underneath by the second hand.

ib. 31. The Harleian, first hand, has *aut jam.*

ib. 32. The Harleian has *insciae* not *inscie.*

CXXV. 10. *invasse.* The Mss. have *invadere.* Lucian Mueller reads *insinuare,* which is, I should think, certainly right, cf. 159. 32 (Lucr. III. 722), where the Mss. have *invadi* for *insinuari.*

ib. 28. *huic deinque petigo.* The Mss. have *huic denique spei* here, *huic denique petigo,* 160. 18. May not the true reading be *huicce inque petigo,* a tmesis for *impetigo?*

CXXVI. 2. The Harleian reads *inperfundiae* for *imperfunditie.*

ib. 8. In this gloss the Harleian, first hand, reads

Jejentare, Afranius...
Jejentare nulla invitat.

Plaut. Curc.,

Quid antepones Veneri jejentaculi.

Afranius,

Haec jejuna jejentavit.

Varro Marcipore,

Ut eat.....quod pulli jentent.

The longer form is clearly right in the passage from Plautus, and the two passages from Afranius, as it completes the metre. *Jejentaculum* should also be restored, Plaut. Curc. I. 1. 73, where we should read,

Me inferre Veneri vovi jejentaculum.

The Mss. of Plaut. seem to have *alentaculum,* the editors

jam jentaculum.

In the passage from Varro *jentent,* the reading of the Harleian and other Mss., may be right. If so I would propose to

read in line 8, *Jejentare et jentare.* If this were the original reading one of the two verbs would almost certainly disappear.

CXXVII. 8. *Hetaerista.* The Harleian, first hand, gives *etacrista*, i.e. *etaerista.*

ib. 17. The Harleian, first hand, has *nausimacho*, i.e. *pausimacho.*

ib. 19. The Harleian, first hand, reads *si ston habuissem.* Should we not read ?

Si istoc habuissem ingenio amatores mihi.

ib. 26. *indiscriminatim et promisce.* The Mss. have *indiscriminatim promisce*, without *et.* Should not *promisce* be rejected as a gloss on *indiscriminatim* ?

ib. 32. For *at*, the Mss. have *ab*, which is surely right. The number of years after the foundation of the city is not given.

CXXVIII. 6. *de off.* &c. The Harleian has *de officiis. Ut ii qui*, altered to *de officiis* II. *ut qui.* The III. in the original reading has been confused with the *Ut.*

ib. 20. *Ita prudentiae.* The Harleian reads *Ista prudentiae*, as the Edd. of Cicero.

ib. 33. The Mss. give *Judicatum atque addictum.* I suggest, *judicio damnatum atque addictum* from Plac. 59. 12, *Judicatus, judicio addictus damnatusque*, where he seems to be referring to this passage from Plautus.

CXXIX. 8. *Inauritum.* The Mss. have *inauditum* as also in 10. This seems right as it is also found in Gell. VI. 6.

ib. 15. The Harleian, first hand, has *nesciat ut sit incognitum.* Is not *nesciat aut sit incognitum* right? cf. Gell. VIIII. 12. 21, *Ignarus non tantum qui ignorat set qui ignoratur.* The example from Vergil would correspond to the first sense.

ib. 20. The Harleian reads *inhermis illatebrasse illatebrant.* Gell. XVII. 2. 3 has *inermi inlatebrant sese. Inlatebrant verbum poeticum. Inermi* should be restored in Nonius (so Quicherat, &c.), cf. 492. 23 inf., where the Harleian has *inhermis* for *inermi.* Should we not also read *inlatebrant sese*, omitting *inlatebrant* altogether, which seems to be due to a misunderstanding of the passage in Gellius ? This is clearly one of the passages where

Nonius borrows from Gellius. We have three consecutive glosses from Gell. IX. 12, XVII. 2, and XIX. 8.

ib. 25. *in fronte.* The Harleian and most Mss. have *frontem*, so Gell. XIX. 8. 6.

CXXX. 6. The Harleian, first hand, has *intonso.*

ib. 14. *exportatum ablatum.* The Harleian (om. *pro*).

CXXXI. 26. *ita occaecat.* The Mss. have *ita hic curat.* Should we not read, *Ita hic oscurat,* a form which occurs in the Harleian for *obscurat*?

CXXXII. 18. *pro claro.* The Harleian, first hand, has *pro praeclaro.*

ib. 23. For *cujus quemodi,* the Harleian, first hand, has *cujusmodi.*

CXXXIII. 8. *Praegredere.* The Harleian has *progredere.*

ib. 16. *Spectant.* The Harleian 214. 21, reads *expectant,* which should be restored here.

J. H. ONIONS.

(*To be continued.*)

LEXICOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

[Most of the following are from papers read before the Oxford Philological Society.]

Agina, Trica.

The word *agina* is usually written in the lexicons *agīna*, with what reason it is difficult to say. The analogy of *sarcĭna* from *sarc-*, *pagĭna* from *pag-*, and *angĭna* from *ang-*, suggests that *agĭna* (from *ag-*) is the right scansion. Paulus, p. 10, explains *agina* as *quo inseritur scapus trutinae, id est in quo foramine trutina se vertit.* Thus it should mean the pendant in which the beam of a balance moves (*agitur*); if the balance had a tongue, as was sometimes though not always the case, the *agina* would be attached to the tongue; otherwise it would be attached to the beam itself.

Placidus, p. 9 (Deuerling), identifies *agina* with *scapus:* but his gloss is probably no more than a confused reminiscence of that in Verrius Flaccus.

From *agina* was derived a denominative verb *aginare* or *aginari*, which is explained in the so-called glosses of Isidore (Löwe, Prodr. Gloss. p. 427) as = *tricari, in parvo morari*, to stick at trifles. On the same page Löwe quotes another gloss, *aginantes, explicantes*, for which I would propose to read *aginantes, tricantes.* Finally Gloss. Steph. p. 9 gives *aginat*, διαπράσσεται, στρέφει, μηχανᾶται. In Petronius 61, Heinsius conjectured *aginavi*, I pondered or considered, which is accepted by Bücheler in his second edition.

From *agino* or *aginor* was further formed a verbal substantive *aginator*, explained as follows by Paulus, p. 10;

aginatores dicuntur qui parvo lucro moventur. Placidus, p. 9, says *aginatorem, negotiatorem actus:* perhaps we should read *aginator, negotiator exactus.*

It seems then clear that at the time of Verrius Flaccus, that is, in the age of Augustus, the word *agina* was familiar in the sense of the pendant in which the beam (or tongue) of the balance turned, and *aginare* or *aginari* in the metaphorical sense of haggling or making a fuss over a bargain. It should now be noticed that the so-called glosses of Isidore explain *aginari* as synonymous with *tricari.*

In attempting to explain the word *trica,* it will perhaps be best to start with the compound verbs *extrico* and *intrico. Extrico* in its earliest usage seems to have meant to loosen or untie; Plautus, Epid. 1 2 49 *extricabor aliqua ope:* Hor. Od. 3 5 31 *extricata densis Cerva plagis:* Dig. 9 2 27 30 *margaritas extricatas,* unstrung pearls. In a metaphorical sense it means to unravel. Varro, Gerontodidascalus (ap. Non. p. 8), *putas eos non citius tricas Atellanas quam id extricaturos:* Vatinius to Cicero, Fam. 5 10 1, *de Dionysio tuo nihil adhuc extrico* (the difficulty is not yet cleared up).

Intricare means exactly the opposite, to involve, entangle; Plautus Persa 457 (R.), *lenonem intricatum dabo,* I will get him into the net: Afranius ap. Non. p. 8, *ita intricavit huius hanc rem temeritas:* Cicero ap. Gell. 7 2 15, *Chrysippus ... intricatur hoc modo* (entangles himself).

From these passages it seems fair to infer that *trica* must have meant something complicated, as a net or web, or twisted, as a string or cord, and be connected with *τρέ-πω* and *tor-queo.*

The word is hardly used, in the existing literature, in its literal sense: yet a trace of this may perhaps be found in Plautus Rudens 1323 (Fleckeisen): *nummos trecentos. Tricas. Quadringentos. Tramas putridas. Trica* and *trama* (the woof) are here put together as though their meanings were akin. And when Varro in the above-quoted passage says *tricas Atellanas extricare,* he means, I suppose, to untie the knots or complications of an Atellane play. The phrase seems to have been proverbial; Arnobius 5 28 *tricas, quemadmodum dicitur,*

conduplicare Atellanas, where Hildebrand and Reifferscheid read *Tellenas*.

Metaphorically *tricae* does not so much mean trifles as complications, entanglements, artificial difficulties; as Nonius says (p. 8), *tricae sunt impedimenta et implicationes*. Plautus Persa 531, *nihil mihi opus est litibus neque tricis:* Most. 556 (Lorenz), *quin tu istas mittis tricas;* Caelius ap. Cic. Fam. 8 5 2 *ut...in his tricis moretur*. So *tricari:* Cic. Att. 14 19 4 *Publius tecum tricatus est:* 15 13 *b* 1, *Vettienum accusat, tricatur scilicet, ut homo talis;* is merely dallying with the matter, making factitious delays.

The adjective *tricosus* is quoted from Lucilius by Gellius 11 7 7 and Nonius p. 79. Müller is probably wrong in reading *strigosus*, for Placidus, p. 13, evidently from a reminiscence of the same line of Lucilius *hic 'st tricosus bovinatorque, ore improbus duro*, says *bovinator, tricosus et inconstans*, the MSS. giving no variant.

Let us now for a moment consider the phrase *apinae tricaeque*, familiar from Martial 1 113 2, *apinasque nostras*, and 14 1 7, *sunt apinae tricaeque et si quid vilius istis*. Pliny 3 104 speaks of two towns in Apulia *quae in proverbi ludicrum venerunt, Apinam et Tricam*. This explanation may be right, but it has the appearance of great artificiality. Is it possible that the original form of the proverb was *aginae tricaeque*, 'hagglings and tricks,' a metaphor taken from commercial dealings, and that the phrase *apinae et tricae*, current in the time of Martial and Pliny, is due to a scholar's mistake, born of the fact that Apina and Trica were the names of two neighbouring towns in Apulia? If *apina* be the genuine form, we may suppose that it was derived from *ap-*, to tie or fasten, and originally meant, like *trica*, a string.

The word *apenarius*, quoted from Trebellius Pollio, Gallienus 9 3, is, I think, wrongly explained by Georges as connected with *apina*, and as meaning 'possenreisser' or 'clowns.' It should rather be derived from the Greek *ἀπήνη*, and mean drivers of war-chariots.

Alapa manumissionis.

The only authorities quoted by Georges as evidence for the supposed custom of slapping a slave when he was manumitted are Phaedrus 2 5 25, and Petronius 38 9. It seems to me that the passage in Phaedrus proves nothing at all about an *alapa manumissionis*, but contains a good joke of the emperor Tiberius which has unfortunately been misunderstood. The story is as follows: Tiberius was walking in the garden of his villa at Misenum, when one of the *atrienses* came up and began, officiously and unasked, to water the ground before his master's feet. Seeing that the man expected some acknowledgment, Tiberius called him, and on his running up eagerly to receive his expected reward, said *Non multum egisti, et opera nequiquam perit; Multo maioris alapae mecum veneunt.* That is, 'You deserve nothing but a slap for your pains, and you have not done enough to deserve even that.' The passage in Petronius, *est tamen sub alapa et non vult sibi male* (said of a freedman), need mean no more than that he still stands in a servile relation to his former master. The only direct testimony which I have been able to find on the subject is a note in Isidore, 9 4 48: *quos manumittebant, eos alapa percussos circumagebant;* which is repeated in the scholia to Persius 5 75.

Amentum.

This word is spelt in the glossaries *admentum* and *ammentum* (Loewe, Prodromus Glossariorum, p. 369), but scholars do not seem to have observed that both spellings were probably known to Verrius Flaccus. For Paulus, p. 12, says *amenta quibus ut mitti possint vinciuntur iacula, sive solearum lora; ex Graeco quod est ἄμματα sic appellata, vel quia aptantes ea ad mentum trahant.* The Greek etymology would justify *ammentum*, the Latin *admentum*. As the word occurs in Paulus just before *adtegrare*, *adtutum*, *attestate*, and *adtubernalis*, the gloss should perhaps be headed *admenta*. (In Vergil Aen. 9 665 the Romanus gives *armenta*, which is per-

haps a mistake for *admenta*; and the Graeco-Latin glosses edited by Labbaeus have *armentum, ἄμμα τῶν ἀκοντίων.*) *Admentis* is given by the Donaueschingen MS. of Orosius 5 15 16, *ammentis* by the Laurentian, *agmenta* by D, *augmenta* by L, in 6 11 3.

Ancyromagus.

This, according to Isidore 19 1 16, was the name of a ship *dictus pro eo quod celeritate sua ancoris et instrumentis reliquis navium vehendis sit aptus.* The word occurs also in the Vatican glosses edited by Mai 7 551 *b*. Whatever be the true form of the word—one would rather have expected *ancyragogus*—it has occurred to me that it ought perhaps to be restored to Gellius (10 25 5). Gellius gives the following names of ships: *gauli, corbitae, caudicae, longae, hippagines, cercuri, celoces* or *κέλητες, lembi, oreae, lenunculi, actuariae, prosumiae, stlattae, scaphae, pontones, †veientimoedia†, phaselli, parones, myoparones, lintres, caupuli, camarae, placidae, cydarum, ratariae, catascopium.* Does the corrupt *veientimoedia* stand for *ancyromagi*?

Cilo.

Paulus p. 43 distinguishes *chilo* and *cilo. Chilo dicitur cognomento a magnitudine labrorum; cilo sine aspiratione cui frons est eminentior, ac dextra sinistraque velut recisa videtur.* This note is to be found in a fuller form in Charisius p. 102 (Keil) who (or whose authority) may have taken it from Verrius Flaccus. Compare also Velius Longus p. 74 (Keil): Caper Orthographia p. 97 *cilo est capite angusto.* The diminutive *cilunculus* occurs in Arnobius 3 14. I would suggest that *cilo* should be restored for *silo* to Varro's *satura γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, quoted by Nonius p. 25, *nonne non unum scribunt esse grandibus superciliis, silonem, quadratum, quod Silenus hirsutis superciliis fingeretur.* The manuscripts and editions of Nonius say *silones superciliis prominentibus dicti:* surely we should read in accordance with the other glosses *cilones. Silones* is defended by Loewe (Prodromus p. 392), who appeals to Festus p. 340 *silus appellatur naso susus versus repando, silo σιμός*, and Gloss. Philox. p. 198 1. But it must be observed in the first place

that the meanings respectively assigned to *silo* and *silus* by Festus and Nonius are different, and secondly that *silo* (like *naso, bucco,* &c.) should be derived not from an adjective but from a noun.

For *non unum* in Nonius Bücheler reads *hominem.* Is the right reading *Silenum*?

Dirigo.

That *derigo* and not *dirigo* should be written wherever the meaning is to straighten, aim, direct, in other words wherever there is the notion of moving or aiming anything in a straight line either perpendicular or horizontal, all scholars who have examined the evidence seem now to agree. Agroecius 115 says *derectum in rectum vadens, directum in latera rectum.* Munro on Lucretius 6 823 does not admit the distinction; but I am disposed to think it was real. Paulus p. 69 says *dirigere invenitur apud Plautum pro discidere.* Just above this he has said *dierectum dicebant per antiphrasin, volentes significare malum diem.* The interpretation given to *dierectum* probably rests on some corruption or misunderstanding; for Nonius p. 49 explains the word in perfect accordance with its known usages, *dierecti dicuntur cruci fixi.* But I wish to raise the question whether *dierectus* is not a mere misspelling for *deirectus*, and whether the two notes in Paulus on *dierectum* and *dirigere* are not fragments of one, in which Verrius Flaccus discussed the word *dirigo* at length. Nonius again p. 290 has the following note: *diligit dividit. Plautus Curculione* (3 54) '*clupeatus elephantum ubi machaera diligit.*' *Titinius Proelia* '*pernam totam diligit.*' In the passage in Plautus Goetz reads *dissicit:* but I would urge that either no alteration is required, and that *diligo* means originally to 'unbind, untie,' or that if any alteration be made, it should be from *diligit* to *dirigit* (= *discīdit*). *L* and *R* are so commonly confused in ancient manuscripts that no violence would be done by the change.

If this reasoning be correct, *derigo* should properly mean to stretch downwards or straight, *deirigo* or *dirigo* to stretch in two directions, or divide in two parts.

I am not of course denying that in later Latin, after the

pronunciation of *ē* and *ī* had become confused, *derigo* was commonly written *dirigo*.

Metuere deos.

In the paper printed p. 563 foll. of the *Commentationes Philologicae* published in honour of Mommsen, Bernays has some remarks on the words *religionis Iudaicae metuenti*, which occur in an inscription C. I. L. 5 1 88. His argument is that the word *metuo* here and in Juvenal's *metuentem sabbata patrem* is a translation from the Hebrew word for 'to fear' God. It should however be pointed out that the phrase *metuere deos* is as old as Plautus: Pseud. 269, *deos quidem, quos maxume aequomst metuere, eos minumi facit.* So Terence Hec. 5 2 6, *nec deos metuunt istae;* Horace Od. 1 35 13 *te* (Fortuna)...*purpurei metuunt tyranni, Iniurioso ne pede proruas Stantem columnam.* Elsewhere we find *metuens* used as an adjective followed by the gen. *numinis* or *deorum:* Ovid Met. 1 323 *aut illa metuentior ulla deorum* (and elsewhere in Ovid); Persius 2 31 *metuens divum matertera.* From these passages the natural inference surely is that *metuere deos* is as much a genuine Italian phrase as δεισιδαιμονία is a genuine Greek word; and that although, supposing an Italian to wish to represent in his own language the Hebrew idea of 'fearing God,' he would use *metuo* and not *timeo*, there is no reason to assume any direct borrowing from the Hebrew.

Prona maria.

This seems to have been a familiar expression for a smooth sea. Pliny Paneg. 86 *Caesar in illa amicitiae specula stetit, precatusque est abeunti prona maria celeremque decursum.* This then may be its meaning in Vergil Aen. 5 212 *Mnestheus... prona petit maria et pelago decurrit aperto.*

Rapo.

Nonius p. 26 *rapones a rapiendo dicti. Varro Papia Papae,* περὶ ἐγκωμίων; *praetor vester eripuit mihi pecuniam; de eo questum ad annum veniam ad novum magistratum, cum hic rapo*

umbram quoque spei devorassit. Possibly this word should be restored to Gaius Gracchus quoted by Gellius 15 12; *si ulla meretrix domum meam introivit aut cuiusquam servulus propter me sollicitatus est, omnium nationum postremissimum nequissimumque existimatote. Omnium nationum* is the reading of the manuscripts; the corrupt *nationum* has been variously emended, by Lipsius into *natorum,* by Gronovius into *latronum,* by Beloe into *hominum natorum.* Of these emendations *natorum* is clearly the best from a palaeographical point of view, but it seems doubtful whether *omnium natorum* or *hominum natorum* would be good Latin, though *nemo natus* is. Besides, the adjectives *postremissimum nequissimumque* would have more point, if the word with which they are joined referred to some definite quality; compare Sallust, Hist. 1 48 3, *M. Aemilius, omnium flagitiosorum postremus:* 4 61 12 *incepta mea postremus servorum Archelaus exercitu prodito impedivit.* From this point of view Gronovius's emendation *latronum* is more suitable to the context than *natorum. Raponum* would be palaeographically almost as good as *natorum,* and more pointed perhaps than *latronum.* It should be noticed that Varro uses it of a provincial governor; compare also the uses of *raptus* and *raptor.*

Remulcum.

This word is, in all the lexicons, referred to the Greek *ῥῡμουλκέω.* The difference of the quantity alone should make us hesitate here, for the first syllable of *remulcum* is short; Valgius quoted by Isidore 19 4 8 *hic mea me longo succedens prora remulco Laetantem gratis sistit in hospitiis.* Again there is another word similar to *remulcum* and apparently with the same meaning, *promulcum* or *promulcus.* Paulus 224 *promulco agi dicitur cum scaphae ducitur fune.* No one, so far as I know, proposes to give a Greek origin to *promulcum.*

I agree with Müller in his note on Paulus, p. 279 s. v. *remulco,* that *remulcum* should be connected with *remeligo,* a delay, of which instances are quoted from Plautus and the comedians. In other words, there was a base *mel-* or *mul-* (perhaps identical with *mor-* in *mŏr-a* and *re-mŏr-a*), which

meant to drag or pull. *Promellere* is said by Paulus p. 250 to mean *promovere.* In *remulcum* the base appears with an additional suffix, *mul-cŏ-.* But this consideration at once leads us to connect *remulcum* with *mulceo, praemulceo, promulceo,* and *remulceo. Mulceo* is properly to pull gently, so to handle gently; *mulgeo,* to milk, is in all probability only another form of the same word. *Praemulceo* and *promulceo* occur together in Apuleius, Florida 1 3 p. 342, *praemulsis antiis et promulsis capronis;* his long curls drawn down in front, his front hair drawn forward over his forehead. *Remulceo* means to draw gently back: Vergil Aen. 11 812 *caudamque remulcens Subiecit pavitantem utero:* Apuleius Met. 1 2 *aures* (*equi*) *remulceo, frenos detraho. Mulcare* means to pull about, to handle: *promulgare* I suppose means literally to draw out to the light.

Seco = Narro.

The evidence for the existence of a verb *seco* or *sequo* = *narro* is contained in a note of Paulus, p. 111, *inseque apud Ennium dic, insexit dixerit;* in Gellius, 18 9 2 foll., where it is argued that *insece, insecenda* are the right forms, not *inseque, insequenda:* and in Placidus, p. 59 16, *insequis, narras, refers, sed interdum pergis.* A comparison of the two last notes makes it very probable that they, like that of Paulus, were derived from Verrius Flaccus. A gloss quoted by Loewe (Prodromus, p. 420), *sequius sermo* (of which more anon), may be explained by the notes above cited; and perhaps the manuscripts of Plautus, Mil. Glor. 1220 (Ritschl), are right as against modern editions in giving *sum secuta* (I have spoken), not *sum locuta.*

Before considering the question whether *sec-* = *narrare* is identical (as the ancient Roman scholars seem to have supposed) with *sec-* = *sequi,* I wish to call attention to a passage in the above quoted chapter of Gellius which I cannot but think has been misunderstood. To make the matter perfectly clear I will transcribe the whole (18 9 2 foll.). Part of it is unfortunately mutilated.

'Insecenda' quid esset, quaeri coeptum. Tum ex his qui aderant, alter litterator fuit, alter litteras sciens: id est alter

docens, doctus alter. Hi duo inter se dissentiebant. Et grammaticus quidem contendebat...'insequenda,' enim scribi inquit, debet, non 'insecenda,' quoniam 'insequens' significat... traditumque esse 'inseque,' quasi 'perge dicere,' et 'insequere;' itaque ab Ennio scriptum in his versibus 'Inseque, Musa, manu Romanorum induperator Quod quisque in bello gessit cum rege Philippo.' Alter autem ille eruditior, nihil mendum, sed recte atque integre scriptum esse perseverabat, et Velio Longo, non homini indocto, fidem esse habendam, qui in commentario quod fecisset de usu antiquae lectionis scripserit non 'inseque' apud Ennium legendum, sed 'insece;' ideoque a veteribus, quas 'narrationes' dicimus, 'insectiones' esse appellatas; Varronem quoque versum hunc Plauti de Menaechmis, 'nihilo minus esse videntur sectius quam somnia,' sic enarrasse; 'nihilo magis narranda esse quam si ea essent somnia.' Haec illi inter se certabant.

Ego arbitror et a M. Catone 'insecenda' et a Q. Ennio 'insece' scriptum sine 'u' littera. Offendi enim in bybliotheca Patrensi librum verae vetustatis Livii Andronici, qui inscriptus est 'Οδύσσεια, in quo erat versus primus, cum hoc verbo, sine 'u' littera, 'Virum mihi, Camena, insece versutum,' factus ex illo Homeri versu Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον. Illi igitur aetatis et fidei magnae libro credo. Nam quod in versu Plautino est 'sectius quam somnia' nihil in alteras partes argumenti habet. Etiamsi veteres autem non 'inseque,' sed 'insece' dixerunt, credo quia erat lenius leviusque, tamen eiusdem sententiae verbum videtur. Nam et 'sequo' (seco?) et 'sequor' et item 'secta' et 'sectio' consuetudine loquendi differunt: sed qui penitus inspexerit, origo et ratio utriusque una est.

Doctores quoque et interpretes vocum Graecarum ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα, et ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, dictum putant quod Latine 'inseque' dicitur; namque in altero ν geminum, in altero σ esse tralatum dicunt. Sed etiam ipsum illud ἔπη quod significat verba aut versus, non aliunde esse dictum tradunt, quam ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕπεσθαι καὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν. Eadem ergo ratione antiqui nostri narrationes sermonesque 'insectiones' appellaverunt.

I wish to call especial attention to the line from the

Menaechmi (1047), which is thus given from the manuscripts by Ritschl; *Haec nihilo esse mihi videntur sectius quam somnia.* This line is usually quoted as giving an example of an adverb *sectius* = *setius,* and translated 'these things seem to me nothing else than dreams.' It strikes one as odd that the singular *sectius* can thus be used for *sectiora.* But passing over this, there seems to be no evidence anywhere for the form *sectius* but this line: old inscriptions and good manuscripts agree in giving *sētius* (not to be confounded with *secus* or *sequius*). The consideration however which to my mind throws most suspicion on the form *sectius* is this: that Varro explained the line in question to mean *haec nihilo magis narranda esse quam somnia.* The word *narranda* can refer to no word in the line except the supposed *sectius:* for just below Gellius, in discussing the respective claims of *insece* and *inseque,* says: *quod in versu Plautino est, 'sectius quam somnia,' nihil in alteras partes argumenti habet.* What point can there be in this remark if *sectius* = *setius*? The whole gist of the discussion is that *insequo* or *inseco* means *narro,* and *insectio* = *narratio.*

I think it therefore almost certain that instead of *sectius* we should read *sectio* or *sectio est.* The line according to Varro should yield the sense *nihilo magis narranda esse quam si ea essent somnia.* The manuscripts of Plautus give *haec nihilo esse mihi videntur sectius quam somnia.* May the line have run thus: *haec nihilo est mage, ut videtur, sectio quam somnia?* or *haec nihilo mage, ut videtur, sectiost quam somnia?* The construction *nihilo mage sectio est haec quam somnia* for *haec nihilo magis secenda sunt quam somnia* might be easily paralleled from Plautus, who uses verbals in *-tio* with a following accusative, as *quae tibi hunc virum tactiost* for *cur hunc virum tangis?*

The gloss *sequius sermo* may also easily, and without any violence to the *ductus litterarum,* be corrected thus; *sectio est sermo.*

Seco to say ought however, to all appearance, to be distinguished from

Seco = Sequor.

Nonius p. 404 says *secare sequi, unde et sectatores bonorum sectores dicti sunt. Vergilius lib.* x (107) '*quam quisque secat spem.*' Servius on the passage in question repeats this explanation, *secat, sequitur, tenet, habet, ut* (6. 900) '*Ille viam secat ad naves*'; *unde et sectas dicimus habitus animorum et instituta philosophiae circa disciplinam.* Comp. Isid. 19 19 8 *sectio dicta a sequendo ea quae ceperit* (cupiat?) *nam secare sectari et sequi est.* The glosses edited by Hildebrand give (p. 269) *secat, meat, praecidit;* and conversely (p. 206) *meat, secat.*

The notes in Nonius and Servius, as is so often the case, have all the appearance of having been derived from a common source; and if I am right in my reasoning in the essays introductory to the fourth edition of Conington's Virgil (vol. 1) this common authority is probably at least as old as the age of Trajan. Gellius in the passage which we have been discussing seems to imply that he knew or thought he knew of a word *seco = sequor*: but it is difficult to say whether he would have identified this with, or classed it as akin to, the *secare = sequi* of Nonius and Servius. However this may be, Verrius Flaccus undoubtedly connected *sectio* and *sectores* with *sequor*, for Paulus p. 337 says *sectio persecutio iuris; sectores et qui secant dicuntur et qui empta sua persequuntur.* Comp. Pseudo-Ascon. Verr. 1 § 61, *sectores autem dicti qui spem lucri sui secuti bona condemnatorum semel auctionabantur, proque his pecuniam pensitabant singulis.* We may fairly assume, I think, that no Roman scholar would have supposed that *sector* and *sectio* were formally identical with *secutor* and *secutio*, and we might therefore, even had there been no such notes in Nonius and Servius as we have quoted, have assumed that in their opinion these words come from a lost word *seco = sequor.* As it is, we have the testimony of Nonius and Servius to the actual existence of such a word, and the fact (which should not be lost sight of) that *inseco* or *insequo* was by some explained as = *pergo.*

The existence of *seco = sequor* might also have been inferred from the word *secta*, even had Servius, or his authority, not connected the verb with the substantive. *Secta* means a way,

From the time of Naevius downwards *sectam sequi*, to follow a path or a track, is common in Latin. The line of Naevius himself, *eorum sectam secuntur multi mortales*, many people follow the way they are going, is as good an instance as any. And that *secta* was felt to be equivalent to *via* by classical writers may be inferred from Cicero N. D. 2 § 67, *habet (natura) quasi viam quandam atque sectam quam sequatur:* Juvenal 14 122 *unam Ire viam pergant et eidem incumbere sectae.*

There seems then to be a fair amount of evidence that there was in Latin a word *seco*, which meant originally to go, to go after, or to follow; just as *peto*, which originally meant to go or move, came afterwards to be used in the sense of to make for, or to claim. I venture to think that traces of this word may be found in several phrases familiar in Roman law.

The words *sectio* and *sector* were, as we have seen, taken by Verrius Flaccus as derived not from *seco* to cut, but from *seco* to follow. Does this etymology accord with their usage?

Most modern authorities, I am aware, prefer to take *sectio* and *sector* as derived from *seco* in the sense of to divide; some supposing the words to have come down from a time when the booty was literally divided, others referring the words to a supposed percentage of profit made by the *sector*.

A great difficulty in the way of this explanation is the fact that *seco* never means to divide unless when followed by an explanatory clause such as *in partes*. Nor do I think that the usages of the words in question, when fairly examined, will be found to require the notion of cutting or division at all.

Sector meant a purchaser of property sold by the *populus:* in practice this meant a man who bought spoil taken from an enemy, or the property of a proscribed citizen. Gaius 4 146 *item ei qui publice bona emerit, eiusdem condicionis interdictum proponitur quod appellatur sectorium, quod sectores vocantur qui publice bona mercantur;* Cicero Rosc. Am. § 103 *sector...hoc est emptor atque possessor:* Florus 2 48 *hastae subiecit tabernas, nec sector inventus est;* and other passages of the like import are quoted in the lexicons.

But as the *sector* does not necessarily buy with the notion of keeping what he has bought, but often intends to sell it again,

he may appear in the light of an agent or dealer in confiscated property, and even in that of an auctioneer; Tacitus Hist. 1 20 *ubique hasta et sector, et inquieta urbs auctionibus.* Lucan 1 178 *sectorque favoris Ipse sui populus,* trafficking in its own favour. Thus *sectores* are often spoken of with disparagement; *cum sector sis isto loco natus,* says Cicero to Antonius (Phil. 2 § 65).

I would urge that the ancient scholars were right in deriving *sector* (in this sense) from *seco = sequor,* and that the word meant originally a petitioner; one who asked for, put in a claim for, the property, and so its purchaser. And according to this view *sectio* should originally mean the act of asking for, or proposing to buy, and then the right to buy or become the owner, as *petitio* sometimes means the right of petition. Thus we can easily explain the phrase *sectionem vendere*[1], to sell the traffic or right of trafficking in the booty; for as *sector*, from meaning the purchaser, comes to mean the agent, so *sectio,* from meaning the purchase, comes to mean the traffic that follows on the purchase. In Cic. Phil. 2 §§ 64, 71 *illud scelus sectionis, pecunia quam pro sectione debebas sectio* apparently means simply the purchase; in Justin (or rather Trogus) 38 7 8 *rapacitas proconsulum, sectio publicanorum,* it means traffic: and so Tac. Hist. 1 90, Ann. 13 23, Sueton. Vitellius 2 *reliquias Neronianarum sectionum, exercendis apud aerarium sectionibus, sectionibus et cognituris uberius compendium nactus.*

I now come to a passage in the Twelve Tables about which, in spite of the *consensus* of the best modern authorities, I cannot but think there are great difficulties: *tertiis nundinis partes secanto; si plus minusve secuerunt, sine fraude esto.* This clause is generally taken to mean 'let them cut his body to pieces. If they have cut too much or too little, let this be no harm to them.' Those who adopt this interpretation have, it appears to me, to answer the following questions.

First, as to the language—Can it be shewn that *partes secare* could, in any Latin whatever, mean to divide into parts? Tertullian (Apol. 4) says, in mentioning the law, *iudicatos*

[1] Cic. Inv. 1 85, Caes. B. G. 2 23; Cic. Leg. Agr. fragm. ap. Gell. 13 25 6, *praedam, manubias, sectionem, castra denique Cn. Pompei sedente imperatore decemviri vendent.*

in partes secari a creditoribus leges erant, and this, no doubt, would be the usual Latin for to cut into parts. But unfortunately it was not the expression in the Twelve Tables if we may trust Gellius 20 1 49, nor has any scholar asserted that it was. *Secare* means not to divide, but to cut: either to make an incision, or to cut a thing out.

But it may be argued that *secare partes* could mean to cut off the limbs. Those who defend this explanation have to shew that *partes*, standing by itself, could mean parts of the body. Now in its oldest and proper sense *pars* means a share or division; and although *partes corporis*, or *pars corporis* might stand metaphorically for a limb, the burden of proof lies with those who assert that *pars* standing by itself can mean anything of the kind.

Again, what is the meaning of *si plus minusve secuerunt, se fraude esto*? 'If they have cut more or less, let it be no harm to them.' Is it contended that the legislators who drew up the laws of the Twelve Tables would go out of their way to insert so childish a provision? To explain the fact we should have to assume that before their time there was a law forbidding the partition of the debtor's body unless it were divided in precisely equal or proportionate parts, and that the decemvirs in their tenderness for the interest of the creditors inserted a provision that such mathematical nicety was no longer to be required of them. Will it be asserted that such a state of feeling is conceivable at the period of the Twelve Tables, or is to be reconciled with the statesmanlike and reasonable spirit which pervades them?

Another very serious difficulty, as several scholars have perceived, arises with regard to the matter of the clause. If such a provision ever existed in the Twelve Tables, how is it that there is no mention of it in any of the historians? Livy in his earlier books is fond of pointing out the miseries of the oppressed debtors with all the power of his eloquence, but he never uses this point to enforce the rhetoric of his appeals. We hear a great deal of imprisonment in private houses, of chains and loss of liberty, but of the dissection of the body not a word. Yet what would have been better fitted to

point a climax of indignation than the existence of a grossly inhuman clause such as this is supposed to be? Its mere existence in the statute-book would have been enough; there would have been no need to see it carried into practice.

Gellius, who in the first chapter of his twentieth book discusses the matter and assumes throughout that *secare* means to cut up, admits that he never heard of the law being carried out; *dissectum esse antiquitus neminem equidem legi neque audivi.* He says that the clause was intended as a bugbear, and compares that which enacted that a false witness was to be thrown from the Tarpeian rock. But then he admits that this sentence was actually carried out in old days.

It must be admitted at the same time that Quintilian (3 6 84) undoubtedly understood the passage in question as referring to the cutting up the debtor's body, and also that there is no trace of the ancients themselves having taken the words in any other way. In answer to this argument the only point which can be urged is that the Twelve Tables were sometimes misunderstood even in the days of Cicero. There is, for instance, a section (Tab. 8 Bruns) directed against the use of charms (*malum carmen*) which was indeed rightly understood by Pliny, but which Cicero and others (e. g. Horace) seem to have interpreted of scurrilous writing (*carmen famosum*). At least this is the opinion of Bruns as expressed in his note on the passage. There are other instances of the language of the Twelve Tables being either variously interpreted, or not being understood at all, in the Ciceronian and Augustan age, or even earlier. Festus p. 313 says that scholars were not agreed upon the meaning of *pedem struere:* on p. 321 he says that not even Messala could explain *sanates;* and Cicero (Legg. 2 § 59) speaking of the passage *mulieres genas ne radunto, neve lessum funeris ergo habento,* adds *hoc veteres interpretes Sextius Aelius et L. Acilius non satis se intellegere dixerunt.* Aelius Paetus was consul 198 B.C., and Acilius was a contemporary of the elder Cato. It is therefore not impossible that Quintilian may have completely misunderstood *secare partes.*

I contend that *secare partes* cannot mean either to divide the body, or to divide the property, into parts. But if *seco*

here = *sequi,* may not *partes secanto* mean 'let them claim their shares in the debtor's property'? *Si plus minusve secuerunt* —'if, (through inadvertence or any other cause) they claim too much or too little, let it not be prejudicial to the claim being considered.' Thus *partes secare* would be equivalent to what in late Latin would be expressed by *partes petere,* and *plus minusve secare* to *plus minusve petere.*

This interpretation would, it seems to me, suit the requirements of the case. The debtor has been adjudged a debtor; if he does not conform to the sentence of the court, his creditor may take him home and keep him in chains for sixty days, if he does not come to a settlement; at the end of that time he may either sell him as a slave across the Tiber (if, that is, he has nothing to pay), or (if he has wherewith to pay) he may with the other creditors claim his share in the property. It would probably require the sentence of a *iudex* or an *arbiter* to settle the proportions of the division.

Perhaps traces of the word *seco* = *sequor* may be found in Horace as well as in Vergil. Sat. 1 2 14 *quinas hic capiti mercedes exsecat, atque Quanto perditior quisque est, tanto acrius urget. Exsecat* here has given a great deal of difficulty, but need give none if it be taken as = *exsequitur:* comp. Sat. 1 6 86 *si praeco parvas, aut quod fuit ipse, coactor Mercedes sequerer.* So possibly in Sat. 1 10 15 *ridiculum acri Fortius ac melius magnas plerumque secat res, secat* may mean attacks, hits, or aims at. And in Epist. 1 16 43, *quo multae magnaeque secantur iudice lites, secantur lites* may perhaps be a relic of an old phrase *secare litem,* to claim the thing in dispute, for which Terence (And. 811, Ad. 248, Phorm. 407) says *sequi* or *sectari litem.* Thus the meaning of the passage in Horace may possibly be 'in whose court many important cases are brought on for trial.'

H. NETTLESHIP.

NOTES ON THE GLOSSES QUOTED IN HAGEN'S *GRADUS AD CRITICEN.*

In reading through this excellent and useful little book I have been struck with a few instances in which the author does not seem to have hit upon the right emendation.

P. 4. *Iam parvi tenebant! iam ad terras veniebant.* For *parvi* Hagen conjectures *portum.* I would suggest *Iamque arva tenebant* (Aen. 2 209, of the two serpents).

P. 6. *Nixantem! saepius natantem. Nutantem* Hagen. Should the whole run *nexantem, saepius nectentem*? Comp. Priscian 1 p. 469, 470 (Keil).

P. 12. *Circumerrant, circum vagant. Vagant,* a form attested by Nonius p. 467, need not be changed into *vagantur,* and the like may be said of *vagamus* and *vagas* on p. 13. Nor again on p. 15 need *trutinatur* be changed into *trutinat.*

P. 17. *In ludicro! res quae de luto dantur.* Hagen changes *ludicro* to *lubrico:* I would propose rather to leave *ludicro* unchanged, and write *ludo* for *luto.*

P. 19. *Lexa, luxuriosa. Luxa?* Paulus p. 119 *luxa membra e suis locis mota et soluta, a quo luxuriosus, in re familiari solutus.* So Nonius p. 55, Isidore 10 160.

Concludere suleos. Sulcus est aratri ductio quo veteres fundamento dirigebant. Hagen emends *concludere sulcos:* I would propose *sulco* (Verg. Aen. 1 425) and *fundamenta* for *fundamento.*

P. 21. *Fluctuans! undam natans. Undans, natans.*

P. 24. *Sertis, floribus, coronis. subtilis vel ardua loca sive rocce in mare.* For *subtilis,* which seems to be the beginning of a second gloss, I would propose *subices:* Nonius p. 168, Gell. 4 17 *Ennius in tragoedia quae Achilles inscribitur subices pro aëre alto posuit.*

P. 25. *Fariolus, vates.* *Fariolus* may be right: Terentius Scaurus p. 13 (Keil) *quem antiqui fariolum, nos hariolum.*

P. 26. *Postera aura, sequens* (emend. Hagen for *frequens*) *dies.* For *aura* I would suggest *aurora.*

P. 38. *Sochors! hebes vanus stultus neglegens fictuus* (i. e. *fatuus*) *vel le inter incedens.* For *le inter* I would read not *leviter* but *leniter.*

Limo solatio, cenoso stagno. Not (as Hagen) *lutoso loco,* but *limoso lacu;* Verg. Aen. 2 135.

P. 39. *Inprolis, nondum vir.* Hagen would read *inpubes,* which is unnecessary. Marius Victorinus p. 20 Keil, *improles enim est qui nondum vir est.*

P. 40 *Valus! qui pedibus iunctis ambulat.* Not *varus,* as Hagen suggests, but *vatius.*

P. 44. *Protenus! confestim, &c....acutum. Actutum.*

P. 47. *Comitia dicuntur tempora bonorum, &c....Honorum.*

P. 52. *Parioletus! divinatus.* Probably *fariolatus:* see above.

P. 55. *In quo et lucus ei fons est. Ei lucus et fons.*

P. 58. *Lumine tergo, truci, terribili.* Not *tetro* (as Hagen) but *torvo:* Aen. 3 677 *cernimus adstantes nequiquam lumine torvo.*

P. 67. *Ergastulum! privata custodia carcer metallum vel locus ubi damnati marmora secant vel aliquid operantur, quod Latine taberna dicitur.* Two glosses are here confused, one on *ergastulum,* the other (which should begin before *aliquid operantur*), on *ergasterium.* Placidus p. 37 has separate glosses on the two words, that on *ergasterium* running thus; *ergasterium graecus sermo est, id est operarium, ubi opus fit, vel taberna, ubi alicuius operis exercitia geruntur.*

P. 69. *Nebulonem, bonum vel levem. Vanum vel levem.* Donatus Eun. 2 2 38 *nebulonem, vel quia nebulas obiciat...vel inanem et vanum, ut nebula est.*

P. 81. *Ebullererent exponerent. Ebullirent, expirarent.* Schol. Pers. 2 10 *ebullire autem proprie expirare.*

P. 97. *Redandare, gratiam referre. Redantruare:* Nonius p. 165 *redantruare, reddere:* comp. Pacuvius ap. Fest. p. 273.

P. 99. *Recidivina, renascentia a morte aut vetustate renovata: vel ex ruinis in integrum restituta.*

The gloss is a confusion of two, one on *recidiva,* the other on *rediviva. Recidiva, renascentia a morte. Rediviva, ex vetustate renovata.* Festus p. 273 *redivivum, ex vetusto renovatum.*

P. 107. *Inextricabilis! error laber intus.* Not (with Hagen), *inextricabilis error, labor invictus,* but *inextricabilis error, Labyrinthus.*

H. NETTLESHIP.

CONJECTURAL EMENDATIONS IN THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE AND THEOPHRASTUS.

De Sensu 443^{a} 6 :

εἰ οὖν τις θείη καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἄμφω ὑγρά, εἴη ἂν ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή. καὶ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

For *φύσις* perhaps *πλύσις* should be read. Compare 442^{b} 30, *ἔστι δὲ ὀσφραντὸν οὐχ ᾗ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ᾗ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικὸν ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος*: and 445^{a} 13, *διὸ εὐλόγως παρείκασται (τὸ ὀσφραντὸν) ξηρότητος ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ χυτῷ οἷον βαφή τις εἶναι καὶ πλύσις.*

Ἡ *τοῦ ξηροῦ φύσις* is an ordinary Aristotelian expression which a scribe might easily fall into, and would not in itself provoke suspicion. But the object of smell would not be accurately defined as *τὸ ξηρὸν ἐν ὑγρῷ*: it is rather a *πάθος* of the *ἔγχυμον ξηρὸν ἐν ὑγρῷ* (cf. 445^{a} 9, and 443^{a} 8), an "infusion" (*βαφή* or *πλύσις*) from it into "the fluid"; as the author lays stress on the element of "infusion," it seems likely that he would not omit it in the definition, and he has not omitted it in the parallel places quoted.

De Sensu 444^{a} 16 :

ἡ μὲν γὰρ τροφὴ ἡδεῖα οὖσα, καὶ ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ ἡ ὑγρά, πολλάκις νοσώδης ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν εὐώδους ἡδεῖα, ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσιν, ὠφέλιμος ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀεί.

Bekker quotes three MSS. for the second *ἡδεῖα*, but omits it from the text. Some substantive is wanted, for, as the context shews, *τροφή* cannot be understood in the second

clause. Perhaps therefore either *εὐώδους ἡδονή* should be read, the mistake being occasioned by the first *ἡδεῖα* (cf. *χαίρει* in the parallel passage 444^{b} 32): or *ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡδείας εὐωδία*, compare 443^{b} 27 *αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰς ἡδεῖαι τῶν ὀσμῶν εἰσίν*, 444^{a} 7 *διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς εἶναι καθ' αὑτὴν ἡδεῖαν*, also Theophr. De Odoribus, § 4, *εὐωδίᾳ μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν φαίνεται καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρειν ὡς εἰπεῖν.*

The word *εὐωδία* occurs in Aristot. Rhet. 1370^{a} 4, and several times in Theophr. De Odor.

De Sensu 444^{b} 2:

τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ὅσα πνεύμονα ἔχει διὰ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου γένους τῆς ὀσμῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποδέδωκεν ἡ φύσις, ὅπως μὴ δύο αἰσθητήρια ποιῇ· ἀπόχρη γάρ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὡς ἀναπνέουσιν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀσφραντῶν, τούτοις τῶν ἑτέρων μόνων ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αἴσθησις.

The last sentence can hardly be construed as it stands. The meaning required seems to be that the breath can be turned to the purpose of smell without interfering with its proper function relative to the lungs. This suggests the change of *ἀπόχρη* into *ἀποχρῆται* (sc. *τῇ ἀναπνοῇ*, or rather the organ of breathing implied in the inaccurate expression *δύο αἰσθητήρια*): which is somewhat confirmed by a comparison of the parallel passage 444^{a} 25:

κατακέχρηται δ' ἡ φύσις τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ἐπὶ δύο, ὡς ἔργῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν θώρακα βοήθειαν· ὡς παρέργῳ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ὀσμήν· ἀναπνέοντος γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ παρόδου ποιεῖται διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων τὴν κίνησιν.

De Memoria 452^{a} 27:

ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος· διὸ ἃ πολλάκις ἐννοοῦμεν ταχὺ ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. Themistius has *οὕτω καὶ ἔθει*, which gives the sense required. Perhaps therefore *συνηθείᾳ* should be read for *ἐνεργείᾳ* which has the same number of letters. The word occurs again in the Parva Naturalia, De Sensu 442^{a} 2 with a similar meaning. Compare also in the same context, 452^{a} 27 *ἐπὶ τὸ*

συνηθέστερον κινεῖται: and De Motu Animalium, 703ª 33: *καὶ γίνεται τόδε μετὰ τόδε διὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἔν τε τοῖς ζῴοις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο διὰ τὴν φύσιν γίνεται.* The difficulty of the text has probably occasioned the insertion of *ἢ δυνάμει* after *ἐστίν* in one MS.

De Respiratione 475ª 31:

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑγροῖς πολὺν χρόνον ἀνανήχεται.... ἀλλὰ φθείρεται ταῦτα (τὰ ἔντομα) καὶ λέγεται ἀποπνίγεσθαι πληρουμένης τῆς κοιλίας καὶ φθειρομένου τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποζώματι ὑγροῦ. *ὑγροῦ* may be a mistake for *ἀέρος*, which seems required by Aristotle's theory of the respiration of insects. Compare 475ª 8 *ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ ὑποζώματι, τῷ ἐμφυτῷ πνεύματι αἴροντι κ.τ.λ.*: De Somno 456ª 12, 17, 19: De Animal. Hist. 535ᵇ 4 seqq.

τὸ ὑγρὸν could not include *ἀήρ*, for in this passage the two are opposed to one another. Cf. 475ᵇ 5, 6.

Nic. Eth. 1134ª 1:

καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τουναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

On *τοῦ ἀδίκου* Susemihl writes: "*τοῦ δικαίου* (?) Γ, secl. Spengelius." *τοῦ ἀδίκου* could of course stand, but the immediate context suggests that perhaps *τοῦ ἀνίσου* should be read.

De Partibus Animal. 656ª 29:

.... αἱ μὲν δύο (αἰσθήσεις) φανερῶς ἠρτημέναι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν εἰσίν, ἥ τε τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν χυμῶν, τῶν δὲ τριῶν ἡ μὲν τῆς ὀσφρήσεως μέση, ἀκοὴ δὲ καὶ ὄψις μάλιστ' ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων φύσιν εἰσί, καὶ τούτων ἡ ὄψις πᾶσιν (ἐπεὶ ἥ γ' ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐπὶ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ποιεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν· ἀκούουσι

μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὀσφραίνονται, αἰσθητήριον δ' οὐδὲν ἔχουσι φανερὸν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τούτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν). ἡ δ' ὄψις πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν εὐλόγως ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, κ.τ.λ.

οὐ seems to have dropped out between *λεγόμενον* and *φανερόν*.

Theophrastus De Sensu, § 90, Wimmer's text:

περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀσμῆς ὅτι ἀπορροή τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνάπνευσις τοῦ ἀέρος σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν[1]. *τὸ δ' ἀφομοιοῦν καπνῷ καὶ ὁμίχλῃ, ταὐτά τε λέγειν οὐκ ἀληθές. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς φαίνεται ποιεῖν. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τὴν δ' ὁμίχλην ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ λέγει μεταβάλλειν.*

According to Wimmer *τε* is a conjectural emendation for *δέ*.

The passage is a criticism of a point in Plato's theory of smell (Timaeus 66 D) which has been stated in the preceding § 85, *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ὀσμὴν ὕδατος μὲν λεπτότερον, ἀέρος δὲ παχύτερον . . . διὸ καθάπερ καπνὸν καὶ ὁμίχλην εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων ἀόρατον. εἶναι δὲ καπνὸν μὲν μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα ὁμίχλην δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ.*

The words (§ 90) *περὶ δὲ τῆς ὀσμῆς ὅτι ἀπορροή τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνάπνευσις τοῦ ἀέρος σχεδὸν ὁμολογεῖται* perhaps refer to the theory accepted in Arist. de Sensu Ch. ii. and rejected in Arist. De Sensu Ch. v. that smell is a *καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις*. For (1) they seem to concede that something akin to the Platonic theory is generally agreed on, and Plato's conception of smell comes under the general notion of *καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις*. (2) Ar. De Sensu 443ª 21 refers to the "smoke-like exhalation" theory as the one generally agreed upon. Compare

443ª 24	443ª 21
ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ὀσμὴν πάντες ἐπιφέρονται οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀτμίδα, οἱ δ' ὡς ἀναθυμίασιν, οἱ δ' ὡς ἄμφω ταῦτα	*δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις ἡ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις εἶναι ὀσμή, οὖσα κοινὸν γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ πάντες ἐπιφέρονται ἐπὶ τοῦτο περὶ ὀσμῆς*

[1] "ὁμολογεῖται P.F. : ὁμολογοῦσιν nescio unde Schneider." Diels.

which have the look of gemini loci. (3) *ἀνάπνευσις τοῦ ἀέρος* may perhaps mean "an exhalation." The use of *ἀναπνοή* in Prob. 933[a] 35 (*ἀναπνοὴ θερμαινομένων ἢ ψυχομένων τῶν ὑγρῶν*), Theophr. de Odoribus § 47 (*λεπτὴ ἀναπνοή* of the smell of a rose), De Od. § 3 (*τὰ γὰρ τῆς ὀσμῆς ἐν ἀναπνοῇ*), ib. § 69, De Hist. Plant. VI. ii. 4, and Stobaeus Ecl. I. 22, 1 (*τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς ἀναπνοὴν* (*εἶναι*) *τὸν ἥλιον*), seems a sufficient parallel. Compare also *πνευματώδης ἀναθυμίασις*, Arist. de Sensu 445[a] 26, and Theophr. De Sensu 30 *ὄζειν μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα.* (4) No difficulty is caused by the association of *ἀνάπνευσις τοῦ ἀέρος*, thus interpreted, with *ἀπορροή τις*, for the notions are nearly allied. Compare De Sensu 443[b] 1 *ἔτι ἡ ἀναθυμίασις ὁμοίως λέγεται ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. εἰ οὖν μηδ' ἐκείνη καλῶς, οὐδ' αὕτη καλῶς.*

The more natural interpretation of *ἀνάπνευσις τοῦ ἀέρος* is "inhaling of the air[1]": cp. Theophr. De Sensu, § 9 *ὄσφρησιν δὲ γίνεσθαι τῇ ἀναπνοῇ, διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ὀσφραίνεσθαι τούτους οἷς σφοδροτάτη τοῦ ἄσθματος ἡ κίνησις*, ib. § 28, § 46. But even if this is right, the two passages from the De Sensu, 443[a] 21 and 443[b] 1, make it likely that Theophrastus is alluding to the exhalation theory. He seems from De Caus. Plant. I. i. 1 to have held himself the doctrine of Arist. De Sensu v. with a modification. But if he here concedes to Plato that the exhalation theory is the one generally agreed upon, it is not likely that he would make a special objection to "the comparison of odour to smoke and mist" (cf. the remark on the use of *καπνός* as a generic term for *ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις* in Meteor. 359[b] 32). Besides Theophrastus not unfrequently associates odour with exhalation (*ἀναθυμίασις, ἀτμίς*) and heat, without proviso: cf. De Odor. § 13, § 44; De Caus. Plant. VI. xvii. 1, 7; De Hist. Plant. IX. iv. 9; De Caus. Plant. VI. xiv. 8. On the other hand he might well contend that it was "wrong to identify smell with smoke and mist (as Plato does, Tim. l. c.), and wrong even on Plato's own shewing (*οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς φαίνεται ποιεῖν*) since he makes smoke different from mist."

[1] Theophrastus held like Aristotle that respiration was not necessary to smell (De Sens. 21): but this makes no difference either way, for *σχεδὸν ὁμολογεῖται* refers to a general consensus and probably not to his own opinion.

Perhaps therefore the original reading δέ is right, and ἀληθές has dropped out before ταὐτά: thus—τὸ δ' ἀφομοιοῦν καπνῳ καὶ ὁμίχλῃ (ἀληθές), ταὐτὰ δὲ λέγειν οὐκ ἀληθές.

The corruption of the text may have caused the addition of μέν before ἀπορροή above the line in the Paris MS. (P. Diels). The Laurentian (F. a MS. inferior to P. according to Diels) has μέν in the text, which is adopted by Diels. Both MSS. have δέ not τε.

J. COOK WILSON.

CATULLUS 64 276.

Sic tum vestibuli linquentes regia tecta
ad se quisque vago passim pede discedebant.

'Vestibuli' cannot be right: the 'regia tecta' are the inner apartments of the palace, in which the 'pulvinar' and the famous 'vestis' or tapestry, described at such a length, were exhibited; 'sedibus in mediis' (v. 48). The 'vestibulum' was the open court before the 'ianua,' formed by the façade of the building and the walls or rooms, run out beyond this façade at each end of it. Ellis says: 'the shelter of the royal porch,' inversion of the adjective. This to me explains nothing. They would pour out through the 'ianua' into the open 'vestibulum': Vitr. VI 7 5 *πρόθυρα* Graece dicuntur quae sunt ante ianuas vestibula. Schrader's 'vestibulo' or 'vestibulis' may be right. But, seeing the persistency with which this wondrous 'vestis' is dwelt on: 50 Haec vestis priscis hominum variata figuris cet.; 265 Talibus amplifice vestis variata figuris cet.: and remembering Virgil's 'pinguis ubi et placabilis ara Dianae,' and 'pinguis ubi et placabilis ara Palici,' I think Catullus may have written 'Sic tum, *vestis ubi*, linquentes' cet. The 'vestibulum' of 293, which by the way with its context really refutes 'vestibuli' of 276, may have caused the corruption. The front approach to the older part of Hampton Court gives a lively image of an ancient 'vestibulum.'

H. A. J. MUNRO.

NOTES ON THE SECOND BOOK OF THE ILIAD.

1.

Vv. 1, 2

ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ
εὗδον παννύχιοι, Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος.

It can hardly be disputed that these words contradict the last line of Book I., which says that Zeus, like the other gods, went to bed and slept (*καθεῦδε*). Accordingly the passage is quoted by Lachmann (*Betrachtungen*, p. 2, Ed. 1865), to show that there is a want of continuity between the first and second books of the Iliad.

Admitting the contradiction, however, we have to consider how much it proves. Does it follow that the author of the second book was ignorant of the first book[1]? This is on other grounds very improbable. The particles *μέν ῥα* by which the second book is introduced imply that the narrative is continued after a pause (as we see by comparing v. 48 *ἠὼς μέν ῥα θεὰ κ.τ.λ.*, v. 211 *ἄλλοι μέν ῥ' ἕζοντο*, &c.); and it cannot be an accident that the second book takes up the story at the exact point (night-fall on Olympus), where the first book left off. Even the mention of 'gods and men' is probably not undesigned, since it carries our thoughts from Olympus to the Greek camp. The next sentence, in which the poet

[1] It should be said that this is not Lachmann's conclusion. He uses the passage to show that even when two 'lays' may be the work of the same author, the language often proves that they are in point of *form* two distinct poems. Later writers press the argument further.

goes on to say that Zeus did not sleep because he was considering "how he should honour Achilles and destroy many by the Greek ships," refers distinctly to the promise made to Thetis, and consequently presupposes the incidents of the first book. The difficulty is, then, that the contradiction does not stand alone, but is associated with the closest relation between the two successive parts of the poem.

The solution may perhaps be helped by a similar contradiction in the Odyssey (15. 4 ff.) :—

> εὗρε δὲ Τηλέμαχον καὶ Νέστορος ἀγλαὸν υἱὸν
> εὕδοντ' ἐν προδόμῳ Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο·
> ἦ τοι Νεστορίδην μαλακῷ δεδμημένον ὕπνῳ,
> Τηλέμαχον δ' οὐχ ὕπνος ἔχε γλυκύς, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
> νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην μελεδήματα πατρὸς ἔγειρε.

Here the poet first says that Telemachus and the son of Nestor were both asleep; then he corrects himself, and says that Telemachus could not sleep. The instances are not quite parallel; for in Il. 1. 611 it is expressly said that Zeus slept, whereas in the passage from the Odyssey Telemachus is only brought in as one of the two who are said to have slept. But this may be due to the natural prominence of Zeus, and it is compensated by the longer pause which separates the two books of the Iliad. The plan of the narrative is essentially similar. The poet ends his first book by the picture, given as a whole, and in an evidently conventional form, of Zeus and the other gods going each to his house and sleeping: he takes up his story by correcting himself, and relating how Zeus in fact did not sleep. The difference between the two cases is that the first and second books of the Iliad are separated by a natural *pause*—a very different thing, be it observed, from the gap between one 'lay' and another.

2.

43. *νηγάτεος*. See p. 61.
129. *πλέας*. See p. 62.

3.

190. *δαιμόνι', οὔ σε ἔοικε κακὸν ὡς δειδίσσεσθαι.*

The common rendering of this line—'it does not become you to be terrified'—can hardly be defended. The verb *δειδίσσομαι* is always transitive in Homer. Moreover, a direct accusation of cowardice does not suit the respectful and politic tone of the speech which follows. The true meaning is: 'It is not seemly to scold or threaten you, as one might a common man.' For the phrase *κακὸν ὡς δειδίσσεσθαι*, compare Il. 15. 196 *χερσὶ δὲ μή τί με πάγχυ κακὸν ὡς δειδισσέσθω*, *i.e.* "let him not try to frighten me by the strong hand, as though a churl." The form of address finds a parallel in the exhortation of Agamemnon to the two brothers Ajax, Il. 4. 286 ff.

σφῶϊ μὲν οὐ γὰρ ἔοικ' ὀτρυνέμεν, οὔ τι κελεύω·
αὐτὼ γὰρ μάλα λαὸν ἀνώγετον ἶφι μάχεσθαι.

i.e. 'it would be an insult to *you* to urge you to the battle.' The speaker's object in both places is evidently to clothe a rebuke or exhortation in the form of a compliment.

4.

194. *ἐν βουλῇ δ' οὐ πάντες ἀκούσαμεν οἷον ἔειπε;*

By reading this line as a rhetorical question the connexion of the speech is considerably improved. Ulysses has begun by explaining the true purpose of Agamemnon. Then he affects to remember that he is speaking to one of the 'kings' who formed the Council. "But why need I tell you this? Did not we all—we of the Council—hear what he said?"

5.

196. *θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων,*
τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διός ἐστι, φιλεῖ δέ ἑ μητίετα Ζεύς.

The text of Aristarchus had *διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος*, a reading probably suggested by the Pronoun *ἕ* in the next line. But

the Plural, which was read by Zenodotus and is supported by quotations in Aristotle (Rhet. II. 2) and elsewhere, seems to give a better sense. Ulysses has been expressing fear of Agamemnon, and now goes on to a general reflexion on the danger of provoking the anger of kings. The change back to the Singular (ἕ) is not unusual: it is found in a very similar passage, Odyss. 4. 691—

ἥ τ' ἐστὶ δίκη θείων βασιλήων,
ἄλλον κ' ἐχθαίρῃσι βροτῶν, ἄλλον κε φιλοίη,

'which is the way of kings—he (a king) will hate one,' &c. So in Euripides, Androm. 421—

οἰκτρὰ γὰρ τὰ δυστυχῆ
βροτοῖς ἅπασι, κἂν θυραῖος ὢν κυρῇ.

Several examples from Plato will be found in Mr Wayte's *Protagoras* (on p. 319 D). There is therefore no need to explain ἕ in this place as a Plural; and the passage does not support the theory of a 'general' Reflexive Pronoun, capable of being used for all Persons and Numbers (Brugman, *Ein Problem*, &c., p. 21).

6.

250. τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύοις.

There is no ellipse here (such as 'if you were wise,' or 'if you were not the vilest'): οὐκ ἄν with the Optative is simply a courteous form of deprecation, here of course ironical. Compare Il. 14. 126 τῷ οὐκ ἂν . . . μῦθον ἀτιμήσαιτε = *I expect you not to disregard my word;* Od. 20. 135 οὐκ ἄν μιν νῦν, τέκνον, ἀναίτιον αἰτιόῳο.

7.

291. ἦ μὴν καὶ πόνος ἐστὶν ἀνιηθέντα νέεσθαι.

'Assuredly we have toil enough to drive a man to return disgusted.' This interpretation, which has the authority of Aristarchus, is the only one that meets all the requirements

of the context. Ulysses begins his speech in a tone of rebuke, telling the Greeks that they are like children that cry to return home. Then he affects to excuse them: "but after all, you have suffered much—it is nine years since you came here —I do not wonder that you chafe." This part of his speech begins with the line now in question; and the change of tone is marked by the Particles *ἦ μήν*, which express *concession:* "I admit indeed that you have much to complain of," &c. The word *πόνος* has its proper Homeric sense, the "toil of battle."

For the Infinitive after *πόνος ἐστί* we may compare such constructions as *ὅθι τοι μοῖρ' ἐστὶν ἀλύξαι where it is thy fate to escape; ὥρη εὕδειν it is time for sleeping; ἐπεί τοι θυμὸς ἀναίτιον αἰτιάασθαι you have a mind (which leads you) to blame the innocent.* In all these cases the Infinitive expresses tendency or consequence. So when *ἔστι* is used impersonally, as *ἔστι μὲν εὕδειν there is (time, means, leave,* &c.) *for sleeping:* cp. also Il. 7. 239 *τό μοι ἔστι ταλαύρινον πολεμίζειν wherefore I have the means to fight with shield of stout hide.* For the use of the Participle with an indefinite meaning compare Od. 11. 158 *τὸν οὔ πως ἔστι περῆσαι πεζὸν ἐόντα which a man cannot cross on foot.* So *ὅσον τε γέγωνε βοήσας so far as a man is heard when he shouts:* Hesiod. Op. 12 *τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας a man will be ready to praise when he notices.*

D. B. MONRO.

ON AESCHYLUS' AGAMEMNON 1227—1230 Dindorf.

Νεῶν τ' ἄπαρχος Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάτης
οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
λέξασα καὶ κτείνασα φαιδρόνους δίκην
ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ.

Canter's ἔπαρχος and *κἀκτείνασα*, the latter virtually the Ms. reading, have been universally accepted. In other respects the passage passed almost or altogether unquestioned by the many distinguished editors of the play, until attention was recalled to it a few years ago by Madvig's emendations in his Adversaria. This paper of mine indeed owes its existence to a few remarks, published by Dr Kennedy in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society (pp. 172—174), and to an article of Mr Verrall in the last number of this Journal.

In that brief paper Dr Kennedy states clearly and tersely what may be said in favour of the old, and against Madvig's reading and interpretation of vss. 1157—1159:

οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα (nom. sing.) γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
λείξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρὸν οὖς, δίκην
Ἄτης λαθραίου, δήξεται κακῇ τύχῃ.

The strange confusion[1] and violence of metaphor here are pointed out not only by Dr Kennedy, but also by Mr Verrall in his article in the Journal and by Mr A. Sidgwick whom he there quotes. Dr Kennedy however concludes (p. 174):

[1] This confusion would in great measure disappear, if a colon were put after *κυνός*: the last two lines would then be in apposition to the first, and the participles might be referred to *κυνός*, the nearest substantive.

'Nevertheless, after much thought, I incline to believe that these emendations are right. And what determines my opinion is that *φαιδρὸν οὖς* (the admission of which would involve *λείξασα* at least) obtains an all but decisive support from Aristoph. Pax 154—6

> *ἀλλ' ἄγε, Πήγασε, χώρει χαίρων,*
> *χρυσοχάλινον πάταγον ψαλίων*
> *διακινήσας φαιδροῖς ὠσίν.*

That the comic poet imitates tragedy here would be obvious, even without the words before in vv. 135—6

> *οὐκοῦν ἐχρῆν σε Πηγάσου ζεῦξαι πτερόν,*
> *ὅπως ἐφαίνου τοῖς θεοῖς τραγικώτερος.*

Whence, then, did he take his *φαιδροῖς ὠσίν*, 'jocund ears' (so strange an expression), if not from this passage of Aeschylus?'

I should answer, from the Bellerophon of Euripides. We might safely infer from Aristophanes himself, when he addresses the *κάνθαρος* as *Πηγάσιον* and *Πήγασε*, that he was quizzing Euripides' Bellerophon, mounted on the real Pegasus. And this inference is amply confirmed by the scholia of the Pax: six times at least they tell us that the poet is quoting, or parodying, or alluding to, this play of Euripides. Thus with reference to the *τραγικώτερος*, cited by Dr Kennedy, they say: *αἰνίττεται δὲ εἰς τὸν Πήγασον καὶ τὸν Βελλεροφόντην Εὐριπίδου.* And on the other vss. cited by Dr Kennedy the Venetian scholiast says: *καὶ τάδε ἐκ τοῦ Βελλεροφόντου 'ἴθι, χρυσοχάλιν', αἴρων πτέρυγας'*: meaning this of course to be followed by *κ. τ. ἑ.* 'and so on', as otherwise it would have no point. Aristophanes likes to begin his parodies by quoting two or three lines of Euripides either literally or slightly distorted, in order to attune his hearers' ears to the tragic key and by this artifice to render his subsequent buffoonery more telling. This he would appear to have done here; for these three anapaests have quite a tragic ring and rhythm.

I should therefore like to put the question in this way: Euripides may have used the actual words *φαιδροῖς ὠσίν*,

'playful frisking ears'; for we find even in prose (Xen. Apol. 27) *καὶ ὄμματι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι φαιδρός*, an expression at least as curious. Or Aristophanes with these words may be parodying words of Euripides. In either case *he* is thinking of Euripides' anapaests, not of Aeschylus' senarius. *If* Aeschylus however *did* write *φαιδρὸν οὖς*, and *if* Euripides wrote *φαιδροῖς ὠσίν*, then it is quite possible that *he* had in his mind this verse of Aeschylus; for I shall speak by and bye of a manifest allusion in Euripides to a passage of the Agamemnon which comes only 30 or 40 lines later in the play. The outcome of all this is that we gain nothing either for or against *φαιδρὸν οὖς*.

I now turn to Mr Verrall, who reads (Journ. of Philology x, p. 306)

> *οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνός,*
> *λείξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνουν λιχήν,*
> *ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ:*

'he knows not what the tongue of the abominable hound, proffering the lick of gladness, shall accomplish by an evil chance of treacherous hurt'.

Passing *λιχήν* over for the moment, I should still question the adequacy of the translation, 'proffering the lick of gladness': the words signify rather 'licking and lengthening out a glad-minded licking', this course of licking having gone on through hundreds of verses[1].

But what is *λιχή*? In his concluding sentence Mr Verrall argues that the Greek language must have been capable of expressing a 'lick'; and that the word for a 'lick' must have been *λιχή* or *λοιχή*, one or both. But classical Greek, eminently rich in most parts of speech, was sometimes just as deficient in substantives denoting abstract processes. It prefers often to express these by infinitives or participles or adjectives. If Aeschylus, for example, *did* use *λιχή*, it is a fact that all subsequent writers, now extant, allowed it to drop out of use.

[1] Mr Verrall, as I now learn, takes *ἐκτείνασα* to mean 'offering'. I can find no authority for such a meaning; and would not the tautology be then intolerable?

Again, if the word were λοιχή, of what service would it be? Nor do I feel sure that the ι of λιχή would be short; or see much resemblance between this λιχή and any of the words which are cited in support of it: none of them seems to express a process or action, which is called for here. If a Greek, not content with τὸ λείχειν or τὸ λιχμᾶν, λιχμάζειν, had seen fit to invent a substantive for 'licking', it would have been λεῖξις or λίχμησις, rather than λιχή or λοιχή; and the Greek would have been Aristotle rather than Aeschylus, I fancy. We meet with θίξις, ὄσφρησις, ὄψις, ὅρασις and the like; not θιγή or ὀδή or ὀπή. Nor can I accept Mr Verrall's arrangement and translation (in p. 306) of the last line. By joining ἄτης λαθραίου with what follows the force of Aeschylus' expression is ruined; and Mr Verrall seems to feel this himself, when he shews such an inclination to read κακὴν τύχην.

And now I am going to expose myself in turn: Caedimus inque vicem praebemus crura sagittis. Dr Kennedy (p. 173) puts well and tersely the case for the old mode of understanding the metaphor. To other pointed remarks he adds the following: 'Having just before described Aegisthus as a cowardly lion, why should Aeschylus call Clytaemnestra κύων in a strictly material sense, and superadd simile within simile?' I will go even farther and avow that, to my taste, the symmetry of the passage is somewhat spoilt by understanding κύων 'in a strictly material sense'. In the four preceding verses Aegisthus, the dastard lion or false ruler of men, lurking in the house and lolling on a couch, contrives the plot of death which he dares not execute. In these four the wife, the lustful she-hound, of iron nerve and unruffled gaiety of heart, by her tongue and her tongue only, leads him gradually on from his chariot to the bath and garment of death. Again in vss. 1257 foll. the δίπους λέαινα, the λύκος and the λέων all act as human beings.

This is the way then I would arrange the passage:

> νεῶν τ' ἔπαρχος Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάτης
> οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισήτης κυνός,

λέξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνους δοκὴν
ἄτης λαθραίου, τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ.

'The captain of the fleet and the destroyer of Ilium knows not what the tongue of a lustful she-hound, speaking as it spoke and lengthening out with a gay heart the ambush of dark crime, will attain—with foul success.'

Not only do I see no *difficulty* in the accus. *οἷα*, nothing 'clumsy and unlikely' (Mr Sidgwick's epithets); but I even prefer it to the genitive *plural*. Of course this neut. plur. is not like other accusatives: the neut. plur. accus. of *pronouns* and *adjectives*, in all Greek writers alike, admits of many applications, sometimes as a sort of cognate, sometimes as an adverbial, and the like. I find in Linwood two other instances of such a neuter after *τυγχάνω* in Aeschylus: from Euripides I have collected several examples; and Ellendt supplies at least four from Sophocles, one of which I will cite (Phil. 506) *πόνων | ἆθλ', ὅσσα μηδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν τύχοι φίλων*. The *κακῇ τύχῃ* at the *end*, as Dr Kennedy observes, is most Greek and idiomatical. Its force in English might be denoted by a dash and pause. And this point and this emphasis are lost by Mr Verrall's arrangement and interpretation. The old lexicographers prove abundantly that *μισητός*, or rather *μίσητος*, may mean, 'lustful', 'lecherous', and this sense I would give it here, as it then answers exactly to the Homeric term of reproach, *κύον ἀδδεές*.

I now come to the words *λέξασα—λαθραίου*: they are manifestly incomplete in sense and grammar: *ἐκτείνασα* hangs in air without an object. This word occurs four times in Aeschylus in connexion with speech, but accompanied always by a word expressing speech; for in *μακρὰν μὲν ἐξέτειναs*[1], to which our passage may allude, *μακρὰν* is equivalent to *μακρὰν ῥῆσιν*. And how should dark Ate prolong speech, or be gay-

[1] Euripides has the same phrase in the Medea: Aesch. Agam. 1296 has *μακρὰν ἔτεινας* in the same sense, and Sophocles *μὴ τεῖνε μακράν*. Comp. Athen. XIII. p. 573 b *καταλέξω δέ σοι, Κύνουλκε, Ἰωνικήν τινα ῥῆσιν ἐκτείνας κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχύλου*: where Meineke adds *Ἀγαμέμνονα*, Athenaeus probably referring to these very words.

minded? Correction therefore being needed, mine is a very simple one, the change of a letter and the substitution of a very uncommon for a very common word. For that word I have the ample authority, confirmed too by Homer, of that good friend of scholars in perplexity, Hesychius. In him we find *δοκαί· ἐνέδραι, παρατηρήσεις*: and again *ἐν δοκῇ· ἐν ἐπιβουλῇ*. The word then meant 'ambush', 'hostile watching for', 'deliberate plot', 'any sort of dark secret treachery', like the Latin 'insidiae', the French 'guet-apens' ('a wait aforethought'). Tho' *ἐνέδρα*, the synonyme of *δοκή*, does not occur so often with this metaphorical sense, as *insidiae* or *guet-apens*, it is so used by both Plato and Demosthenes: Plato Laws X, p. 908 D *εὐφυὴς δὲ ἐπικαλούμενος, δόλου δὲ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης* (doli et insidiarum plenus). Homer has *ἐν προδοκῇσιν*, and is fond of *δοκεύω*, the verb of *δοκή*. He uses it of a hound watching by what part to seize an animal; of a warrior spying out another's weak point; of a charioteer on the alert to 'jockey' the man in front of him. This verb occurs too in the Bacchae. I would not personify Ate, but would take *ἄτης λαθραίου* for the murder of Agamemnon, just as in v. 1523 *δολίαν ἄτην* refers to the death of Iphigenia. This genitive I would compare with Cicero's 'ex mediis mortis insidiis', and 'has urbanas insidias caedis atque incendiorum'.

The sentence strikes me as now complete, and the words seem well to depict Clytemnestra's appalling equanimity, the long-protracted dissimulation of her never-wavering tongue. The *δοκή* consists in her unfailing power of false speech, made credible to her husband by the cool cheerfulness which she was able to sustain; but which Cassandra of course saw through. Now *ἐκτείνασα φαιδρόνους* seems to express this well: *ἐκτείνειν*, used of speech, occurs again and again in Aeschylus; and once or more than once in Sophocles, Euripides and Plato. At the same time it can be applied to other kinds of extension: Sophocles has *ἤδη πολὺς ἐκτέταται χρόνος*, Euripides *ἐκτείνειν βίον*. And then as to *φαιδρόνους*, Aeschylus, even if *θερμόνους* be refused him, certainly has *θηλύνους* and *κουφόνους*, the latter in Sophocles as well. There are many other parallel

examples, such as Xenophon's suggestive one in Ages. 11 § 5 *τοὺς κρυψίνους ὥσπερ ἐνέδρας ἐφυλάττετο.*

So much for the form; now for the meaning of the word. It is here an exact synonyme of *φαιδρᾷ φρενί*: compare now Choeph. 565 *καὶ δὴ θυρωρῶν οὔτις ἂν φαιδρᾷ φρενὶ Δέξαιτ', ἐπειδὴ δαιμονᾷ δόμος κακοῖς.* Orestes assumes that a porter amid the troubles of the house could not shew a cheerful mind and receive them hospitably. The success of Clytemnestra's plot depended on her being able, and she was able, to feel and thus outwardly to display such cheerfulness, so that the word comprehends in it the much feebler *φαιδρωπός*[1], which Blomfield suggests. Virgil, at the conclusion of Sinon's long speech, says (Aen. II 195) Talibus insidiis periurique arte Sinonis Credita res, captique dolis lacrimisque coactis: Sinon's *insidiae* or *δοκή* consisted in his skilful lying speech, supported, as his case required, by tears and signs of distress; Clytemnestra's demanded studied cheerfulness of mind and face. I would conclude with a verse from Jeremiah (9, 8): Their tongue is an arrow shot out; it speaketh deceit: one speaketh peaceably to his neighbour with his mouth, but in heart he layeth his wait.

It is not easy to avoid bringing this *φαιδρόνους* into connexion with that other corrupt v. (1172)

ἐγὼ δὲ θερμόνους τάχ' ἐμπέδῳ βαλῶ,

and arguing, if *φαιδρόνους* is right, then *θερμόνους* should be retained; and so with *φαιδρὸν οὖς* and *θερμὸν οὖς*. But this resemblance may after all be quite illusive. The Ms. reading, with *ἐν πέδῳ* for *ἐμπέδῳ*, so long the vulgate, is now generally discarded. *βαλῶ* can hardly mean *βαλῶ ἐμαυτήν*, and if it could, the words would signify 'I will throw myself on the ground', not 'I will be struck down to the ground and murdered', the sense which would seem to be called for. Canter's

[1] Klausen and Conington compare the passage just cited from the Choeph. with Agam. 520 *φαιδροῖσι τοισίδ' ὄμμασι δέξασθε.*

θερμὸν οὖς appears in Hermann's text, but is scarcely supported in his note. It is however accepted by Dr Kennedy. If 'I will soon lay a glowing ear on the ground' can mean 'I will fall down dead', then is this a brilliantly simple solution. Certainly to me the words seem rather to signify 'I will soon voluntarily throw myself to the ground on my glowing ear,' with a sense analogous to that of the passage quoted by Hermann from the Bacchae.

Mr Sidgwick adopts Mr T. Miller's *θερμὸν οὐ στάγ' ἐν πέδῳ βαλῶ*; and translates: 'And shall not I let fall a hot drop on the ground?' 'The chorus' he says 'have expressed deep sympathy with her...and she replies: Alas for our city's ruin! alas for all the sacrifices of my father! they could not aid the city: she lies low; *and shall not I weep?* The last line is just what is wanted. *στάξ* does not occur for 'a drop', but *στάγες* does, Ap. Rh. 4, 626, which is enough; indeed, the word is a natural formation. Compare *ῥάξ, πτάξ*, from *ῥαγ-, πτάκ-*.' I will speak first of the words themselves. For reasons which I will give presently I would not part with *τάχα*. Nor would I say that the authority of Apollonius is enough to justify *στάγα*: he *may* have got his *στάγες* from an old writer; but it is at least as likely to be the empty coinage of his brain: his poem teems with falsities of the sort. Nor do I see much analogy between *ῥάξ, ῥ ᾶ γ ο ς, πτάκα*, and *στάγα*. But as *στάγες* is feminine in Apoll. like *σταγών*, we must take his gender with his word and write *θερμήν*. No Attic writer, in prose or verse, knows any feminine but *θερμή*, one of the commonest words in the language, and there is not even any metrical excuse here for such an anomaly as *θερμόν*. For no scholar will appeal to the *θερμὸς ἀυτμή* in a Hesiodic poem and a Homeric hymn: Odyss. *μ* 369 we meet with the equally anomalous *ἡδὺς ἀυτμή*. Baumeister has surely good reason to say that in these three places the common *ἀυτμή* has supplanted the rarer *ἀυτμήν* (masc.) which is found both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey. If anybody refuses to admit this, will he introduce into Attic *ἀγανώτατον* (femin.) after Hesiod, or *ὁλοώτατος ὁδμή* from the Odyssey?

Now for the interpretation: I cannot think '*and shall not I*

weep' 'just what is wanted' for the last line. Compare the corresponding strophe, where she speaks of Paris, the loss of friends, Scamander on whose banks she was reared. But *soon* she will have to prophesy by Cocytus and Acheron. The chorus replies: A babe may understand your meaning: I am stricken with grief for the woes you tell of: her own death, that is. In our antistrophe she speaks of the destruction of Troy, which all Priam's riches could not avert. Then follows our last verse. The chorus replies: What you now say is like what you said in the strophe: some over-mastering power makes you speak of death-dealing woes, the *end of which I cannot guess.* Now the chorus knew as well as Cassandra did of the fate of Troy; knew of and rejoiced in its total destruction. What is it then, the end of which they cannot guess? Surely something in the last verse, portending death to Cassandra, as in the strophe. Mr Sidgwick therefore should make *στάγα* 'a blood-drop', not 'a tear-drop'; and then *θερμὴν οὐ στάγ'* would be at least as wide of the Mss. and in other respects very inferior to Musgrave's *θερμὸν ῥοῦν τάχ'*.

The problem is therefore to get out of this verse a sense suited to the context, a sense which in *any case* must be somewhat abrupt. I do not like Hermann's *σάλῳ*, but his *ἐμπεΛΩ* for *ἐμπεΔΩ* is most specious. I have thought of

ἐγὼ δὲ θερμόνους τάχ' ἐμπελῶ βόλῳ:

'But I with heated mind will soon approach the net'. Comp. Eur. Bacch. 847 *ἀνὴρ ἐς βόλον καθίσταται*: Rhes. 730 *ἴσως γὰρ ἐς βόλον τις ἔρχεται.* Aeschylus[1] is fond of metaphors from nets, snares, etc. *τάχ'* corresponds closely with the *τάχα* of the strophe, and should not be ousted.

As this verse is so notorious a *crux* and as opinion will never be unanimous concerning it, I will not, even at the risk of appearing importunate, withhold one more suggestion. This has likewise occurred to me:

ἐγὼ δ' ἔθερμον οὗ τάχ' ἐμπελῶ βόλῳ:

'while I inflamed (with love) him whose net I soon shall

[1] Who, Pers. 424, has *ἰχθύων βόλον.*

come to'. As 'whose net' may mean indifferently 'the net spread *for* whom', or '*by* whom', it might refer to Agamemnon. But I should then have looked for *ἐθέρμηνα*. For this and other reasons I would rather refer it to Apollo. Cassandra from the beginning with singular persistency attributes to him her woes: comp. 1072 to 1087 *ἆ ποῖ ποτ' ἤγαγές με; πρὸς ποίαν στέγην;* Then look to 1203 foll. for Apollo's frustrated love: *μῶν καὶ θεός περ ἱμέρῳ πεπληγμένος; κ.τ.ἑ.* And see the passage which comes later, ending with 1275 *καὶ νῦν ὁ μάντις μάντιν ἐκπράξας ἐμὲ 'Απήγαγ' ἐς τοιάσδε θανασίμους τύχας.* Would not this last verse explain *οὗ τάχ' ἐμπελῶ βόλῳ*?

For *ἔθερμον* comp. Hesych. *θέρμει· θερμαίνει: θέρμεσθαι· θερμαίνεσθαι.* The imperfect of this passive occurs again and again in Homer: he once employs the active, *θέρμετε δ' ὕδωρ. θερμαίνω* suits such passions as love, anger, hope; Pind. Ol. XI 87 *μάλα δέ τοι θερμαίνει φιλότατι νόον.* Sophocles uses it of hope, Euripides of joy.

Under the guidance of my friend Hesychius, I will discuss one more disputed line of this grand and difficult play, 1267,

ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον πεσόντ' ἀγαθὼ δ' ἀμείψομαι.

Many editors follow Hermann in his elegant reading *ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον πεσόντ'· ἐγὼ δ' ἄμ' ἕψομαι*: several adopt *πεσόντα γ'· ὧδ' ἀμείψομαι*: but *γε* is intolerable. Paley has *πεσόντ'· ἄγ' ὧδ'· ἄμ' ἕψομαι*, with a strange explanation. Blomfield suggests *πεσόντα γ' ὧδ' ἀμείψομαι*; Mr Sidgwick adopts Mr Verrall's *πεσόντα θ' ὧδ' ἀμείψομαι*: which 'makes better sense and is nearer the Mss.: Go to destruction, and as ye lie, thus will I avenge myself on you (*as she speaks, she throws down the staff and crown and tramples on them*)'. I must question the Greek in respect both of *τε* and *πεσόντα*: *δέ* is surely called for, not *τε*: and *πεσόντα* in such a sentence cannot be the same as *κείμενα*. It must go with *ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον*, and express a single action coincident with and terminating with the *ἴτε*: Eur. Bacch. 848 *ἥξει δὲ, οὗ θανὼν δώσει δίκην*: 'where he will pay the forfeit of death', 'will die and pay the forfeit': *θανὼν*

denotes the single completed act of dying, and differs from τεθνηκώς on the one hand, and θνήσκων on the other: Troad. 464 the chorus says μεθήσετε γραῖαν πεσοῦσαν; and Hecuba answers ἐᾶτέ με κεῖσθαι πεσοῦσαν: the participle in both cases expresses the single act or point of falling and differs from πίπτουσαν or κειμένην: 'will you leave the old woman where she fell?'—'just leave me to continue lying where I fell': not κεῖσθαι κειμένην.

I would therefore rather read ἄγ' ὧδ' ἀμείψομαι, taking ἄγε in the sense of 'age', 'come'. But, tho' ἀμείβομαι with many contexts signifies to 'requite', I do not like it here, and would suggest ἀμέρξομαι: comp. Hesych. ἀμεργομένη· δρασσομένη. ὑφαιροῦσα[1]. And we should get I think a more powerful verse, and *really perhaps come nearer the Mss.*, by reading ἴ θ' ὧδ' ἀμέρξομαι. The words in Italics may look paradoxical; but I appeal to the high authority of Bastius, comment. palaeogr. p. 743, in Schaefer's Gregor. Corinth.: De syllaba αγ hoc addo, interdum similem esse syllabae ει tali compendio scriptae, quale videbis tab. II. num. 17 in voce ἔχει. quod si quis hoc ει cum littera sequente connecteret, αγ et ει *non possent nisi sensu verborum dignosci.* iam facile apparet, cur in Scholiasta Aeschinis... ἐξαγομένη mutari potuerit in barbarum ἐξειομένη, quod debetur errori perperam legentis vocem genuinam. If then ιθ were written ειθ, ειθ ωδ might by a similar error pass into αγθωδ.

Cassandra's action on the stage would make intelligible to the audience much that is obscure to us in this and the preceding verse, and *purposely abrupt* for scenic effect. As she says σὲ μὲν...διαφθερῶ· she destroys something, which we do not know, but which the spectators knew; an image of Apollo, I guess, which she wore on her head or breast. As she says ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον πεσόντα· she dashes her σκῆπτρα on the ground. As she says ἴθ' (or ἄγ') ὧδ' ἀμέρξομαι· she clutches and tears off from her head and neck, with her hands now free, her staff being gone, her μαντεῖα στέφη.

In order to reproduce feebly the stage-effect, I would present these verses in the following shape:

[1] Eur. Herc. Fur. 397 has the active: χρύσεον πετάλων ἀπὸ μηλοφόρων χερὶ καρπὸν ἀμέρξων. Theocritus and others use the middle in the same sense.

τί δῆτ' ἐμαυτῆς καταγέλωτ' ἔχω τάδε—
καὶ σκῆπτρα—καὶ μαντεῖα περὶ δέρῃ στέφη;—
σὲ μὲν πρὸ μοίρας τῆς ἐμῆς διαφθερῶ·—
ἴτ' ἐς φθόρον πεσόντ'·—ἴθ', ὦ δ' ἀμέρξομαι·—
ἄλλην τιν' ἄταις (ἄτης) ἀντ' ἐμοῦ πλουτίζετε.

Editors point out a manifest allusion to our passage in what Cassandra says in Eurip. Troad. 451 foll. To support my reading and interpretation of the last clause I would appeal to the following words of Euripides: ὦ στέφη τοῦ φιλτάτου μοι θεῶν...ἴτ' ἀπ' ἐμοῦ χρωτὸς σπαραγμοῖς: here ἴτε σπαραγμοῖς at all events comes very near in meaning to ἴτε, ἀμέρξομαι.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

CATULLUS 63 18.

Hilarate erocitatis [O, crocitatis G] erroribus animum. Many corrections have been made of this verse: the following would be a simple one, the substitution of a P for the ambiguous E or C: Hilarate procitatis cet.: 'gladden the heart with flights of eager emulation.' Phil. Gloss. Procitat, προεκκαλεῖται: Paul. Fest. p. 225, 7 Procitant, provocitant. citare enim vocitare est. The word therefore signifies 'certatim citatis,' 'provocatis.'

H. A. J. MUNRO.

INSCRIPTIONS OF CILICIA, CAPPADOCIA, AND PONTUS.

Out of a large number of inscriptions, of which Col. Sir Charles Wilson, H.M. Consul General in Anatolia, has sent me copies, I have selected the following, adding two which I transcribed in July 1882 and two others taken from the woodcuts of an Armenian book. The inscriptions sent by Sir C. Wilson have been copied either by himself, by Lieut. Bennet, R.E., or by the Rev. Mr Christy, an American missionary. Those which are here printed have been selected as presenting more or less geographical interest.

Mallos.

Mallos was situated on a height at the mouth of the river Pyramos, which has in modern times altered its course. A low range of hills stretched along the coast north-east from the ancient mouth. The river Pyramos, Jeihun Chai, now joins the sea at the opposite end of the range, several miles to the east of its old course, but its former channel with the bridges that cross it can still be traced. The level country inland from Mallos is the famous Aleian plain. The district is represented very accurately in Kiepert's map after the survey of Capt. Beaufort. The coast land south of the range of hills is all a recent formation from the river, which is rapidly filling up the bay of Ayas, i.e. Αἰγαίας, on the east.

The two inscriptions which follow have been copied by Lieut. Bennet, R.E.

Nos. 1 and 2.

On two sides of the same block of marble at Kara Tash. As the inscriptions have no connection with one another, and

are in different character[1], it is clear that the same stone has been used at two different periods. Probably No. 1 is the older and belongs to the autonomous period.

(1)

ΑΛΛΩΤΩΝΟΔΗΜΟΣ	[Μ]*αλλωτῶν ὁ δῆμος*
ΔΡΑΚΟΝΤΧΧΑΡΤΕΜΙΔΩΡΟΥ	*Δράκοντ[α] Ἀρτεμιδώρου*
ΑΡΕΤΗΣΕΝΕΚΕΝΑΕΥΝΟΙΑΣ	*ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν [κ]α[ὶ] εὐνοίας*
ΤΗΣΠΡΟΣΤΗΝΠΑΤΡΙΔΑ	*τῆς πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα.*

(2) ΤΡΥΦΕΙΣΗΡΟΦΙΛΟΥΔΙΣΗΔΗΜΙΟΥΡ
ΓΟΣΚΑΙΙΕΡΕΙΑΤΗΣΣΕΒΑΣΤΗΣΚΑΙΤΗΣ
ΠΟΛΕΩΣΗΡΟΦΙΛΟΝΤΡΙΣΤΟΝΑΔΕΛ
ΡΟΝΚΑΤΑΤΗΝΤΟΥΠΑΤΡΟΣΔΙΑΟΗ
ΚΗΝΑΙΙΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ

Τρυφεὶς Ἡροφίλου τοῦ Ἡροφίλου, ἡ δημιουργὸς καὶ ἱέρεια τῆς Σεβαστῆς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, Ἡρόφιλον Ἡροφίλου τοῦ Ἡροφίλου τὸν ἀδελ[φ]ὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δια[θ]ήκην ἀ[ν]έστησεν.

No. 1 is the first inscription found on this site that actually contains the name Mallos. For some time the city was called Antiocheia, and two inscriptions containing that name are published in Lebas, *Voy. Archéol.* III., No. 1486, 1487. The old name again revived, and on bronze coins of the first century B.C. the inscription is ΜΑΛΛΩΤΩΝ. This inscription is on the pedestal of a statue erected to Dracon son of Artemidoros.

No. 2 is engraved by a woman, Trypheis, in honour of her brother Herophilos according to the terms of their father's will. Trypheis had been chief magistrate, dêmiourgos, of the city. The title was a common one in Doric states; it is found also at Tarsos, and at Anazarbos (see Lebas, No. 1480). Women held public offices not infrequently under the empire: the offices were generally of a more honorary character, where wealth and liberality were the chief requisites, such as Agonothetes; but there is no reason to think that under the Empire the Demiourgos had the same character and powers as in the autonomous period. The emperor Heliogabalus condescended to become

[1] The difference could not be rendered in printing.

demiourgos of Anazarbos (Lebas, *l.c.*), and it is probable therefore that the office had a religious character. The name Trypheis may be compared with Tryphaina.

Anazarbos.

The following inscription was copied by Lieut. Bennet at a village Sai Gechid on the road between Adana and Sis, and near the site of Caesareia Anazarbos, on a tributary of the Pyramos. It was one of the chief towns of Cilicia, and when Cilicia was divided into three provinces by Diocletian about 297 A.D., it was the capital of Cilicia Secunda. Suidas is certainly wrong when he says that its original name was Kyinda. The town lay beside Mt. Anazarbos.

No. 3.

ЄΥΘΗΝΙΑΘΕΑ	Εὐθηνία Θεᾷ
ЄΤΟΥϹ ΗΙΡΜΗΝΟϹ	Ἔτους ηιρ', μηνὸς
ΥΠЄΡΒЄΡЄΤΑΙΟΥΙΚ	Ὑπερβερεταίου ι[β?
ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟϹΒΙЄΡΑϹΑΜЄ	Δημήτριος Δημητρίου ἱερασά-
ΝΟϹΔΙΟϹΠΟΛΙЄΩϹΜΙϹΠΑΙ	μενος Διὸς Πολιέως [καὶ Ἐπαρ-
ΧЄΙΟΥ.	χείου.

The goddess Euthenia is of the same class with Euposia at Hierapolis of Phrygia, Eubosia at Acmonia of Phrygia, and many others. The inhabitants claim that Zeus, the patron god of their city, is also god of the whole province (ἐπαρχία), though Tarsos was the real capital. The month is Macedonian, as was generally the case in Grecised Asia. The era is 19 B.C., when Augustus showed some favours to the city and doubtless gave it the name Caesareia. The era occurs frequently on coins of the city from Domitian onwards. This inscription therefore belongs to the year 99 A.D. Another era occurs on a coin of the emperor Nero: Eckhel after reading the date on this coin as ΠΕ and reckoning the era from the battle of Actium finally read it as ΜΕ and reckoned the era as 19 A.D., like that in use at the neighbouring town of Augusta. Mr Head has shown me a coin in the British Museum, struck under Tiberius. The date may either be read as Ε agreeing with Eckhel's era 19 A.D., or as a monogram of ΞΕ agreeing

with Eckhel's first theory, the battle of Actium. But this very rare era, whatever it is, cannot be that used in the inscription[1].

Comana of Cappadocia.

The site of Comana is not marked in Kiepert's map of Asia Minor, but is given in the map made by him for Tchihatcheff's Travels. It lies, exactly as Strabo describes it, in a deep valley of the Antitaurus, through which flows the river Sarus, now called Seichun Chai. The modern name of Comana is Sheherdere-si, "the town of the gorge." The situation of the town illustrates and confirms the Antonine Itinerary, which makes the road from Caesareia Mazaca to Comana and the road from Sebasteia to Comana meet at Coduzalaba and coincide for the last twenty-four miles. There is now a direct mountain road Kaisarieh (Caesareia) south-east to Sheher; but the waggon-road goes straight east through Ekrek, traverses an easy pass through the mountains, and joins at Maghara the road running north and south between Sivas (Sebasteia) and Sheher. It is now reckoned three days' easy journey from Kaisarieh to Sheher, which agrees well with both the Antonine Itinerary and the Peutinger Table[2]. The former places seventy-two Roman miles, the latter eighty, between Caesareia and Comana.

The following inscriptions are, so far as I am aware, the first that have been published from Comana. They were copied by Sir C. Wilson, who saw also many others which he had not time to transcribe. The ruins were on a very large scale, and at the time of his visit were quite deserted. Now an Armenian village is established there, and is working the usual destruction among the marbles and remains. It is to be hoped that the place may be visited again soon, before too much havoc has been wrought. The Armenians have always a remarkable preference for inscribed stones in building. It is unfortunate that none of the inscriptions refer directly to the great religious establishment at Comana with its powerful priesthood and its six thousand temple slaves or hierodouloi. All show more or less

[1] Two coins given by Mionnet, no. 69 and Suppl. no. 93 prove that this rare era is 19 A.D.

[2] For these facts about the modern roads I am indebted to Lieut. Chermside, R.E.

the influence of the Romano-Hellenic civilisation, which tended so much to destroy provincial characteristics and produce one uniform state of society throughout the empire. In the great cities this civilisation had more power, and thus it arises that most information about these great religious establishments of Asia Minor is furnished in the inscriptions, not of Comana nor of Pessinus, but of the obscure district of the Katakekaumene on the borders of Lydia and Phrygia.

Strabo says little about the Cappadocian Comana, which is often distinguished as Chryse; but he gives a much fuller account of the Pontic city, and records the important fact that in the two places the cultus-ceremonial was exactly the same. The priesthood was originally the ruling power over the whole country round. Each of these great religious centres in Asia Minor was a genuine theocracy. The temple was also an oracle, where the god declared his will; the priests were his interpreters, and therefore practically the rulers of the whole country. The power of the kings, and in western Asia Minor of the people, established itself only by slow degrees alongside that of the priesthood, backed as it was by the enormous numbers of hierodouloi belonging directly to the temple service and at the disposal of the priests. In each Comana they numbered six thousand. Curtius, *Beitr. z. Gesch. Kleinasiens*, has sketched the early history of Ephesus directly on the model of the eastern temples, and there can be little doubt that he is right in assuming the complete analogy.

No. 4.

(1) on the side of an altar, (2) on the top of the same altar.

(1) ΚΥΡΙШΑΠΟΛ
ΛШΝΙ
ΚЄΑCΚΛΗΠΙШ
ЄШΤΗΡЄΙ
ΑΥΡΚΥΡΙΛΛΟЄ
ΒΝЄШΚΟΡΟЄ

Κυρίω Ἀπόλλωνι κὲ Ἀσκληπίω
Σωτῆρει Αὐρ(ήλιος) Κύριλλος
β. νεωκόρος τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος.

(2) ΤΟΥΑ
ΠΟΛΛ
ШΝΟЄ

The two parts are evidently intended to be read continuously. The Apollo whose neokoros here dedicates an altar to him is certainly not the Greek Apollo, but a genuine native deity: otherwise we should not hear of his *neokoros*. The office was an Oriental one, and never attained honour and position in the true Hellenic temple-ritual. Under the empire the great cities of Asia Minor deemed it the highest honour to receive the title of *νεωκόρος* in the state cultus paid to the emperor. This native Apollo is a god of frequent occurrence all over Asia Minor, and he was one of the chief deities of this district of Cappadocia (Strab. p. 537). He is simply the Oriental Sun-god, worshipped over the whole of Asia Minor and identified by the Greeks sometimes with Apollo, sometimes with Zeus, according to slight local diversities of character. Asclepios the Saviour to whom the altar is dedicated in company with Apollo is also doubtless Hellenic only in name. Worshipped in the same temple and on the same altar with the Sun-god, he is simply a form of the same deity individualised in one of his attributes as the Healing God.

No. 5.

ΜΗΙ	*μηνια ζημ*
-ΙΤΕΙ	*ἱερέ]α τῆς Νικηφόρου Θ[εᾶς*
ΜΗΝΙΑΖΗΜ	*στρατηγὸν Καταονία[ς ἐπιμελ-*
ΑΤΗΣΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥΘ	*η]σάμενον αὐτῶν ἐπιεικ[ῶς τε*
ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΝΚΑΤΑΟΝΙΑ	*καὶ εὐεργετικῶς.*
ΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΝΑΥΤΩΝΕΠΙΕΙΚ	
ΚΑΙΕΥΕΡΓΕΤΙΚΩΣ	

The Nikephoros Thea is of course Ma or Artemis or Bellona, the great goddess of Comana. She had here much of the war-like character which often attaches to the Artemis of Asia Minor; hence she is the conquering goddess, like the Pallas of Pergamus.

According to Ptolemy, Cappadocia was under the Romans divided into four districts, Cataonia, Aravene Saravene or Abarene, Lavianêsinê, and Muriane. But Strabo says that in his time the Romans retained the old division into ten strategiai, of

which Cataonia is the second in his enumeration. Marquardt (*Alt.* IV. I. 208) says that this division lasted as late as the time of Antoninus Pius. Now after the death of Archelaus the last king, Tiberius placed Cappadocia under the direction of a Roman knight as procurator; and it is possible that each of the ten strategiai was governed by a stratêgos while this system continued. If so the person honoured in this inscription was Stratêgos of Cataonia either under one of the native kings or under the early empire.

No. 6.

ΑΘΗΝΑΙΣΣΠΙΤΟΥΗ	Ἀθηναῖς Σπίτου ἢ
ΚΑΙΒΑΖΕΙΣΣΠΙΤΗΝ	καὶ Βάζεις Σπίτην
ΣΠΙΤΟΥΤΟΥΜΙΘΡΑ	Σπίτου τοῦ Μιθρα-
ΤΩΧΜΟΥΤΟΝΕΑΤΗΣ	τώχμου τὸν ἑατῆς
ΑΝΕΨΙΟΝΤΙΜΗΤΙΚΩΣ	ἀνέψιον τιμητικῶς
ΠΡΟΣΑΥΤΗΝΔΙΑΤΕ	πρὸς αὐτὴν διατε-
ΘΕΝΤΑΕΥΝΟΙΑΣΚΑ	θέντα εὐνοίας κα[ὶ
ΦΙΛΟΣΤΟΡΓΙΑΣΕΝΕ	φιλοστοργίας ἕνε[κεν.

The spelling ἑατῆς is characteristic of the Augustan period (*Arch. Ztg.* 1876, p. 54). The most interesting thing in this inscription is the double name of the lady; she has a Greek name and a native. One thinks of the line quoted by Athenaeus *αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ὄνομα Φρυγιακὸν γυναῖκ' ἔχειν.* Both her father and her cousin's father are called Spites.

No. 7.

On four sides of a square block of marble in a ruined chapel near Sheher.

(1)

ΜΝΗΜΑCΚΛΗΠΙΑΔ	
ΠΥΛΑΔΟΥΤΟΔΕ	
ΤΕΥΣΕΝΑΡΕΙΩΝ	
ΠΡΩΤΟCΚΑΙΦΙΛΙ	
ΚΑ////ΓΕΝΕΙΕΝΓΥΤ	

(2)

ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟCΑΥΘΕΤΑΡΩΝ	
ΠΡΟ + ΕΡΩΝ	
ΑCΚΛΗΠΙΟΔΩΡΟC	
ΟΙΚΕΙΟCΦΙΛΙΗΝ	
ΙΔΕΠΑΡΩΝΥΜΙΗΝ	

(3)
ΦΑΙΔΡΟCΔΑΥΤ
ЄΠΙΤΟΙCΙΤΡΙΤΟC
ΦΙΛΙΗΔΑΡΑΠΡΩΤΟC

ΔЄΙΜΑΤΑЄΙΜΝΗCΤΟΝ
CΗΜΑΦΙΛΩЄΤΑΡΩ

(4)
ΤЄCΤΡΑΤΟCΑΥΜЄΜΦΙC
ΟΥΤΟΙΤΑΦΟΝ
ЄΖЄΤЄΛЄCCAN

ΤЄCCΑΡЄCЄΚΠΟΛΛΩΝ
ΜΝΗΜΟΝЄCЄΥCЄΒΙΗC

Μνῆμ' Ἀσκληπιάδ[η] Πυλάδου τόδε τεῦ[ξ]εν Ἀρείων,
Πρῶτος καὶ φιλίῃ καὶ γένει ἐνγύτ[ατα·
Δεύτερος αὖθ' ἑτάρων προ[τ]έρων Ἀσκληπιόδωρος
Οἰκεῖος φιλίην [ο]ἵδε παρωνυμίην·
Φαιδρὸς δ' αὖτ' ἐπὶ τοῖσι τρίτος, φιλίῃ δ' ἄρα πρῶτος,
Δείματ' ἀείμνηστον σῆμα φίλῳ ἑτάρῳ·
Τέτρατος αὖ Μέμφις· οὗτοι τάφον ἐξετέλεσσαν,
Τέσσαρες ἐκ πολλῶν μνήμονες εὐσεβίης.

No. 8.

ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΑ	Αὐτοκράτορα
ΚΑΙCΑΡΑΜΑΥΡ	Καίσαρα Μ. Αὐρήλιον ['Αντωνεῖνον]
ЄΥCЄΚ	Εὐσεβ(ῆ) Εὐτυχ(ῆ) Σεβ(αστὸν)
ЄΥΤΥΧCЄΒΜЄ	μέ(γιστον).

Caracalla is sole emperor when the inscription is engraved, so that the date is between 215 and 217 A.D.

No. 9.

ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟC	'Αν[τ]ίγονος
ΙΑCΟΝΟCΚΑΙ	'Ιάσονος καὶ
ΕΡΜ///ΔΩΡ	Ἑρμ[ο]δώρ[α
ΦΑΡΝΑΚΟ	Φαρνάκο[υς
ΟΛΥΜΠΙΩΤΩ	'Ολυμπίῳ τῷ
ΑCΥΝΚΡΙΤΩ	ἀσυνκρίτῳ

At the end of line 3 the beginning of an A could be seen. The inscription is raised by a father and mother to their son. The names are all Greek except that of the mother's father. Pharnaces was a common name among the Pontic kings. It was originally a divine name or epithet: Mên Pharnakou was

one of the chief gods of Pontus, and the most sacred oath of the kings of Pontus was by this deity (Strabo 557). Just as the name and the whole cultus of the Pontic Comana was learned from Cappadocia, so doubtless was all their religion, including Mên Pharnakou.

No. 10.

ΤΦΛ ΟΥΙΟΣΚΟΛΕ	Τ. Φλαουιος Κολε-
ΣΦΛΑΟΥΙΩΑΠΟΛΛΩ	ς Φλαουίω Ἀπόλλω-
ΝΙΤΩΙΔΙΩΘΡΕΠΤΩ	νι τῶ ἰδίω θρεπτῶ
ΜΝΗΜΗΣΕΝΕΚΕΝ	μνήμης ἕνεκεν

It is doubtful what is the surname in the first line, Κολεος or Κολες. Such *θρεπτοί* or *θρέμματα*, poor children brought up in the family, were apparently regarded generally with genuine affection. A place is very often provided for them in the family tomb, and they are mentioned between the children and the freedmen. But they were sometimes brought up as slaves, and are mentioned after the freedmen. In this case they had a right to claim their liberty, as Trajan writes when Pliny consulted him on the subject (*Epp.* x. 71 and 72, ed. Lemaire).

No. 11.

ΜΙΘΡΕΟΥΣ	[ὁ δεῖνα] Μιθρέους
ΕΑΥΤΩΚΑΤΕΣΚΕΥΑΣ	ἑαυτῶ κατεσκευάσ[εν
ΤΟΝΤΑΦΟΝ	τὸν τάφον.

Persian influence had been very strong in Cappadocia. The months were called by Persian names. It is therefore natural to find such names as Mithratochmos (No. 6), and Mithres. Mithre is the name of a Cappadocian month (see *Philol.* II. 249: Schmidt, *Neue Lyk. Studien* 142).

Sebasteia.

No. 12.

An inscription in the Armenian village of Pilkinik, one mile or more from Sivas, was copied by Sir C. Wilson formerly, and

seen by me in June, 1881. The letters are much worn: the stone is complete on the left side, broken at the top and the right.

ΙCΓΟΟΡΙΟΝ	...]ς τὸ ὅριον
ΙΙΟΥCΘΤ	το ἂν τοῦ ὁρί[ου τ-
ΤΟΑΝΤΟΥΟΡΙC	ὧν ἐπανγελιῶ[ν
ΩΝΘΠΑΝΓΘΛΙΩ	ο τειμησάμεν[ο
ΟΤΘΙΜΗCΑΜΕΝ	ωσαν τάδε ἐπ[ὶ.....Κ-
ΩCΛΝΤΑΔΘΘΠ	[ρ]ισπείνου τη[
ΙΙCΠΕΙΝΟΥΤΗ-	Σεβασ[τείας ἄρχοντες, β-
ΑΤΙΙΛΙCΘΒΑC	ο[υ]λὴ, δῆμος
Ο///ΛΗΔΗΜΟC	

The interest of the inscription arises from the mention of the name Sebasteia. In line 1, [τὸ]ἔ[ν]σόριον suggests itself, but I could not reconcile this with the stone. Instead of N, the letter seemed quite certainly either Γ or Τ. The inscription is probably honorary, to judge both from the end and from the word ἐπανγελιῶν: it was not uncommon for candidates to seek election to posts of honour by promising to spend great sums in office, and the technical word for this promise throughout Asia Minor is ἐπαγγέλλειν. The inscription is dated under the Roman official Crispinus; but I do not see how to supply his title. Sebasteia was in Pontus Polemoniacus, which never formed part of the province of Bithynia Pontus, but was united to Galatia throughout the first century and afterwards to Cappadocia (see below, No. 15). The government of Cappadocia (see No. 5) was remodelled by the emperor Vespasian, who stationed legions there, and from this time it was generally united to the province of Galatia. The governors were of consular rank, ruling as legati Augusti pro praetore Cappadociae Galatiae. The office was filled by Neratius Pansa, 78—80 A.D., Caesennius Gallus 80—82 A.D., and Julius Candidus Marius Celsus, consul 86 A.D., perhaps held the office, though he cannot be proved except in Galatia. But it seems quite certain that Bellicius Sollers, propraetor of Galatia about 90—5 A.D., did not rule in Cappadocia, and that he was not of consular rank: while Julius Quadratus, consul 93 A.D., was ruler of Cappadocia alone in the year 94 or

95. When the provinces were separated Pontus Polemoniacus went with Galatia (see C. I. L. III. No. 291). It is probable that the severance was for some temporary purpose, as from 95—100 A.D. we find Pomponius Bassus ruling over Cappadocia and Galatia. But he seems to have been the last officer that united under his sway such a vast extent of country. Trajan finally divided the province, and placed a *legatus* of consular rank over Cappadocia, while a *legatus* of praetorian rank ruled Galatia: Pontus Polemoniacus was probably joined to the former[1]. The name Crispinus occurs neither in the list of known governors of Cappadocia given by Marquardt, nor in that compiled for Galatia by M. Perrot (*de Galatia Prov. Rom.*); but both are of course far from complete.

Comana Pontica.

In an Armenian book of Travels belonging to the priest of Pilkinik near Sivas, I saw the following inscriptions along with several others, all equally badly copied and hopeless, from Geumenek near Tokat. I give two of these inscriptions, which contain the name of the town.

No. 13.

ΝΚΑΙΣΑΡΑ	]ν Καίσαρα
οΚΑΙΣΑΡΕΩ	η Ἱερ]ο-Καισαρέω[ν Κο-
ΙΑΝΕΩΝΠΟΛΙΣ	μ]ανέων πόλις
ΟΥΣ .ΡΓ.	ἔτ]ους ργ′.

The inscription is dated in the year one hundred and three. On the analogy of the local eras used in various parts of Asia Minor in the Imperial period, there can be no doubt that this era is that either of the formation of the country into a Roman province or of the assumption by the town of the name Hiero-Caesareia. This name for the city is common on the coins, which show that the era dates from A.D. 37, when Caligula gave to Polemon the kingdom of Pontus, which had belonged to his

[1] See Marquardt *Röm. Alt.* IV. p. 205; Perrot, *de Gal. Prov. Rom.* p. 98 ff. and below no. 15.

father Polemon. In the year 140 A.D., which corresponds to the year 103 of the inscription, the consuls were the emperor Antoninus Pius and Verus Caesar, afterwards the emperor M. Aurelius. It is probable that this inscription is in honour of the two consuls, and it may be restored as follows, omitting the honorary pedigree and titles which were given with the emperor's name.

[Αὐτοκράτορα Καίσαρα Τ. Αἴλιον] [Ἀδριανὸν Ἀντωνεῖνον, κ.τ.λ. καὶ] Μ. Αἴλιον Οὐῆρο]ν Καίσαρα ἡ Ἱερ]οκαισαρέων Κομ]ανέων πόλις. ἔτ]ους ργ'.

No. 14.

(1) ΑΙΑΥΡΗΛΙΩΟΥΗ
.. ΡΟCΛΥΤΗΟΑΘΗ

(2) ЄΒCΙΩΚΑΠΗΙЄΙ
ΟCΚΡΙCΠΕΙΝΟΥЄ

(3) CΑΡЄΩΝΚΟΜΑΝЄ
ΡΑ ΑΙΛΙΟΥΠΡΟΚ

(4) /////ΚΑΙΑCΥΑΩ

[Αὐτοκράτορσιν Μ. Αὐρ. Ἀντωνείνῳ Σεβαστῷ Καίσαρι κ]αὶ Αὐρηλίῳ Οὐη[ρῳ Σ]εβ[α]στῷ Καίσ(αρι) ἡ Ἱερ[οκαι]σαρέων Κομανέ[ων νεωκόρος] καὶ ἄσυλος [πόλις.....ἐπιμεληθέντ]ος? αὐτῆς? Ἀθη[νίων]ος Κρισπείνου ἐ[πὶ ἀντιστ]ρα[τ . . .]Αἰλίου Πρόκλου.

The name Crispinus also occurs at Sebasteia (No. 12). The general drift of the inscription is clear, but it is difficult to connect the separate fragments, some of which need considerable emendation; and the latter part is very uncertain.

Sebastopolis (Sulu Serai).

Sir C. Wilson in a visit to this place some time ago copied a number of inscriptions. The most important of them has been edited by Rénier, *Rev. Archéol.* 1877, p. 200, and by Roehl, *Beitr. z. griech. Epigraphik,* with notable differences. Sir C. Wilson's copy confirms M. Rénier's reading in every respect. The inscription is in honour of the emperor Hadrian and of

Aelius Caesar; and I give the concluding lines, in which alone there is any difference between the two published copies. The copy on which Rénier and Roehl had to work is so very bad, that one cannot wonder at the difference between them. Roehl kept far more strictly to the letters transmitted than Rénier: and where the latter made ΕΠΙΦΑΑΡΜΑΝΟΥ into *ἐπὶ Φλ. Ἀρριάνου*, the former read *ἐπὶ Φααρμάνου*, understanding the person referred to as the Pharasmanes who at this period was ruler of Iberia in the Caucasus.

No. 15.

ΕΠΙΦΛΑΡΡΙΑΝΟΥ	*ἐπὶ Φλ. Ἀρριάνου*
ΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΤΟΥΚΑΙΑΝΤΙΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΥ	*πρεσβευτοῦ καὶ ἀντιστρατηγοῦ*
ΤΟΥΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΥ	*τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ*
ΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΠΟΛΕΙΤΩΝΤΟΝΚΑΙ	*Σεβαστοπολειτῶν τῶν καὶ*
ΗΡΑΚΛΕΟΠΟΛΕΙΤΟΝ	*Ἡρακλεοπολειτῶν*
ΑΡΧΟΝΤΕΣ · ΒΟΥΛΗ · ΔΗΜΟΣ	*ἄρχοντες, βουλή, δῆμος.*
ΕΤΟΥΣΘΛΡ	*ἔτους θλρ.*

The inscription belongs to the year 137 A.D., and to the first half of the year; and as it is dated in the year 139, the era employed must begin B.C. 2. In that year we may conclude that the town was honoured with the name of Sebastopolis, having been formerly called Heracleopolis. A small number of coins occur with the double name of the city, and one of them was picked up in the town itself.

There is a difference also between Roehl and Rénier as to the town in question: the former considers that it is the Sebastopolis of Pontus Galaticus, the latter that it is of Pontus Cappadocicus. I have not the opportunity of seeing Roehl's dissertation, which is not to be found either in the British Museum or in the Bodleian. It is quite certain that Sulu Serai is situated in Pontus Galaticus, but Marquardt declares that both Pontus Polemoniacus and Pontus Galaticus went along with Cappadocia and not along with Galatia when these provinces were separated by Trajan (*Röm. Alt.* IV. I. p. 205: see above, No. 12). Perrot (*De Galat. Prov. Rom.* p. 59) thinks they went with Galatia, but the present inscription goes along with

much probable evidence to show that he is wrong. This Sebastopolis is clearly the one which lay on the northern road from Tavium to Sebasteia in the Antonine Itinerary. The inscription is still on the actual Roman bridge over which the road passed. Sulu Serai is not far south of Zela, and a comparison of the Tables shows that the road from Tavium to Zela and Neocaesareia coincided for a considerable part of the way with that to Sebastopolis and Sebasteia. The former road is given in the Peutinger Table, Rogmor XXXVI, Aegonne XXXVI, Ptemari XXVIII, Zela XXVI, Stabulum XXXII, Seramisa XXII, Neocaesareia XV. The latter in the Antonine Itinerary is Mogaro XXX, Dorano XXIIII, Sebastopolis XL. It is probable that Mogaro is Rogmor, Ptemari is Sebastopolis, and that the roads coincided thus far.

Apart from its geographical importance, the inscription is interesting as a monument of the rule of the historian Arrian in Cappadocia, Pontus, and Armenia Minor. It was the custom to send a consular as legatus to this province, and by a singular fortune the consulate of Arrian, otherwise unknown, is mentioned in the stamp on two bricks found in Rome (see Descemet in *Rev. Archéol.* 1881). Arrian was legatus in the year 131, and continued to be so till the middle of the year 137, when he was succeeded by L. Burbuleius Optatus Ligarianus (on these dates see Rénier, *l. c.*).

Amasia.

No. 16.

On a stone beside a ruined bridge over the river Iris.

IMPNEPVACAESAVC	Imperator Nerva Caesar Au-
PONTIFMAXTRIBPO	gustus, Pontifex Maximus, tri-
TEST·COSIII·PPRESTI	bunicia potestate, Consul III.,
TVITPERPOMPONI	Pater Patriae, restituit per
VMBASSVMLEG	Pomponium Bassum legatum
AVG·PRO·PR	Augusti pro praetore
P	[M].P.

The inscription, C. I. L., III. No. 309, records a repair of the roads executed under Trajan, A.D. 98—9, by Pomponius Bassus

in the province of Galatia. Here we find the same governor a few months earlier repairing a bridge in Pontus. It is certain that T. Pomponius Bassus governed Galatia, Cappadocia, Pontus, &c., as *legatus pro praetore* during a period that extended at least from 95 to 100 A.D. (Perrot, *de Galat. Prov. Rom.* p. 111). Coins of Caesareia Mazaca show that his rule extended over Cappadocia, coins and an inscription (C. I. L. III. No. 309) that it included Galatia. The interior of Pontus was not included in the province of Bithynia-Pontus, but went at this time with Galatia, so that it is quite natural to find Bassus governor at Amasia. Perrot (*de Gal. Prov. Rom.* p. 103 ff.) well describes the road-building energy that marked the period of Vespasian and Trajan, and its effect in civilising the country as well as strengthening the imperial rule. The great majority of the milestones of Asia Minor belong either to this period or to the reconstruction of the empire, Roman now only in name, in the time of Diocletian and Constantine. For example, the great thoroughfare of the province of Asia, from Ephesus to Smyrna and Pergamus, is marked by the milestones of its first builder Aquillius Glabrio, of Vespasian, and of Diocletian (see a paper on Southern Aeolis in *Journ. Hell. Studies*, 1881, pt. 1).

No. 17.

In Ahmed Serai about ten hours north of Amasia on the road to Amisus, now Samsun.

IMPCAES	Imp(eratori) Caes(ari)
C VPVA	Caio[A]ur(elio) Va[l(erio)
DIOCL	Diocl[etiano
PFINVICAVG	P(io)F(elici)invic(to)Aug(usto)[et
5 IMPCAES	imp(eratori) Caes(ari) [Marco Aurelio
.....	[Valerio Maximiano]
PFINVICAVC	P(io) F(elici) invic(to)Aug(usto)
ETFLVA	et Fl(avio)Va[l(erio)
CONSTANT	Constant[io
10 ETC	et G[al(erio) Val(erio)
MAXIMIAN	Maximian[o
NOBIIISS·CA	Nobiliss(imis) Ca[es(aribus)
KΓ	[Millia Passuum] KΓ

The inscription dates between 292 and 305 A.D. The reconstruction of the empire by Diocletian, consummated about 297 A.D., is marked by great activity in road-making (see above, No. 15).

This milestone is of great importance for the geography of Pontus. Ahmed Serai lies east from the hot springs of Kavsa, and the distances given by the natives are, Kavsa four hours, Ladik two, Amasia ten, Samsun twelve. Sir C. Wilson writes; "Ahmed Serai is on the line of a road from Nicopolis (Kara Hissar), Neo-Caesareia (Niksar) to Kavsa: there it forked, one branch going by Mersifun to Tchorum, Aladja, and Nefez keni, or from Aladja direct to Angora. The other branch went by Vezir Keupru, crossed the Halys by a Roman bridge which I am told still exists, and went on.....towards Constantinople. Ahmed Serai is the place where a road would naturally pass over the hills west of the Tash Ova. The distance you found would be either to Mersifun, an old site, or to Sunnisa, a remarkable old site on the Tash Ova."

No. 18.

At Ak Dam, two miles south of Anazarbus: copied by Lieut. Bennet, R.E.

ΑΠΟΑΝΑΖΑΡΒΟΥ
ΗΜΗΤΡΟΠΟΛΕΩϹ
ΤΩΝΓ̄·ΕΠΑΡΧΕΙΩΝΠΡο
ΚΑΘЄΖΟΜΕΝ–ϹΚΑΙ
Β̄·ΝЄΩΚΟΡΟΥ
Α

Ἀπὸ Ἀναζάρβου [τ]ῆ[ς] *μητροπόλεως τῶν γ' ἐπαρχειῶν προκαθεζομένης καὶ β' νεωκόρου*, A. This is the first milestone on the road leading from Anazarbos south, perhaps the road to Mopsuestia from which another milestone is published (Lebas 1495). There was, as M. Waddington remarks (Lebas, *Inscr. As. Min.* no. 1480), a constant rivalry between Anazarbos and Tarsos, and each city tries to outdo the other in the splendour

of its titles and to appropriate those which the other had assumed: similar contention between Ephesus and Smyrna led at last to imperial interference. In the above-quoted inscription, of which a better text is published by Collignon (*Ann. d. l. Faculté d. Lettr. Bordeaux*, 1881, p. 154), Tarsus boasts itself *μητρόπολις τῶν γ' ἐπαρχειῶν* Κιλικίας Ἰσαυρίας Λυκαονίας *προκαθεζομένη*[1] *καὶ β' νεωκόρος*. Cilicia was under the early emperors governed by a *procurator* under the *legatus Augusti* of the province of Syria. Under Vespasian it became a separate province governed by a *legatus pro praetore* (Marquardt *Röm. Staatsverw.* I. p. 229). M. Waddington supposes that it was under Severus that Isauria and Lycaonia were placed under the same administration as Cilicia.

No. 19.

Anazarbus: copied by Sir C. Wilson.

ΔΡΟ ΑΙΣΑΡΑ
ΤΙΒΕΡΙ ΣΤΟΥΥΙ
ΟΝΘΙ ΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΥΥΙ
ΩΝΟΝ ΕΛΕΝΟΣΒΑΣΙ
ΛΕΩΣΦΙΛΟΠΑΤΟΡΟΣ
ΑΠΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ

Δρο[ῦσον κ]αίσαρα, Τιβερί[ου σεβα]στοῦ υἱὸν, Θ[εοῦ] Σεβαστοῦ υἱωνὸν, Ἕλενος *βασιλέως Φιλοπάτορος ἀπελεύθερος*. Philopator was one of the obscure kings of part of Cappadocia and Cilicia, about whom see Eckhel III. p. 82. Tarcondimotos I was on the side of Pompey and afterwards of Antony. His sons Philopator and Tarcondimotos deserted to Augustus after the battle of Actium; the kingdom was taken away from Philopator, but restored to Tarcondimotos in B.C. 20. Philopator II died A.D. 17: nothing is known of his accession or parentage (see Tac. *Ann.* II. 42). The letters Δ Λ on a coin of king Philopator perhaps indicate that his reign reached a thirty-fourth year. Drusus, son of the emperor Tiberius, was

[1] It is necessary to modify the text of M. Collignon by reading *προ-*.

made consul for the first time in A.D. 15, and it is not probable that the inscription is earlier than this date, while it cannot be later than A.D. 17.

No. 20.

Rock-tomb at Anazarbos, fragment of a long inscription now illegible: copied by Sir C. Wilson.

Τ ΦΟΝΗΑΛΛΗΚΤΟΜΕΓ ΙΡΑ
...mutilated relief
ΑΓΟΝΟΝΣΥΝΟΥΧΟΝΦΥΛΑΣΣΟΜ
ΗΑΝΟΙΓ/ΟΥ ΑΡΘ

τ[ισι]φόνη, Ἀλληκτ[ώ], Μέγ[α]ιρα.....
ἄγονον, [ε]ὐνοῦχον φυλασσομ .....

It is unfortunate that this inscription is so mutilated. Perhaps a comparison with the very bad copy in Langlois *Inscr. de la Cilicie*, p. 12, and Lebas 1513, will help some one to restore it.

No. 21.

Comana: copied by Rev. Mr Christy.

ϹΩΤΗΡΙΑ
ϹΚΛΗΠΙΩ
ΚΑΝΖΑ
ΡΑΙΛΑΡΟϹ
ΥΠΕΡΕΙϹΙΝ
ΟΥΤΟΥΥΙ
ΟΥ

Σωτῆρι Ἀσκληπίῳ Καυζαραιλαρος (?) ὑπὲρ Εἰσινου (?) τοῦ υἱοῦ. The inscription records the gratitude of a father for his son's recovery from sickness: the names are doubtful. The god Asclepios has already occurred on another inscription. His worship grew steadily in popularity throughout the imperial time, and was the last and most difficult cultus for Christianity to abolish. Hence there was a growing tendency to identify the native gods of Cappadocia with Asclepios.

No. 22.

ΦΛΑCΙΑΤΙΚΟC
ΚΑΙΙΟΥΛΙΑΑΘΗ
ΝΑΙCΠΑΠΟΥΦΛ
ΝΥCΗΤΗΓΛΥΚΥ
ΤΑΤΗΚЄΜΟΝΗ
ΑCΥΝΚΡΙΤΩΘΥ
ΓΑΤΡΙΠΡΟΜΟΙ
ΡΩ

Φλ. Ἀσιατικὸς καὶ Ἰουλία Ἀθηναὶς Πάπου Φανυση (?) τη γλυκυτάτη κὲ μόνη ἀσυνκρίτω θυγατρὶ προμοίρω.

Athenais appears to have been a common name at Comana; it is probable that the warlike θεὰ νικηφόρος was sometimes identified with the Greek Ἀθηνᾶ νικηφόρος. Papas, a name of the Phrygian and Bithynian supreme god, is often used as a personal name in Phrygia, and is doubtless also a native name in Cappadocia.

W. M. RAMSAY.

NOTE ON INSCRIPTION. No. 2, p. 144.

Wesseling thought that Cilicia was divided into two provinces at the redistribution of the Empire under Diocletian about 297 A.D. But in the Verona MS. which gives the resulting arrangement, and in Polemon Silvius (380—5), Cilicia is a single province: and only in the period that elapsed before the *Not. Dign. Or.* appeared (400—5) was it divided. Cilicia I. was governed by a *consularis*, II. by a *praeses*; and this mode of government is given in Hierocles (before 535) and was continued by Justinian, *Nov.* VIII. The undivided Cilicia was probably governed by a *consularis*; though a *praeses* seems to have ruled under Constantine. The officers were under the *Comes Orientis*. (See Wesseling ad Hier.: Böcking ad *Not. Dign. Or.*, p. 141; Mommsen in *Rev. Archéol.* 1866 and 1867.)

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOLOGY.

ON THE MOSTELLARIA OF PLAUTUS.

I. 2. 39

Primum dum parentes fabri liberum sunt,
Et fundamentum substruunt liberorum.
Extollunt, parant sedulo in firmitatem,
Et in usum boni ut sint et in speciem populo.
Sibique (h)aut materiae reparcunt
Nec sumptus ibi sumptui esse ducunt.

So I would write this passage, differing from Ritschl in not altering *Et* in 40 to *Ei*, in eliciting from the MS. reading of 42 *et ut in usum* rather *et in usum boni ut sint* than Ritschl's *ut in usum boni sint*, in rejecting the very questionable word *neparcunt* which Camerarius substituted for the *reparcunt* of MSS. and consequently changing *aut* to *haut*, lastly in retaining *ibi* in 44 with all the best MSS. vv. 43, 44 I would translate 'And they do not grudge themselves any outlay of breeding stuff, and think no expense expensive there.' With *materiae* I would compare Colum. VI. 27 *Est enim generosa materies quae circo sacrisque certaminibus equos praebet*, and VII. 3. 15. The meaning is that the parents put all the vigour of the stock or breed

into making their children. *Reparcere* is found also Truc. II. 4. 23, 4 *Vtinam a principio rei pepercisses* (so A) *meae, Vt nunc repercis sauiis.* Munro on Lucr. I. 668 explains *repercis* as *uicissim parcis*: to me the idea it suggests is rather of holding back, an expansion or repetition of the idea of *parcis* 'grudgingly withhold.'

I. 3. 13

Non uestem amatores amant mulieris set uestis fartum.

Ritschl altered this to *Non uestem amantes mulieris amant, sed uestis fartum.* I cannot think this necessary or even probable. As a dactyl *mulieri* would be quite defensible; but it seems *possible* that *mulier muliercula* were sometimes treated as if the *i* were ignored and the three syllables considered an iambus. At any rate in Hor. Epod. XI. 23 *Nunc gloriantis quamlibet mulierculam* the ear would be greatly relieved by such a scansion; for in a short and finished lyric like this an anapaest seems to be out of the question, and even a spondee to approximate too nearly to the iambics of the stage. Not that this very Epode does not exhibit in the 14 trimeters it contains many spondees in the fifth foot: but they are made up differently. The two exceptions, 15 *Quod si meis inaestuet praecordiis* and 19 *Vbi haec seuerus te palam laudaueram,* are dissimilar, the former in being preceded by a diiambus which contains in itself the third and fourth feet together, the latter in the greater separation of *te* from *palam* as contrasted with *quam* from *libet.*

I. 3. 25, 6

Scapha. *Ita tu me ames, ita Philolaches tuus te amet, ut uenusta's.*
Philol. *Quid ais, scelesta? quomodo adiurasti? ita ego istam amarem?*

So the MSS. *amarim* Guyet and Ritschl. Surely the imperf. is right: *amarem* is simply oratio obliqua of *ita Philolaches te amet.* 'What oath is that you swore—As truly as I was to love her?' Quite similarly Horace Sat. II. 2. 124 *Ac uenerata Ceres, ita culmo surgeret alto, Explicuit uino contractae seria frontis:* in orat. recta the prayer would be '*ita culmo surgas alto.*'

I. 3. 37

Philem. *Nolo ego mei male te, Scapha, praecipere.*
Scaph. *Stulta's plane.*

So the MSS. Ritschl inserts *mea* after *te*; would it not be an easier remedy simply to invert the position of *nolo ego*? Bücheler, Grundriss der lateinischen Declination, p. 57, ed. 1866, says *mei* as a form of *mihi* is not unfrequent from Plautus to Cicero; and on his authority I would retain it here.

I. 3. 65

Di me faciant quod uolint, ni ob istam orationem
Te liberasso denuo.

Bothe reads *Diui* for *Di*, and I am surprised to see that so advanced a critic as Schöll in his edition of the Truculentus has admitted the same correction IV. 1. 3 where MSS. give *Di magni ut ego laetus sum et laetitia differor.* The passage of Aulul. I. 1. 50 *Vtinam me diui adaxint ad suspendium* ought not to be alleged in support of *Diui* in so common a formula as *Di magni*, or as *Di me faciant*, even if *diui* were not unique in the above-quoted line of the Aulularia for Plautus (Wagner, ad loc.): but for Ritschl's *Di pol me faciant*, either *Ita Di* or *At Di* would seem an easier substitute.

I. 3. 67

Si tibi sat acceptumst, fore tibi uictum sempiternum.

Bergk's remark '*non agitur hic quid isti mulieri placeat uel lubitum sit, sed qua spe uel fiducia nitatur*' is quite uncalled for. *Sat* or *satis accipere* is 'to take security,' so 'to feel assured' as Lambinus has pointed out in his note. Stich. IV. 1. 4 *Satis abs te accipiam, nisi uideam mihi te amicum esse, Antipho. Nunc quia te mi amicum experior esse, credetur tibi.*

I. 3. 88

Edepol si summo ioui bo agent o... sacruficassem
Pro illius capite quod dedi, numquam aeque id bene locassem.

I have copied 88 as it appears in the first draught of B. Over *bo* was written later *uiuo* and over the first letter of *agent* *r*. This *uiuo* also appears in DF, as well as in the editio

princeps (Z). It is difficult not to believe this a survival of the genuine reading, of which *argento* was an interpolated explanation. It is obvious that the *ui* of *ioui* caused the absorption of *ui* from *uiuo* and that *uo* remained as *bo*. I should propose then to read *de uiuo sacruficassem*, 'from the principal,' an expression found in Cic. pro Flacco XXXVII, *dat de lucro, nihil detrahit de uiuo*. After *Aedepol* possibly *ego* has fallen out.

I. 3. 121

Quid olant nescias nisi id unum ni male olere intellegas.

Ritschl alters this to *male ut olere intellegas*. I much prefer the MS. reading 'one can't tell *what* they smell of, except that one thing is clear,—you're not to know that they have a *bad* smell.' The one purpose which the variety of scents used by the *uetulae edentulae* effects is to make one feel certain that he is not meant to detect the unsavouriness of their persons.

I. 3. 141

Philol. *Quid hic uos diu agitis?*
Philemat. *Tibi me exorno ut placeam.*
Philol. *Ornata es satis.*

Diu, as Ritschl suggests, seems to have crept in from the former verse *nimis diu abstineo manum*: if not, it is possibly a mistake for *duae* the corrected reading of B and confirmed by F which has *dui*. The whole verse I would read, either dropping *diu* or reading *duae* as a monosyllable,

Philol. *Quid hic uos (duae) agitis?*
Philemat. *Tibi me exorno ut placeam.*
Philol. *[Ex]ornata's satis.*

I. 3. 138

Libet et edepol mihi tecum, nam quod tibi libet, idem mihi libet.

Perhaps, omitting *tecum*,

Libet et edepol mihi; nam tibi quod libet, idem mihi libet.

This at least brings out the correspondence of the clauses with the due balance, and effectively.

I. 4. 13, 14

Caue modo, ne prius in uia accumbas,
Quam illi ubi lectus est stratus coimus.

Ritschl inserts *nos* before *coimus.* I should prefer *eo.*

II. 1. 11

Vel aliqui quiq' denis hastis corpus transfigi solet.

So B, *Vbi* for *Vel* B corrected and CDZ. Perhaps *Vel aliquo unde* or *Vbi alicunde.*

II. 2. 47

Quid istuc est sceleste aut quis id fecit cedo?

Quid istuc scelestist? is, I fancy, what the MSS. point to, rather than Ritschl's *Quid istuc scelus est?* It is true that the previous speaker had said *Scelus inquam factumst,* but this does not necessitate *scelus* in the reply; rather the change to the less direct *scelesti* throws into the expression a vagueness 'What do you mean by your talk of crime?' which agrees well with the incredulous and slightly derisive tone of the speaker.

II. 2. 100

Tu ut occepisti tantum quantum quis fuge
Atque Herculem inuocabis.
Theurop. *Hercules te inuoco.*

The future *inuocabis* of MSS. (B had at first *inuocabi*) ought surely to be retained at any price: for it is impossible to suppose it an *alteration* from the imperative. The last three words, unless *Hercule* could be shown to be used as a form of the vocative, may perhaps be retained by scanning *Hercules* as a disyllable. I am not unaware that Stich. I. 3. 70 where the MSS. give *Hercules te amabit prandio? cena tibi?* has been altered by Ritschl, following the traces of A HERCULE. SAMAUI, into *Herculeo stabunt,* and that this is admitted by Fleckeisen. Yet, to me, the MS. reading has a singular air of genuineness 'Will *you* pay a breakfast to win the favour of Hercules? Do *you* bid with a dinner?' The sudden change from *te* to *tibi* (*poscis*) is helped out by *adnuistin* in the following verse. On

the other hand *Hercules* (trisyllable) is found as vocative, Stich. II. 2. 62, 70, twice and very unmistakeably. It is possible therefore that we should read in the passage of the Most. *Herculem uoco,* which the next verse would take up very well, *Et ego, tibi hodie ut det, senex, magnum malum.*

III. 1. 67

Tran. *Non dat, non debet.*
Danist. *Non debet?*
Tran. *Nec erit quidem*
Ferre hoc potes.

Acidalius altered this to *ne gry quidem,* and so Ritschl with *hinc* for *hoc.* Many years ago I conjectured, what some one may since have anticipated me in publishing, *ne frit quidem.* Varro R. R. I. 48. 3 *Illud summa in spica iam matura, quod est minus quam granum, uocatur frit.* The next possibility would be *trit,* which however would scarcely suit, if the text of Charisius p. 239. 19 is sound. *Trit Naeuius in Corollaria, significat autem ut ait Plautus in quadam 'crepitum polentarium' id est peditum.* The allusion to Plautus seems to be Curc. II. 3. 16.

III. 1. 90

Theurop. *Quid illi debetur?*
Tranio. *Obsecro hercle iubi*
Obi argentum ob os impurae beluae.
Theur. *Iubeam?*
Tran. *Iube in homine argento os uerberarier.*

I would correct this as follows:

Th. *Quid illi debetur?*
Tr. *Obsecro hercle, iuben ibi*
Obicere argentum ob os impurae beluae?
Th. *Iubeam?*
Tr. *Iuben homini argento os uerberarier?*

Iuben homini is already corrected so in B.

III. 1. 112

Theu. *Nam quid ita?*
Tran. *Speculo claras, clarorem merum.*

May not this be the way in which a very out-of-the-way compound *speculiclaras* (mirror-bright) sc. *aedes*, was written? Somewhat similarly *unanimis* is written in Catull. LXVI. 80 *uno animus*, IX. 4 *unanimos uno animos*, and so *flexanimo* is *flexo animo* in LXIV. 330. Anything more than a *single* word, with *clarorem merum* following to explain it, would be *de trop.*

III. 1. 133

Quid ego nunc agam
Nisi ut in uicinum proximum mendacium?

proximem from *proximare* 'bring home to' or perhaps '*lay at the next door*' seems not unlikely, though I cannot quote any passage in which *proximare* is used transitively.

III. 2. 30

Si. *Quíd agis?*
Tr. *Hominem óptumum téneo.*
Si. *Amicé facis*
Qúom me laudás.
Tr. *Decet cérte.*
Si. *Habens hércle te*
Háu bonum téneo seruóm. Tr. * * * *
Si. *Éia mastígia ad mé redi.* Tr. *Iam ísti ero.*

So I would read this doubtful passage. For *Habens hercle te* B has *hercle te habeo.* After *seruom* I think something is lost, in which Tranio moves away from Simo, who instantly calls him back.

The passage which immediately follows is I think to be constituted as follows:

Si. *Quíd nunc, quam móx?*
Tr. *Quid est?*
Si. *Quód solet fíeri hic*
Íntus.
Tr. *Quid est?*
Si. *Scís ibi quód solet fíeri.*

The first of these two cretic verses is so given by Ritschl from B. The second I have elicited from A as given in Ritschl's apparatus criticus.

INTUSQUIDIDESTSCISTIBIQVOD...SOLETFIERI.

I do *not* think that the repeated *solet fieri* is an error, but an intentional iteration to make Tranio see Simo's drift more clearly.

III. 2. 42, 43

Ímmo uita ántehac erát:
Nunc nobis communia haec exciderunt.

Communia is a mistake, I believe, not for *omnia*, but for *cum omnia*. Something seems to have fallen out, *Nunc nóbis* [*non ést*], *cum omnia háec excidérunt*, retaining Ritschl's bacchiac scansion of this and the verse before. 'Life it *is* no more, now that all this is lost.'

III. 2. 77, 78

These two lines exist in A as follows:

QUIAESTAUDITUMESSEAESTATEIBIDEMUICTUMPERBONUM
TESUBSOLECOLUMEMUSQUEPERPETUUMDIEM

the dotted letters are doubtful.

The first was perhaps *Quia esse audit aestate ibidem uictum perbonum*. In the second I cannot but believe that *columem* or possibly *columen* is to be retained, and that no word like *colere* has any place in it. The Balliol glossary has *columen saluum* and *columen et incolumen differt. Incolumen animo accipimus, columen corpore.* This latter gloss is nearly identical with that given from an earlier MS. by Löwe in the Acta Soc. Philol. Lipsiensis, II. 467, where he shows beyond a doubt the existence of *columis* as = *incolumis* from a great number of glossaries, and restores it to Plautus in Trin. 742 *Columem te sistere ei sed detraxe autument.* It is remarkable that both B and C write the word there *columen*; equally remarkable that the Balliol glossary no less than six times writes the *n*, not *m*. Is it possible that in these words and in the much-disputed but undoubted form *sublimen*, there existed a by-form of

the accusative, in *n*? Ritschl indeed Opusc. II. p. 464 regards *sublimen* as a virtual adverb, explaining it of slaves suspended *beneath* the *limen superum* or lintel, cf. Ribbeck in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 77, p. 184 sqq. On this hypothesis we might assume that, like *sublimen, in columen* was originally an adverb 'leaning against a pillar,' was afterwards used where it might represent an accusative = *incolumem*, and then that the same licence was extended to the accusative of *columis*, so that *columem* was occasionally written *columen*. At any rate *columem* or *columen* seems in complete accordance with the rest of the passage. Tranio says his master wishes to inspect Simo's house as a model for some alterations which he intends to make in his own, including a walk (*ambulacrum*) and a portico. How natural that he should use the word *columis* with this idea in his mind! The portico would keep him safe under its *pillars*. Either then I would read *sub sole* (or as the other MSS. *sub diu*) *columen usque perpetuum diem*, or if *columen* is impossible, *columem in usque*.

III. 2. 98

This verse in B is written *Ero seruos multum suo fidelis*. In A the first two words are lost, the rest is thus given by Ritschl, MULTIMODISFILIUS UNUSEST. The whole may be conjecturally restored thus:

Ero seruos multis modis fidus unus,

'A slave in many ways as trusty as any his master has.'

III. 2. 100

Quid illic obsecro tam diu destitisti?

Destitisti is guaranteed both by A and the other MSS. I would retain it, in the sense of 'you have absented yourself,' 'have retired.' Bodl. Gloss. Auct. T. II. 24 *Desistere desinere cessare discedere recedere.*

III. 2. 165

In spite of Ritschl I cannot help believing that here C and D have preserved the true reading. Tranio has just been warn-

ing Theuropides to take care of the house-dog, which he pretends to frighten away. Then Simo breaks in with these words

nil pericli est, age [modo]
Tam placida est quam feta qua uis eire intro
audacter licet.

Ritschl added *modo* which is not in the MSS.; the next line seems to have been *Tam placidast quam feta quaeuis, ire intro audacter licet.* *Eire* (*cire*, D) has prefixed the *e* of *quaeuis* which had been written above *quauis* and then shifted; 'The dog is as quiet as any pregnant woman' if homely, is natural and quite intelligible: whereas *Tam placidast quam placidast aqua, uise, ire &c.* (Ritschl after Camerarius) is weak dramatically and inartistic metrically. Ritschl compares III. 2. 64 *Tam liquidust quam liquida esse tempestas solet*, but to illustrate an unruffled temper by a clear sky does not justify the comparison of a quiet dog to water. In B the three first letters of *feta* are erased.

IV. 1. 19

Vbi aduersum ut eant uocatur.
n

Perhaps

Vbi áduersus út eant uocántur

a bacchiac tripodia acatalectic.

IV. 1. 21

Iam hercle ire uis múla foras pastum.

The metre is no doubt cretic, as R. writes it: but I should prefer *Iam hércle te, múla, uis íre pastúm foras.*

IV. 2

This scene has been drawn out metrically by Hermann in Ritschl's Parerga, p. 504, ed. 1845, yet not without some dissentient scruples on the part of Ritschl, which he silenced in deference to Hermann's authority. Others have not been so submissive, especially Spengel who protests very reasonably against the large number of words introduced by Hermann merely to complete his idea of the metre. Far more successful is Studemund, de Canticis Plautinis, p. 70, where he has written

out at length his view of the metre of each line. I am persuaded that he is generally right; there can be no doubt that the scene, one of the most lively and spirited in Plautus, is essentially lyrical, and that the rhythms of the ordinary dialogue are only of spare occurrence in it. The scene opens, as Studemund shows, with an iambic dimeter to which after an interval of one verse a corresponding iambic dimeter succeeds. Then an anapaestic tetrapodia, a bacchiac tetrapodia; followed by an anapaestic octonarius, and another bacchiac tetrapodia. All this seems quite beyond doubt. But interspersed with these ordinary lyrical rhythms are lines where even Studemund, to my fancy, has not hit on the right metrical principle. I take the first

A. *Phanisce etiam respice.* Ph. *Mihi molestus ne sis.*

Studemund scans this as an iambic septenarius, supposing an hiatus after *Phanisce*, which, in spite of the pause we might assume after a vocative, is far too harsh to be probable. But can there be any reasonable doubt that we have here a specimen of a very different type? A type, so far as I have examined, rare, though not unexampled in Plautus? In a word, a *sotadic* verse. The basis of the sotadic rhythm is ionic a maiore, as Hermann shows; but the forms the verse assumes are very numerous. This one however is straightforward enough

Phānīsce ĕtĭ | ām rēspĭcĕ | mĭhĭ mŏlēstŭ(s) | nē sīs.

Let us try the next. The peculiar lilt of the rhythm is generally a tolerable guide.

Ph. *Oculi dolent.* A. *Cur quia fumus* [*est*] *molestus.*

Here the rhythm is slightly more complex. The only difficulty is to constitute the first foot. The paeon *ŏcŭlī dŏ-* will hardly do duty for the ionic a maiore. Possibly *vah* which is not wanted at the end of the previous line really belongs to this. Then we should have this rhythm[1]

$$-\cup\cup-\cup\,|\,--\cup\cup\,|\,-\cup-\cup\,|\,-\cup$$

[1] I suggest that Phaniscus here *begins to cry*, incensed at the taunt *te erus tuos amat*, and that unable to conceal his tears he says his eyes are smarting. This is not the ordinary view.

The next line in B is written

Tace si faber qui cudere soles plumbeos numbos nos

and this also has a sotadic look, though the unnecessary interpolation of *numbos* (*nummos*) is misleading. The *nos* of B though not found in the other MSS. may be genuine, the sense 'you that so often coin us into bad money,' i.e. pass us off as knaves. Then we might read

Tace sis, faber, qui cudere plumbeos soles nos.

But I would not deny that this is uncertain. The following verse,

Non potes tu cogere me ut tibi maledicam,

I would read thus

Non potes tu me cogere tibi uti maledicam.

Vv. 895—902 should, I believe, be written as follows:

895*a* Ph. *Sí sobríus sis, mále non dícas.* Anap. dimet.
895*b* A. *Tibi óbtemperém cum tu míhi nequeás?* Bacchiac tetrapod. catalect.
A. *At tu mecum, pessime, ito aduorsus.* Ph. *Quaeso hercle abstine*
Iam sermonem de istis rebus. A. *Faciam et pultabo fores.*
Heus ecquis hic est qui maximam his iniuriam
Foribus defendat? Ecquis, ecquis exit huc atque aperit?
900 *Nemo quidem hinc exit foras. Vt esse addecet nequam homines*
Ita sunt, sed eo magis cauto opust, ne eat huc qui male me mulcet.

896, 7 trochaic septenarii; 898 iambic senarius; 899—901 iambic septenarii. In 899 B has *huc exit*, but *exit huc*, repeating the sound *ec-* three times over as it does, admirably expresses the impatience of the knocking *aduorsitor*. In 901 *eat huc* is for *exeat huc* of B.

There is still one verse, 888, in which agreeing with Studemund as to the metrical type to which it belongs, I would reconstitute it somewhat differently. The MSS. write it

Manesne ilico impure parasite?

Studemund supposes a long syllable lost after *ilico*, and thus makes a bacchiac tetrapodia. On this view we might insert *puer*; it is perhaps more probable that *puere* has fallen out after *impure*.

Manésne ilico ímpure [púere] parasíte?

The vocative *puere* is used several times in the succeeding scene.

III. 3. 1

Tr. *Quid tibi uisumst mercimoni?*
Th. *Totus [equidem] gaudeo.*

So I would fill up the line.

III. 3. 23 is thus written in B.

Th. *Ego enim caui recte. Eam debes gratiam atque animo meo.*

There seems no necessity to suppose a lacuna of a whole verse. All that is required to give a sufficient connexion to the two parts is to write

Th. *Ego enim caui recte.*
Tr. *Meam habes gratiam atque animo meo,*

'to me and to my devotion belongs the gratitude you feel,' you are indebted to me and to my devotion for that.

IV. 2. 50, 51

Vide sis ne forte ad merendam quopiam deuorteris
Atque ibi melius cuiquam satis fuerit biberis. Ph. *Quid est?*

For *cuiquam* of B, D has *culiquam* (*cule q*), whence Camerarius corrected *meliuscule*. The Ambrosian palimpsest has IBI... ELIUSQUAM, from which may have been lost NEM. Hence it seems probable that the verse was

Atque ibi ne meliuscule quam sat fuerit biberis. Ph. *Quid est?*

At any rate it seems difficult to find any reasonable ground for distrusting *meliuscule bibere*, when *bene potus, bene potare* are common enough. If however this appears to any hazardous, we might follow Gulielmius Verisim. I. 7, in conjecturing *ne*

pluscule for *meliuscule* and supposing the other letters which have fallen out in A to be DĒ.

Atque ibidem ne pluscule quam sat fuerit biberis? Ph. *Quid est?*

IV. 2. 68

Tranio is uel Herculi conterere quaestum †potest.

Pote siet seems nearer than *possiet.*

R. ELLIS.

PROPERTIANUM.

Lecturing last year on the fourth book of Propertius, I expressed a belief that in the well-known verse El. IV. 7. 81 *Ramosis Anio qua pomifer incubat aruis,* where all modern editors accept Broukhuysen's emendation *Pomosis—*[1]*spumifer,* a less violent change was probable, and that *Lamosis* 'boggy' was what Propertius wrote. Acron on Hor. Epist. I. 13. 10 says *Lama est aqua in uia stans ex pluuia. Dicit lamas lacunas maiores continentes aquam caelestem. Ennius: siluarum saltus latebras lamasque lutosas:* with which compare Phillipps Glossary 4626 *Lame sunt confracture uiarum que fieri solent pluuiarum interluuione.* My friend Mr Hardie of Balliol has pointed out to me a confirmation of this in Nonius 489 *Ab eo quod est labos labosum facit non laboriosum. Lucilius Satyrarum lib. xi. Praeterea omne iter est hoc labosum atque lutosum.* L. Müller comments on Nonius' error in connecting *labosus* with *labor laboriosus,* and himself derives it from *labes.* Mr Hardie suggests that *labosus* had no real existence whatever, and that Lucilius wrote *lamosum atque lutosum,* following in the track of Ennius' *lamasque lutosas.* This appears to me highly plausible: but I have not been able to find *lamosus* in any of the Latin Glossaries I have yet examined. Most readers of Propertius will allow that *Lamosis aruis* is no unapt description of fields filled with boggy chasms by the flooding of the Anio.

[1] *Spumifer* is beyond doubt. Exactly the same corruption is found in the MSS. of Ovid's Amores, III. 6. 46, *Tiburis Argei spumifer arua rigas.*

R. ELLIS.

THE EARLIEST ITALIAN LITERATURE; CONSIDERED WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EVIDENCE AFFORDED ON THE SUBJECT BY THE LATIN LANGUAGE.

It may be well to state at the outset that by literature I do not merely mean documents actually preserved by writing or engraving, but all productions capable of being so preserved, whether originally handed down by oral tradition or not. It will be the special aim of this essay to examine the evidence of language as to the character of the earliest Italian literature; for I doubt whether this branch of the subject, important as it is if we would gain anything like accurate ideas, has received the attention which it deserves. It is true that the evidence has been over and over again collected and reviewed, yet, as I venture to think, without sufficient grasp and clearness of conception. In this, as in other cases, conventional criticism, that is, criticism based upon insufficient investigation and handed down unquestioned from scholar to scholar, has exercised its usual baneful effect of obscuring the facts, and producing a confused misrepresentation instead of a clear and natural picture.

The study of Latin etymology, the further it is pursued, seems more and more clearly to point to the conclusion that the Italian branch of the Indo-Germanic family of nations was for a long time separated from the Hellenic; that its social and political institutions were, in all their main outlines, fully developed before any serious influence from Hellas made itself felt; that its religious system is, in all essentials, its own creation; and finally, that long before the great revolution introduced into its literature by the study of the Greek master-

pieces, it had developed a literature of its own with marked national characteristics, which, in spite of the strenuous efforts of the Hellenizing school, were never wholly effaced.

No candid student of the Hellenic and Italian literatures can fail to recognize a fundamental difference of character between them. In spite of the enormous influence of Greece upon Italy, the two bear unmistakable signs of having sprung from different roots. The poetry and oratory which were born on the Italian soil are of a different temper from those of Greece; their tones are less simple, less sweet, less manifold, but, while not less impassioned, are more accented and more national. There are signs also that in the lost works of the earlier Roman historians the germs at least must have been contained of a political philosophy to which the Greeks were strangers. In a word, the Latin literature breathes from first to last the sense of a continually developing national life. Here lies the true inspiration of the poetry and oratory of ancient Italy, and the source of its power in the civilized world. To speak of the early Italians as having no original gift for literary creation is wholly misleading; as if the imaginative impulse could be implanted where it did not exist, or the gift of the Muses be borrowed like money.

An examination of language, our only resource where documents and tradition alike fail us, will help us in some measure to appreciate the elements out of which the national poetry and oratory of the Italians arose. Let me then endeavour to set forth as briefly as possible the evidence to be derived from this source. I propose to speak of the earliest compositions, of the earliest literary caste or order, and of the characteristics, so far as they can be ascertained, of this primitive literature.

The earliest compositions fall roughly into three classes; religious, historical, and dramatic.

The most general word for a composition of a solemn, ceremonial, or prophetic kind is *carmen*. *Carmen* or *casmen* is a term unknown to the Greeks, but common to the Italians and the ancient Indians. In the Sanskrit of the Vedas[1] *çasman*

[1] See Grassmann, Lexicon zum Rigveda, s. v. The long form of the base *çās-* means also 'to blame, punish.'

and *çasā* meant praise or a song of praise: the base *çans-* or *ças-* is apparently used in the general sense of a solemn utterance, whether it be the solemn pronunciation of names or formulas, or the offering of praise. The Latin *carmen* has precisely the same applications; it is a ceremonial utterance, whether in verse or prose[1]. A *carmen* might be a charm, an incantation, a formula, or a prophecy.

Without discussing the original meaning of the root from which the word is derived, we are justified in saying that the ancient Indians and the progenitors of the ancient Italians had settled in common the usage of a word which was apparently unknown to the Greeks, and of which no traces remain in any of the Indo-Germanic languages but Sanskrit and Latin; but which in Latin is the simplest and most universal term expressive of a poetical utterance.

As it is with this common substantive, so it is with an equally common verb. *Carmen* (= *casmen* or *cansmen*) has been, for instance by Mommsen, connected with *cano*. The etymology is, I suppose, by no means impossible: but whether it be true or no, it is worth noticing that the base *can-* has a different application in Latin, and to a certain extent also in Sanskrit and the Keltic languages, from what it has in Greek. For in Greek *καναχή* and *κόναβος* mean noise, whereas in Sanskrit *kánvas* is the proper name of a singer, in old Irish[2] *for-chun, for-chanim* mean to teach, and in Cornish *cheniah* is a singer. Now *cano* in Latin never has the meaning of mere noise, but always, if not used of singing, implies some form of solemn or ceremonial utterance, prophetic or otherwise.

Perhaps we may go a step further and link the word *cano* with one of the earliest expressions (apparently) for a musical instrument. *Canna* is explained in one of the glosses of Labbaeus as = *συρίγγιον ἐκ καλάμων*: Isidore 17 7 57 says that it was the old name for *harundo*. In Apuleius (Metam. 5 25) *Cannam deam*, if the manuscript may be trusted, is the equivalent for *Σύριγγα*[3]. *Canna* then may very probably have been

[1] Jordan, 'Kritische Beiträge,' &c. p. 178 foll.

[2] Curtius, Greek Etymology, No. 32.

[3] *Complexus hec homo canam deam.*

a name for the reed as an instrument of music, and stand for *cania*, the sounding pipe. There is, as we shall see anon, abundant reason on other grounds for believing that the use of wind instruments was known to the Italians before their contact with the Greeks.

Returning now to *carmen*, let us consider the words *Carmentis* or *Carmenta*, and *Camena*; words which have usually, but I think wrongly, been treated as identical. With regard to *Carmentis* Daniel's Servius on Aen. 8 336 preserves the following important notice; *ideo Carmentis appellata a suis quod divinatione fata caneret: nam antiqui vates carmentes dicebantur, unde etiam librarios qui eorum dicta perscriberent carmentarios nuncupatos. Alii huius comites Porrimam et Postvortam tradunt, quia vatibus et praeterita et futura sunt nota.* So Ovid Fasti 1 630 foll. *Si quis amas veteres ritus, adsiste precanti: Nomina percipies non tibi nota prius: Porrima placantur Postvortaque, sive sorores Sive fugae comites, Maenali diva, tuae.* So far all is plain; *Carmenta* or *Carmentis* is either a prophet or the goddess of prophecy, attended by her sisters or companions *Porrima* or *Antevorta* (Macrob. 1 7 20) and *Postvorta*, who sing respectively of things in front (*porro*) or the past, and of things following behind or the future. But the matter is apparently complicated by the fact that the worship of Carmenta was especially patronized by married women. Plutarch (Quaestiones Romanae 56) asks διὰ τί τὸ τῆς Καρμέντης ἱερὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες ἱδρύσασθαι, καὶ νῦν καὶ μάλιστα σέβονται; One of his explanations, like that given by Ovid in his account of the *Carmentalia* (Fasti 1 618 foll.), seems to rest, as Preller has remarked, on a confusion between *Carmenta* and *carpentum*, or at least on a supposed connection between these words: the other runs thus, οἱ δὲ μοῖραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν Κάρμενταν εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θύειν αὐτῇ τὰς μητέρας. This is supplemented and made perfectly clear by the words of Augustine, Civ. Dei 4 11: *in illis deabus quae fata nascentibus canunt et vocantur Carmentes.* The reason therefore why the *Carmentes* are worshipped

Jahn would correct this into *complexus Echo montanam deam.* But surely Syrinx, not Echo, was the favourite of Pan.

by matrons is because they tell the fortunes of the children. A strangely perverted explanation of their relation to the early days of infants is given by Varro quoted by Gellius 16. 16. 6[1].

It is thus plain that Carmentis or Carmenta was deemed to be, whatever else, a goddess of prophecy. The tasteless Hellenizing mythologists made her the mother of Evander. In Vergil (A. 8 336) she is represented as the first who foretold the greatness of Rome. She is also spoken of as having invented the Roman alphabet, or adapted the Greek alphabet to Italian use (Hyginus 277, Isidore 1 4 &c.). The myth shews a tendency to identify the literary and priestly caste; in other words, it points, in all probability, to the fact that in ancient Italy the seers were the persons who had the knowledge of the ancient religious songs and formulae, and perhaps the control over their composition. It is true that the Roman scholars offer us two distinct theories of the *Carmentes*, one of which makes them soothsayers or *vates*, while the other makes them goddesses. In one point of view the latter theory is doubtless correct, for the temple of Carmenta and the altars to the Carmentes are historical facts. And it is not impossible that *Carmentis*, which stands in point of form to *carmen* exactly as *sementis* stands to *semen*, may have been originally a mere abstract substantive formed from *carmen* and have come afterwards to be personified into a goddess. But I confess that it seems to me more natural to suppose that *Carmentis* was originally equivalent to *vates* and meant a singer; and that the word afterwards became applied to a supposed goddess of song.

But *Camena:* is this word identical with *Carmentis* and *Carmenta?* So far as the form goes this hypothesis is surely far-fetched; for how are we to account for the extrusion of *s* and the shortening of the first syllable of the word, when the forms *Carmentis* and *Carmenta* have remained intact? It is true that Varro (L. L. 7 26) is made by his editors to quote

[1] *Quandoque igitur contra naturam forte conversi in pedes, brachiis plerumque diductis, retineri solent, aegriusque tunc mulieres enituntur. Huius periculi deprecandi gratia arae statutae sunt Romae duabus Carmentibus, quarum altera Postverta cognominata est, Prorsa altera, a derecti perversique partus et potestate et nomine.*

Casmenarum from an old poet, perhaps from Ennius: there is no doubt also that he, like Verrius after him (Festus p. 205), assumed that *Casmena* could become *Camena*. But Jordan in his *Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichte der Lateinischen Sprache* (p. 132 foll.) has given us good reason for doubting whether the word *Casmena* can really be traced to Ennius or to any other Latin poet. He suggests with great plausibility that the form is merely a scholar's fiction, as it was also only a scholar's fiction which identified *Casmillus* with *Camillus*. To the critical reasons which Jordan adduces I would add the fact that the *Camenae* are not the same as the *Carmentes*. The *Camenae* are the Italian Muses; goddesses not of prophecy but of literature. There is no trace of *Camenae* ever having meant the same as *vates*. On the etymology of this word I do not venture to offer any hypothesis; but its form suggests that it was a participle from some lost verb.

The reasoning which I have applied to *Carmentis* will, I think, be found to apply quite as easily, if not more so, to *Faunus*. Modern etymologists are for the most part inclined to connect the word Faunus with φῶς (φαϝ-ος) and to explain it as meaning the god of light, grace, and favour. This idea is so vague and general that it would explain anything or nothing: yet the attributes of Faunus are tolerably distinct, and admit also, I think, of a clearer and more natural explanation. The base φαϝ- light and φα- speech are treated by Curtius (G. E. p. 296) as identical: may not Faunus then originally mean the speaker? Such at least was evidently the opinion of many among the ancient Latin scholars. So Isidore 8 11 87 *fauni a fando, ἀπὸ τῆς φωνῆς dicti, quod voce, non signis, ostendere viderentur futura. In lucis enim consulebantur a paganis, et responsa illis non signis sed vocibus dabant.* The same idea seems to be implied in Varro's words L. L. 7 32, *hos (Faunos)...in silvestribus locis traditum solitos fari futura.* Conversely *fanum* was by some connected with *faunus:* Paulus p. 88 *fanum a Fauno dictum.* And *Faunus* again was sometimes identified, sometimes closely connected, with *Fatuus*, the power or god of speech. Servius A. 6 776 *idem Faunus, idem Fatuus, Fatuellus:* 7 47 *quidam deus est Fatuellus: huius uxor est Fatua. Idem*

Faunus et eadem Fauna. Ducti autem sunt a vaticinando, id est fando. Unde et fatuos dicimus inconsiderate loquentes; 8 314 *hos faunos etiam fatuos dicunt, quod per stuporem divina pronuntiant:* Justin 43 1 *Fauno fuit uxor nomine Fatua, quae adsidue divino spiritu impleta velut per furorem futura praemonebat, unde adhuc qui inspirari dicuntur fatuari dicuntur.* Arnobius 1 36 *Fenta Fatua, Fauni uxor.* Reading between the lines of these notices we discern clearly that *fatuus* (from *fari*) originally meant a speaker, and that it came afterwards to mean a talker, a babbler; that in fact like other words of similar association, for instance our *witch* and *wizard*, it started with a good sense and ended with a bad one, as in course of time the accomplishments of the speaker or the knower became useless. So I have argued elsewhere that *superstitio* originally meant knowledge and the power of prediction, and afterwards false knowledge and false belief.

In point of form *faunus* corresponds exactly with *-φωνος* in such words as *βαρβαρόφωνος*, being in fact the masculine of which *φωνή* is the feminine. But we have now to ask how the attributes of *Faunus* are better explained, by reference to the notion of light or to that of speech.

Faunus is spoken of in an ambiguous way, partly as a divine, partly as a human being. He is native to the soil of Italy; he is king of the Aborigines and father of Latinus; he is the son sometimes of Picus sometimes of Saturnus and the father of Stercutus; he utters oracles, he keeps off wolves (*Lupercus*). But there are many *fauni:* these appear sometimes as inspired utterers of oracles, sometimes as benevolent, sometimes as mischievous or malignant fairies (Pliny 25 29, 30 84). In their oracular capacity they were supposed to speak in Saturnian verse, which is called after them *Faunius.* Ennius speaks of the *versus quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant;* Varro L. L. 7 32 *fauni dei Latinorum, ita ut faunus et fauna sit; hos versibus quos dicunt Saturnios in silvestribus locis traditum est solitos fari futura.* Festus p. 325 *Saturno dies festus celebratur mense Decembri, quod eo aedes sit dedicata; et is culturae agrorum praesidere videtur, quo etiam falx est ei insigne. Versus quoque antiquissimi, quibus Faunus fata cecinisse hominibus vide-*

tur, Saturnii appellantur. Marius Victorinus p. 138 Keil (*versui Saturnio*) *tamquam Italo et indigenae Saturnio sive Faunio nomen dedit:* and with a different turn Placidus p. 47 *Fauniorum modorum, antiquissimorum modorum, quibus Faunum celebrabant.* It is this fact in particular that determines me to look for the base of *Faunus* in *fav-* to speak. Once imagine Faunus as a speaker, προφήτης, and all becomes clear. He is not only the composer and reciter of verses, but generally the seer or wise man, whose superior knowledge entitles him to the admiration and dread of the country folk who consult him. He tells them how to cultivate the soil and how to keep off the wolves. But as his real nature and functions are superseded, his character is misconceived; he becomes a divinity, the earliest king of Latium, the god of prophecy, the god of agriculture. The *fauni*, from being the seers of the early rustic communities, become unreal beings, speaking with unearthly voices in the recesses of mountain and forest; and when the tide of Graecizing mythology inundates Italian antiquities, the transformation is completed, and the native *fauni* are identified with the Πᾶνες and σάτυροι of Hellas.

The reasoning here applied to the Fauni and Carmentes may perhaps be supported by the history of the word *Pilumnus*, which seems to have meant both a miller and the god of grinding corn. In the mythology he is the inventor of the art of pounding dry corn (Augustine, Civ. D. 6 9, Servius A. 9 4, 10 76): but a note by Varro preserved by Isidore 4 11 5 says *Pilumnum quendam in Italia fuisse qui pinsendis praefuit arvis, unde et pilumni et pistores.*

We have here the same phenomenon which I think is presented by the *Faunus* and *Carmentis*, the name of a person exercising an art or craft transformed into the name of a divinity.

The transition was easier in the case of *Carmentis* and *Faunus*, words which always retained something of the adjectival origin and association, than in that of *vates*, which throughout all Latin is a substantive and nothing more. The form of the word is almost without analogy in existing Latin, a fact which suggests either that the word is foreign, or that it is very old.

Professor Sellar thinks that it is Celtic[1], but it does not appear that the chief modern authorities share his opinion. Vaniçek would connect it with *gā-* to sing or cry, a base appearing in Sanskrit (*gā-tú-s* song) and in the Greek γῆ-ρυ-ς and γέ-γω-νε. The same sense would be yielded by a simpler etymology. *Vā-* means to cry or to speak: of the word *Vaticanus* Varro (ap. Gell. 16 17 2) said *Vaticanus deus nominatur penes quem essent vocis humanae initia, quoniam pueri simul atque parti sunt eam primam vocem edunt quae prima in Vaticano syllaba est, idcircoque vagire dicitur, exprimente verbo sonum vocis recentis.* There is nothing to prevent our acceptance of this etymology, and what holds good of *Vaticanus* must surely be applicable also to *vates*. *Va-te-s* from *va-* may perhaps be compared with the Greek verbals in *-τη-ς*, *κρι-τή-ς* and the like.

Vates then, like Faunus, is a speaker, and so either a prophet or a bard. Varro L. L. 7 36 *antiquos poetas vates appellabant:* Servius A. 8 337 *nam vatem et poetam possumus intellegere.* When Ennius speaks contemptuously of *fauni vatesque*, he apparently means the national singers of Italy.

More clearly than *faunus* and *carmentis* does *vates* take us back to the time when the poets were the priests or seers. And the history of the word in literature is quite what analogy would lead us to expect: in a bad sense, as when Ennius says *superstitiosi vates impudentesque harioli*, or Lucretius *religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum*, it means a false prophet: in a good sense, as when Vergil says *me quoque vatem Dicunt pastores, at non ego credulus illis, vates* is always the writer of genius, not merely of accomplishment or cultivation.

Thus far then our investigation has brought us across words which seem to imply the existence of a prophetic or priestly class, the depositaries of the sacred literature. Most of these words are, if not in form, at least in the development of meaning which they have attained, peculiar to Latin, though one is common to Latin and Sanskrit, one to Latin, Sanskrit, and the Celtic languages.

[1] It may be identical with the Irish *faith:* but this would only prove that the word was originally common to the Italians and the Celts, not that one nation borrowed it from the other.

Turning to Greek, we find that *-φωνος* and *καν-* are used in different ways from *Faunus* and *cano*, while of *carmen carmentis* and *vates* Greek has no trace at all. Language knows of no Graeco-Italian period, so far as literature is concerned. Let us go further and see whether other facts point in the same direction.

No characteristic of the ancient Italian literature is more marked than its fondness for alliteration, a device which is never laid aside from the earliest and rudest to the latest and most finished monuments. Whether it be simple and obvious as in Naevius, Plautus, and Ennius, or more artistically concealed, as in Vergil, it is a principle of Latin prose and poetry, a necessity to the ancient Italian ear. Here surely is a positive proof of the long period of separation which must have occurred between the Italians and the Hellenes of pre-historic times. For alliteration is unknown to the ancient Greeks, while on the other hand the Italians and the Teutons are familiar with it. It is not necessary to do more than point out this fact; but it is more important to shew in detail that the early Italian metre is far more similar to that of the ancient Teutons and Indians than to that of the Greeks[1].

Perhaps the most important notice affecting the general principle of the Saturnian metre is that of Servius on Georg. 2. 385, *Saturnio metro...quod ad rhythmum solum vulgares componere solebant:* that is, the principle of the metre was, as we should say, not quantitative but accentual. The complete embarrassment of the other grammarians as to the real nature of the metre fully bears out the remark of Servius. Caesius Bassus (p. 265 Keil), says *nostri antiqui, ut vere dicam quod apparet, usi sunt eo non observata lege nec uno genere custodito, ut inter se consentiant versus, sed praeterquam quod durissimos fecerunt, etiam alios breviores, alios longiores inseruerunt, ut vix invenerim apud Naevium quos pro exemplo ponam.* Atilius Fortunatianus p. 293 Keil: *et hic versus obscurus quibusdam videtur quia passim et sine cura eo homines utebantur.* The grammarians, who understood no principle of metre but that

[1] This point has been worked out conclusively by Bartsch and Westphal.

of quantity, were misled into endeavouring to explain the Saturnian verse by the analogy of Greek measures. This, they admit, they were only able to do to a certain extent, and the instances which they quote are picked out to suit their theory.

But taking into consideration not only the smoother specimens quoted by the grammarians, as *summas opes qui regum regias refregit, magnum numerum triumpat hostibus devictis, duello magno dirimendo regibus subigendis, fundat fugat prosternit maximas legiones, magni Iovis concordes filiae sorores, dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae*, but the rougher and shorter ones which have survived in literature and inscriptions such as *eorum sectam sequontur multi mortales*, we are forced to the conclusion that the Saturnian metre is based as much on accent as on quantity. This theory is, I think, now accepted by all scholars, however much they may differ in detail as to the analysis of the verse. The Saturnian line consists of two members, and its first law seems to be that the *ictus* of the metre corresponds with the accent of the word in the first and the penultimate syllables of the second colon (*Nǽvio poĕtae, mŭlti mortáles*), and in the penultimate syllable of the first: (*dabunt malum Metĕlli*). So much is sufficient for our present purpose. Speaking generally, it seems that the Saturnian measure very much resembles the simple accentual verse of which the ancient Teutonic ballad metre affords an example. Admitting however, as it does to a certain extent, the principle of quantity as well as that of accent, it stands midway between the German metre in question and the developed quantitative measure in which the Hellenes had learned to express their thoughts before their literature emerges into the light of history. It has been argued with much plausibility by Mr Allen, in a recent volume[1] of the *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung*, that the Homeric hexameter is the development of a verse consisting, like the Saturnian, of two *cola* each originally consisting of four beats.

Without accepting in all its details a view which has perhaps hardly been, as yet, sufficiently discussed to have made good its claims, we may safely assert that the Saturnian

[1] 1879.

verse represents a more ancient stage in the development of metre than the Homeric hexameter. This conclusion is historically of the utmost importance, for it clearly points to the fact that the Italians had, independently of the Hellenes, developed a metre suitable to the genius of their language, applicable, as we know, to long as well as short compositions, and presumably, therefore, not deficient either in flexibility or in power.

We have the testimony of Ennius that the Saturnian verse was used in the prophecies of the *fauni* and *vates*, and a notice in Charisius (p. 288 Keil) is perhaps best explained on the hypothesis that it was employed also in the service of religious festivals: *quod eius temporis imperiti adhuc mortales huiusmodi usi versibus videantur suas sententias clusisse vocibusque pro modo temporum modulatis sollemnibus diebus cecinisse.* Caesius Bassus (p. 265 K.) and Charisius l. c. tell us further that Saturnians were found in the *lintei libri* and in the *tabulae* or *tituli triumphales* put up in the Capitol by victorious generals. If indeed we may trust Atilius Fortunatianus (p. 293 Keil) it was in these *tituli* that the Saturnian was most frequently employed. After saying that it was used *passim et sine cura,* he proceeds *maxime tamen triumphaturi in Capitolio tabulas huiusmodi versibus incidebant.*

Had we, indeed, no other evidence bearing on the subject, we might safely have inferred that the Saturnian metre was widely employed in ancient Italy from the fact that it was used by Livius Andronicus in his translation of the Odyssey, and by Naevius in his great national poem on the Punic War. For it must be remembered that both Livius and Naevius were quite able and accustomed to write in Greek metres, and must therefore have adopted the Italian measure by choice, not of necessity. Even supposing that Livius, *a semi-graecus*[1], wrote his Odyssey in Saturnians as a *tour de force,* the same cannot be said of Naevius, who was notoriously anti-Hellenic in his tastes. It is inconceivable that a long Italian epic poem like the Punic War of Naevius should have been written without the foundation of a previously existing literature; the art of writing epics is not

[1] Suetonius de Grammaticis 1.

born in a day. But there is happily no need to have resort to conjecture. I have spoken already of the *tituli triumphales* written in Saturnians; of these it can hardly be doubted that Naevius must to a great extent have availed himself. Besides these there were the family memorials, which, whether in prose or poetry, perpetuated, not without much falsification and exaggeration, the tradition of the great deeds of the Romans of old. Such memorials, written in prose, existed in the time of Cicero (Brutus 62: *et hercule hae quidem extant: ipsae enim familiae sua quasi ornamenta et monumenta servabant, et ad usum, si quis eiusdem generis occidisset, et ad memoriam laudum domesticarum et ad inlustrandam nobilitatem suam*).

But it was also a custom of the ancient Romans to sing at their social gatherings ballads commemorative of the deeds of their ancestors. Cic. Brutus 75 *utinam extarent illa carmina quae multis saeculis ante suam aetatem in epulis esse cantitata a singulis convivis de clarorum virorum laudibus in Originibus scriptum reliquit Cato.* Varro ap. Non. p. 76 *in conviviis pueri modesti ut cantarent carmina antiqua in quibus laudes erant maiorum, et assa voce et cum tibicine.* Cic. Tusc. 4 3 *gravissimus auctor in Originibus dixit Cato, morem apud maiores hunc epularum fuisse, ut deinceps qui accubarent canerent ad tibiam clarorum virorum laudes atque virtutes.* Valerius Maximus 2 1 10 *maiores natu in conviviis ad tibias egregia superiorum opera carmine comprehensa pangebant, quo ad ea imitanda iuventutem alacriorem redderent.* These ballads were performed sometimes by boys, sometimes by adults, with or without an accompaniment on the flute. Cato mentioned the custom as having existed some generations before his time, and in the age of Cicero both the practice and the ballads which it had called into existence had disappeared, perhaps owing to the influx of Greeks, Greek literature, and Greek fashions. There does not however seem to be sufficient reason for supposing that it had wholly died out in the time of Naevius. If it had not, yet another source of inspiration was open to him.

The *carmina* just mentioned must be carefully distinguished from the *neniae* or dirges sung at funerals. Of these Varro

says (ap. Non. p. 145) that they were performed to the accompaniment of flutes and strings after the *praefica* had done her part in praising the dead. The custom must have continued until comparatively late times, for Cicero (Legg. 2 62) prescribes its continuance in his ideal republic, and Quintilian (8 2 8) speaks of the *nenia* as if it were still in use in his day.

Our investigation, then, has so far led us to recognize a class of wise men or seers (*vates*, *fauni*, *carmentes*) the repositories of prophecy and religious song (*carmina*); of hymns to the gods; of a national Italian metre (*Saturnius versus*); of inscriptions in this metre put up by victorious generals; of ballads, presumably also in this metre, sung at banquets in commemoration of the ancient worthies; of family records in prose; and of *neniae* or dirges sung at funerals. Here surely was ample material for poets to work upon. I cannot doubt that much of what is most characteristic in Latin poetry and oratory had its root in these ancient *carmina* and *laudes funebres*. Of ballads and short commemorative pieces in the Saturnian metre there must have been a great number when Naevius, inspired by what were then the greatest events in Roman history, undertook to commemorate them in a national poem.

The Latin writers of the Ciceronian and Augustan ages are probably in great measure responsible for our entire ignorance of what may be called the pre-Hellenic period of Roman literature. Cicero himself indeed speaks with real respect both of Livius and of Naevius; but, not foreseeing how grateful the nineteenth century would have been to him had he supported his criticisms by quotation, he has not, as he has in the case of Ennius, cited a single passage from either. But others were less generous and appreciative than Cicero; and so rapid was the change in literary taste from generation to generation among the ancient Italians, that not merely Naevius and Livius, but the old comedians and tragedians dropped out of view in the first century after Christ, and in the last half of it even Cicero and Caesar were passing out of fashion. We are apt to forget how great was the revolution ushered in by Livius and Ennius. Naevius, who was a younger contemporary of Livius, and an eye-witness, as it were, of all his determined efforts in

the direction of Hellenizing Italian metre and language, had reason enough for his bitter complaint that the Latins had forgotten their own language. New words, new ideas of accent and prosody, were straining the Latin language into a new mould. If however Cicero could admire Naevius, if he could praise the purity of his Latin, and compare his *bellum Punicum*, for vigour, as we must suppose, and plenitude of life, to a work of Myron—*tamen eius quem in Faunis et vatibus adnumerat Ennius bellum Punicum tamquam opus aliquod Myronis delectat*—the poem must have been one of the greatest monuments of Italian literature. It must not be forgotten that the verdict of Cicero in literary matters has been found, whenever it has been possible to test it, to be in accord with that of the whole civilized world. Even a modern scholar might reasonably infer that the poet who wrote the two lines *Seseque ei perire mavolunt ibidem Quam cum stupro redire ad suos populares*, must have been capable of producing many other fine verses; and it is the misfortune, not the fault, of Naevius that the few fragments of his poem which remain are quoted, not for their poetical merit, but simply to illustrate points of grammar or lexicography.

Before considering the early Italian drama, it may be well to say a word on the musical instruments used in accompaniment to singing. The genuine Italian instrument was the *tibia;* the stringed instrument or *fides* was probably borrowed from the Greeks. The word *tibia* is purely Italian and has, so far as I can find, no parallel in the cognate languages. Its etymology however is to my mind uncertain, though modern scholars have no hesitation in connecting it with *stare* and make it mean the straight, upright bone or instrument. The importance attached from the earliest times to the *tibia* is shewn by the fact that the *tibicines* formed a privileged class. Livy 9 30 5, *tibicines, quia prohibiti erant in aede Iovis vesci, quod traditum antiquitus erat, aegre passi Tibur uno agmine abierunt, adeo ut nemo esset qui sacrificiis praecineret. Tuba,* the trumpet used in war and at funerals, was equally an Italian, or at least a non-Hellenic instrument. The word has been connected by some with the German *du-del*, by others with the Sanskrit base *stu-* to praise;

whatever be the truth about its etymology, the word does not appear in Greek.

As the germs of Italian poetry and oratory were contained in the early compositions which have been mentioned, so the *versus fescennini*, the *satura*, and the *Atellana* formed the beginnings of a dramatic literature which the prejudices of the Roman nobility did not allow to develop[1]. The main characteristic of the *versus Fescennini* was that they were employed originally, as Mr Munro has pointed out, for the purpose of averting the evil eye or the envy of the gods, on great occasions of supposed good fortune, such as marriages or triumphs. They were sung or recited by alternate speakers; Livy 7 2 6 speaks of the professional *histriones, qui non sicut ante Fescennino versu similem incompositum ac rudem alternis iaciebant* &c. So Horace Epist. 2. 1. 145 *Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia morem Versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit:* and Pliny 19 144, speaking of Caesar's soldiers at his triumph, *alternis quippe versibus exprobravere lapsana se vixisse apud Dyrrachium.*

About the origin of the word *Fescenninus* the ancient Italian scholars were themselves doubtful. Paulus p. 85 (Müller) *fescennini versus qui canebantur in nuptiis ex urbe Fescennio dicuntur adlati, sive ideo dicti quia fascinum putabantur arcere.* The connection with *fascinum* is insisted upon and drawn out by Mr Munro in his admirable remarks on this subject ("Criticisms and Elucidations of Catullus," pp. 76 foll.). To trace the links of connection is however not easy. The adjective *Fescenninus*, if not derived from Fescennium, implies a substantive *fescennus* or *fescennius*. This may perhaps be the word glossed by Paulus p. 86 *fescemnoe dicti qui depellere fascinum putabantur.* Supposing the word in Paulus to have been *fescenni*, we should have a substantive *fescennus* meaning a charmer, or a person

[1] Cicero De Rep. 4 § 11 *nunquam comoediae, nisi consuetudo vitae pateretur, probare sua theatris flagitia potuissent. Et Graeci quidem antiquiores vitiosae suae opinionis quandam convenientiam servaverunt, apud quos fuit etiam lege concessum ut quod vellet comoedia, de quo vellet, nominatim diceret... Patiamur, inquit, etsi eiusmodi cives a censore melius est quam a poeta notari... Iudiciis enim magistratuum ac disceptationibus legitimis propositam vitam, non poetarum ingeniis, habere debemus.*

who had the power to avert the effects of a curse or of the evil eye. In form *fescennus* would offer an exact analogue to *Dossennus,* the conventional glutton of the *fabulae Atellanae.* There are traces of similar forms in the proper names *Cupiennius* and *Herennius,* which must be derived from lost forms *cupiennus* and *herennus:* is the ending *-ennus* the same as *-ēnus* in *Alfenus Misenum Capena habena harena avena* &c.? If there was a substantive *fescennus, fescennus* and *fascinum* would be parallel forms, both to be referred ultimately to *fas,* a saying. *Fascinum* would mean originally the word, then the thing used as a charm: *fescennus,* a charmer, or one who has power over the *fascinum; fescennini versus* the verses used by charmers.

It is curious that the fescennine verses which have come down to us are not in the Saturnian but in the trochaic metre. *De Germanis non de Gallis duo triumphant consules: Urbani, servate uxores, moechum calvum adducimus*[1], and so on. The cretic was called *pes Fescenninus* by Diomedes[2], which may perhaps shew that the Fescennine verse could also be formed of cretics (– ∪ – | – ∪ – ‖ – ∪ – | – ∪ – ‖). Supposing the line to have strictly consisted of eight trochees and a half, and that the short syllable of every alternate trochee were omitted, we should have four cretics. And this abbreviation may easily have taken place in a metre based originally on accent, not on quantity. Was the trochaic of the *Fescennini* borrowed from the Greek through the medium of the stage and then adapted to the Latin accent, or was it a native Italian metre? I do not know that we have any evidence to decide the question.

The *versus Fescennini* represent the most primitive stage of the old Italian drama. The merry banter of alternate speakers would afford the element from which a dialogue might in course of time be developed. The next stage is represented by the *satura,* which is described by Livy as resembling the fescennine verses in its oldest form; but as having been developed into a more artistic composition with musical accompaniment.

The word *satura* undoubtedly means a medley; at least this is the almost unanimous theory of the ancient Italian

[1] Suetonius Julius 51, comp. ib. 80. [2] p. 479 K.

scholars. As applied to a law, the term implied that the law consisted of various provisions. Paulus p. 314 *satura...lex multis aliis legibus conferta:* Diomedes p. 485 Keil, *lege satura quae uno rogatu multa simul comprehendat:* Isidore 5 16 *satura vero lex quae de pluribus simul rebus eloquitur.* And *per saturam* or *in saturam* was a common phrase in Roman political life for anything, as the passing of a law, or the election of an officer, done in confusion with other things when it ought to have been done separately. Fest. p. 314 quotes from the ancient orators T. Annius Luscus and C. Laelius *imperium quod plebes per saturam dederat, id abrogatum est: postero die quasi per saturam sententiis latis,* and other instances will be found in the lexicons.

In its literary application two senses of the word *satura* must, I think, be distinguished. The ancient authorities sometimes explain it as meaning a composition which treats of a number of miscellaneous subjects: so Festus p. 314, Isidore 8 7 8: Acron on Horace S. 1 1 1: sometimes as a composition written in various metres: so Diomedes p. 485, Isidore 5. 16. The word would no doubt, in many cases, be applicable in both senses; but I think it is plain that the original idea was that of a composition of miscellaneous contents. It could only be after a considerable knowledge of Greek metres had been acquired at Rome that the writers of *saturae* would be able to compose in several metres; but there is no doubt that the *satura* had existed long before this time. Again, the transition of meaning is more intelligible on this hypothesis. All the ancient authorities incline to the theory that *satura* meant originally a dish full of various ingredients, a basket of various fruits, or a forcedmeat of various materials; Festus and Varro ap. Diomedes 11. cc., Isidore 20 2 8. So Juvenal, with a full sense of the literal and metaphorical applications of the word, says *quicquid agunt homines, votum timor ira voluptas Gaudia discursus nostri est farrago libelli.* And there are one or two other passages in the literature of the classical times which seem to recall this sense of the word *satura:* Sisenna[1] quoted in the

[1] Sesenus lib. II *non dignus* &c. If *Sesenus* stands for Sisenna, we may compare Vita Persii p. 241 Jahn: *satirae proprium est ut vera humiliter*

Scholia to Juvenal 4 2 says *non dignus in quem debeam saturam calentem...ingerere:* and when Juvenal in this place says *Crispinus...est mihi saepe vocandus Ad partes* it is possible, as the scholia suggest, that *partes* means *partes convivii.*

The *satura* then was originally a rude kind of drama of miscellaneous contents, distinguished from a *fabula* by having no plot: Livy l. c. *Livius...qui primus ab saturis ausus est argumento fabulam serere.* As its contents were miscellaneous it may fairly be inferred that it contained personations of various characters, and Livy implies that more than one actor might take a part in it. When the Hellenizing poets introduced the fashion of writing in Greek metres, and the *satura,* having ceased to be an acted drama, became a literary work with only an imaginary stage, it may of course have easily happened that the variety of metres, or the interchange of prose and verse, which characterized the classical *satura* in the hands of Ennius and Varro, was adapted to the variety of parts in the dialogue, as to a certain extent is actually the case in Petronius.

I have elsewhere[1] endeavoured to shew how the *satura,* as we know it in literature, still preserves some of the essential features of its primitive form. Passing then over this point, let me say a few words on the original character of the *Atellanae.* I am not sure that Mommsen is right in denying that these pieces were originally Campanian; for it must be remembered that Campania was the nurse of arts and literature at least as early as Latium. The epitaph which Naevius wrote for himself is characterized by Gellius as *plenum superbiae Campanae*[2]. However this may be, the *Atellana* was distinguished by the constant exhibition of certain conventional characters, *Maccus* the fool, *Pappus* the old father, *Dossennus* or *manducus* the glutton, *Bucco* fatchaps, to which may be added (from the surviving titles of *Atellanae*) *Bubulcus, Decuma, Fullo,* and perhaps

dicat, et omnia cum sanna faciat, quam Sisenna protulerat poeta. Did Sisenna, then, write *saturae*? In the words of the Vita Persii which follow almost immediately, *satira genus est clarni vel lancis multis ac variis frugum generibus plena,* we should perhaps read *cinni* for *clarni:* see Nonius p. 59.

[1] The Roman Satura: Oxford, 1878.

[2] 1 24 1: probably from Varro.

Mania. The actors were free men in masks: Festus p. 217 *per Atellanos qui proprie vocantur personati, quia ius est iis in scena non cogi ponere personam, quod ceteris personis pati necesse est:* Livy 7 2 12 *quod genus ludorum ab Oscis acceptum tenuit iuventus, nec ab histrionibus pollui passa est.*

If we may judge by the titles of the *Atellanae* of Pomponius and Novius, the conventional characters appeared in various comical situations, like the old German *Hans.* Thus we have *Bucco auctoratus, Bucco adoptatus, Bubulcus, Bubulcus cerdo; Decuma, Decuma fullonis; Fullones, Fullones feriati; Macci gemini, Maccus Miles, Maccus sequester, Maccus virgo, Maccus Copo, Maccus exul; Mania medica; Pappus agricola, Pappus praeteritus, Sponsa Pappi; Verres aegrotus, Verres salvus.* Maccus the fool appears (naturally) to have absorbed the lion's share.

Another conventional characteristic of the *Atellana* seems to have been the prevalence in it of riddles or puzzles: Quintilian 6 3 47 *amphibolia, neque ea obscura quae Atellani ex more captant,* where I see no occasion for reading *obscena* with Teuffel. For the reading of the manuscripts, *obscura,* is supported by the phrase *tricae Atellanae,* the knots or riddles of an *Atellana:* Varro in his Gerontodidascalus ap. Non. p. 8, *putas eos non citius tricas Atellanas quam id extricaturos?* Arnobius 5 28, *tricas quemadmodum dicitur conduplicare Atellanas.* Instances of these *tricae* are preserved or alluded to by Suetonius: Caligula 27 *Atellanae poetam ob ambigui ioci versiculum media amphitheatri harena igni cremavit:* Nero 39 *Datus Atellanarum histrio in cantico quodam* 'Τγίαινε πάτερ, ὑγίαινε μῆτερ, *ita demonstraverat, ut bibentem natantemque faceret, exitum scilicet Claudi Agrippinaeque significans, et in novissima clausula,* '*Orcus vobis ducit pedes,*' *senatum gestu notaret:* comp. Tiberius 45.

H. NETTLESHIP.

A NEGLECTED MS. OF PLATO.

The Malatestian Library, formerly attached to the Capuchin monastery and now connected with the public Gymnasium in the little Italian town of Cesena, contains a MS. of Plato, which although mentioned by Montfaucon, is not included in the Apparatus Criticus either of Bekker or Stallbaum.

Cesena is on the line of railway between Bologna and Brindisi. The hotel is fairly comfortable, the librarians are extremely civil,—and a young scholar may easily do worse than spend a fortnight in following the example of Aldus Manutius and working at Desk No. XXVIII in the graceful and modest building of the Malatesti, which has suffered little alteration since the 15th century.

According to the Catalogue, the Malatestian copy of Plato is 'at least' as old as Sec. XII. This may be a sanguine estimate. But the MS. may be confidently held to be less recent than those at Florence and Milan, and older than any at Venice except T (Bekker's t) and Π. It is of thick cotton paper in large folio, ruled, with about forty lines of very neat small writing in each page. The scholia are not abundant, but they are pretty frequent in some dialogues and seem mostly to have been added by a nearly contemporary hand, which has also given several various readings. The iota of the imperfect diphthongs is uniformly omitted. The MS. is easily legible and there are few erasures.

The volume contains the whole Platonic canon except the Laws, the Epinomis, the Definitions and the Epistles. The Introduction of Albinus has been prefixed by a later hand. The table of contents and the Life of Diogenes Laertius form part

of the original MS. Then follow 36 dialogues in the Thrasyllean order (including the seven *νοθευόμενοι*). But after the Clitophon the order is Timæus Locrus, Timæus, Critias, Minos,—then 68 golden verses of Pythagoras,—and, last, the ten books of the Republic.

Two leaves, at least, have been torn out: one containing Rep. VI. 510 E *ταῦτα*—VII. 516 D *τιμωμένους τε*[1], the other Rep. VII. 523 D *ἦν δ' ἐγὼ*—527 B *φθεγγόμενοι*. In the latter case the lacuna has been supplied by a recent hand.

I. The text of the smaller dialogues in the Cesena MS. (C), in the places examined by me, follows very closely the recension of which Schanz finds the archetype in T (Bekker's t, Ven. App. 4, 1).

The following examples are enough to make this clear[2].

Theæt. 143 D *ἀνηρώτων* TC: *ἂν ἠρώτων* B.
„ 151 A *οὗτοι* TC: *αὐτοὶ* B.
„ 165 B *συσχόμενος* TC: *συνεχόμενος* B.
„ 166 B *ἀνομοίωσις* TC: *ἀνομοίως* B.
„ 172 E *τὴν* TC: *τινα* B.
„ 177 E *μὴ γὰρ* TC pr.: *μὴ γὰρ...θεωρεῖται. μὴ γάρ* B.
„ 179 D *σκεπτέον* TC: *σκεπτέον καὶ* B.
„ 185 D *ὄργανον ἴδιον* TC: *ὀργανίδιον* B.
„ 190 C *περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου* TC pr.: *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου* B.
„ 191 B *καὶ ἴσως* TC: *ἴσως* B.
„ 192 A *οἰηθῆναι* TC: *τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι* B.
„ 195 B *δεινόν γε* TC: *δεινόν τε* B.
„ 197 C *ἔχειν* TC: *σχεῖν* B.
„ 201 C *καὶ δικαστήριον* TC: *καὶ δικαστήρια* B.
„ 203 B *ἔχει τὸ εὖ* TC: *εὖ ἔχει τὸ* B.
„ 204 A *ὡς καὶ* TC: *ὡς* B.
„ 204 C *εὑρήκαμεν* TC: *εἰρήκαμεν* B.

[1] By an odd coincidence Ven. Π has also lost the beginning of B. VII.

[2] I take the Theætetus, because I had a purpose in examining it, and because this dialogue has been fully treated by Schanz.

Theæt. 204 D *καὶ μὴν* TC : *καὶ μὴν καὶ* B.
„ 207 B *πρόσθε(ν) που* TC : *πρόσθεν οὐ* B.
„ 209 E *δοξάζωμεν* TC : *δοξάζομεν* B.
„ 209 E *εἰπὲ δὴ* TC : *εἴγε δὴ* B.

I could extend this list with quotations from other dialogues, but this sample may possibly suffice.

C has also many of the "new scholia," which have hitherto been observed only in T.

Thus on Crito 48 B *ἀνόμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερος*: *γρ. ἀνόμοιος εἶναι τῷ (καὶ) πρότερον* TC.

Phædo 96 A *ἱστορίας* : *γρ. αἰτίας* TC.
„ 108 A *θυσιῶν* : *γρ. (καὶ) ὁσίων* TC.
„ 117 A *διδόναι* : *γρ. δώσειν* TC.
Theæt. 143 E *σημειῶσαι οἷος (ὁ) Σωκράτης (τὸ εἶδος ἦν)* TC.
„ 147 A *ἱπνοπλάθων* : *γρ. κο(υ)ροπλάθων* TC.
„ 187 C *θράττει* : *ταράττεις (καὶ) ἐνοχλεῖς* TC.
Soph. 216 E *τοῦ μηδενὸς* : *παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων* TC.

Also those on Soph. 236 A, 239 B, 257 E ; and those on Politicus 263 B, 264 B, D, 271 A (with the tell-tale change of *συντελοῦντας* to *λυσιτελοῦντας*), 290 E, Phædr. 230 E, Prot. 340 D, 343 A, Gorg. 450 B, Meno 76 D.

II. Is C then, in these dialogues, derived from T ?

The following instances make against such a conclusion :—

1. Schanz has observed that in Politicus 275 A, T has the words *θεὸν ἀντὶ θνητοῦ—διείπομεν* in the margin, with the curious blunder of *τρόπομεν* for *τρόπον οὐ διείπομεν*. The passage occurs without a trace of error in the text of C.

2. C has in the text some words which are v.rr. in T.

Apol. 18 A *ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη.*
Phædo 84 C *λελέχθαι.*

3. In Crat. 412 D, where T has *ὥσπερ ἑστῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις* with *γρ. καθάπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις*, C has *ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις.*

And in the scholium on Prot. 340 D where T misquotes Hesiod *τὴν μέντοι κακότητα*, C rightly gives *τὴν μὲν*.

4. In Theæt. 197 B, where T has *φορῶι* C has *φοροῖ*.

These are but slight indications, and yet enough to show that C is not *exclusively* derived from T.

And even supposing the text of C to have been transcribed from a copy of T, the diorthotes clearly had access to other MSS. The most notable proof of this is in Theæt. 177 E, where, as in this whole family, the words *μὴ γὰρ...θεωρεῖται* are omitted; but the defect is thus remedied in the margin, *κείμενον ÷ μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα· ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω*. This reading, which agrees closely with Badham's emendation of the passage, has hitherto been found only as a correction of Π. See Schanz in loc.

III. So far, however, the close relation in which C proves to stand to T, an older and better MS., prevents us from hoping for much aid from this fresh source. But the case is somewhat altered when we come to the Republic. Here T fails us after the middle of B. III., and even in the earlier books it has been shown by Schanz to be probably derived from Par. A. According to the same acute author, who has given close attention to the subject, all the MSS. of the Republic hitherto examined, which are independent of A, are probably derived from Ven. Π (Schanz' D).

1. Now the changed order of the last dialogues in C may warn us against hastily concluding that they belong to the same family with the rest, and a brief inspection was enough to show that C, which in the smaller dialogues agreed with T, here follows a quite different tradition; independent certainly of A, if Π is so, and also differing in a marked degree from Π.

2. Thus in

Rep. I. 332 C *ὦ πρὸς* AT: *πρὸς* CΠ.
„ 345 *πιαίνειν* A, *παχύνειν* T: *ποιμαίνειν* CΠ.
„ II. 358 A *ψέγεται* AT: *ψέγεται· ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται* CΠ.
„ 364 D *λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ (δέ)τε* AT: *στρεπτοὶ δέ τε* CΠ

Rep. II. 378 C *τοιαῦτα* A : *τοιαῦτα λεκτέα* ΠΠ.
„ IX. 580 D *τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται* A : *λογιστικὸν δέξεται* ΠΠ.
„ X. 606 E *ἄξιον* A : *ἄξιος* ΠΠ.

In these cases C agrees with Π. For Bekker's report of II. 364 D is not correct, as the words *λιστοὶ δὲ* in Π are by a recent corrector. (It may be observed that most of the corrections in Π are by a recent hand.)

3. But in other places hardly less significant C agrees with A against Π.

Rep. II. 367 D *ἀποδεχοίμην* Π : *ἀποσχοίμην* AC.
„ 375 A *καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν* Π : om. AC.
„ 382 E *οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας* Π : om. AC.
„ 383 A *ἀκούειν* Π : *ποιεῖν* AC.
„ III. 386 D *ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη* Π : om. AC.
„ 416 C *παρεσκευάσθαι* Π : *παρασκευάσασθαι* AC.
„ X. 607 D *ἀπολογισαμένη* Π : *ἀπολογησομένη* AC.

4. Of other MSS. of the Republic, that with which C agrees most nearly (at least in the later books) is Vat. 61, Bekker's m, e.g.:—

In II. 367 D *ἀποσχοίμην* is read only by AmTC.
In III. 416 *παρασκευάσασθαι* is read only by AmC.
In V. 473 E *εὐδοκιμήσειεν* is read only by mC.
In VI. 506 D *φανερὰ* is read only by ΞυmC.
In VII. 534 E *λέγειν* is read only by ΦυmC.
In VII. 537 E *ἐμπίπλανται* is read only by ΦmC.
In IX. 590 A *λέγεσθαι* is read only by ΦυmC.
In X. 606 E *ἀναλαβώντι* is read only by ΦmrC.
In X. 610 E *ζῶντι κακῷ* is read only by ΦmC.
In X. 614 D *αὐταῖς δικασθείη* is read only by AυδmC.

5. It deserves further consideration whether m or C is nearer to the fountain-head. And if, as Schanz supposes, m is derived from A, the fact that both m and C sometimes agree with Π in differing from A may be accounted for by supposing that they came through a copy of A which had been corrected from Π. But, as in all such cases, there is another possibility, viz. that the archetype of m and C may be a lost MS. of an earlier period,

resembling A in some respects and Π in others and occasionally differing from them both.

The various readings added by the diorthotes show that other texts were accessible at the time.

My object in thus communicating the results of a passing inspection of this MS. is to induce some scholar, who has leisure as well as inclination for such work, to collate it with Bekker's or Stallbaum's edition for the Republic at least. Ven. App. 4, 1 (Schanz' T) is not the only MS. which Bekker has practically undervalued. Of this I will give one more example, and so conclude this paper. The oldest of the Ambrosian MSS. of Plato, D. 56 Sup., Bekker's *r*, contains 13 dialogues, Euthyphr., Apol., Phædo, Polit., Parm., Symp., Phædr., Charm., Prot., Gorg., Meno, Menex., Axiochus, but is only quoted by Bekker on 6, Phædr., Prot., Charm., Meno, Symp., Menex. Yet on the Phædo he does quote from *s*, Amb., D. 71 Sup., which he himself describes as "*Chartaceus valde recens*"!

It is true that the earlier leaves of *r* have been a good deal injured, but there can be no sort of difficulty in collating it for Politicus, Parmen., Gorg., nor indeed for most of the Phædo. In Polit. 276 C this MS. has μὲν ἐλέγομεν with ὃ written over ἐ by the Scholiast, thus suggesting the true reading and accounting for the variations of other MSS.

L. CAMPBELL.

Note. In the difficult place, Crat. 412 A, C agrees with Schanz' G (Bekker's Λ) in omitting δεῖ. An emendation, which I have not seen suggested anywhere, and yet fairly in accordance with the whimsical logic of the Cratylus, is διὸ δεῖ ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ ΈΠ – ΕΙΣ – ΘΈΜΙΝ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν.—In two other places of the Cratylus I would venture to suggest a change:

In 395 A *read* τοῦ* ἤθους τε καὶ καρτερίας.

In 434 C *read* τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ *πλήθει προσέοικεν.

Cp. supr. 426 E τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ. The word †σκληρότητι in the MSS. comes from some lines below.

ON SOME ALLEGED LINGUISTIC AFFINITIES OF THE ELOHIST.

Those who have followed the recent course of Pentateuch-criticism on the Continent will be aware that the question at present most keenly debated is that touching the date of the document which, as constituting the frame-work, if not the actual basis, of the historical series Gn.—Josh. is often spoken of as the *Grundschrift*—the 'Elohistic' narrative of the older critics, Wellhausen's Q, Dillmann's A. This document, the reader need hardly be reminded, opens with the account of the Creation Gn. 1, 1—2, 3; sections, longer or shorter, appertaining to it, are clearly distinguishable as far as the book of Joshua inclusive; and it embraces, in particular, the great body of ceremonial legislation extending (with interruptions) from Ex. 25 to Nu. 36. Formerly, it was generally regarded by critics (Ewald, Nöldeke, Schrader, &c.) as the oldest portion of the Hexateuch: but latterly a pronounced change of opinion has manifested itself: the theory advocated some half century ago, principally by Reuss and Vatke, but without obtaining much support, has been revived; and Kuenen and Wellhausen, treading in the footsteps of Graf (*Die Gesch. Bücher des A. T.*, 1866), and receiving a continually increasing number of adherents, declare confidently that the 'Grundschrift' embodies the latest developments of the legislative system of the ancient Hebrews: in other words, they assign it, as a whole, to the period subsequent to the Captivity, to the age of Ezra and Nehemiah. This conclusion is based on a multitude of independent considerations, of different weight, but dependent mainly upon a critical examination, from an historical standpoint, of the Levitical

legislation itself. The argument from language was admitted to be secondary. It is indeed allowed on both sides, that the phraseological criteria are sufficient for distinguishing—often with complete certainty—the different writers who have contributed to the formation of our present Hexateuch; but the bearing of these criteria upon the question of *relative date* (except in the case of Deut., which does not here come into consideration) was left practically out of the discussion. Such a condition of things naturally could not continue for long. It was of importance to know whether the evidence of language and style agreed or not with the argument drawn (rightly or wrongly) from history: in a matter of some 500 years, it might be expected to speak on one side or the other, even though, for reasons which need not now be entered into, it had not the distinctness which might be desired. Accordingly after a few observations on one side by Riehm (*St. u. Krit.* 1872, p. 283 f.) and on the other by Wellhausen (*Einleitung*, p. 174, &c.), a comprehensive enquiry into the style of the Elohist was instituted by C. V. Ryssel, who published the result of his investigations in a dissertation, *De Elohistae Pentateuchi Sermone* (Lipsiae 1878). Here, having sketched the periods into which the history of the Hebrew language divides itself, Ryssel surveys in succession the prominent linguistic phenomena exhibited by the Elohist—the different forms of nouns of which he makes use, varieties of pronouns and prepositions, notable syntactical usages—comparing them in detail with those exhibited by writers whose age is well-ascertained and undisputed. His result is on the whole favourable to the older view: while allowing that some sections bear traces of having originated in what is termed by him the *second* period of the language (700—540 B.C.), he denies the necessity of referring any part, on linguistic grounds, to the period subsequent to the exile and declares all the most important sections (p. 82) *ad origines litterarum gentis Israeliticae referendas esse.* The treatise is written in a spirit of great fairness, and is suggestive and valuable throughout: it errs only by making some concessions which do not appear to be needed, and by sometimes not being exhaustive, where it would have been an advantage to be so.

The question thus opened was not however suffered to rest where Ryssel left it. In the second number of Stade's *Zeitschrift für die Alttest. Wissenschaft* (Giessen, 1881) is an article on the language of the Elohist by F. Giesebrecht—favourably known to scholars by his dissertation on the use of the preposition Lamed—the object of which is to establish conclusions contradictory to Ryssel, by shewing that the linguistic affinities of Q—as for brevity we may designate the Elohist or his work—are throughout with writers during, or subsequent to, the exile. After a brief criticism of Ryssel's method, and in particular of his artificial inclusion of Hag. Zech. Mal. within the second period, Giesebrecht proceeds to formulate the question which his article is designed to answer (p. 183): do the linguistic characteristics of the Elohist forbid, or do they necessitate, the conclusion that he belongs to the period between 700—450 B.C.? The answer to this question is contained in a tabular comparison (p. 188—197) of some 110 distinctive (but not specially technical) words, as used by him and by writers belonging to various periods of the history, the result of which is to shew (p. 206) that while the resemblances between Q and other writers are slight for the earlier periods, they increase steadily in successive centuries, till they attain a maximum at the time of the exile. The rest of the article is devoted to a detailed discussion of particular words, and to a consideration of certain syntactical and other features which are said to point in the same direction.

Giesebrecht's facts are (with a few exceptions) correct: the use made of them is not sufficiently discriminating. The tabular synopsis is plausible and impressive: as the eye glances over it, the inferences which it is intended to carry home seem clear and unanswerable. The same may be said of the figures occurring so frequently in the later parts of the article. But both labour under a radical defect: *they number words instead of weighing them;* and when individual cases are examined, some cause *which cannot be tabulated* may appear for the presence or absence of a given word in a particular writing. In other words, the ostensible cause, apparent from the table or the enumeration, may not be the real cause which led to the employment of a word or phrase. Secondly, in spite of the

remark p. 187, the column headed 'Hexateuch-Redactor' is from its position likely to be misunderstood. The comparison of the Elohist with this person merely shews either that he is in accordance with himself, or that he is in accordance with a writer (or writers) whose style and vocabulary were modelled upon his own: obviously this forms no fixed and independent standard from which his work can be estimated. Thirdly, the last column, headed "Aramäisch" is altogether misleading: most of the words thus described, are, as I hope soon to shew, in no distinctive sense Aramaic at all; so that the use of the term creates an unfair prejudice in the reader's mind. Fourthly, in the pages which follow, the discussion, while seemingly thorough, is often in reality superficial, and has the effect (doubtless wholly against the author's intention) of placing various questions in a false light.

The object of the present paper is twofold. Philologically, it has a positive aim, that of criticizing certain positions which appear to me to be untenable. Critically, its aim is negative. My object is not to undertake a full discussion of the linguistic affinities of the 'Grundschrift,' or to shew that they are incompatible with a date in or near the exile, but to examine certain *data* which have been alleged, and inquire whether they have been interpreted correctly. It is true that the date of that document cannot be settled by an appeal to language alone, nor does Giesebrecht himself apparently (p. 182) mean his linguistic arguments to be so applied: at the same time, from the general tenour of the article this might readily be misunderstood; and it is worth while, therefore, to shew that the features noticed by him do not point to a late date with the clearness and cogency which might otherwise be imagined. But even for those who (upon other grounds) accept his general position, the philological observations which follow, will not, I hope, be altogether without value.

We may begin by considering the Aramaisms alleged to exist in Q. And here it will be convenient to examine first those conceded by Ryssel (p. 70), and of course appropriated by Giesebrecht. 1. חֲנֻכָּה. After citing the passages in which this word occurs, Ryssel continues 'in the Aramaic parts of Ezra

and Daniel *persaepe legitur*.' This phrase is, doubtless, an oversight; for, in the sections referred to, the term occurs but 4 times, with reference to two occasions, Ezr. 6, 16 f. Dn. 3, 2 f. Surely this is not sufficient to stamp the word as distinctively Aramaic: it does not appear to be particularly frequent in the Targums, and does not occur in Syriac at all. The occurrence of the root, with an allied signification, in Arabic (see Ges. *Thes.*), is an indication that in all probability it belonged to the common old-Semitic stock, and lends no support to the opinion of Giesebrecht (p. 200) that it is 'nicht alt' in Hebrew. In Q, it should be borne in mind, it appears only in Nu. 7, and is *restricted to the dedication of the altar;* the rite is not, as in 1 K. 8, 63 (and in Ezra), extended to the entire sanctuary.

2. מִשְׁרָה Nu. 6, 3 the root of which must be identical with the Aramaic שְׁרָא, *to dissolve*. But this is no proof that the *derivative* is an Aramaism: such words as מָעוֹן מִשְׁפָּחָה מַלְקוֹשׁ מִכְפּוֹא מִדְבָּר shew that a genuine Heb. word may be derived from a root which has fallen into disuse in Heb., or occurs there in a different sense, and is preserved only in a cognate dialect. The rarity of the particular word does not bear on the question: מִשְׁרַת עֲנָבִים is evidently a technical expression, which would not be expected to occur frequently. 3. שְׂטָה Nu. 5 in the specific sense of conjugal unfaithfulness, which is compared with סְטָא, ܣܛܐ. It may be a question whether in this chapter it is used with that specific sense, and whether it does not obtain it from the context, for it is not once used absolutely: still if such be the case, the reference to the Aramaic is indecisive; for סטא is not confined to that sense, being used, e.g. by Onkelos quite generally, as Nu. 20, 17. 22, 23 = נטה, and a reference to Castell would have shewn that ܣܛܐ is used with equal latitude (Gn. 19, 2 = סור: 1 Tim. 1, 6. 5, 15 = ἐξετράπησαν: add Nu. *ll. cc.* 2 S. 2, 19. 21. Ephr. II. 20 F. 310 F.). The talm. סוֹטָה is evidently derived from the passage in Numbers, the case there described being familiarly referred to as that of the סוטה.

4. חָזָה. The Aram. is חֲדִי, ܚܕܝ. This may be dismissed at once: if חָזָה, with the 'Lautverschiebung,' be an

Aramaic word, then זָהָב and זֶה are Aramaic likewise[1]. 5. גדף certainly occurs in Aramaic: but it occurs also in a genuine prophecy of Isaiah's (37, 23). 6. צְדָיָה. Ex. 21, 13. 1 S. 24, 12 shew צדה to be a genuine Hebrew word: the occurrence of the root in Syriac (the words cited in Ges. are from Castell, who quotes them without examples), and Chaldee (Ps. 35, 8 Levy), prove, not that it is an 'Aramaism,' but merely that it is not confined to Hebrew. 7. כסס Ex. 12, 4 *to compute* appears to be found in neither Syr. nor Ch. (except in the entirely different sense of *reproving*): it is difficult therefore to understand upon what ground it can be claimed (Giesebr., p. 192) as an Aramaism. מַכְסֵהּ, מוֹכְסָא are of too uncertain origin, being in any case only secondary formations from מכס itself, to be here cited. 8. הִתְנַדָּה. It is far from clear that this word is formed in imitation of Aramaic usage. Only one occurrence of the Ethpael is cited from the Targum, Dt. 3, 29 Jerus.: Onk. uses always the Pael וַדֵּי to represent the Heb. התודה, and Ps.-Jon. the Aphel יְוַדֵּי, which is found also 2 C. 30, 22 Targ. (מְהוֹדֵן). Similarly Pesh. has always ܐܰܘܕܶܐ except Ezra 10, 1 where ܐܶܬܝܕܶܐ occurs: this, however, is all but a *ἅπ. λεγ.* in Syriac, see P. S. *Thes.* col. 1550. What is there in these facts to authorize the inference that the hithp. התודה is an imitation of the Aramaic? 9. Had מסר been borrowed immediately from Aram. we should have expected it to be employed in some passage where the idea of *delivering up* or *handing over* was more prominent than is the case in Nu. 31, 5: followed, as it there is, by מִן, it remains to be shewn that it was used by the author as a mere synonym for נתן ביד &c., and not rather with some particular shade of meaning which no other Heb. word would have conveyed[2]. 10. עָדַף is doubtless a word peculiar to Q: but the fact that while the root occurs in Arabic it is rare in the Targums (Levy cites but one passage, Ps. 45, 3; and it is not once used by Onk. for the Heb. עדף, as might fairly have been expected had it been a familiar

[1] With the 'Lautverschiebung' a word is 'exempt from all suspicion of having been borrowed by any one Semitic people from any other' (Lagarde, *Gött. Nachr.* 1882, p. 395).

[2] *V.* 16 seems to be corrupt.

Aramaic word), and is not cited at all for the Syriac, lends no support to the view that it is distinctively an Aramaism. It is one of those words which are not the peculiar property of any one Semitic language, but occur sporadically in several. Ryssel, indeed, only speaks the truth when he says 'Aramaicae stirpi ...*respondere videtur*': but Giesebrecht (p. 193) boldly labels it *aramäisch.* 11. פָּשָׂה Lev. 13—14 of the spreading of the leprosy spots: 'fortasse,' Ryssel: without any such qualification, Giesebrecht (194). But the proof that there is an Aram. word פְּסִי has yet to be forthcoming: no such word is cited as occurring by either Castell or Levy: פְּסָיוֹנָא is found only in Lev. 13 Ps.-Jon.; and פִּיפָא Dt. 33, 3 *ib.* is evidently derived from Ps. 72, 16. The arab. فشا (Ges.) with cognate (not the same) meaning goes to shew that there was an old Semitic root, which received a divergent application in the two languages: restricted in Hebrew to the diffusion of the leprous eruption, it is preserved only in the chapters in which that subject is treated. 12. טָוָה *to spin.* מטוויתא *spider* occurs once in the Targums, Job 8, 14; the root טְוָא, usually in Chald., and always in Syr., has an entirely different meaning, that of *cooking.* The ordinary Aramaic word for *to spin* is ܓܕܠ. If the writer of Ex. 35, 25 f. had desired to express the idea of spinning (and the art must have been known to the Hebrews long prior to the captivity), what word other than טָוָה could he have employed? the somewhat doubtful מְאוּנָל occurs indeed, but not before Ezekiel (27, 19). Unless it can be maintained that the Elohist, or some contemporary, in despair how to designate the new invention, and knowing of an Aramaic word which meant *to turn on a spit,* applied it forthwith in the sense of *turning up on a spindle,* the assertion that טוה is an Aramaism is gratuitous: and the word should have been included by Giesebrecht amongst those to which he is prepared (p. 228) *Verzicht zu leisten.* 13. מקבילות Ex. 26, 5. 36, 12 may, indeed, be derived from the Aram. קֹבֶל, קָבֵל, but it may also have been in use in Hebrew as a technical term: the fact that the Piel is Aramaic, or confined to late Hebrew, is not a proof that the Hifil, with a different meaning, is late likewise. 14. יזח has, it is true, an Aramaic

analogue; but is there any other word by which the particular idea of the displacement of dress would be expressed in Hebrew?

We may now pass to the table given by Giesebrecht, p. 188 ff. The Aram. ܢܨܡ may illustrate Ct. 3, 8[1]; but has no bearing on the Nifal נֹאחַז of Gn. 47, &c. Is a transitive force so common in this conjugation, that its absence in נֹאחַז (p. 225) can be a source of difficulty? אָנַח, אָנַק, and נָאַק (p. 227). None of these roots has Giesebrecht succeeded in shewing to be distinctively Aramaic: besides, אנח occurs in Q not more than once (ויאנחו Ex. 2, 23), אָנַק only (presumably) in אֲנָקָה Lev. 11, 30 the name of a species of lizard, from which no conclusion as to the date of composition can be derived (Pesh. has ܐܘܟܣܐ, which is found also Pr. 30, 28 for שממית, and which may or may not be connected with ܐܘܣ[2]). נָאַק, the root of נְאָקָה, which occurs twice, Ex. 2, 24. 6, 5, is on the other hand exceedingly rare in Aramaic: Job 30, 7 alone is cited (Bomb. נהקין); and Onk. does not even employ it in the passages of Exodus. Is it seriously contended that the ideas of sighing and groaning were unknown to the Hebrews till the days of Ezekiel? and if they were not unknown, by what other words could they have been expressed? שאגה or נהמה would, of course, have been ludicrous in the present connexion. דָּבָה One passage, Gn. 37, 2 is cited by Levy, in which some MSS. and edd. of Onk. read דִּבָּהוֹן (for טִבָּהוֹן); but this is declared by Luzzatto (*Oheb Ger*, p. 43) to be a mere error: in Nu. 13 f., O. paraphrases by שׁוּם בִּישׁ. Whether דָּבָה answers to ܛܒܐ, ܛܒ must remain uncertain: it would be, if I mistake not, the one instance of a Hebrew ד = Aram. ܛ. The references in Ges. connect it more directly with the Arab. دَبَّ, and favour, therefore, the view that it is an old Hebrew

[1] In linguistic investigations of this nature, a sound method demands that books the date of which is disputed should be quoted with reserve. Giesebrecht decides that the Song of Songs is post-exilic: but other critics, perfectly free from prejudice in this direction, place it before 900: cf. Wellh. *Einl.* p. 523, Reuss, *Gesch. d. H. Schr.* p. 225, W. R. Smith, *Encycl. Brit.*[9] v. 36[b].

[2] אנק seems to be rare in Ch.: in the Targ. דנק is more frequent; and Levy's suggestion that in Ez. 9, 4 ודמאנקין should be read for ודמדנקין is confirmed by the cod. Reuchl. (Lagarde).

word. הוֹלִיד (p. 236). The argument is inconclusive. יָלַד was for a time used indifferently of either parent, though far more frequently in actual usage of the mother; and to this fact is due, doubtless, the adoption of הוֹלִיד, for greater distinctness, of the father. But ילד is not used of the father with sufficient frequency to enable us to say when it went out of use, and was succeeded by הוֹלִיד: the two appear side by side in Dt. Job, II Isaiah (add for ילד, Pr. 17, 21. 23, 22. 24), and may therefore have been used similarly earlier[1]. ילד of the father is altogether rare, being confined in the hist. books to Gn. 4, 18. 10, 8. 13. 15. 24. 26 (transcribed in 1 Chr. 1, 10—20). 22, 23. 25, 3, and 1 Chr. 2, 48. זָכָר. The frequency of this word in Q is explained from the technical character of his work; the comparison of the Aram. is nugatory, for the reason given above under חזה; and the antiquity of the root (as G. virtually allows, p. 223) is attested by Ex. 23, 17. נקבה (p. 193, 233) admits of being similarly explained. טִירָה occurs twice in Q, each time with reference to the habitations of certain nomad tribes, from which it may be fairly inferred that it was the special term by which they were known, and might well be of Aramaic origin, though not an 'Aramaism.' The inference is corroborated by Ezek. 25, 4. But the root is found also in Arabic (see Ges.), and is therefore common Semitic, so that in spite of ܛܝܪܬܐ, טירה may still be a genuine Heb. word. מִין. תְּמוּנָה (J) shews that at one time a root מון must have been in use in Hebrew itself, from which both words were derived. A corresponding root, which can be readily connected in signification with both מין and תמונה, is pointed out by Ges. in Arab. and Ethiopic. ܡܢ in Syr. appears to denote only the *γένη* of human kind (families): Pesh. renders מין by ܓܢܣܐ (i.e. *γένος*). It cannot be shewn that מין was borrowed from the Aramaic: there was evidently an old Sem. root, מון, retained as a verb in Ar. and Eth., and in particular derivatives in Heb. and Aram. מְנוֹרָה נִיר נֵר Aram. נור (*fire*) are related similarly to ܢܘܪ *to shine.*

[1] The attempted restoration of Jud. 11, 1 p. 236) והוא בן אשה זונה יולדת לנלעד את יפתח is unidiomatic in its use of the participle.

פגע (cf. p. 200). ܦܓܥ is by no means confined to *friendly* intervention: it is used quite freely with a neutral (Gn. 28, 11. 32, 2. 1 S. 10, 5 P.) or hostile sense (1 S. 22, 18. 2 S. 1, 15 P. Ephr. II. 292 F.): Gn. 23, 8 and elsewhere, the Syr. translator, not feeling ܦܓܥ to be distinct enough, has recourse to ܨܒܐ. If, as the reader would infer from the remark p. 193, ܦܓܥ were met with *exclusively* in the friendly sense, something might be said for the view that the use of פגע in Gn. 23 is a later one: but as the two senses are found side by side in Syriac, the context determining which is intended, the comparison of the Aramaic is misleading: it is arbitrary to fix the period of Jeremiah as that before which the double application could not have arisen. פֻּרְדָּה. There seems to be nothing in Aram. to suggest the peculiar sense in which this word is used in the O. T.: see Levy and Castell (פִּירוּרָא, ܦܝܪܘܪܐ, of crushed corn). פֻּרְכָּה makes it probable that a root פָּרַךְ was once in use in Heb.: cf. فرك[1] צב. As the origin of this word is quite uncertain, and it does not appear to occur in Syriac, it may with equal plausibility be affirmed to have been borrowed by the Targums from the Heb. צָבָה *to swell*. The Aram. sense of the root is altogether different (*to wish*): Giesebrecht appears to have misread through haste the etymological notice in Ges. הֵקִים בְּרִית, as is well known, is the phrase for which Q shews a preference (cf. Delitzsch, *Gen.* p. 61) in the sense of *establishing* (= concluding) a covenant, which is more commonly expressed by כָּרַת בְּרִית. In addition to Gn. 6, 18. 9, 9. 11. 17, 7. 21. Ex. 6, 4 it occurs in the same sense also Ez. 16, 60. 62. According to Giesebrecht (p. 221 f.) this is due to Aramaic influence: by analogy, הקים ברית should signify, as it does in actual usage (Dt. 8, 18), not to *establish*, but to *confirm* or *maintain* a covenant. But again, if the facts are fully considered, the argument will be seen to be inconclusive. For (1) the Aram. קוֹם, ܩܝܡ are not restricted to the sense of *establishing* an engagement or promise. They are used equally

[1] Levy, ii. 574[a].

in that of *confirming* or *fulfilling* it, being found, e.g., in the following passages of the Targ. and Pesh. respectively, for the Heb. הקים where it bears the latter sense: Gn. 26, 3. Nu. 30, 14[1]. Dt. 8, 18. 9, 5. 1 S. 15, 11. 13. 1 K. 2, 4. 6, 12. 12, 15. 2 K. 23, 3 al.: in N. T., cf. ܩܝܡ = *ἐπιστηρίζω* Acts 15, 32. 1 Th. 3, 13: ܐܬܩܝܡ = *ἱστάναι* Rom. 3, 31. Heb. 10, 9; = *τηρέω* Mk. 7, 9. And (2) it does not appear that הֵקִים superseded כָּרַת, in the sense of *establishing* in the later Hebrew, as it might be expected to do, if this application of it were really due to Aramaic influence: כרת ברית is used quite freely, not only in Ezek. (17, 13. 34, 25. 37, 26), but in Chr. (often) Ezr. (10, 3) Neh. (9, 8), while הקים ברית is confined (in that sense) to Ez. 16, 60. 62. הקים ברית, in the sense of *establishing* a covenant, is doubtless *peculiar* to the Elohist; but when such a usage (1) is in no respect characteristic of the Aramaic, and (2) cannot be shewn to preponderate in later Hebrew, it is unreasonable to see in it an evidence of Aramaic influence. In point of fact, however, הקים ברית is not quite identical with כרת ברית: the noun is always definite, '*my* covenant,' or (Gn. 9, 17) 'the covenant *which*...,' and the phrase denotes the perpetuation or maintenance of a covenant already, at least in idea, existing, rather than the formation of one altogether new; the latter is expressed by כרת ברית, where the noun may be used absolutely. The use of הקים by the Elohist is analogous to that made by him of זָכַר: it implies more than the *mere* establishment of a covenant, so that even supposing the alleged Aramaic usage were more distinctive than it is, it would still not directly correspond to it. קְלוּט and מְקֻלָּט are technical expressions: the root of both being one which otherwise fell into disuse in Hebrew, like מְדֻבָּר, &c. Moreover the two passages in Chr. (1. 6, 42. 52) are simply transcribed from Josh. 21, 13. 21, and afford no clue as to the date at which the term was used by the author of that section of Joshua. נָדָה is a root which in Aram. combines very different significations—to *flow*, to *journey*, to *chasten* or *instruct*, and to *plough*: whether these can be connected together, and if so, how, need not be here discussed; but

[1] Pesh. ܩܝܡ: cf. *v.* 8 ܢܩܘܡ = יָקוּמוּ.

it will be admitted that none of them affords an immediate starting-point for the very definite sense *rule* or *subdue* borne by the Heb. רדה. Very rarely, indeed, רְדָא occurs in Targ. for the Heb. רָדָה: Lev. 26, 17 (but not 25, 43. 46. 53). Ps. 110, 2 (but not 49, 15): is it not, however, a *ὕστερον πρότερον* to ground upon this slender foundation an antecedent Aramaic usage extensive enough to serve as a source for the Heb. רדה? The common representative of רדה in the Aram. versions is שלט, פלח, ܦܠܚ. If the Heb. and Aram. senses are related, it is evident that they have been differentiated independently from a primitive common stock. On רְקִיעַ it will be enough to say that only by another glaring *ὕστερον πρότερον* can it be described as 'Aramaic.' As to the verb רָקַע itself, it is rare in Chaldee (in Job 37, 18 alone it represents the Heb. רָקַע); and in Syr. though found for רָקַע in Pesh. (Is. 42. 44. Ps. 136. Job 37), it properly denotes rather *to compress* (Lk. 6, 38 ܢܨܒܐ = *πεπιεσμένον*[2]). Why therefore should the Hebrew word be borrowed from the Aramaic rather than *vice versa?* The same question may be asked with reference to שקץ (which does not appear to occur in Syriac at all). שרץ, on the other hand, is certainly found in Syriac, though not in Chald.: but is there anything in the Syriac usage, as substantiated by Ges., to suggest that the root is not Hebrew as well? מַשְׂכִּית (p. 201). The special sense borne by this word does not favour the view that it was introduced into Hebrew as a fresh formation from the Aram. סכא. קָרְבָּן (p. 227). Whatever the original application of קרבן may have been, it is appropriated in Hebrew to designate a sacred oblation, and it is only as thus appropriated that we know anything of it. It is one of the many words, found in every language, which, so far as their etymology goes, might be of general application, but which are limited by usage to specific objects; מנחה is used in both a wider and more special sense, and קרבן is a term describing generally different kinds of sacred offerings. The English *oblation* has been similarly restricted by

[1] Is. 14, 6 Pesh. ܢܚܬ probably bears its usual sense of *correcting*: *v.* 2 רדו is rendered by ܢܫܠܛ. Similarly Lev. 26, 17; *vv.* 18. 23. 28, on the contrary, יִסַּר stands for ירד.

[2] See also Ephr. on Gn. 1, 6.

usage, while *offering*, though derived from the same Latin verb, bears still a general sense.

Does it not appear as if a just and reasonable criticism made a considerable reduction in the number of 'Aramaisms' supposed to be discoverable in Q?

On the alleged 'poetical' character of the expressions noted p. 229—32 it is evidently impossible to argue: an assertion on one side can only be met by an assertion on the other. As I read the Hebrew, I am not sensible of the 'poetical,' still less of the 'bombastic,' tone which Giesebrecht thinks that he can discover in the language of Q. To me the style of the Elohist appears to be simple, not grandiose. Certainly several of the words cited are used besides only by prophets and poets[1]; but this fact does not determine them to be exclusively poetical and unsuitable to prose; some are rare altogether, and only occur in Q for the purpose of giving expression to a particular idea not wanted elsewhere in prose (e.g. שחק רחף בהו Ex. 30, 36[2]).

Let us turn to some of the further considerations urged by Giesebrecht. It is well known that while other writers employ שֵׁבֶט Q commonly uses מַטֶּה in the sense of *tribe;* and on p. 242 the following theory is proposed as the most natural way of accounting for this peculiarity. The use of מטה in this sense, it is said, is a product of exile times; since the destruction of the N. kingdom both the name and the thing expressed by the older term שבט had passed from the recollection of the people: the שבטי ישראל were spoken of only by 'individual preachers and poets,' so that it began to assume an archaic and artificial character; and a fresh term had therefore to be devised as soon as a learned literature arose. Surely such a theory is most improbable. If, as is admitted, שבט occurred repeatedly in the older literature

[1] Not however אֵל שַׁדַּי, which it is impossible to consider as poetical. What *is* poetical, and is used in Job and the poetical passages from J, is שַׁדַּי by itself, not אֵל שַׁדַּי.

[2] The lists of passages are moreover not always drawn up quite accurately. מבלעדי in Is. 36. Jer. 44 does not mean *except* but *apart from*, and the charge of bombast brought against the 'later historical style' on the strength of it at once falls through. רחף, תהו, שחק, מגורים (Lam. 2 it means *terrors*), צמת occur each in very different *nuances* in the passages cited. And on p. 237 נשיאים = *vapours* (Jer. Prov.) is cited beside נשיא = *prince!*

the scribes would naturally again have recourse to it: moreover, as a glance at the concordance will shew, it had both been constantly in use between 720 and 500, and continued in use afterwards: not to mention other writers, Ezek. (47—8) uses it, Jud. 20—21 (which G. quotes[1] for this period) uses it exclusively, the Elohist himself not unfrequently uses it, and the Chronicler uses it. Indeed, the latter, in spite of its being such a little known word, employs it more spontaneously than מטה: it occurs scattered about both Books, as well in parts peculiar to himself as in those borrowed from Kings, *while* מטה *is confined to* 1 C. 6, 45—65. 12, 31 and 2 C. 5, 2 (= 2 K. 8, 1). The first of these passages, enumerating the 'cities of refuge,' is excerpted directly from Josh. 21, the word employed there being still retained. There remain 12, 31. 2 C. 5, 2 *alone*, if they are of any value, to shew that מטה is peculiar to post-exile times. If we examine the manner in which the Chronicler uses מטה, instead of contenting ourselves with counting the times of its occurrence, we see, then, that while he certainly bears independent witness to the *fact* that Q had used it before him, he affords no evidence whatever as to the *date* at which Q thus used it; both terms were in use in the days of the Chronicler, and unless a particular circumstance influences him, he himself employs by preference the term שבט. And both terms were similarly in use when Q wrote, though *he* (and he alone) employs by preference the other term מטה. Does not מטה, like שבט, in this metaphorical sense, belong to an archaic style altogether? To apply such a word to designate a tribe is a mark of primitive thought; and if מטה had, till the exile, meant nothing but *rod*, it surely could not then have been suddenly appropriated in this novel acceptation, even by a writer with the singular genius which is attributed to Q.

The same observation may be made on מגרש. Of the 46 times which, we are reminded, this word is used by the Chronicler, 42 are in the same chapter, 1 C. 6, 40—69, in which Josh. 21 is transcribed; and the fact of their occurrence possesses obviously no logical force of the nature accorded to it. Moreover, the word is a technical one, which only the priestly writers

[1] P. 191, 223, 244.

(Q, Ez.[1] Chr.) have occasion to employ[2], and (upon Giesebrecht's own principle, p. 203) should have been excluded from the synopsis.

It is difficult to understand upon what ground מֶמְשָׁלָה (p. 243) should awaken suspicion. The root denotes *dominion, authority,* obviously of a more general character than מלך, being nearly synonymous with the later שלט, by which indeed it is often represented in the Aramaic versions. The use of the derivative is in strict accordance with that of the verb. For it is hypercritical to suspect ממשלתך in Is. 22, 31. If J can speak of Abraham's steward as המושל בכל אשר לו (Gn. 24, 2), why cannot Isaiah speak of the authority exercised by the state-officer who was על הבית as a ממשלה? the importance of his jurisdiction, quite apart from the particular term ממשלה, is clear from the language of Isaiah itself (cf. Ew. *Gesch.* iii. p. 367 f.). As the word is thus guaranteed by Isaiah, Mic. 4, 8 need not here be insisted on, though ממשלה there is but parallel to משל 5, 1, and though Stade's attempt to treat both 4, 5—10 and 4, 11—5, 3 as later interpolations has met with the approbation of neither Reuss (*Gesch. d. H. Schr. A. T.'s,* p. 314), nor W. R. Smith (*Prophets of Israel,* p. 428). And if, as is plain from Is. 16, 1 מוֹשֵׁל אֶרֶץ (to say nothing of Gn. 45, 8. 26. Jud. 9, 2. 1 K. 5, 1, &c.), משל can be used with a word like ארץ, with what show of plausibility can it be doubted that אֶרֶץ מֶמְשַׁלְתּוֹ 1 K. 9, 19 is an unexceptionable Hebrew construction, which a writer of the most classical period could have employed? The passage 1 K. 9, 19 *may* itself be a late one, but the fact, if true, has no bearing upon the date at which ממשלה was first in use; and the attempt to discredit the word, as early and classical, must be pronounced unsuccessful. In Gn. 1, 16 the use of the substantive is parallel to that of the verb in *v.* 18: of the later passages, those in Ps. 136, 8. 9 are in direct imitation of Gn. 1, in others it follows ארץ: the *really* later and freer application of the word is first seen in 2 K. 20,

[1] *Three* times: 27, 28 the Mas. reading is מִנְּרֹשׁוֹת, and 36, 5 מ׳ is an inf.

[2] The circumstance that, like some other institutions of Q, the מגרש is not alluded to in the other earlier historical books must, of course, receive its due weight; but it constitutes an *historical* argument, not a philological one, and does not therefore here concern us.

13. 2 C. 32, 9. Ps. 114, 2. Dan. 11, 5 to which Gn. 1, 16 bears no resemblance.

With respect to עֵדָה, there is no proof, independent of the date to which we assign Q, that it is either an early or a late word. Used technically, it is confined to Q, Jud. 20 f., 1 K. 8, 5 ‖, and 12, 20. Upon the assumption that Q is late, Giesebrecht rejects it in the two latter passages, as due probably to some corrector or editor; but the independent grounds for such a view, especially in 1 K. 12, are slight. In point of fact, the passages from the 'silver age' (Ps. 1. 7, &c.) have very little bearing on the question: in most of them, עדה is used in a general sense, admitting no comparison with its use by Q: the two sets of passages are out of relation to one another, and from one no inference can be drawn as to the other—the technical sense may have arisen, of course, later than the general one, or as in the parallel case of קָהָל it may have coexisted with it. But the usage of the postexilic writers, if it has any weight at all, is not in favour of עדה being a late term. Ez. Neh. Chr., while constantly employing קהל, *do not once use* עדה, the only apparent exception being 2 C. 5, 6 which is just 1 K. 8, 5. And קהל יי occurs at least as early as Mic. 2, 5: so unsafe is it to infer, from the frequency with which later writers may employ a term, that it was probably not in use much earlier.

Giesebrecht observes justly (p. 202) that technical terms ought to be disregarded in any comparison of the vocabulary of Q with that of other writers; but in fact a large proportion of the words collected by him will be found to be, if not directly technical, still adapted to give expression to specific ideas which are seldom or never required in the other historical parts of the O. T. דְּמוּת is an instance in point. The use of this word in Q is wholly different from its artificial application by Ezek., nor is there any other term exactly expressing the idea of likeness which was required for Gn. 1, 26. 5, 3. 5 the only three occasions on which it is employed by Q. Unless it can be shewn that the *idea* could not have arisen till the period of the exile, no objection can be made to the use of the term denoting it[1]. The case

[1] There is nothing to excite suspicion in the *form:* כְּסוּת occurs in Ex. 21 f., פְּדוּת (si vera l.) in Ex. 8, 19, זְנוּת in Hos., שְׁבוּת in Hos. and Am., חֶסוּת in Is. 30.

of תַּבְנִית is similar. A third instance is afforded by תּוֹלְדוֹת. Genealogizing writers use this word, whatever their date: others do not: the late הִתְיַחֵשׂ (Chr. Ez. Neh.) is altogether absent from Q. Other words, as בְּקֹר, בְּקָרָה, מָאוֹר, צְמִיתוּת (including several, such as זָכָר, מִין, רָקִיעַ, of those which I have attempted to shew are not Aramaic), may be similarly explained: they express distinctive ideas for which there is little or no place in the history as treated by the other writers of the Pent., or the authors of 1—2 Sam. &c. The Elohist writes technically from beginning to end: he introduces us to a side of the Hebrew language with which, but for him, we should be most imperfectly acquainted: it is instructive to note his vocabulary, but great care must be exercised in interpreting its coincidences with the later Hebrew style. Documents of the later periods are much more copious than those of earlier date: and it remains to be shewn that a writer, contemporary for instance with J, *having to describe the same objects as Q*, would have used a different vocabulary for his purpose.

Sometimes indeed, by a mechanical use of the Concordance, sight is lost of real distinctions. תּוֹשָׁב in Q is used in its literal sense: from the derived, metaphorical sense which it bears in the passages Ps. 39, 13. 1 C. 29, 15 (and which is an advance even upon Lev. 25, 23) no argument can be founded as to their nearness in date to Q. אָכְלָה always occurs in a particular phrase לְאָכְלָה, and always (except Jer. 12, 9 where לאכלה has plainly the force of an infinitive, cf. לֶאֱכֹל Is. 56, 9) with another dative, לְאֵשׁ נִתַּן לְאָכְלָה, לָכֶם יִהְיֶה לְאָכְלָה. The terms which correspond, roughly speaking, with our *food*, though doubtless in particular passages they might be interchanged, are not synonymous. It is easier to feel the difference than to express it in words: but אֹכֶל, it may be observed, denotes food in a definite concrete form, מַאֲכָל is a wider and more general term, and אֲכִילָה (1 K. 19, 8 only), in form a verbal subst., corresponds nearly to our *meal*. לְאָכְלָה, on the other hand, is לֶאֱכֹל generalized: a thing is given לֶאֱכֹל on a particular occasion, it is given לְאָכְלָה for a continuance. But in לְאָכְלָה, as distinguished from מַאֲכָל, the verbal force is still retained; thus a particular object becomes a definite and

literal מַאֲכָל, while לְאָכְלָה is more suitable when the subject of the proposition is general, or the sense metaphorical. The flock in Ezek. 34 is not, like the fruit of 47, 12 or the corpses in Jer. 7, 33 &c., described as literal food (מַאֲכָל), but as having been abandoned to its foes *for consumption* (לְאָכְלָה): while, if the passages in Q be examined, the *general* sense of the injunction, or description, will in each case be apparent. Thus לְאָכְלָה expresses the meaning which Q desired to convey better than either לֶאֱכֹל, or לְמַאֲכָל would have done. A third case is לְעָמַת. Is the Hebrew language to have no means of designating the relation between two objects, running alongside of, or corresponding to, one another, before the time of Ezekiel? Its occurrence in 2 S. 16, 13 is thoroughly natural: for it exactly expresses the direction in which Shimei moved relatively to David, which neither עַל יָדוֹ nor מִצִּדּוֹ would do (Wellh. *Text der BB. Sam.* p. 199: *ἐχόμενα* is, moreover, the LXX. rendering of לעמת itself, Ezek. 3, 13. 10, 19. 11, 22. 48, 13. 18. 21). Again נִקְוָה in Gn. 1, 9 is used otherwise than in Jer. 3, 17: Is. 22, 11 (מִקְוֶה) is the truer parallel, which establishes the early use of the root to denote the gathering together of water: a derivative, the root of which *ex hypothesi* was not current at the time, could not have been for the first time coined by Isaiah. And what word but מוּךְ is there to express the idea of *becoming low*, or *being impoverished?* Had the verb רוּשׁ been employed (supposing it to have been adequate), it would, of course, have been equally condemned on account of the late Ps. 34, 11: מָסְכְּנוּ, would have been not less suspicious on the ground of Is. 40, 20. Verbs connected with אביון &c. do not occur: and שפל denotes the humiliation which comes upon pride, not depression through misfortune. Is it reasonable to suppose that there can have been no indigenous word in Hebrew to denote depression in the latter sense before the Captivity? And there is the less ground for assuming מוך to be borrowed from the Aramaic: for the signification borne by the root does not seem to be altogether identical in the two languages (see the Lexx.): at any rate, in Lev. 25. 27 מוך is represented in both Pesh. and Targ. not by the corresponding word, but by ܡܣܟܢ, מסכן.

So lastly with הִבְדִּיל. The only near synonyms are הִפְלָה and הִפְרִיד: חָלַק is to *distribute*, other words, as בקע, בתר, גזר, פלג, diverge still more widely. But הפלה is to distinguish by some external mark of favour, and could not therefore be substituted for הבדיל in any of the numerous passages where some neutral term is obviously required. Nor is הפריד a real synonym. It would take long to consider the cases separately; but it may be questioned whether there is any occasion in the O. T. on which either word could be substituted for the other. הבדיל is to sever, physically or metaphorically, what is continuous and united: הפריד is to part more widely objects which though contiguous are still (actually or virtually) disunited: it thus expresses, for instance, either a separation between friends, or the widening diffusion of waters, or of families of men, from a single centre. But in הבדיל the metaphorical sense is most frequent, and the word is applied to acts of a *formal*, and especially of a religious, nature: in הפריד, on the contrary, the physical aspect predominates. The force of הבדיל is plainest in the passages of Q which speak of the distinction בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ לְחוֹל, between Israel and the nations, &c.: but it is clearly present also in Deut.: the cities of refuge were not physically severed from other parts of the Holy Land, but separated in idea, marked off for a sacred purpose, which is indicated by this word, twice applied to them. So of the tribe of Levi, Dt. 10, 8 (as Nu. 8, 14. 16, 9). The same religious significance appears also in Dt. 29, 20[1]. It is evident that both here and in Q (including Gn. 1, 4. 14. 18[2]) הפריד would be too strong a term to employ: conversely in Gn. 31, 40. 2 K. 2, 11 הבדיל would be weak, and otherwise unsuitable. A similar distinction obtains with the Nifal: the נִבְדָּל is one who though he lives amongst others does not mix with them; the נִפְרָד is one who is isolated from others locally (Jud. 4, 11. Neh. 4, 13). Such being the distinctions subsisting between הבדיל and its

[1] And in Isa. 59, 2 where, though מפרידים might doubtless have been employed, the associations suggested by מבדילים, the separation of the people *from what was holy*, caused by their sins, would have been lost. So Ex. 26, 33 it is not a mere physical partition (as 1 K. 6, 21) which is spoken of.

[2] Also cf. Lev. 1, 17. 5, 8 where separation, not segregation, is all that has to be expressed.

nearest synonyms, what value is to be attached, from a philological point of view, to the observation that Q's use of it agrees with that of D and the exilic writers? The word occupied a place in the Hebrew language which no other word occupied: and unless it can be made probable that this place was vacant till the age of D, the observation, so far as the date of Q is concerned, is irrelevant.

Enough will have been said to shew the precarious nature of conclusions, based on an unchecked application of the method of arithmetical computation. The use of that method implies that the units summed *are of equal value;* but in the facts of language with which we are now dealing this is constantly not the case: they differ by the presence of factors, variable and subjective, of which the arithmetical computation can take no account. The conclusion, therefore, does not, as it professes to do, embrace the *whole* facts: it seems plausible, but it may be entirely false. A Hebrew word may have its analogue in Aramaic without being an 'Aramaism,' and without constituting any criterion of date. There are coincidences of phraseology between Q and the writers of 600—400 B.C.: but when the individual cases are examined, it appears that these may admit of other explanations than coincidence of date. The objects and ideas dealt with by Q differ from the scenes of domestic life and national history which form the pictures given by J: and by those objects and ideas his language is determined. Even J is at times technical, and then, it may be observed, his language becomes no less suspicious. For instance, in Gn. 30, 35—43 and allied passages (all referred by Wellhausen to J) we meet with the following words, not one of which occurs elsewhere, except in writings referred to a late date: חישים (2 C. Pr. 30), טלוא (Ez. 16), ערמון (Ez.), יחם (Ps. 51), עטף (often late), קרח 31, 40 (Jer. Job). In Gn. 24 (J) we find צמידים (Ez. and Q), בקע (Q), הגמיאני (Job 39), משתאה (cf. Ch. שתי, ܐܫܬܝ Ephr. II. 412 F), מגדנות (2 C. Ezr.). In the section 1 S. 9, 1—10, 16, universally admitted to be an early one, there occur דאג[1], תישורה (cf. Is. 57), אזל, חלף, לשכה, רבע (Ez. Q), which, if Giesebrecht's argument is

[1] Of which, strangely, no notice is taken, upon either of the three occasions on which דאגה is referred to (p. 189, 199, 248).

sound, must go far to alter our estimate of its date[1]. Such examples are not indeed parallel to *all* the instances in question, but they are parallel to words like נאחז, בהו, תבנית, טוה, זחח, רחף, מקבילות, and they shew how misleading the inclusion of such words in a tabular statement may be. The inference, if valid, implies that the words *had no place* in the language till the times of Jeremiah, and subsequently (for clearly, if they existed, it was competent for Q to employ them): this however is an assumption which requires still to be proved; for some of the words are technical terms which we should not expect to find in frequent use, while others express ideas which the Hebrew cannot have so long dispensed with, or are not real synonyms with the words which are supposed during the early period to have filled their place.

The consideration of Q's use of suffixes and pronouns may now follow. Two out of the three points urged by Giesebrecht may be dismissed at once: the third will detain us longer. It is true (p. 250) that most of the instances of the rare suffix יְהוּ (as מוֹטֶהוּ Nah. 1, 13) are of doubtful antiquity: but who will be persuaded that the author of Dt. 14 adopted the form לְמִינֵהוּ not from some document already before him, but from 'the elevated poetical language of his time'? Not once elsewhere, even when his exalted rhetorical style might seem to invite it, does the Deuteronomist employ this form: in the most prosaic section of the entire book, a section moreover which corresponds almost *verbatim* with a part (Lev. 11) of a document in which the same form, rare though it be elsewhere, actually meets us, we are asked to believe that he adopted it as a grace of style, independently! Whatever the origin of למינהו in the formulae of Gn. and Lev. 11, it may at least be affirmed with confidence to be anterior to the Deuteronomist.

To the comparative frequency with which the two modes of expressing the pronominal object, viz. by the verbal suffix, and the separate use of את, are employed by Q, no great weight appears (p. 258—61) to be attached by Giesebrecht himself.

[1] Examples of other, more isolated words: התעשׂק Gn. 26, 20; תעתע 27, 12; לשד Nu. 11 (Ps. 32); ירט and הסכן in Nu. 22, 22—35.

The older writers exhibit indeed a preference, more or less decided, for the former: Q, on the other hand, has a preference for the latter. Both forms, however, are continually employed, and it is far from clear that the disproportion, such as it is, is to be attributed to a difference of date. The preference for the separate pronom. object is rather to be accounted for from its being in harmony with the measured style which is throughout characteristic of Q (note e.g. the repetition of clauses, Gn. 1, 27. 17, 22—27. Nu. 3, 49 f. &c.); and the distinctness and emphasis which, writing with the precision of a legislator, he is generally careful to observe, are undoubtedly promoted by its use.

With respect to אָנֹכִי and אֲנִי Giesebrecht appears (p. 251—8) at first sight to make out a formidable case. Upon the basis of the table given in Böttcher § 858, he shews that while in writings of an admittedly early date the two forms occur with about equal frequency, or אנכי actually predominates (e.g. J אנכי : אני :: 90 : 52; Judg. 17 : 12; Sam. 50 : 50; Hos. 11 : 10), later writers use אני with increasing frequency, till at length אנכי even disappears altogether (Jer. אנכי : אני :: 37 : 53; Is. 40 ff., 18 : 62; Ezek. 1 : 138; Lam. 0 : 4; Zech. 1—8, 0 : 8; Haggai 0 : 4; Est. 0 : 6; Eccl. 0 : 29; Chr. 1 : 30, &c.). These figures leave no doubt that the longer form fell gradually into disuse; and the circumstance that Q stands here nearly on the same footing as Ezekiel, offering אנכי once, against אני some 130 times, is certainly remarkable. It will be worth while, however, to examine the instances in detail. It is clear in the first place that though ultimately אני superseded אנכי, both forms were in use together in the earliest periods of the language; the examples from J, Judg. Sam. are sufficient to establish this. It was competent therefore for any writer, whatever his date, to use אני, if for some reason it seemed to him to be preferable to אנכי. Now two differences are noticeable between the two forms. One is slightly fuller and more emphatic than the other: and *they are not rhythmically equivalent.* Hence, though doubtless many cases would occur allowing equally of either form, we should not expect the usage of the best writers, where it fluctuates, to be determined *entirely* by accident or caprice, but rather by a delicate, instinctive appreciation of the form best adapted to the

structure and rhythm of particular sentences. And indeed this is exactly what takes place. Sometimes the writer's choice is evidently determined by the position which the word occupies in the sentence, sometimes by a feeling that the sense which he desires to convey will be better brought out by one particular form: and there are, besides, individual phrases of frequent occurrence, in which one form is all but uniformly preferred to the other. How heavy, for example, in 2 S. 15, 20 ואני הולך על אשר אני הולך would be the repetition of אנכי: in the differently constructed sentence Jud. 17, 9 ואנכי הולך לגור באשר אמצא, on the contrary, it is perfectly suitable. אני suits the rapid movement of Dt. 32, 39 ראו עתה כי אני אני הוא ואנכי: the statelier style of Isa. 43, 25 אנכי אנכי הוא מוחה פשעיך למעני (contrast similarly 2 S. 19, 21 and Jo. 7, 20; Isa 45, 7[b] and 44, 24[b]; 46, 4 and 49, 25[b]; and even 43, 10[b] and 11). Gn. 27, 19 אנכי עשו בכורך, Jacob not unnaturally lays a slight emphasis on his assumed personality: *v.* 32 אני בנך בכורך עשו, Esau takes his own for granted. Analogously, when the subject of a verb is to be expressed separately, אני emphasizes it slightly, אנכי is used where a rather stronger emphasis is desired: contrast e.g. 1 S. 26, 6[b] with Gn. 46, 4; 2 S. 7, 8 with 12, 7[b]. If, further, instances of ואנכי be compared with those of ואני (Nold. p. 83 and 89), it will be seen that often the latter could not be substituted for the former without a distinct loss in meaning; ואני implies a mere contrast, while in ואנכי a real stress lies upon the pronoun[1].

Lastly, cases in which the shorter form, as a rule, is decidedly preferred, are when the pronoun is appended to the verb for the sake of emphasis, whether with or without גם (Jud. 1, 3 והלכתי גם אני אתך בגורלך; 2 S. 17, 15 וכזאת יעצתי אני), and when it follows the participle (1 S. 3, 13 כי שופט אני את ביתו; Jud. 15, 3): on the contrary, *before* the participle (especially if הנה precede) אנכי is more common (1 S. 3, 11 הנה אנכי עושה דבר וג׳). Further examples will be referred to below. So we find almost universally חַי אָנִי, אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי and וַיֹּאמֶר אָנִי (2 S. 2, 20 ויאמר אנכי), but נַעַר אָנֹכִי, עֲמָלֵקִי אָנֹכִי and אָנֹכִי עִמְּךָ.

[1] What has been said in the text will explain the use of אני in passages such as Gn. 14, 23. Is. 37, 24 f. 38, 10, and the much greater frequency of אני and ואני above אנכי and ואנכי in the Psalms.

We are now in a position to consider the use of אֲנִי in Q. In the great majority of cases, it forms part of the formula אֲנִי יְהוָה (sometimes with additions), and about one half occur in the section Lev. 17—26. Examples of אני יהוה and cognate expressions (מקדשכם or אני יהוה אלהיכם, וידעו כי אני יהוה, &c.) are found Ex. 6, 2. 6—8. 29. 7, 5. 12, 12. 16, 12 &c. (see Nold. p. 74 f.[1]); and beyond the limits of Q, Dt. 29, 5; Jud. 6, 10; 1 K. 20, 13. 28; Is. 40 ff.[2]; Joel 4, 17; Jer. 24, 7. 32, 27, and often in Ezek. It is clear, then, that אני יהוה was a standing type of expression, which, though used most frequently by the Elohist and Ezekiel, was undoubtedly in use long before the exile. The example Dt. 29, 5 is in this respect peculiarly instructive; for, while the two 'margins' of the Deuteronomic legislation agree elsewhere with the body of the work (ch. 12—26) in exclusively preferring אנכי, in this single formula אני is employed. Had the author of Dt. 29 been the first to use the expression, he would surely have employed אנכי: his use of אני shews that it had been in use before, and was merely borrowed by him; and when the type had once been formed with אני it is natural that it should be adhered to uniformly. Indeed it may be traced back much earlier than D: to Gn. 15, 7. 28, 13 J[3] (the latter passage vindicating the originality of אני in the former); Ex. 14, 4. 18 E[3], even if 7, 17. 10, 2. 15, 26 be disallowed. In face of these facts, whatever weight may be attached to the correspondency of Q and Ezekiel, or to the frequency with which Q employs the expression, the mere circumstance *that he uses* אני *and not* אנכי is no decisive indication of the age at which he lived.

There is however another formula in which אנכי is employed, occurring in both recensions of the Decalogue (Ex. 20, 2. 5 = Dt. 5, 6. 9) and occasionally besides (Hos. 12, 10. 13, 4; Is. 43, 11. 44, 24. 51, 15; Ps. 81, 11; cf. Gn. 26, 24 J אנכי אלהי אברהם אביך. 31, 13 E. 46, 3 E; Ex. 3, 6 E; Is. 46, 9; Ps. 46, 11). But this is much rarer than אני: and looking at JE alone, it is noticeable that, while neither formula is there very frequent, אני *occurs not less than* אנכי. In fact, it is tolerably clear that whoever first

[1] Similarly אני אל שדי Gn. 17, 1. 35, 11.

[2] אני יי of 27, 3. 41, 17 &c. is somewhat different.

[3] Wellhausen in *Jahrb. D. Th.* 1876, p. 421, 546; cf. 412, 437 f., 549.

formulated the expressions in question (and both are met with early) was determined in his preference for אני or אנכי by considerations of *rhythm:* when the predicate is י alone, אנכי never occurs, the lighter אני being uniformly employed; when the predicate is weightier (as אלהי אברהם, or האל בית אל), then אנכי is found more appropriate to balance it; אני יהוה is also retained when some further defining clause is appended (as אלהיכם מקדשכם, or המעלה אתכם מארץ מצרים[1]), אנכי יהוה is confined (except Is. 43. 44) to the instances where אלהיך (with the *light* suffix) follows (Ex. 20 ‖; Hos. 12. 13; Ps. 81: the alternating types being אני י אלהיכם, and אנכי י אלהיך; for אני יהוה אלהיך will scarcely be met with beyond Is. 41, 13. 43, 3. 48, 17).

Let us examine some of the other examples of אני in Q, and consider whether any principle can be established for their use, irrespective of date.

1. אשר אני נותן Gn. 9, 12; Lev. 14, 34. 23, 10. 25, 2; Nu. 13, 2. 15, 2; Dt. 32, 48. 51; and similarly, after the relative, and before a participle, Ex. 25, 9; Lev. 18, 3. 20, 22 and Nu. 15, 18 (אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה); Lev. 18, 24. 20, 23; Nu. 5, 3. 35, 34. D in similar sentences uses always אנכי (Nold. p. 86): if D's preference for אנכי does not constitute him one of the earliest writers of the O. T., we should argue with caution from Q's preference for אני that he is one of the latest. Both forms were in use early: J uses אני, for instance, Gn. 27, 8 (24, 3. 37. 42. 28, 20 אנכי), though it must be admitted that the early historians generally prefer אנכי in this connexion. It will be noticed, however, that the instances in Q are mostly cases of standing expressions: and it is quite possible that אשר אני נתן may have been as regularly[2] in use as אשר אני עשה, which is met with some eight times in writers of all ages from Gn. 18, 17 J[3] to

[1] So also Lev. 19, 2. 20, 26. 21, 8 (where the predicate קדוש precedes). With 11, 44. 45^{b} כי קדוש אני comp. Ex. 22, 26 J כי חנון אני.

[2] אנכי (except in Dt.) only Josh. 1, 2. How tenaciously phrases, when once formed, were adhered to by the Hebrew writers, may be illustrated from the phrase ... הנני מביא, which from Ex. 10, 4 J occurs nearly 20 times (especially in Jer., with רעה following): only once do we find הנה אנכי מביא רעה Jer. 6, 19.

[3] For Wellhausen's doubts (*l. c.* p. 417) have here a very slight foundation; and both אני's are in place.

Mal. 3, 17. 21, while אשר אנכי עשה occurs only twice, in one verse Jer. 33, 9 where the rhythm strongly demands it.

2. Gn. 17, 4 ... אני הנה; and ואני הנה (Ex. 31, 6; Nu. 3, 12. 18, 6. 8; Jer. 1, 18), or ואני הנני (Gn. 6, 17. 9, 9; Ex. 14, 17 E; Jer. 26, 14. 40, 10, but not Ezekiel). This is the usual form when the pronoun precedes הנה: when it follows it, we have, on the other hand, הנה אנכי Gn. 24, 14. 43. 25, 32. 28, 15. 48, 21; Ex. 3, 13. 4, 23. 7, 17 &c.; the same idiom in other books, as Josh. 23, 14; Jud. 6, 37 (to denote a provisional occurrence). 7, 17 and often (Nold. p. 87 f.); Mal. 3, 23; 1 C. 17, 1; whereas הנה אני is very rare even in the books which, as a rule, favour אני most decidedly, 2 K. 10, 9; Jer. 32, 27; Ez. 37, 5. 12. 19. 21; 2 C. 2, 3 are exceptional. The two forms אני הנה and הנה אנכי are obviously, however, not equivalent; and inasmuch as in the passages from Q the sense requires that the pronoun should occupy the first place, there was no option but to employ אני; for the collocation אנכי הנה (occurring, I believe, once only, in the singularly worded clause, Jer. 7, 11^{b}) does not appear to have been generally in use.

3. Lev. 20, 2 ושמתי אני. 26, 32 *after* the verb. אני here is in accordance with the usual custom, 2 S. 12, 28. 17, 15; Jud. 8, 23.

4. Lev. 26, 16 אף אני אעשה; and following the verb, 26, 24 והלכתי אף אני (also with גם). 28 ויסרתי אתכם אף אני. So Jud. 1, 3; 2 S. 18, 2. 22 ארוצה־נא גם אני; Hos. 4, 6 אשכח בניך גם אני, and elsewhere. In neither of these cases (as said above) would אנכי be expected: an early writer would avoid it, as too heavy, not less than a later one (exceptions, as Gn. 30, 3. 30^{b}, are very rare); and even D, abandoning his usual אנכי, writes as it were instinctively (12, 30) ואעשה כן גם אני[1].

In addition to the passages cited, there are some eight or ten places besides, where the occurrence of אני is not readily reducible to principle[2]. The result of our investigation appears to be that, while the predominance of אני in Q is marked and

[1] This is the 8th instance of אני, which Giesebrecht (p. 257) desiderates.

[2] Nu. 20, 19 אני ומקני follows the type of אני וביתי Gn. 34, 30. 37, 10. 41, 11: 1 S. 14, 40 &c., which is a good deal commoner than that of אנכי ורעיתי Jud. 11, 37 (cf. 7, 18. 2 S. 3, 28: Josh. 24, 15).

undeniable, it is not so certain that this predominance is to be attributed to the lateness of date. Though there are naturally many occasions on which either form might be employed without serious detriment to sense or rhythm, the best writers do not use them entirely without discrimination: at one time אנכי is preferred, at another אני. The majority of instances in Q consist of the formula אני יי, which was certainly in use long before the date at which Giesebrecht would place the Elohist: the formula being fixed, the frequency of its occurrence renders it characteristic of Q—or of Q and the 'Heiligkeitsgesetz,' Lev. 17—26—but constitutes no criterion of the period at which Q was composed. And several of the other examples occur in phrases in which analogy would lead us to suppose that even an early writer would prefer אני to אנכי[1]. I do not deny that the preponderance of אני in Q has *some* significance, but it is far less than the mere statement of the numerical ratio 130:1 might be imagined to imply.

Let us pass to the field of syntax. Doubtless the assertion is correct (p. 262 f.) that the construction of a participle with following genitive is common to all periods of the language, and cannot therefore be claimed as a mark of antiquity; but the same is also the case with the construction of the accusative with a passive verb (וַיַּגֶּד אֶת־דִּבְרֵי עֵשָׂו: Ew. 295[b]), which Giesebr. is less willing to allow (p. 263 f.). For the instances in Q are scattered, and their numerical preponderance, as compared with the frequency of instances elsewhere, is not great: several also are afforded by set phrases which recur (יִתֵּן, יֹאכַל, וַיּוֹלֶד, יַעֲשֶׂה: cf. וַיַּגֶּד in J, Sam. Kgs.). But the endeavour to shew from its frequency in Chaldee that there was a tendency to resort more freely to this construction in later times is a failure: quoting merely from Winer, Giesebrecht has not observed that the cases in which it is used in the Targ. are reducible to two classes: (1) where it merely reproduces the Hebrew idiom, (2) where שמע, ראה spoken of God, with an accusative following, are paraphrased by שְׁמִיעַ קֳדָם יי, גְּלֵא, and where the Heb. את is represented by ית. Instances of (1) need not be repeated[2]; the instances of (2) are

[1] אנכי in Deut. occurs almost entirely in 2 or 3 fixed formulæ, as אנכי מצוה אתכם, מצוך.

[2] I add them for completeness in a·

Gn. 21, 17. 31, 12. 42 (similarly 41, 16. 44, 16); Ex. 2, 24. 3, 7. 9. 4, 31. 6, 5. 16, 12. 32, 9; Nu. 14, 27; Dt. 1, 34. 5, 25. 9, 13[1]. These are all the cases whatever of its occurrence in Onkelos. In the Targ. on 1—2 S., it is to be found similarly only ii. 21, 11. 22. If it be thought that the Targ. Jerus. exhibits an earlier phase of the text of Onkelos, the theory has still less support; for there no example of ית with passive verb occurs at all[2]. It is clear that in the Targums, wherever it appears, it is through the influence of the Hebrew original[3]. That there is no independent tendency towards it in Chaldee is evidenced (1) by the fact that it is not resorted to where, if such were the case, it might be reasonably expected (e.g. Gn. 48, 16; Ex. 5, 2. 33, 5[b]); (2) that when present in the Hebrew text it is often not represented in the Chaldee (Ex. 25, 28. 27, 7; Lev. 10, 18. 16, 27; Dt. 12, 22; Josh. 7, 15; 1 K. 18, 13 [9, 3. 2 K. 13, 4. 20, 5]; Am. 4, 2; Hos. 10, 6; Jer. 35, 14. 38, 4. 50, 20). Even supposing therefore that it decidedly preponderated in Q, the Targums would enter no very effective 'protest' against its antiquity. All that can be said of the construction is, that it is one occurring from time to time at all periods of the language: if, however, it were becoming more frequent later, it is strange that Jer. Ezek. do not afford more numerous instances of it[4]—

foot-note: Gn. 4, 18. 17, 5. 14 (edd., but not Bomb.). 21, 5. 8. 27, 42. 46, 20; Ex. 10, 8. 21, 28; Nu. 9, 15 (הקים rendered by a passive). 11, 22. 26, 60; Dt. 20, 8 (יְתֻבַּר Bomb.). Also Ex. 40, 34 f.; Nu. 14, 21 אתמלי (so 1 K. 8, 10 f.; Ez. 10, 3. 44, 4 but not 43, 5. Ps. 72, 19). In Gn. 40, 20; Lev. 6, 13. 13, 55 f.; Nu. 7, 10. 84. 88 an active finite verb is substituted for the inf. passive of the original.

[1] 2 K. 19, 27[b] ‖; Jer. 18, 23. 23, 25; Ez. 35, 12 may be added.

[2] Targ. Ps.-Jon., being admittedly of much later origin, need not be taken into account.

[3] Like the retention, so constant in Onk., of וְ before the future, where the Heb. has used it with the *pf. consec.* to mark the apodosis, or of את itself, Josh. 22, 17; Jud. 20, 44[b]; Ez. 35, 10.

[4] Giesebrecht in fact credits them with a greater number of examples than they actually exhibit. Jer. 36, 22 ought certainly not to be cited in this connexion. Ez. 10, 17 the verb is *plural*, and אוֹתָם is clearly = אִתָּם (as 2, 1. 6 &c.); and in 23, 29 (as also in the passages from Job, Ps. 87, Isa.) the case is somewhat altered by the absence of את. Nor does 2 K. 18, 30 (where the verb תִּנָּתֵן is *fem.*) belong to the present category (Ew. § 277[d] *note;* Del. on Isa. 36, 15 [where the Heb. omits את]): analogous cases in Targ., where, the construction being altered, ית retained mechanically from the Heb. is a palpable redundancy, are

to say nothing of Ezra, Neh. Est. &c. in which it seems to be unrepresented ('2 C. 26, 6' I cannot verify). It may not be a specially antique usage, but still less can it be shewn to be specially a late one. Neither from the O. T. itself (apart from the date of Q, which is the matter in dispute), nor from the Targums, can the smallest support be derived for such an opinion.

We proceed to the idiom (Ew. 293[a]) in which, when a noun is qualified by an adjective, a defining article, instead of standing, as usual, before *both* words, is prefixed to the adjective alone (יוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי). This unquestionably becomes common in post-Biblical Hebrew (cf. Ezra 10, 9 which is quite exceptional in O. T.); does it predominate in Q to such a degree as to form a real addition to the linguistic arguments favouring the later date? The examples from Q fall into two classes, (1) where the substantive thus left undefined is the word *day*: Gn. 1, 31 יום הששי. 2, 3 את יום השביעי; Ex. 12, 15 מיום הראשון עד יום השביעי. 18. 20, 10 (in the Decalogue: so Dt. 5, 14); Lev. 19, 6. 22, 27: (2) in the phrases *a*. Gn. 1, 21 כל נפש החיה הרמשת אשר ···; Lev. 11, 46[a] כל נפש החיה הרמשת במים; *b*. Gn. 9, 10 כל נפש החיה אשר ···; Lev. 11, 10; *c*. Gn. 1, 28 כל חיה הרמשת על הארץ; Lev. 11, 46[b] כל נפש השרצת על הארץ. Add *d*. Nu. 28, 6 עולת תמיד העשויה ···; Lev. 24, 10 את איש הישראלי. These, I believe, are all the occasions on which the Elohist employs this construction; and it is singular that if he possessed the 'morbid predilection' for it which Giesebrecht detects, he has not found more ample opportunities for its exercise. In point of fact, he uses continually בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן[1] &c., e.g. throughout Nu. 7. The first of these usages (if a *st. c.* relation is not to be thought of: cf. Ew. § 287[a]), which is at least as old as D[2], appears to have arisen in

Ex. 16,7—9 שמיעין קדמי ית תורעמתכון; Nu. 26, 55 תתפליג ית ארעא; 32, 5 תתיהב; 1 S. 6, 9 אתעבידת; 1 K. 2, 21; 2 K. *l. c.*; also 9, 26. 19, 4 שמיעין; Jer. 29, 11 גליין קדמי ית מחשבתא. 38, 23 (reading מוצָאִים and תִּשָּׁרֵף, cf. *vv.* 17. 22); Jon. 3, 10.

[1] It is possible, indeed, that there was a tendency to point a prep. with *pathach* in cases where otherwise the art. might have been dispensed with. But there is no reason to suppose this was done in Q more than in J or other writers.

[2] And, for aught there can be affirmed to the contrary, older; for, if I mistake

connexion with familiar words, which were not always felt to need additional definition by the article: cf. Jer. 38, 14 (מבוא): Zech. 14, 10; Ez. 9, 2; 2 C. 23, 20 (all שער): 1 K. 7, 8. 12; Ez. 40, 28. 31. 47, 16 (all instances of חצר). In 2^a and ^{b} כל נפש is *ex vi termini* definite; so is עולת ת׳ in 2^d: while in 2^e (and ^{a}) not only is there כל, but the participle with the article (in spite of the remark on p. 266) is parallel to 1 S. 25, 10, being equivalent to the 'relative pronoun and a verb[1].' Ezekiel, however, is by no means so strongly represented as might appear from p. 267: 2, 3. 14, 22. 32, 22. 24 are all instances of the participle, which on p. 266 were declared to stand on a different footing from the Elohistic passages: 8, 3 (see Smend) is a case of *st. c.*; and there remain only the phrases with שער and חצר, which have been just referred to. But why is the early passage 1 S. 16, 23 רוח הרעה omitted? where it is clear that הרעה is an adjective, (1) from a comparison of *vv.* 15^b. 16^b, (2) from the fact that הרעה never appears as a qualifying genitive. And 2 S. 12, 4 לְאִישׁ העשיר (though this depends only on the points) is, as Ew. remarks, analogous to Lev. 24, 10.

The instances in Q are not sufficiently numerous to establish

not, no example of the explicit type היום השביעי is found until Neh. 8, 18; Dan. 10, 12. (How much Ex. 20 may be prior to D, is left here an open question.)

[1] Other examples: (*α*) Dt. 2, 23; Jer. 27, 3. 46, 16=50, 16 (חרב היונה); Ez. 2, 3. 14, 22. 32, 22. 24; Ps. 119, 21; Dan. 9, 26^b: with passive ptcp., Isa. 7, 20 Hitz. Jer. 32, 14; Zech. 11, 2 Kt.; Ps. 62, 4. (*β*) (irregular): Gn. 41, 26; 1 S. 12, 23 דרך הטובה. 19, 22 (doubtless corrupt); Ju. 21, 19 למסלה העולה; 2 K. 20, 13 שמן הטוב (Is. 39, 2 השמן הטוב); Jer. 6, 20 קָנֶה הטוב (but Ct. 7, 10 יין הטוב). 17, 2; Ez. 21, 19 (but see Smend); Zech. 4, 7; Ps. 104, 18; Neh. 3, 6=12, 39 שער הישנה (this is dub.: see Berth. Keil). 9, 35: 'Joel 2, 25' must be an error. Also הזה 1 S. 14, 29. 17, 12 (text doubtful). 17; Jer. 40, 3 Kt.: יום ההוא Mic. 7, 11 reads suspiciously.

In note [2], p. 266, different constructions are confused. Gn. 37, 2 רעה is not an epithet to דבתם, but a secondary predicate: 1 S. 2, 23 'I hear the account of you (as) evil' &c. is precisely parallel. Gn. 42, 19 אחד is sufficiently defended by 1 S. 13, 17 already compared by Ewald, § 290[f]. Gn. 32, 23 has nothing to do with Ex. 10, 1; Josh. 2, 20; 1 K. 10, 8: אלה, זה *never* have the art. after a word determined by a pron. suffix (Gn. 24, 8; Ex. 11, 8; Ju. 6, 14; Dt. 5, 26. 11, 18. 21, 20 al.); whereas the idiom בלילה הוא is a very rare variant for בלילה ההוא: Gn. 19, 33 (35 ההוא). 30, 16. 32, 23 (22 ההוא). 1 S. 19, 10. With Ps. 12, 8 compare 1 S. 2, 23 *end* (unless עם יהוה should be read after LXX).

a dominant usage: they are reducible to clearly defined groups, which admit of explanation; nor are any so abnormal as some of those just cited (p. 230, note [1]).

The instances of the constructions noticed on p. 267—8 are too isolated for an argument of any value to be built upon them. Were the combination of particles, for instance, in cases where ordinarily a single one would be sufficient, a constant phenomenon in Q, it might be reasonable to argue that it was due to that deterioration of language which is characteristic of a later age: but when the entire number of instances amounts to four, and each of these is moreover distinct from the others, it is clear that such an explanation is out of the question. In Gn. 17, 23 the sentences are intentionally anacoluthic; on Lev. 5, 17 ואם נפש כי תחטא Giesebrecht remarks that 'the sense of the single word was more or less lost to the author, so that in order at all to express the hypothetical case, two particles were necessary': but this argument is at once refuted by the fact that on the same page, as well as constantly elsewhere, he finds a single particle fully adequate: see *vv.* 1. 7. 11. 15. 21; 4, 22. 27. 32 &c. All that can be said of חלילה לנו ממנו למרד Josh. 22, 29 is that it stands alone in the O. T.: Giesebrecht seems to regard לנו ממנו as an amalgamation of ממנו and לנו, the one preposition strengthening the other: but this is without analogy; nor is חלילה ever construed with מן of the person deprecating, or (as it then would be) with ל before the verb expressing the act deprecated. Probably the easiest explanation is to regard למרד as epexegetical of the suffix in ממנו. On the other hand, the construction Gn. 23, 6 is quite different, and in accordance with analogy after a verb implying negation: cf. 1 S. 7, 8 אל תחרש ממנו מזעק אל יי; Jud. 6, 27[b] מעשות is also similar.

Here this criticism may end. The problems, literary and historical, presented by the Grundschrift, are complicated and difficult; and no solution that may be offered of them can for the present be regarded as other than provisional. But the solution is not expedited by the use of untrustworthy methods; and my object will have been attained, if I have shewn that some of those on which Giesebrecht relies (or at least appears to rely) do not deserve the confidence that is placed in them. The

positive argument to be derived from the language or style of Q in favour of its late date, is much weaker than the reader of the article might imagine. Of the Aramaisms and later usages which he might suppose abounded in Q, many *have no existence*, and are only so termed by a misnomer: others (including some which I have not noticed) are isolated or ambiguous. I allow indeed that there is a residuum, which perhaps cannot be removed; and of these the most remarkable appears to me to be the use of אני, for though there are many occasions on which this form presents to me no difficulty, there are other classes of cases in which it is surprising that אנכי should *never* occur. Yet while this residuum is candidly admitted, ought it not also in fairness to be asked whether, if the instances comprising it are really due to lateness of date, the document containing them would not afford more conspicuous and unmistakeable examples than it actually does? Ezekiel's incorrectness of style, for instance, is wanting: the resemblance with him in vocabulary may be delusive. Kuenen suggests (*Theol. Tijdschr.*, 1879, p. 643) that the Elohist wrote a learned style, not that ordinarily current among his contemporaries: but even so, it is strange that he did not unconsciously betray, more distinctly than he has done, the age in which he lived. Nehemiah, Giesebrecht remarks (p. 269), set a value upon pure Hebrew: nevertheless, his attempt to write it was a failure; for the chapter (13) to which Giesebrecht refers abounds with the marks of a deteriorated style, of a kind not to be found in Q. Chapters such as Gn. 1; Lev. 16; Nu. 6, seem to me to be entirely free from late usages and forms[1]; they may lack the brilliancy and attractiveness of JE, but that is fairly accounted for by the difference of subject-matter, necessitating, of course, a different treatment. Elsewhere, to be sure (e.g. Nu. 1—4), I admit that the style appears inferior, and phraseological irregularities sometimes present themselves; but we have no independent

[1] Few will subscribe to Wellhausen's verdict (*Gesch.* p. 399 ff.) on Gn. 1. Whence, for instance, does it appear that the temporal sense of ראשית is an Aramaism? بدء constantly signifies *primitiae* (Pesh., both N. T. and O. T.; Ephr. 1. 40 B. 282 F), not less than *principium*: see also Hos. 9. 10 Hebr.

means of judging how an early writer would handle a technical description, or impart interest to a dry enumeration of details; and the more distinctive marks of a later age are still absent. Yet such is the fascination which the style of JE and the early historians exercises over the critic, that it is unconsciously adopted as the standard by which all besides is to be estimated. The assumption underlying the whole of the article which has been here criticized is that whatever cannot be shewn to conform to that standard, is (more or less probably) late. Is this assumption legitimate? or, at least, must it not be resorted to with great caution? Is it not clear from the character of the civilization already attested by the early historians and prophets themselves, that many ideas and objects must have been familiar to the Hebrew people, to which, nevertheless, those historians, from the nature of their work, never allude? May we not be unnaturally restricting the Hebrew language if we limit its lexicon for 10—9 cent. B.C. to the words actually found in their writings, and view with suspicion a multitude of others, which in the extant literature, except in Q itself, do not happen to be attested till subsequently? But, whatever our ultimate opinion on the literary question may be, it is probable that some other alternative will be open to us, besides the extreme one advocated by Giesebrecht[1].

[1] In the above discussion I have accepted Wellh.'s distinction of sources, without inquiring how far in particular cases it was justified.

The article which follows, *Ueber die Abfassungszeit der Psalmen*, is marked by the same superficial style of criticism. For the remark of Stade (*Ztsch.* II. p. 166) that Giesebrecht has there shewn 'dass auch die Sprache der Psalmen dieselben in die nachexilische Zeit verweist,' must be restricted to those which were already known, or reasonably suspected, to be of late date. At least, the method applied to the rest would equally demonstrate that pieces of admitted antiquity belonged to the period bordering on the exile. Thus, Isa. 11, 1—9: נצר II Is. Dan.; חטר Pr.; נזע II Is. Job; משמע ἅπ. λ.; מישור (metaph.) late Pss. Mal.: צפעוני II Is. Jer. Pr.; פתן ψ. Dt. Job; שעשע ψ. 94. 119; לים מכסים nearest parallel Nu. 10, 25 in Q. So in Ex. 15, 1—18: נזלים, קפא, מצולות, עופרת, are otherwise all late; נערמו, cf. ערמה Jer. 50. Ct. Chr. &c.; אריק חרבי Lev. Ezek. 'the older language would have said אשלק ח' [see p. 304 on ψ. 87, where, however, the supposed earlier construction would have been unsuitable]; רעד ψ. 55 only. Even 2 S. 1, 19—27 is, linguistically, as suspicious as such Psalms as 42 f. 84. 90, &c.: thus נעל Jer. Ez. Q; עדנים ψ. 36; נעים Pr. Ct. late Pss. 2 S. 23, 1 'welche

I append a few additions and corrections, which readers of Ryssel's dissertation may find useful.

Speaking of words formed by prefixed מ, Ryssel (p. 42) observes that while such as denote a *concrete* object are met with from the earliest periods of the language, those which are used in an abstract sense, or signify an action or state, only make their appearance later. This is not altogether true. For to take the form (*α*) מִשְׁפָּט 2 S. 4, 5, משפט, מספר Jud. 7, 15, משמע Is. 11, 3, משפח Is. 5, at any rate denote actions; and inasmuch as in words derived from verbs ע״ו the feminine form is all but *universally* employed, it is fair to place by the side of מְנָחָה (2 K. 9, 20) מרוצה 2 S. 18, 27, מנוחה, 14, 17. But these instances are unimportant, and the statement that as a rule the form מִכְתָּב denotes throughout the earlier language concrete objects is doubtless correct. Under (*β*) we read that the form מִכְתֶּבֶת 'nonnisi actionem significat ideoque artificium (i.e. actionem continuam).' Is not this statement misleading? Or what of מִשְׁעֶנֶת (staff), משקלת Is. 28, מסגרת Ps. 18, Mic. 7, משמעת 1 S. 22, 2 S. 20, מפלצת 1 K. 15; and with *pathach*, מַאֲכֶלֶת Gn. 22 al., מהפכת Jer. 29, 2 C. 16, מחרשת 1 S. 13, מסכת Jud. 16, מפלת (corpse) Jud. 14, מפרקת 1 S. 4, מצבת 2 S. 18 al., מקבת Jud. 4 (hewing instrument, hammer), Is. 51 (hewing place, quarry), מרחשת Lev. 2. 7, מרצפת 2 K. 16, 17, most of which denote different kinds of implements?

(*γ*) The forms מַכְתַּב and מַכְתָּב are found only 'in recentissimis libris.' But, to say nothing of forms with gutturals, as מאכל J, מארב Jud. 9, מחמד Hos. 9, מחשך Is. 29, מעגל 1 S. 26, מעבר 1 S. 13, 23, מעלל 1 S. 25, 3, מעמד Is. 22, 19, מעטף Is. 3, we find מַטְבֵּעַ Is. 20, מַטֶּה Mic. 1, מַלְאָךְ repeatedly, מַסָּע Gn. 13, 3 (J), מַפָּל Am. 8, מַצָּב 1 S. 13 al., מַצֵּב 1 S. 14, 15 ff., מַצָּע Is. 28, מַשָּׂא Ex. 23, 2 S. 15, &c., מַשָּׂק Is. 33, all from the earlier periods of the language: and מַגָּל Jer. 50, מַכָּר 2 K. 12, מַסָּע Job 41, מַפָּח Job 11, מַפָּץ Ez. 9, מַתָּן Gn. 34, 12 (J), Pr. 18. 19. 21, at least not in the

eine besonnene Kritik dem David nicht zusprechen kann' (p. 207); קלו Jer. Hab. Job. Can a method which conducts to such results as these be a sound one? Yet on the strength of it we are told not that particular Psalms, but that the Psalms generally are *by their language* determined to be post-exilic!

latest writings of the O. T. Nor is it correct to say that the plural of this form belongs to the same period; for we have מַטְעַמִּים Gn. 27, מַחֲמַדִּים Hos. 9, מַעֲדַנִּים Gn. 49, מַשְׁאֲבִים Jud. 5, מַרְחַקִּים and מַעֲשַׂקּוֹת Is. 33, מַהֲתַלּוֹת Is. 30. Although therefore these forms become somewhat more frequent in the later period of Hebrew, they are far from restricted to it.

(δ) 'Words of the form מַכְתֵּבָה, with the single exception of מַהֲפֵכָה Am. 4, Is. 1 al., are confined to the second and third periods of the language.' But מַגֵּפָה 2 S. 12, 31, מַגֵּפָה often, מוֹעֵצָה Hos. 6, Mic. 6 al., מזמרה Is. 2. 18, Mic. 4, מחרשה 1 S. 13, 20 f., מכפלה n. pr., מכשלה Is. 3, מסכה Ex. 32, Hos. 13 &c., מצבה often, מרגעה Is. 28, משטמה Hos. 9, משרקה n. pr. (Edomite), משענה Is. 3, מפלה Is. 23, מקדה n. pr., seem to disprove this assertion, as well as the accompanying one that the form only rarely bears a concrete signification.

(ε) מַכְלוּלִים Ez. 27, מַצְפּוּנִים Ob., מַחֲמוּדִים Lam. 1, מַדּוּחִים Lam. 2 are perhaps hardly to be referred justly to the '*recentissimi* libri.' But the form, whether singular or plural, is altogether rare, the entire number of words not exceeding about 18, and not generally of early occurrence.

On p. 27, 49, 53 *n.* It cannot be denied that infinitives of the form קְרָבָה are met with in later writers, although, if those occurring in Q be put aside, their number is not great. The commonest are טמאה (Ez. 22. 44. Lev.), and טהרה (Ez. 44 and Q [sometimes with the force of a substantive]): besides these, Ez. offers רחקה and מרטה, once each, Zeph. גבהה—though it should be recollected that if רחקה and גבהה are late, רָחֹק and גָּבֹהַּ are later (Ps. 103, Qoh.): Isaiah (30, 19) has בְּשָׁמְעָתוֹ[1], and דבקה occurs Dt. 11. 30. Jo. 22. Q has besides only קרבה (3) and רחצה (twice: also 2 C. 4, 6); and the remaining ones are אכלה Jer. 12, 1 S. 1, 9? חזקה 2 K. 12, עצמה Is. 47, שבעה and שכרה Hag. 1, 6. It is an open question, however, whether in particular words this form may not have been chosen for euphony, or whether again it may not have been felt to be more expressive than the ordinary form, and hence have been used by Q when occasion required the description of acts (or states) of a formal or con-

[1] So Hos. 7 has עֵר חֲמַצָתוֹ, the only parallel to which is לְחֻמְלָה Ez. 16, 5.

tinuous nature[1]. If the occurrence of the form is solely an accident of date, it is singular that writers such as Ez. and Chr. *do not resort to it more frequently*, as they do to other late idioms (e.g. אֹתִי = אוֹתִי, the perfect and ו for the imperfect and ו *consec.*, &c.). It is, on the contrary, a well-observed fact that language does not develope along rigid and uniform lines; and thus with certain words particular forms may have early come into use, which, when once framed, would as a rule be adhered to subsequently. Such may well have been טָמְאָה and טָהֳרָה: אַהֲבָה and יִרְאָה[2] belong certainly to the same category: the former is found constantly from Gn. 29; 1 S. 18. 20; 2 S. 19 and Hos. 9 onwards (אֶהֱב only Qo. 3), the latter, though לִרְא occurs 1 S. 18, 29 (and יִרְא once, Josh. 22), is found as early as 2 S. 3, 11, so that its occurrence in Dt. has of itself no bearing on the question of date (p. 27)[3]. And is not this the case with מְלֹאת (p. 53 *note*)? The word may occur only in particular books, but there is no indication that any other form of the infinitive was ever in use with this verb: מְלֹא appears to have been avoided on account of the substantive of the same form. In Piel, לְמַלֹּא is found in Q, as well as לְמַלֹּאות (twice each, Ex. 29. 31. 35)[4].

S. R. DRIVER.

[1] Similarly, I observe, Böttcher, II. 224.

[2] To the other instances given of these forms add שַׁחֲטָה Hos. 5; דאבה Jer. 31; ראוה Ez. 28: and לִרְבָעָה Lev. 20; לרכבה Ez. 27; לרשעה Ez. 5. But רעה (*ib.*) is merely the fem. of רע. ישרה (Ol. 245[d]), and חרדה (Stade, 619[c]) do not belong here.

[3] Nor is לְמַן rightly cited on the same page. This occurs twice in Deuteronomy (4, 32. 9, 7) in a phrase ... למן היום which was certainly in use early, Ex. 9, 18 J; 2 S. 19, 25 (and elsewhere). Other phrases, likewise of early occurrence, are ... למיום Is. 7, 17 al.; ... למאיש Ex. 11, 7 J; 2 S. 6, 19 ‖; ... למרע 2 S. 13, 22; למרחוק Is. 37, 26 (genuine) al. On the use of the ptcp. with the subst. verb (*ib.*), see my *Tenses*, p. 199 *note* (ed. 2). In Nu. 18, 7 ל is not closely connected with מן, but is parallel to the ל preceding: למבית is not therefore analogous to למתחת (p. 56).

[4] The partitive use of מן, which is mentioned on p. 61 as characteristic of the 'second' period of the language (though two instances only are cited) occurs earlier: see 2 S. 11, 17. 24 (where ויכותו מעבדי המלך is exactly parallel to יצאו מן העם ללקט); and add also 2 K. 10, 23.

ON PETRONIUS.

THE publication of Bücheler's third edition of Petronius with the *Priapea*, fragments of Varro's *Menippeae*, and the *Testamentum Porcelli*, induces me to commit to writing a few suggestions on Petronius which I have long had by me.

c. 5. *Artis seuerae si quis amat effectus*
Mentemque magnis applicat, prius mores
Frugalitatis lege poliat exacta.

For *amat* Bücheler now prints *ambit*. This, though very plausible, does not seem to me certain: *ornat* would give a fair sense and would be not unlike the condensed style of Petronius, not merely 'aims to produce the results of a strict art' but 'would dress out the qualities of art;' nearly = 'aims at the ornamental effects of a strict art.' I would compare with it such expressions as *transtulit pietas uices* applied in c. 89 to the two sons of Laocoon, who, in their fraternal affection, try to keep the serpent's fangs away each from the other, not from himself.

c. 11. *Me coepit non perfunctorie uerberare.*

Glossarium Balliolense *Perfunctorie transitorie imaginarie.* The opposite is *defunctorie*, 'thoroughly, finally, decisively.' c. 132. *Rogo te, mihi apodixin defunctoriam redde.* Gloss. B. *Defunctorium est quicquid ita dicitur uel fit ut ad finem alicuius rei aut terminum spectet.*

c. 41. *Hic aper cum heri summa† cenam uindicasset a conuiuis dimissus est.*

Büch. *cena eum.* It seems possible that a single word *summicena* 'the top of the table' may have existed, as in Most. III. 1. 112 *speculiclaras* has become in the MSS. *speculo claras.*

c. 43. *Et quot putas illum annos secum tulisse? septuaginta et supra. sed corneolus fuit, aetatem bene ferebat, niger tamquam coruus. noueram hominem olim †oliorum et adhuc salax erat.*

Possibly *olorium* 'gray as a swan.'

c. 44. *Nec sudauit unquam nec expuit. puto eum nescio quid †asiadis habuisse.*

This seems to refer to *the digestion of an ostrich.* Gloss. B. *Asida strucio (struthio)* and *Asida animal est quam Graeci struthocamelum* (MS. *strutucameleon*) *Latini strucionem uocant.*

c. 45. *Aut hoc aut illud erit, quod utique.*

Büch. *quid.* I fancy *quod utique* is right 'to say the least.' Similarly I would not change *sua re causa* i.e. *uel causa* c. 47. Both expressions look idiomatic. So again c. 48 *in diuisione tamen litteras didici* may surely mean 'I have been educated enough to know how to divide an argument.'

c. 53. *Ceterum duo esse in rebus humanis quae libentissime spectaret, petauristarios et cornices.* Again c. 98 *Consonuere cornices funebri strepitu.* In the second passage *cornicines* (MS. *cornicipes*) occurs just before, and it might appear therefore that *cornicines* was throughout the word written by Petronius. Yet it seems strange that the same corruption of it should not only be found twice, but confirmed by glossarial authority. Gloss. Bod. Auct. T. II. 24 *Cornicae qui in cornu canit,* where the *ae* probably stands for a mere *e*, and in any case cannot be a mistake for *cornicine.* And again *Liticines cornices id est cornu canentes.* Is it impossible that an old word *cornix* 'horner' in the sense of *cornicen* 'horn-blower' survived the introduction of the later and more authorized form?

c. 56. *Etiam si illos* (medicos) *odi pessime quod mihi iubent saepe †anatinam parari.*

The general sense seems to be that physicians are disliked because they order *emetics.* *ἀναπτύειν*, or some word formed from it, is a possible suggestion.

Ib. *'Ceruical': offla collaris allata est, 'serisapia et contumelia': aecrophagie saele datae sunt et contus cum malo.*

It is obvious that the apophoreta, or presents for distribution to the guests, correspond to the *pittacia* or descriptive labels. *Contumelia* is explained by *contus cum malo; serisapia* must similarly in some way correspond to the character of the present. Now *saele* might well be ζελάς, a Greek word of foreign introduction, doubtless identical with Pliny's *celia* H. N. XXII. 164, a Spanish *potus ex frugibus* or beer, similar to the Egyptian *zythum*. *Aecrophagie* may be *cachryophagiae* 'with edible kernels,' for the *cachrys* was a round ball-shaped growth on certain trees, oak, fir, larch, picea, linden, nut, plane, *after the leaves had fallen*. It hardens in winter, and contains a nucleus or kernel like those of the pine (Plin. XVI. 30). The late appearance of these on the tree would naturally suggest ὀψιμαθία. We might suppose a number of these kernels in a jar of Spanish beer to form one of the apophoreta.

c. 57. *Et puer capillatus in hanc coloniam ueni.* Kaibel Inscriptt. Graec. 9 45 Εὐφράτης παῖς ἦλθον, ἔθ' αἱ πλοκαμῖδες ἐπῆσαν.

c. 59. *Et tu cum esses capo, cocococo, atque cor non habebas.*

Büch. says '*Suppleo* faciebas *uel* sonabas;' perhaps so; yet I believe that another allusion was certainly intended; for which see Anth. Pal. XII. 3. 4.

c. 64. *Non moratus ille usus est equo manuque plena scapulas eius subinde uerberauit, interque risum proclamauit: bucca, bucca quot sunt hic?*

Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I. p. 67. 'In the English nursery the child learns to say how many fingers the nurse shows, and the appointed formula of the game is Buck, Buck, how many horns do I hold up?'

c. 67. *Etiam in alueo circumlata sunt oxycomina unde quidam etiam improbiter †nos pugno sustulerunt.* That *oxycomina* was rightly retained by Heinsius is clear from Gloss. Ball. *Oximinum* (l. *oxicominum*) *acetum cumino mixtum*, which also proves that the form in *-na* not *-nia* is the true one. Bücheler prints in his third edition partly after Gronovius *improbe ternos pugnos s.* I am not so sure that this is right as not to venture

on a different emendation, *improbiter in os pugno sustulerunt*, 'quite greedily lifted a handful to their mouth.' The words which immediately precede this passage *pax palamedes* are perhaps desperate: yet I will add one more to the conjectures which have been made upon them. Heinsius suggested *pelamides:* is it possible that *faex pelamidis*, a nominative used interjectionally, 'faugh on the stinking thunny-mess!' or, as elsewhere in Petronius, a nominative used *barely* to express contempt, 'Just so much leavings of spoilt thunny!' may be right?

c. 68. *Praeter †errantis barbarie† aut adiectum aut deminutum clamorem.*

Heins. *recitantis*, and so Büch. Possibly *horrentis barbariae* 'besides the loud tones, now in a higher now in a lower key, which the *rude voice of the barbaric reciter* assumed.' He was an Oriental[1].

c. 73. *Ceteri conuiuae circa labrum manibus nexis currebant et †gingilipho ingenti clamore exonabant.*

Bücheler explains of a cry raised by the bathers as they form a ring and run round the bath: a sort of 'Here we go round and round.' If so, *girgilipho* may be the right form. Gloss. Ball. from Isid. orig. xx. 15. 2 *Gyrgillus dictus quia in giro uersabatur. Girgillus* was the name of the roller round which the rope by which a pail was lowered into a well revolved.

c. 93. *Ales Phasiacis petita Colchis,*
Et pictis anas †renouata pennis,
Atque Afrae uolucres placent palato,
Quod non sunt faciles.

For *renouata* perhaps *euocata*, summoned from foreign climes, not of home growth.

c. 97. *Sic ut olim Vlixes pro ariete adhaesisset.* Bücheler alters this to *arieti adhaesisset.* I cannot help believing the

[1] Shakespere's 'erring barbarian,' Othello i. 3, is oddly like the expression *errantis barbariae:* but the Trau MS. was not discovered till the middle of the 17th century, and if it had been, could hardly have been known to Shakespere.

MS reading to be right, as it agrees with so many representations of Ulysses, with his legs under the ram's belly, his head projecting in front below the ram's chin.

c. 99. *Ego cum Gitone quicquid erat †in alter compono et adoratis sideribus intro nauigium.*

Büch. *in iter.* I think *inalter* was a popular abbreviation of *alterum in altero* 'pack up all there was, one thing inside the other,' comparing *inalterare,* and Cicero's *aliud in alio peccare* (Att. IX. 10. 2).

c. 114. *Praeteriens aliquis tralaticia humanitate lapidabit.* With *lapidare* in this sense of heaping stones over a body, compare Gloss. Ball. *Dilapidata uia lapidibus strata.*

The following extract is interesting in reference to the celebrated Trau MS of the *Cena.* In Ray's Collection of Travels II. 21 in a letter from Mr Francis Vernon to Mr Oldenburg, Jan. 10, 1675—6, written at Smyrna are these words, 'Trau is ancient and hath good marks of its being so. Here I spoke with Mr Stasileo who put out that fragment of Petronius Arbiter, and I saw his manuscript.'

The so-called *excerpta* or *fragmenta uocabulorum Petronii Arbitri,* on which see Bücheler's large edition p. XII, are contained in MS 1 of Prince Boncompagni's Library at Rome, where I copied them. At the end is written *Finis per me Pyrrhum Vizanum Bonōn* MCCCCLXXXXIIII *die uigesima septima Februarii.* By far the larger number of them are taken from A. Gellius. The following extract from the little-known *Entheticus* of John of Salisbury may be new to most readers. Enth. 1675,

> *Odo libris totus incumbit sed tamen illis*
> *Qui Christum redolent gratia maior inest.*
> *Hic grauis Eumolpis, Encolpius hunc et Adonis*
> *Cum Gittone cauent, et Venus ipsa timet.*

R. ELLIS.

TWO EMENDATIONS IN CICERO.

Ep. ad Att. XII. 18.

Ego, quantum his temporibus tam eruditis fieri poterit, profecto illam consecrabo omni genere monumentorum, ab omnium ingeniis scriptorum, et Graecorum et Latinorum: quae res forsitan sit refricatura volnus meum.

Cicero is writing of the shrine he was about to build for his deceased daughter Tullia. The words above cannot stand as they have come down to us in the MSS, and Orelli's conjecture *sumptorum* is generally accepted. I think the following is preferable: *consecrabo omni genere monumentorum*, ORNABO *omnium ingeniis scriptorum* cet. How easily *ornabo* might have been corrupted after *orū* and before *o* into its remnant *ab* is obvious.

Ep. ad Att. XII. 46.

Quid ergo? inquies: nihil litterae? In hac quidem re vereor ne etiam contra. Nam essem fortasse durior. Exculto enim animo nihil agreste, nihil inhumanum est.

Cicero is still sorrowing for his daughter. He here says that literature does not assuage his grief, and that he would have borne it better if he had been less finely cultured. 'For,' he writes, 'I should have been perhaps of sterner stuff if illiterate. For (as it is) there is in my whole mind nothing rude, nothing savage.' Such I take to be the meaning of the MS corruption *exto*, which points to EX TOTO. *Exculto* the vulgate has no authority, and as Boot points out demands *in*, which he actually introduces. But my reading besides being simpler is more idiomatic, for *ex* is the preposition used in such cases: cf. the line of Propertius: *Nec quicquam ex illa, quod querar, inveniam.*

A. PALMER.

EURIPIDES.

(*A Lecture delivered in* 1857.)

Before I begin the work of interpreting the three plays which are to form the subject of this term's Lectures, I have a few words to say to you upon the character of Euripides and his writings. There is no poet of antiquity upon whose merits as a man and as a writer such widely different judgments have been pronounced, both by his contemporaries and by critics of our own generation: and I doubt whether any one of us is not conscious of having formed, at different periods of his life and studies, various and even contradictory impressions upon this subject. As regards his contemporaries, we know from Aristophanes that Euripides had a large following among the young men of the day (Nub. 1371), who had learnt to sneer at Aeschylus as full of sound and fury, uncouth, mouthy and rugged[1]. Tradition informs us that Euripides had friends among the graver sort also. The story (ap. Diog. Laert. II. 5 init.) that Socrates helped him in the composition of his plays, or at least supplied him with materials

[1] *ψόφου πλέων ἀξύστατον στόμφακα κρημνοποιόν.* Nub. 1367. On the other hand old Philocleon in the Vespae and old Strepsiades in the Nubes stickle for the poets of their youth, Aeschylus and Phrynichus. The passage in the Nubes ought probably to be thus arranged,

τῶν Αἰσχύλου λέξαι τι μοι· κἄθ' οὗτος εὐθὺς εἶπεν

* * * * * *

ψόφου πλέων, ἀξ. στ. κρημνοποιόν.

κἀνταῦθα πῶς οἴεσθέ μου τὴν καρδίαν ὀρεχθεῖν;

ἐγὼ γὰρ Αἴσχυλον νομίζω πρῶτον ἐν ποιηταῖς.

We thus avoid the contradiction between two successive lines, as in the vulg.

I suppose no one would now accept the conjectures of two eminent German scholars, of whom for *πρῶτον*, Meineke proposes *ῥῶπον*, and Thiersch, alas! *πρωκτόν*.

is doubtless apocryphal[1]; and there is even reason to doubt the testimony of the biographers and others as to the intimacy which subsisted between Socrates and the philosopher of the stage, as Euripides is sometimes called. Had he been an habitual associate of Socrates, a member of the Socratic "set," as we say, he would have heard of it from Aristophanes, who is silent, so far as I remember, as to any such connexion. It is more interesting to find Plato in the Phaedrus name Euripides as a co-ordinate authority with Sophocles on one of the highest questions of poetical criticism, the relation which the several parts of a Drama should bear to the whole and to one another (p. 268, c). I say the notice is more interesting, because it evidently conveys the opinion of Plato, who was a much better judge of poetry than his master, and whose purely theoretical prejudice against poets as a class does not seem to have impaired his powers of critical discrimination as between one poet and another. It is hardly necessary to quote the remarks of Aristotle in the Poetics, who, though he complains of Euripides for occasionally mismanaging his plots, makes amends for this censure by the splendid epithet *τραγικώτατος τῶν ποιητῶν*, which after every abatement he does not scruple to apply to him. That the general public of Athens remained not less favourably affected to Euripides than his special friends the philosophers and rhetoricians, is plain from the fact mentioned by the pseudo-Plutarch, that, at the instigation of the orator Lycurgus, the Athenians set up bronze statues of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides at the public expense, and caused a correct edition to be made of the works of all three, which was to be preserved among the public archives, with the proviso that the public notary should be present at every representation with a copy of the play which happened to be acted on each particular occasion, in order that the actors might not interpolate as they had been accustomed to do[2]. No similar compliment was paid to any other of the

[1] *Μνησίμαχος οὕτω φησί,*
Φρυγὲς ἐστὶ καινὸν δρᾶμα τοῦτ' Εὐριπίδου,
..... ᾧ καὶ Σωκράτης
τὰ φρύγαν' ὑποτίθησι. D. L. l.c.

[2] Pseudo-Plut. Vitt. x. Oratt. p. 841 f. This Attic recension found its way ultimately to the Alexandrian Library. Ptolemy III. paid 15 Attic

numerous Tragic poets of the Athenian stage: whence we may fairly gather that the persevering efforts of Aristophanes to shake the reputation of Euripides produced no permanent effect upon the mind of his countrymen in general. These attacks have borne fruit, as we shall presently see, in our own and the immediately preceding generation; but in the records of ancient criticism we seek in vain for any traces of the malign influence of Aristophanes. Indeed the fact that the number of tragedies of Euripides which have been preserved entire more than equals those of both his rivals put together; while the fragments of his lost plays, which in number equal those of Sophocles and double those of Aeschylus, far exceed both in their beauty and importance, is a proof of an increasing rather than a diminishing popularity.

Nor does the judgment of Roman differ from that of Greek antiquity. The early Latin tragedians, as Attius, Ennius, &c., translated or adapted many more of the plays of Euripides than of any other Greek poet; agreeing in this preference with the poets of the New Comedy, who looked up to Euripides as their great guide and model even in their own walk of literary art. *εὖ γ' ὁ κατάχρυσος εἶπε πόλλ' Εὐριπίδης* was the exclamation of the comic poet Diphilus (ap. Athen. 422 B), and some of you may remember the much more extravagant compliment of Philemon:

> *εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν οἱ τεθνηκότες*
> *αἴσθησιν εἶχον ἄνδρες, ὡς φασίν τινες,*
> *ἀπηγξάμην ἄν, ὥστ' ἰδεῖν Εὐριπίδην.*

"Were it true, as some pretend, that the dead retain the use of their senses, I had hanged myself ere this, to gain sight of Euripides." Horace gives intimations of a like partiality. Certain well-known lines in the Ars Poetica contain by implication an answer to some of the hostile criticisms of Aristophanes. You all remember how merry the Comic Poet is made by the beggarly attire in which the discrowned and banished Telephus was brought on the stage by Euripides in the drama

Talents for the loan of it: but instead of returning the original, he sent back only an incorrect copy. (Galen, Tom. v. p. 412, ed. Basil.)

which bears his name: a drama which seems to have attracted great attention among the ancients[1], insomuch that one wonders that so few fragments of it have come down to us.

> Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri.
> Telephus et Peleus, cum pauper et exul uterque
> Projicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba,
> Si curat cor spectantis tetigisse querela.
> Non satis est pulchra esse poemata, dulcia sunto,
> Et quocunque volent animum auditoris agunto.
> Ut ridentibus arrident ita flentibus adflent
> Humani vultus: si vis me flere dolendum est
> Primum ipsi tibi; *tunc* tua me infortunia laedent,
> Telephe, vel Peleu. A. P. 96.

(The Peleus, it may be observed, was also the title of one of Euripides' plays, though as the same subject was handled also by Sophocles, it is only probable, not certain, that Horace refers to the Peleus of Euripides.)

Horace, it is true, nowhere mentions Euripides by name, but then we must remember that his name is not admissible in a hexameter line without a violation of quantity (nomen quod versu dicere non est), and for this the Roman poet was not prepared, notwithstanding the precedent afforded by the Greek Epigrammatists, who occasionally allow themselves this liberty. Horace's precepts, however, are formed on the practice of Euripides rather than on that of his rivals; as when he recommends his pupil to be "in verbis tenuis cautusque serendis," and tells him that he will write well, "notum si callida verbum Reddiderit junctura novum," a description which applies best to the style of Euripides, and to that λεπτότης which excites the admiration of Aristotle[2], and which Aristophanes derides and copies with equal success[3]. Nor

[1] Comp. Diog. Laert. VI. 87, Κράτητά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν διαδοχαῖς θεασάμενον ἔν τινι τραγωδίᾳ Τήλεφον σπυρίδιον ἔχοντα καὶ τἆλλα λυπρὸν, ἀΐξαι ἐπὶ τὴν Κυνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

[2] See Aristotle, Rhet. III. 2 (speaking of the ars celandi artem), κλέπτεται δ' εὖ ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ, ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

[3] The compound εὐριπιδαριστοψανίζειν was invented by a rival comic

can we doubt that the line (A. P. 310),

Rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,

and those which follow, point to Euripides rather than to any other poet.

To these testimonies of the estimation in which Euripides was held, I might add those of Cicero[1], Quintilian, the early Christian Fathers and the later Greek critics; as well as those of many great lights of the time of the Renaissance, by whom Euripides was far more studied than either Aeschylus or Sophocles, as is evident from the comparatively greater number of editions through which his works passed during the 16th 17th and 18th centuries. But the passages already adduced are sufficient to prove that however the hostile criticisms of Aristophanes may have been accepted by certain classes of his contemporaries, they remained without effect upon the judgment of antiquity at large, and that it was reserved for the critics of modern Germany to discover that Aristophanes was not only an unblemished patriot and a master of political wisdom, but also a critic as infallible as he was impartial. Our own Porson, who is of all men least to be suspected of incapacity for appreciating Aristophanes, took a very different view of the value of his criticisms. "Calumnias noti et professi inimici, tuti spernimus." "Fuit Aristophanes vir doctus, homo facetus, poeta in primis bonus: et propter purissimum Attici sermonis saporem ipsi etiam Platoni commendatissimus; sed idem fuit liberrimi oris scurra, et viris se longe majoribus indignis modis insultavit. Philosophos et poetas omni genere conviciorum et contumeliarum vexavit: dummodo risum spectatoribus excuteret, nemini parcebat: nihil privatum neque publicum, sanctum neque profanum curabat. Hujus iniquitatem erga Euripidem Socratis

poet (Cratinus) to denote the resemblance between the style of Aristophanes and that of Eur. and the obligations of the comic to the tragic poet. This resemblance was admitted by Aristophanes so far as his language was concerned: but he repudiates the debt in other respects,

χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ,
τοὺς νοῦς δ' ἀγοραίους ἧττον ἢ κεῖνος ποιῶ.

[1] [Euripidi] tu quantum credas nescio. Ego certe singulos ejus versus singula [*σοφίας*?] testimonia puto [vulgo s. ejus test.]. Ep. ad F. XVI. 8.

amicitiâ, Platonis admiratione abunde compensabimus. Denique," he adds, "omnis posteritas, omnes gentes ad quas quidem literae humaniores pervenerint tragicum nostrum maximi semper fecere et summo in pretio habuerunt." (Praelectio in Euripidem, prefixed to Porson's Adversaria, p. 14.)

The *manes* of Aristophanes have indeed been completely appeased in more recent times. You all know how severely Euripides is handled by Schlegel in his celebrated Dramatic Lectures, and these censures have been repeated with exaggerations by a host of minor critics both in Germany and England. Among these, Gruppe, the author of a treatise on the Greek Drama known under the fanciful name of Ariadne, is entitled perhaps to the first rank. His book is worth the study of all who wish justly to appreciate the dramatic art of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Nor are his remarks on Euripides unworthy of attention. He is in some respects a more candid judge than Schlegel: but the candour shewn in his estimate of particular plays is more than compensated by the boldness with which he denies to Euripides the title of a dramatic artist, and the audacity of the epithet "a bad poet," which he indirectly applies to him. O. Müller in his Greek Literature is much more moderate: but even he "does not know what induced a person of Euripides' tendencies to devote himself to tragic poetry[1]." Again, the author of his biography in the last two editions of the "Greek Theatre" informs us that Euripides was "undeniably a bad citizen and an unprincipled man[2]." Amid this din of hostile criticism—*κοράκων ἄκραντα γαρυόντων*—the admirers of Euripides will rejoice to hear the greatest of German poets, Goethe, delivering the following just judgment: "To feel and to honour a great character in his works, it is necessary for the critic himself to be somebody—to have a character of his own. All who denied the greatness of Euripides were but poor creatures, incapable of exalting themselves to his level: or else they were impudent charlatans, who by the airs they

[1] If all Müller's criticisms had been of a piece with this, we might with more justice have wondered what induced the learned professor to devote himself to the history of Greek, or indeed of any other poetry.

[2] G. T. p. 366, 395.

assumed in the eyes of a weak-judging world—wished and indeed succeeded in making more of themselves than they really were[1]." In accordance with this is the language of Mr W. S. Landor[2]: "This poet when he is irregular is great: and he presents more shades and peculiarities of character than all the other poets of antiquity put together;" testimony the more valuable as coming from one whose hatred of Greek philosophy amounts to a passion, and occurring as the preface to a passage in which he represents Euripides as "haunted even on the stage by the daemon of Socrates."

After this brief resumé of the opinions of others, I shall endeavour to give you a few data which may enable you to form an independent judgment, or at any rate may help you to appreciate and enjoy what is really admirable in the writings of this poet. I must premise that no criticism appears to me more unsound than that which sets the excellences of one author in antithesis with the faults of another: which argues for instance that because Sophocles was a great poet, and Euripides is very unlike Sophocles, therefore Euripides is *not* a great poet. This reasoning rests on a premiss which needs only to be stated in order to be rejected: "All great poets are like each other." Some such proposition does in effect lie at the root of much of the hostile criticism which Euripides has had to encounter. His critics are for ever dilating on the cheerfulness, good temper, and natural piety of Sophocles, as if no man could be a poet who was not cheerful, good-humoured, and believing—as if indeed the opposite qualities of constitutional melancholy and an earnest preference of truth to seeming were not at least as frequently found coupled with genius[3]. That many of the

[1] "Aber freilich um eine grosse Persönlichkeit zu empfinden und zu ehren, muss man auch widerum selber etwas sein. Alle die dem EURIPIDES das Erhabene abgesprochen, waren arme Häringe und einer solchen Erhebung nicht fähig; oder sie waren unverschämte Charlatane, die durch Anmasslichkeit in den Augen einer schwachen Welt mehr aus sich machen wollten und auch wirklich machten als sie waren." Eckermann's Gespräche, III. p. 269.

[2] Imaginary Conv. I. 297.

[3] Aristotle, or whoever wrote the Problemata, propounds the question Διὰ τί οἱ εὐφυεῖς μελαγχολικοί; Probably this is one of those cases in which the cause is inquired before the existence of the fact has been proved. But the

peculiarities of Euripides arose from his natural temperament, his own writings conspire with the traditions of antiquity in leading us to believe. In some verses ascribed to Alexander Aetolus, a writer of the time of Ptol. Philadelphus[1], he is described as austere (*στρυφνός*), averse from laughter (*μισογέλως*) and incapable of raillery even over his cups[2] (*καὶ τωθάζειν οὐδὲ παρ' οἶνον μεμαθηκώς*) but, it is added, all that flows from his pen is sweet as honey, and charming as the Siren's song[3]. This constitutional sadness of Euripides frequently colours his views of human life, and renders them in reality far more sombre than those of Sophoc'es or even of Aeschylus. With the exception of Shakspere's Lear I know no such picture of heartrending sorrow as is presented by Andromache and Hecuba in the Troades. If we compare the conclusion of this drama or, still better, of the Hercules Furens with that, for instance, of the Oedipus Coloneus of Sophocles, we shall be able to form some idea of the different tempers of the two poets. The prospect of being canonized after death is held out to Hercules and to Oedipus alike, as the guerdon of their toils and sufferings: and is accepted by the Sophoclean hero as an ample recompence for all he has gone through. "He descends into his last resting-place," says Bishop Thirlwall, "honoured by the express summons of the gods and yielding a joyful obedience to their pleasure. His orphan daughters indeed drop some natural tears over the loss they have sustained; but even their grief is soon soothed by the thought of an end so happy and peaceful in itself and so full of blessing to the hospitable land where the hero reposes." As Milton says,

> Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail
> Or knock the breast, no weakness, no contempt,
> Dispraise or blame, nothing but well and fair
> And what may quiet us in a death so noble.

question points to a frequent though not a universal conjunction of genius with melancholy.

[1] As by Aul. Gell. xv. 20. A biographer gives them to Aristophanes.

[2] Compare Melanippe, fragm. xxix, Dind. *ἐγὼ δὲ πῶς μισῶ γελοίους κ.τ.ἑ.*

[3] *ἀλλ' ὅ τι γράψαι τοῦτ' ἂν μέλιτος καὶ Σειρήνων ἐτετεύχει.*

In sharp contrast with all this is the contemptuous disdain with which the hero of Euripides' play rejects the consolations proffered him by the hospitable monarch who succeeds so well in soothing the last hours of Oedipus. Hercules is found by Theseus in a state of abject grief and shame consequent on the discovery of the deed of ineffable horror which in his heaven-sent frenzy he had unwittingly committed. His friend at first has much difficulty in rousing him from the trance of woe into which he is plunged. Once and again he waives off the approach of his would-be comforter, *προσείων χεῖρα σημαίνει φόνον*—and when at length Theseus pours into his ear all the consolations which a friendly ingenuity can suggest, appealing to the records of Olympus in proof that the immortal gods themselves share in the sins as well as in the sorrows of mortality—

οὐδεὶς δὲ θνητῶν ταῖς τύχαις ἀκήρατος
οὐ θεῶν—

and finally holding out to him the prospect of sharing the divine honours and dwelling a joint occupant of the temples which the piety of his subjects destined for himself after death,

θανόντος δ', εὖτ' ἂν εἰς Ἄιδου μόλῃς
θυσίαισι λαΐνοισι τ' ἐξογκώμασι
τίμιον ἀνάξει πᾶς Ἀθηναίων πόλις, (v. 1331)

the hero can only reply that all this was beside the mark, that a great sorrow like his is not to be thus appeased:

πάρεργά τοι τάδ' ἐστ' ἐμῶν κακῶν,

and that as for the tales of the crimes and sufferings of the gods—

ἀοιδῶν οἵδε δύστηνοι λόγοι—
δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὄντως θεός, Οὐδένος.

I think these concluding scenes of two of their greatest plays

highly characteristic of the two poets. That the catastrophe of the Oedipus is more pleasing, more elevating, if you will, even more sublime, I will not dispute—but it is impossible to deny the superior tragic power displayed in the corresponding scene of the Hercules Furens. It is with no wish to detract from the divine beauty of the scene in Sophocles that I make this comparison; but only by way of illustrating the position, that the differences between the two poets—their characteristic excellences and defects, were due to the different points of view from which they contemplated human affairs and their relation to divine. It is observed by O. Müller that Sophocles saw in the mythic legends of Greece a profound solution of the problem of human existence. That Euripides was thoroughly dissatisfied with such solutions—that they seemed to him not "profound," but shallow—was owing partly to his sombre temper and more inquiring intellect, and partly also to a difference in his mental training. The mere fact that Sophocles was born 15 years before Euripides is not without significance. Athens, it is well known, though before the conclusion of the fifth century she was already the Alma Mater of Greece, at the beginning of that epoch lagged far behind many of the colonial cities in philosophic culture. Of the earlier schools of philosophy not one sprung up on the soil of Attica: nor do we hear of a single foreign philosopher of eminence[1] permanently settling there until the year of the battle of Salamis, which brought Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, then aged but 20 years, to take shelter under the shadow of the Acropolis.

His sojourn in Athens, which was prolonged until B.C. 450, a period of 30 years, coincides with the youth and early manhood of Euripides. It is not likely that the youthful philosopher established any great reputation in Athens during the earlier years of his sojourn, and it was probably the penetrating eye of Pericles that first discovered his merit as a thinker and a man. His celebrated treatise on Nature was doubtless composed in Athens: but however this may be, the speculations

[1] The only seeming exception is that of Onomacritus and his Pythagorizing friends at the court of Pisistratus. But these were hardly "philosophers."

of Anaxagoras appear to have possessed no charm for Sophocles. Of their importance the fragments preserved to us leave us in no doubt. Their sobriety, according to Aristotle—no very candid judge of other men's opinions—in at least one essential particular presented a favourable contrast to the wild flights of the earlier Ionians[1]; and it is surely no discredit to Euripides that he lent an attentive ear to teaching which made a deep impression on the acute and practical mind of Pericles. In what sense he is to be regarded as the disciple of Anaxagoras, as his biographers assume he was, may be left for the present an open question: but that his tastes and mental habits were influenced by intercourse with the high-minded sage or by familiarity with his book, there can be little doubt. It is said of Pericles that the general greatness of his sentiments, and his masterly mode of handling a subject—*τὸ ὑψηλόνουν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πάντη τελεσιουργόν*—were gifts which he owed to his frequent intercourse with Anaxagoras, and the habit of contemplating the sublime mysteries of nature thus produced[2]. In full accordance with this view are the splendid lines of Euripides in praise of a philosophic life which you will find in Dind. Fr. inc. No. CI. They form a good illustration of the passage in the Phaedrus:—

ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς [3]ἱστορίας
ἔσχε μάθησιν
μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύναν
μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν
ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
κόσμον ἀγήρω, πῇ τε συνέστη,
τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδεπότ' αἰσχρῶν
ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

[1] *οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.* Metaph. I. 984 b.

[2] Phaedrus, p. 270 A.

[3] Valckenaer's conjectural emendation, *γῆς* for *τῆς*, is very unfortunate, and so is his notion that *γῆς ἱστορία* refers to geometry. *ἱστορία* is evidently the Inquisition of Nature as practised by the physical theorists of Ionia. He has anticipated me in rejecting the *καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως*, which would give us three particles all meaning the same thing.

The play (styled Μελανίππη ἡ σοφή) in which Euripides is supposed to have set forth the Anaxagorean doctrines is seldom mentioned by recent critics without a sneer. We could wish that time had left these candid gentlemen more to sneer at; but the fragments, though tolerably numerous, are meagre. On the other hand, among the remains of another play, the Chrysippus, we are surprised by a clear though brief statement of the leading principles of the Anaxagorean physics —the Homoeomeria. (You will find the passage in Dindorf's Fragments, Chrysipp. No. VI., beginning χωρεῖ δ' ὀπίσω τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας φύντ' ἐς γαῖαν.) This and a fragment of the Melanippe to the same effect (Dind. VI.) are the only passages in which there is anything strictly Anaxagorean, if we except one in the Orestes (v. 982, Dind.) and a fragment of the Phaethon (not. Pors. ad Orest. l. c.), both of which refer to the opinion of Anaxagoras, that the sun was a mass of red-hot metal or stone—μύδρος or λίθος διάπυρος—which to the orthodox of the day seemed a blasphemous assault on the divinity of Helius. I would have added as certainly Anaxagorean a fragment of the Peirithous (Dind. No. II.) beginning

σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
ῥύμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξαν θ',

which refers to the doctrine that the Νοῦς impressed a circular motion on the original chaotic mass, through which motion the atoms gradually fell into place and formed homogeneous bodies. But the genuineness of the Peirithous is open to grave doubts, being by some attributed to the contemporary Critias the tyrant, also a dramatic and elegiac poet of some pretensions. Many other similar philosophemes are scattered in various plays and fragments, but they are mostly borrowed from other philosophers, such as Heraclitus, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Archelaus[1]. Euripides was in fact one of the most book-learned men of his time, and we cannot judge him truly without

[1] Such are the famous lines (Polyeid. VII.)

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

which come from Heraclitus.

taking this into account. You remember the Aristophanic line put into his mouth in the Ranae:

χύλον διδοὺς στωμυλμάτων ἀπὸ βιβλίων ἀπηθῶν,

"giving juice of frothy speeches cunningly distilled from books." And Athenaeus[1] gives us the curious information that the library of Euripides was in its day as famous as the earlier collection of Peisistratus or the later ones of Aristotle and the Ptolemies. Book-learning was one of the numerous ingredients which went to compose the vulgar Greek notion of a *σοφὸς* or *σοφιστής*, and the possession of a large library would of itself expose a man to the evil surmises of the multitude, for which Aristophanes was ever ready to provide fit utterance.

But the fact in question is interesting to the biographer of Euripides on another account. It confirms in an unexpected manner the statement, which rests on the respectable authority of the historian and antiquary Philochorus, that Euripides was well, indeed nobly, descended even on his mother's side. This noble descent is also attested by Athenaeus, X. p. 424 E, *ᾠνοχόουν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οἱ εὐγενέστατοι παῖδες...καὶ Εὐρ. ὁ ποιητὴς ἐν παισὶν ᾠνοχόησε.* "Among the ancients the noblest youths were selected as cupbearers. Thus the poet Euripides performed this office, &c." *καὶ γὰρ τῶν σφόδρα εὐγενῶν ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα ἡ* Κλειτώ, *ὡς Φιλόχορος ἀποδείκνυσι,* Suid. It would hence appear that the humble occupation of his mother was a fiction of the comic poets. Except in the case of a Metœc, wealth and nobility usually went together in Athens, and a large share of the former was unquestionably necessary in order to the formation of a considerable library, for we read of fabulous sums paid for rare books at this period[2].

This, however, is a digression. We were speaking of the philosophical studies of Euripides and their influence on his views of human and divine things, so far as those views can be inferred from his extant writings. We are not to regard him as the expositor of any particular system, and his obligations to Anaxagoras, with the exception of a few philosophemes,

[1] I. p. 3.

[2] On the early collections and collectors, see Gräfenham, Gesch. der Classischen Philologie, v. I. p. 59.

were rather general than special. There is, in fact, hardly a topic, moral or theological, on which it would not be easy to collect from the works of Euripides contradictory maxims. That his proneness to philosophize arose partly from the desire to display his erudition, it would be idle to deny: but it would be as uncandid to doubt the operation of a better motive, a sincere desire to refine and humanize the Athenian public, by instilling a taste for pursuits more elevated than those of the assembly and the law courts. Among these pursuits he evidently reckoned the habit of free discussion of moral and social problems—of the relations of private as well as political life. The lines from the Antiope, frag. 29—

> ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων
> ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός,

may be looked upon as an explanation of his own practice, perhaps as an apology for it. The want of sufficient attention to this two-sidedness has led to false views of the character of Euripides and the tendency of his writings. He has been quoted, ever since the time of Aristophanes, as a Woman-hater, and the ingenuity of his biographers has been taxed to invent stories of domestic infelicity which would account for this unamiable feature in his character. These stories are nowhere alluded to by Aristophanes, who must have known them had they been current in his time, and who had besides many tempting opportunities of introducing allusions to them in his plays. For instance, they must inevitably have found a place in the Thesmophoriazusae, which was written about six years before the death of Euripides, and the subject of which is the revenge taken or attempted to be taken on the poet by the wrathful Athenian matrons whose evil doings he had exposed on the stage. One may observe in passing that if the ladies of Athens were half so bad as they represent themselves in the Thesmophoriazusae, Euripides rather deserved a crown at their hands for the signal moderation with which he had treated them. But in truth there is no poet of antiquity who has shewn a keener sense of the virtues—whether tender or heroic—of the feminine character, of which he presents the bright side

quite as often as the dark. *αἱ δ' εἰσ' ἀμείνους ἀρσένων ᾗ 'γὼ λέγω* he says in Frag. Melanippes.

> *τῆς μὲν κακῆς κάκιον οὐδὲν γίγνεται*
> *γυναικός, ἐσθλῆς δ' οὐδὲν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν*
> *πέφυκ' ἄμεινον· διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ φύσεις*[1]

is a sentiment which has been repeated in various forms, for experience has shewn it to be true: but I cannot find that it had been uttered by any one before Euripides. And accordingly in no poet do we meet with a greater variety of female character; or with a greater number of remarks upon the sex both eulogistic and the contrary. It may however be observed that the bitterest kind of sarcasms, such as that in the Danae,

> *οὐκ ἐστὶν οὔτε τεῖχος οὔτε ναῦς*
> *οὔτ' ἄλλο δυσφύλακτον οὐδὲν ὡς γυνή,*

or that from the First Hippolytus,

> *γυναικὶ πείθου μηδὲ ταληθῆ κλύων,*

are usually wrung from the speakers by the incidents of the play: while such delicate and feeling descriptions as that, e.g. in the 6th Fragment of the Phrixus and the wife's speech in the 100th of the Uncertain Fragments[2], have the appearance of coming fresh from the heart of the poet, and might lead us

[1] Melan. Capt., Fr. xiv. Dind.

[2] Thus emended and arranged by Nauck,

οὐδεμίαν ὤνησε κάλλος εἰς πόσιν ξυναόρον,
ἀρετὴ δ' ὤνησε πολλάς· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀγαθὴ γυνὴ
ἥτις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται.
πρῶτα μέν γε τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει, κἂν ἄμορφος ᾖ πόσις,
χρὴ δοκεῖν εὔμορφον εἶναι τῇ γε νοῦν κεκτημένῃ·
οὐ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ κρίνειν [δύνατόν] ἐστιν ἀλλὰ νοῦς.
εὖ λέγειν [εὐλογεῖν vulg.] δ' ὅταν τι λέξῃ χρὴ δοκεῖν, κἂν μὴ λέγῃ·
κἀκπονεῖν ἂν τῷ ξυνόντι πρὸς χάριν μέλλῃ λέγειν.
ἡδὺ δ' ἂν κακόν τι πράξῃ συσκυθρωπάζειν πόσει
ἄλοχον, ἐν κοινῷ τε λύπης ἡδονῆς τ' ἔχειν μέρος...
σοὶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ νοσοῦντι συννοσοῦσ' ἀνέξομαι,
καὶ κακῶν τῶν σῶν ξυνοίσω, κοὐδέν ἐστί μοι πικρόν.

to believe that he had been fortunate rather than the reverse in his domestic relations—they seem in fact to anticipate the refinements of modern sentiment on the subject; at any rate they are much in advance of the sentiment of that age.

I can hardly say whether it is equally honourable to Euripides to have anticipated Plato (perhaps we should add Socrates) in his conception of the somewhat anomalous passion known under the name of Platonic Love, which is painted in such vivid colours in the Phaedrus and the latter part of the Symposium. The fact however is certain: as you will perceive if you compare the celebrated chorus in the Medea in which we read of

ἔρωτες σοφίᾳ πάρεδροι
παντοίας ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργοί,

with Fragment VIII. of the Dictys,

ἀλλ' ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως κ.τ.λ.

and Frag. inc. 113

παίδευμα δ' ἔρως σοφίας ἀρετῆς.

From which of his 'books' Euripides may have 'distilled' these perhaps rather over-refined στωμύλματα I do not know. Considering however how important a personage the Platonic Ἔρως afterwards became, and the great figure he has made both in the ancient and modern world, it is interesting to be able to trace his lineage one step further in the ascending line. We may say, I think, confidently that the Socratic school owe more to Euripides than Euripides owed to Socrates or to any of his disciples.

The poet who could make these euphuistic flights does not however disdain to recommend the homelier affections—the love of mother, son and brother.

ἐρᾶτε μητρὸς παῖδες, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως
τοιοῦτος ἄλλος ὅστις ἡδίων ἐρᾷν[1],

are lines which could hardly have flowed from another pen. The selection of the word ἔρως instead of the colder φιλία or

[1] (Erectheus, XIX. p. 360).

στοργή is quite characteristic of the poet who, in the interview between Jocasta and Polynices in the Phoenissae and in many an immortal scene besides, has infused the warmth of true passion into the most blameless of human affections; who shewed for the first time perhaps in the ancient world that virtue may exist without coldness and passion without impurity[1].

On Euripides's singular power in exciting the passion of pity it is needless to dilate: but there are two passages in the Electra which have always appeared to me worthy of notice for their deep and almost Christian refinement of feeling, and also as conveying the poet's apology for scenes in his tragedies which to his coarser countrymen may have seemed lacrymose and effeminate—

"Pity," he says, "doth nowhere dwell with ignorance,
"But with the wise of the earth: for not without
"Its price is overwisdom to the wise."

ἔνεστι δ' οἶκτος ἀμαθίᾳ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ
σοφοῖσι δ' ἀνδρῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀζήμιον
γνώμην ἐνεῖναι τοῖς σοφοῖς λίαν σοφήν. v. 294.

And again in line 605 of the same play:

ὦ τέκνον οὐδεὶς δυστυχοῦντί σοι φίλος—
εὕρημα γὰρ τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται τόδε
κοινῇ μετασχεῖν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ.

Compare with these a fragment of the Ino (Fr. XVI. Dind.)—

ἀμουσία τοι μηδ' ἐπ' οἰκτροῖσιν δάκρυ
στάζειν· κακὸν δὲ, χρημάτων ὄντων ἄλις,
φειδοῖ πονηρᾷ μηδέν' εὖ ποιεῖν βροτῶν.

[1] I mean this remark to apply to the *post-homeric* literature, whether lyrical or dramatic. It is known how the relation between Achilles and Patroclus was misunderstood even by Aeschylus. (Frag. Myrmid. 128). We may ask further what tragic poet other than Euripides would have illumined a subject like that of Danae with a gem like the following:

τάχ' ἂν πρὸς ἀγκάλαισι καὶ στέρνοις ἐμοῖς
πεσὼν ἀθύροι καὶ φιλημάτων ὄχλῳ
ψυχὴν ἐμὴν κτήσαιτο.
(Fr. I. Dind.)

(She is speaking of her own infant, which Acrisius had entrusted to her care, believing it the offspring of his wife.)

These passages are further characteristic, as implying a firm belief in the humanizing influence of those literary and philosophical pursuits which the conservatives of the day viewed with horror as the causes of the supposed degeneracy of the rising generation.

It may be said however that refinement of taste is after all an indifferent substitute for religious faith, and that the tendency of the writings of Euripides is undoubtedly towards religious scepticism. And however excusable it may have been in a thinking man to feel dissatisfied with the popular theology of that day, the example, it may be said, of Aeschylus and Sophocles might have shewn him that it was possible to combine a respect for traditional observance with high views of the divine perfection, and a firm belief in the immutable principles of morality. And if it be replied that he was brought up under other influences than those which moulded the character of his predecessors, it may be urged on the other hand, that these influences themselves were evil, that a great and good man would have set himself to counteract them, and that this was in effect the task to which the best and greatest of Euripides' contemporaries dedicated his life. For certainly we search in vain among the remaining works of Euripides for evidences of that reasoned faith in the existence of an intelligent Creator, which distinguishes Socrates so honourably from all previous speculators, and which was the characteristic mark of his genuine followers in after ages. The religious point of view of Euripides is not easily fixed. It is easy to quote passages of an irreligious tendency, passages which seem to strike at the root, not merely of the popular superstitions, but even of natural or philosophical theism.

ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός,

Fr. inc.

is a sentiment which startled Cicero [1], but it does not necessarily imply that there is no god *besides* the human mind, nor do we know from whose lips the words fall, nor how they are received by the person to whom they are addressed.

[1] Tusc. I. 26. 64. Ergo animus, ut ego dico, divinus, ut Euripides dicere audet, deus.

Again there are two lines in a fragment of the Philoctetes (Fr. VI. Dind.) which taken apart from the context imply at least scepticism on such matters:

> *ὅστις γὰρ αὐχεῖ θεῶν ἐπίστασθαι περὶ*
> *οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οἶδεν ἢ πείθειν λόγῳ.*

The context however shews that they are to be understood as a rebuke of the pretensions of the soothsayers, a class which Euripides detests, to interpret the counsel of heaven:

> *τί δῆτα θάκοις μαντικοῖς* (vulg. *ἀρχικοῖς*) *ἐνήμενος*
> *σαφῶς διόμνυσθ' εἰδέναι τὰ δαιμίνων;*
> *—οὐ τῶνδε χειρώνακτες ἄνθρωποι λόγων.*

The play called Melanippe, to which I have already alluded, originally commenced with the startling line

> *Ζεύς, ὅστις ὁ Ζεύς, οὐ γὰρ οἶδα πλὴν λόγῳ*[1],

but in another fragment we are told

> *ἀλλ' ἔστι, κεἴ τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,*
> *Ζεύς, καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη,*

from which it were candid to infer that in the former line the Zeus of the popular mythology is intended, while in the latter there is a recognition of a supreme ruler. The personality of such a ruler is however left in doubt in a remarkable passage of the Troades, l. 884:

> *ὦ γῆς ὄχημα καὶ πὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν*
> *ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,*
> *Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν—*
> *προσηυξάμην σε, πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου*
> *βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ Δίκην τὰ θνῆτ' ἄγεις.*

Another sentiment triumphantly quoted by Clement of Alex-

[1] Altered, it is said, by particular request to *Ζεὺς ὡς λέλεκται τῆς ἀληθείας ὕπο*, and so quoted by Aristophanes in the Frogs. See Nauck, annot. ad Frag. Melanippes. Aeschylus, it should be remembered, begins a strophe in the Agamemnon with the words *Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ' ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*

andria might have been uttered with equal propriety by a Hebrew prophet or a Greek Pantheist:

> *ποῖος δ' ἂν οἶκος τεκτόνων πλασθεὶς ὕπο*
> *δέμας τὸ θεῖον περιβάλοι τοίχων πτυχαῖς;*

but the couplet which Clement quotes immediately afterwards

> *θεὸν δὲ ποῖον εἰπέ μοι νοητέον;*
> *τὸν πάνθ' ὁρῶντα καὐτὸν οὐχ ὁρώμενον*

is orthodox enough—so orthodox indeed as to suggest doubts of its genuineness. I confess it does not seem to bear the Attic mint-mark, and modern editors have accordingly placed it among the "Fragmenta dubia."

Another Fragment from the Melanippe (XII. 2) is worth quoting in this connexion:

> *δοκεῖτε πηδᾶν τἀδικήματ' εἰς θεοὺς*
> *πτεροῖσι, κἄπειτ' ἐν Διὸς δέλτου πτυχαῖς*
> *γράφειν τιν' αὐτά; Ζῆνα δ' εἰσορῶντά νιν*
> *θνητοῖς δικάζειν; οὐδ' ὁ πᾶς ἂν οὐρανὸς*
> *Διὸς γράφοντος τὰς βροτῶν ἁμαρτίας*
> *ἐξαρκέσειεν· οὐδ' ἐκεῖνος ἂν σκοπῶν*
> *πέμπειν ἑκάστῳ ζημίαν· ἀλλ' ἡ Δίκη*
> *ἐνταῦθα ποὔστιν ἐγγὺς εἰ βούλεσθ' ὁρᾶν.*

> Think ye that human crimes fly straight to heaven,
> And there in Zeus' dread book are registered?
> Which he, beholding, equitable doom
> Pronounces on each deed? I tell ye nay,
> Not heaven itself might hold the records huge
> Of human error, nor great Zeus himself
> Surveying, send of each particular sin
> The just award. Had ye but eyes to see,
> Justice is very near us here on earth[1],

a sentiment to which no reasonable exception can be taken, and to which Socrates himself would have subscribed. The same may be said of another fine fragment of the Phrixus (Fr. VIII. *D*) which is to the same effect.

[1] The 'reply, as printed by Dindorf,' evidently belongs to some other place.

I have given you a few specimens of the Theologumena Euripidis out of many which presented themselves. The number of such passages is so great[1] as to compel the inference that the mind of the poet was habitually tried by doubts and difficulties which no thinking man in an age of awakened speculation can wholly avoid, or perhaps without express revelation satisfactorily solve. A like φροντίδος ἄχθος had weighed on the mind of the poet Aeschylus, which he shook off rather by an effort of will than of reason[2]. If it be made matter of reproach to Euripides that—so far as appears—he never attained the clear conviction upon these subjects, which the calm reasoning of Socrates wrought upon other minds, we may answer that Socrates, who was twelve years younger, did not begin to teach until the poet had attained a ripe age,—and certainly all his professed disciples were greatly his juniors—, secondly, that the physical studies in which Euripides had spent his early manhood had taken a hold upon his susceptible imagination which they never had upon the sounder but more prosaic understanding of Socrates; and lastly that Socrates was himself the most singular phenomenon that meets us in the history of Greek speculation; which, but for him, must, so far as we can see, have had quite another and different development. Even he, as we know, was unable to eradicate the Pantheistic element which prevailed in nearly all the systems which arose before him, and which is perpetually rising to the surface in the subsequent history of Greek Philosophy. It is wiser surely as well as more charitable, to regard with indulgent sympathy the frank avowal of his doubts and perplexities which the poet addressed to an audience many of whom had grappled or were grappling more or less earnestly with the same difficulties, than to frown upon him because the hypothesis of a retributive Providence setting all things right in

[1] Such are H. F. 339, 1311, 1341. Troad. 458, 884, 970. Frag. Bell. xxi. xxiii. In a contrary sense are many passages of the Bacchae, Peliad. Frag. iii. &c.

[2] οὐδ' ἔχω προσείκασαι
πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος
πλὴν Διὸς, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως.
Agam. 160 seq.

this life, which had satisfied Aeschylus, appeared to Euripides, as it must to us, inconsistent with the truth of history and the facts of actual experience[1].

I have referred you to the principal passages bearing on the Theology of Euripides. The date of most of his plays is so uncertain that it is hard to say what change his views may have undergone during his dramatic life of fifty years. The Bacchae, one of the very latest, contains many passages in which a too curious inquiry into religious questions is strongly reprobated, as e. g. that well-known one

οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν.
πατρίους παραδοχὰς ἅς θ' ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ
κεκτήμεθ' οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
οὐδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ηὕρηται φρενῶν.

These lines probably represent the poet's latest sentiments, and the same may be said of a fine fragment preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus[2],

ὃς τάδε λεί'σσων θεὸν οὐχὶ νοεῖ
μετεωρολόγων δ' ἑκὰς ἐῤῥιψεν
σκολίας ἀπάτας, ὧν ἀτηρὰ
γλῶσσ' εἰκοβολεῖ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν
οὐδὲν γνώμης μετέχουσα.

"Hapless is he (for so we may supply the missing word) who when he beholdeth these things thinks not on God nor flings far from him the tortuous deceits of visionary speculation; which a pestilent tongue untempered by sound judgment shoots at a venture, as it prates on matters wrapt in obscurity."

Of the few immoral lines of Euripides of which Aristophanes has made so much it is hardly necessary to speak at length.

[1] If we would know the difference between a state of mind like that of Euripides, wavering between doubt and belief, or rather hesitating in its choice between conflicting probabilities, and a condition of cold and satisfied incredulity, it is enough to compare the strongest of the passages referred to with a remarkable fragment of the Sisyphus of Critias, preserved to us by Sextus Empiricus. See Nauck, Fragm. Trag. p. 598.

[2] No. cvi. in Dindorf's Collection.

The most famous of all you are of course familiar with—*ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος*, a flower which deserves a place in a Jesuit anthology. But it is a sufficient justification of Euripides to say that the line has under the circumstances a dramatic propriety. It is uttered by Hippolytus in a moment of impassioned indignation, over which however his high sense of truth and honour enables him after reflection completely to triumph.

Another line equally well known to the readers of the Ranae, *τί δ' αἰσχρὸν ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ*; is put in the mouth of a hero who has committed a frightful crime, and is naturally desirous to palliate it by sophistry. It is neither more nor less defensible than the sophistries of Angelo in Measure for Measure. And I believe a similar apology might be made for the remaining lines of like tendency—they are really not numerous—which the malice of our poet's enemies has been able to cull from the 75 plays which he composed.

I have said nothing as yet of the literary defects which modern criticism—looking alternately through the spectacles of Aristotle and Aristophanes—has been able to detect in the works of Euripides. As a dramatic artist he is in many points of view inferior to Sophocles. He is too solicitous about the matter of his plays to care sufficiently for their form, like those painters who excel in expression but fail in grouping. But even to this rule there are noble exceptions. For unity of general effect no plays in the world excel the Hippolytus and the Medea: and no critic of importance has discovered any serious blemish in the Bacchae. We must recollect too that while the hand of time has spared the acknowledged masterpieces of Sophocles, it has not been equally discriminating in the case of Euripides. This I think might be shewn from the writings of ancient critics beginning with Aristotle and even earlier. But it is a subject which would require at least a whole lecture. I prefer to end the present, by exhorting you to consider well a criticism of Cicero, which a German professor of Aesthetik would probably deem beneath his notice, but which I am old-fashioned enough to think as wise in substance

as it is elegant in expression. "Natura nulla est, ut mihi videtur, quae non habeat in suo genere res complures dissimiles inter se, quae tamen consimili laude dignentur. Nam et auribus multa percipimus, quae, etsi nos vocibus delectant, tamen ita sunt varia saepe, ut id quod proximum audias, jucundissimum esse videatur: et oculis colliguntur paene innumerabiles voluptates, quae nos ita capiunt, ut unum sensum dissimili genere delectent: et reliquos sensus voluptates oblectant dispares, ut sit difficile judicium excellentis maxime suavitatis. At hoc idem quod est in naturis rerum, transferri potest etiam ad artes. Una fingendi est ars, in qua praestantes fuerunt Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus: qui omnes inter se dissimiles fuerunt; sed ita tamen ut neminem sui velis esse dissimilem. Una est ars ratioque picturae, dissimillimique tamen inter se Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles: neque eorum quisquam est cui quidquam in arte sua deesse videatur. Et si hoc in his quasi mutis artibus est mirandum, et tamen verum, quanto admirabilius in oratione atque in lingua? quae quum in iisdem sententiis verbisque versetur, summas habet dissimilitudines; non sic, ut alii vituperandi sint, sed ut ii, quos constet esse laudandos, in dispari tamen genere laudentur. Atque id primum in poetis cerni licet, quibus est proxima cognatio cum oratoribus, quam sint inter sese Ennius, Pacuvius Acciusque dissimiles; quam apud Graecos Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides; quamquam omnibus par paene laus in dissimili scribendi genere tribuatur.....Quis eorum non egregius? tamen quis cujusquam nisi sui similis?"—*De Oratore*, III. 7.

W. H. THOMPSON.

EURIPIDEA.

Fragm. 323. Danae.

ἦν γάρ τις αἶνος, ὡς γυναιξὶ μὲν τέχναι
μέλουσι, λόγχῃ δ' ἄνδρες εὐστοχώτεροι.
εἰ γὰρ δόλοισιν ἦν τὸ νικητήριον,
ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀνδρῶν εἴχομεν τυραννίδα.

'vs. 1 *ἦν ἄρα τις* Meinekius' Nauck. There is a manifest corruption here; but the following I think will be a better correction, as μ and ν in many classes of Mss. are so often confused: *ἦ μάρτυς αἶνος, ὡς κ.τ.ἑ.* The verb substantive is by no means wanted: frag. 511 *παλαιὸς αἶνος· ἔργα μὲν κ.τ.ἑ.*: Archil. fr. 80 Bergk *αἶνός τις ἀνθρώπων ὅδε, ὡς ἆρ' ἀλώπηξ καΐετος κ.τ.ἑ.*

I will take this opportunity to make a few additions to, and corrections of, my paper in the tenth volume of the Journal. In frag. 324, v. 5, I wrote *ἐν τοῖς δ' ἔχουσι δὴ βάτης* (Mss. *ἔχουσιν ἡβητὴς*) *πέφυχ' ὅδε*. I would now write *ἔχουσιν ἦ βάτης π. ὁ.*: this I wanted to do before; but could find no satisfactory example of the corroborative *ἦ* having such a position in the sentence. See however Rhesus 898 *οἵαν ἔκελσας ὁδὸν ποτὶ Τροίαν, ἦ δυσδαίμονα καὶ μελέαν*. I should have liked an instance from Euripides or Sophocles; but still the Rhesus is of the fourth century and pre-Alexandrine.

In frag. 457, v. 1, *δὲ* should be *δὴ*.

Frag. 582, v. 6, Nauck says '*ἀποθνήσκοντα* suspectum': I observed 'no word in the whole passage is more genuine'. I ought however to have explained, and I intended to explain, why I spoke so emphatically. I did not know whether Nauck objected to the use of the word itself or to its meaning here.

The sense it yields seemed to me and still seems most appropriate; but I once had strong doubts whether the poet would have employed it, because this is the only place in which he uses it, and it does not once occur in Aeschylus or Sophocles. Now there are of course hundreds of *ἅπαξ εἰρημένα* in the Tragedians: but this is the one idiomatic word in prose of all ages to denote natural or violent death. And this of course has to be expressed in almost every page of Tragedy; and therefore we perpetually come across *θνήσκω* or one of the many other phrases for dying. Some reason therefore must have existed for this general proscription of *ἀποθνήσκω*: the word I presume had too prosaic a savour. My doubts however were conquered by the following facts: Homer has to speak of dying a thousand times over and has hundreds of different expressions for it. Twice in the Odyssey we meet with *ἀποθνήσκων*, once and once only we encounter *ἀποτεθνειῶτες* in the Iliad: no other form of the word is found in either poem. Pindar too twice and only twice has the *partic. ἀποθανών*. These facts will support I think this solitary use of the *partic.* in Euripides.

When I doubted the word, I thought of *ἄπωθεν ὄντα*: Mss. would infallibly have changed the Attic *ἄπωθεν* into the later Greek form *ἄποθεν*: see Lobeck's Phrynichus and Rutherford's New Phrynichus: and the unmetrical *ἄποθεν ὄντα* might have passed into *ἀποθνήσκοντα*.

In frag. 892 I suggested *τὸν ἁγνὸν*, or *τοιοῦτον*, as perhaps nearer *τὸν αὐτὸν* than *τὸν ἐσθλὸν* was. I should however have added: But, comparing Phoen. 84 *ἀλλ' ὦ φαεννὰς οὐρανοῦ ναίων πτύχας Ζεῦ, σῶσον ἡμᾶς...χρὴ δ', εἰ σοφὸς πέφυκας, οὐκ ἐᾶν βροτὸν τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ δυστυχῆ καθεστάναι*, I would rather read

> *ὤφειλε δῆθεν, εἴπερ ἔστ' ἐν οὐρανῷ*
> *Ζεύς, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δυστυχῆ καθεστάναι*
> *ἀεί.*

ἀεί might easily be absorbed in the preceding letters.

In frag. 1039, v. 4, I suggested *ἔξω σφήν τίς* for the corrupt *ἔξωθέν τις*: this I still think offers a suitable sense; but I would now propose a reading which gives perhaps a more

vigorous meaning, and comes certainly nearer the Mss. ὅ τ' ὄλβος ἔξω θc [i.e. θεός] τίς ἐστι πραγμάτων. Aesch. Choeph. 59 τὸ δ' εὐτυχεῖν, τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς θεός τε καὶ θεοῦ πλέον: comp. too Eurip. Cycl. 316 ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρωπίσκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός: frag. 20 μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπῃς· οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεόν, ὃν χώ κ.τ.ἑ. Eurip. calls both ἐλπίς and φιλοτιμία θεός.

Euripides during his life met with sorry treatment alike from the wits and the general public. After death, it is true, he enjoyed for some centuries a world-wide renown, as the most popular of Athenian poets. For many long ages however his ill-luck has come back upon him; and he the consummate master, who brought to its last perfection the keenest instrument of poetical expression which perhaps has ever been devised, whose exquisite diction gives you a feeling of what the language of Pericles and Plato may have had in common, is often forced by fate and criticism combined to utter stammering nonsense. More than half his plays have been transmitted to us in a vilely corrupt condition; and again and again the meanest artifices of interpretation are had recourse to in order to extort a meaning out of what has none, artifices at all events which would be more in place in deciphering a chorus of Aeschylus, as to which it may be debated to the end of time whether certain agglomerations of words come from the poet or a Byzantine reviser. How sad it would have been if the Protagoras or the De Corona had come down to us in a like condition; and yet the dramas of Euripides deserved just as much the capricious good graces of fortune. Prime favourite also of Milton, he has for some time past been exposed to the outrages of 'coxcombs' like Schlegel; and I have heard with my own ears critics, who still behold the light of the sun, prefer the Septem, perhaps the poorest play of Aeschylus, to the Phoenissae, of which the strength and splendour of the language and the sustained vigour of the action are unsurpassed in Greek poetry. Ennius had his merits, but it is better not to follow the Emperor Hadrian in preferring him to Virgil.

At the risk of being hoisted by my own petard I will discuss a few passages of Euripides, and will begin with a corrupt

one from the Supplices, which is among the most corruptly transmitted of all his plays.

Supplices 450—455.

κτᾶσθαι δὲ πλοῦτον καὶ βίον τί δεῖ τέκνοις,
ὡς τῷ τυράννῳ πλείον' ἐκμοχθῇ βίον,
ἢ παρθενεύειν παῖδας ἐν δόμοις καλῶς
τερπνὰς τυράννοις ἡδονάς, ὅταν θέλῃ,
δάκρυα δ' ἑτοιμάζουσι; μὴ ζῴην ἔτι,
εἰ τἀμὰ τέκνα πρὸς βίαν νυμφεύσεται.

With the exception of Hermann's *νυμφεύσεται*, which the Greek idiom seems to require, for *νυμφεύεται*, I have here given the Ms. reading of these very corrupt verses; for in v. 2 the best Ms. *has* ὡς, not ὃς. The passage is surely unintelligible as it stands: in v. 2 the *τῷ*, if the context be compared, has no meaning; the absence of a subject to *ἐκμοχθῇ* might perhaps be explained away in a chorus of Aeschylus, not in a senarius of Euripides; in v. 4 how interpret the plur. *τυράννοις*? what is the subject of *θέλῃ*? syntax would say 'the father', which is absurd: sense the *τύραννοι*, which is impossible; in v. 4 is *δάκρυα* nomin. or accus.? *ἑτοιμάζουσι* verb or partic.? in either case what is the meaning and construction? Paley gives no answer at all to most of these questions, and no satisfactory answer to the rest. The latest critical editor, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, omits v. 2 after Kirchhoff; in v. 3 he reads *καλόν* after Nauck; in v. 4 he gives *τελῇ* for *θέλῃ*; in v. 5 he adopts Markland's suggestion, *δὲ τοῖς τεκοῦσι* for *δ' ἑτοιμάζουσι*, and Hartung's *ἐγώ* for *ἔτι*.

These are certainly violent changes, and yet I am unable to translate his text. The whole of this speech is of course monstrously out of place in the mouth of Theseus, and is in fact a political pamphlet of the year 421 B.C. The poet must have been sadly lacking in the supreme *εὐκολία* of his great rival. Theseus is nominally addressing the Theban herald; in reality Euripides, through the king's mask, is telling the world of the unique excellence of Athenian life and law. I

would correct as follows: the three or four changes I make are all of them slight, diplomatically speaking:

> *κτᾶσθαι δὲ πλοῦτον καὶ βίον τί δεῖ τέκνοις,*
> *ὥς τῳ τυράννῳ πλείον' ἐκμοχθῇς βίον,*
> *ἢ παρθενεύειν παῖδας ἐν δόμοις καλῶς*
> *τερπνὰς τυράννῳ σ' ἡδονάς, ὅταν θέλῃ;*
> *δάκρυα δ' ἑτοῖμα σοὔστι. μὴ ζῴην ἔτι, κ.τ.ἑ.*

The *βίον—βίον* is not unusual in Greek, tho' such a repetition would be inelegant in Latin or English. The *σε* which I have inserted in v. 4 is I think in place and connects its context with *τί δεῖ*: 'Or why should you bring up your daughters in virtuous maidenhood to serve for the lust and pleasure of a tyrant, when he chooses? while tears are in store for yourself. May I live no longer, if etc.' *τερπνὰς ἡδονάς* is in apposition with the clause, like Orest. 1105 'Ελένην *κτάνωμεν*, Μενέλεῳ *λύπην πικράν*: Soph. El. 966 *πημονὴν αὐτῷ σαφῆ*: Aj. 556 *μητρὶ τῇδε χαρμονήν*. But *δάκρυα* surely cannot be part of that apposition. The *ἔτι* must not be tampered with: comp. Orest. 1146 *μὴ γὰρ οὖν ζῴην ἔτι, εἰ μὴ 'π' ἐκείνῃ φάσγανον σπάσω μέλαν.*

The very corrupt text of the Supplices teems with lacunae and other defects. I am not indisposed to think that a verse is lost before the 5th one in our passage. The Erectheus was written about or just at the same time as the Supplices, and breathes the same patriotic, or if you like Chauvinistic spirit. In frag. 364, v. 24, I find *ἐξουσίᾳ δὲ μήποτ' ἐντυχών, τέκνον, αἰσχροὺς ἔρωτας δημοτῶν διωκαθεῖν· ὃ καὶ σίδηρον ἀγχόνας τ' ἐφέλκεται, χρηστῶν πενήτων ἥν τις αἰσχύνῃ τέκνα.* Perhaps then our passage might be reconstructed on the lines of this one: [*ὅθεν σίδηρος πατρὶ μητρί τ' ἀγχόναι,*] *δάκρυα δ' ἑτοῖμα ζῶσι*: 'while tears are in store for them, if they brook to live'. This would add fresh emphasis to the *μὴ ζῴην ἔτι.*

Troades 1167—1172.

> *ὦ φίλταθ', ὥς σοι θάνατος ἦλθε δυστυχής·*
> *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔθανες πρὸ πόλεως, ἦβης τυχὼν*
> *γάμων τε καὶ τῆς ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος,*

μακάριος ἦσθ' ἄν, εἴ τι τῶνδε μακάριον·
νῦν δ', αὖτ' ἰδὼν μὲν γνούς τε σὰ ψυχῇ, τέκνον,
οὐκ ἦσθ', ἐχρήσω δ' οὐδὲν ἐν δόμοις ἔχων.

v. 5 δ' addidit Reiske. *σὰ* scripsi. *σῇ* codices.

v. 6 *ἦσθ'* scripsi. *οἶσθ'* codices.

This is a very Greek sentence; the different clauses of which are closely interlaced. I cannot help thinking my alterations in the last two vss. necessary, tho' Paley says that 'they appear to require interpretation rather than alteration'. Yet his note gives no explanation whatever of *οἶσθα*. On v. 1 indeed he annotates: '*δυστυχής* without burial'. This shews that he cannot have an inkling of the inter-connexion of the whole sentence, which is most Greek and could be illustrated by a score of passages taken from Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, the Orators, Sophocles and Euripides himself. And then as to his 'without burial', this speech of Hecuba's is an elaborate funeral oration on the poor child, whom Greek and Trojan vie with each other in burying with all honour. Even Professor Tyrrell in his careful and valuable note says that, tho' 'the passage is extremely obscure, there is no reason for supposing it corrupt'.

To illustrate our sentence, I will first cite Soph. Ajax 442, because there the idiom in question comes twice over: *εἰ ζῶν Ἀχιλλεὺς τῶν ὅπλων τῶν ὧν πέρι κρίνειν ἔμελλε κράτος ἀριστείας τινί, οὐκ ἄν τις αὖτ' ἔμαρψεν ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ· νῦν δ' αὖτ' Ἀτρεῖδαι φωτὶ παντουργῷ φρένας ἔπραξαν...κεἰ μὴ τό τ' ὄμμα χαἱ φρένες διάστροφοι γνώμης ἀπῆξαν τῆς ἐμῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε δίκην κατ' ἄλλου φωτὸς ὧδ' ἐψήφισαν· νῦν δ' ἡ Διὸς γοργῶπις ἀδάματος θεὰ ἤδη μ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς χεῖρ' ἐπευτύνοντ' ἐμὴν ἔσφηλεν*: and next Eur. Or. 496 *ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐξέπνευσεν Ἀγαμέμνων βίον...χρῆν αὐτὸν ἐπιθεῖναι μὲν αἵματος δίκην...,τὸ σῶφρόν τ' ἔλαβ' ἂν ἀντὶ συμφορᾶς, καὶ τοῦ νόμου τ' ἂν εἶχετ' εὐσεβής τ' ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν δαίμον' ἦλθε μητέρι.* This *νῦν δέ*, like *nunc, at nunc, nunc vero*, etc. in Cicero, Lucretius and Livy, brings in the contrast of what is true, or has taken place, with a preceding hypothesis which is not true, or has not happened. 'What an ill-fated death is yours! For if you had

died for your country, after reaching manhood and marriage and godlike sovereignty, you would have been happy, if there is happiness in any of these things. But as it is, you were *not* happy, because, tho' you had seen them and known them in mind to be yours, you had not anyhow enjoyed them by actual possession'. The last two lines give a very Greek construction: even in prose *οὐκ ἦσθα μακάριος, ἰδὼν μέν ...ἐχρήσω δ' οὐδέν* would be a natural construction. Eurip. often thus passes from the partic. to the finite verb: very harsh is Bacch. 1131 *ἦν δὲ πᾶσ' ὁμοῦ βοή, ὁ μὲν στενάζων...αἱ δ' ἠλάλαζον*: still harsher Heracl. 39 foll. More like our passage is Med. 1315 *ἔκλυεθ' ἁρμούς, ὡς ἴδω διπλοῦν κακόν, τοὺς μὲν θανόντας, τὴν δὲ τίσομαι φόνῳ* (or, *τίσομαι φόνου*, see Verrall): comp. too our Troades 365 *πόλιν δὲ δείξω τήνδε μακαριωτέραν ἢ τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, ἔνθεος μέν, ἀλλ' ὅμως τοσόνδε γ' ἔξω στήσομαι βακχευμάτων, οἳ κ.τ.ἑ.*

Again my *σὰ* for *σῇ* at once supplies a deficiency and removes a redundancy: any slave in the house might see and perceive in mind these things, as well as Astyanax. When the word refers to the subject of the sentence, you say in Greek *ψυχῇ, θυμῷ,* (in prose, if you like, *τῇ ψ. τῷ θ.*) in Latin *animo, mente;* you do not add *σῇ, tuo,* unless to give some very special emphasis. Professor Tyrrell is quite correct in saying that in Eurip. *ψυχή* is not the 'reason'; but in Eurip. and in all idiomatic non-technical Greek, *ψυχή* or *θυμός* may mean the whole animate, sentient, thinking part of man, like *animus, mens, soul, mind, spirit:* Orest. 1180 *ἐπεὶ τὸ συνετὸν οἶδα σῇ ψυχῇ παρόν*: Hipp. 1005 *οὐδὲ ταῦτα γὰρ σκοπεῖν πρόθυμός εἰμι παρθένον ψυχὴν ἔχων.* For *γνοὺς σὰ* (=*γνοὺς σὰ ὄντα*) comp. Troad. 365 quoted above, and Soph. Oed. T. 1114 *ἄλλως τε τοὺς ἄγοντας ὥσπερ οἰκέτας ἔγνωκ' ἐμαυτοῦ*[1]. The corrections I have made are diplomatically slight, as *σὰ ψυχῇ* would

[1] On May 25th Dr Kennedy read a short paper on this passage, which has reached me in its printed form just as my paper was going to press. He takes *νῦν δέ* in its temporal sense; joins *σῇ ψυχῇ* ('with thy *disembodied* spirit') with *οὐκ οἶσθα*; and thus translates the two last lines: But now—though thou didst see, didst recognise These things my child—thy spirit knows them not: None didst thou use, when all were housed with thee. As the passage is so difficult, I have not withdrawn my exposition.

obviously be likely to pass into *σῇ ψυχῇ*, and *οἶσθα* is an instance of the confusion which prevailed so long between *οι, ει, η, ι, υ*, with reference to which I will take a passage a few lines lower down,

Troades 1187, 1188.

οἴμοι, τὰ πόλλ' ἀσπάσμαθ' αἵ τ' ἐμαὶ τροφαὶ
ὕπνοι τ' ἐκεῖνοι φροῦδά μοι.

The last words cannot mean 'those broken anxious sleeps'; and the various corrections *πόνοι, ὕμνοι, ὕπνοι τ' ἄυπνοι* are none of them very specious. Prof. Tyrrell's *ἄυπνοί τε κλῖναι* is more ingenious; but I confess I should have looked for *κοῖται*: *κλίνη* means 'a sofa', in the one place where it is found in Eurip. and all Tragedy. The correction which at once presented itself to me is so obvious, that its very simplicity makes me dread something wrong; else why have not others hit upon it? *ὕπνοι τε κοινοὶ* of the grandmother and child seems to me to give a most natural sense. Perhaps it is hypercritical to remark that her sleepless nights, poor woman, were not things of the past.

Medea 160—163.

ὦ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πότνι' Ἄρτεμι,
λεύσσεθ' ἃ πάσχω, μεγάλοις ὅρκοις
ἐνδησαμένα τὸν κατάρατον
πόσιν; ὃν κ.τ.ἑ.

These fierce words, spoken aloud by Medea behind the scene, look in themselves quite in order; but then the nurse says just after *κλύεθ' οἷα λέγει κἀπιβοᾶται Θέμιν εὐκταίαν Ζηνά θ'*, *ὃς κ. τ. ἑ.* Medea therefore invoked Zeus as well as Themis; and the Scholiast says it was a much debated question, why Medea invokes Artemis and the nurse says she invokes Zeus. Several solutions by various grammarians are then given, more or less ingenious, but none suited to a modern taste. And yet it is quite certain that Medea did call on Zeus: to deny this

would be flying in the face of all the precedents of ancient tragedy. Elmsley however, for whose labours on Euripides I have the highest veneration, remarks on this: Nemo hodie, opinor, has turbas excitaret, neque eam Euripidi licentiam negaret, quae oratoribus conceditur, ut censeantur dixisse quod non dixerint. The drift of these words I cannot comprehend; tho' Paley too, whom likewise 'honoris causa nomino', says 'the answer is obvious' to the Scholiast's question. The recent Editors Prinz and Verrall both recognise a corruption, tho' to read with the former after Weil *ὦ μέγαλε Ζεῦ καὶ Θέμι πότνια* is to rewrite the verse.

A paroemiac, or the last part of one, would seem to have fallen out at the end of Medea's speech. It is possible that here too a clause beginning with *καὶ* is lost, and that Eurip. wrote *ὦ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πότνι' Ἄρτεμι | [καὶ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ] λεύσσεθ' ἃ πάσχω*; then the emphatic *τὸν κατάρατον* would form a good base. We can perhaps conceive the nurse not mentioning the intervening Artemis.

I have also thought of another, perhaps more recondite, scheme. Hesiod (Theog. 901 foll.) calls Themis the second wife of Zeus, by whom he had Eunomia, Dike, Eirene and others, a progeny quite as respectable as the one he had by his last wife Hera. Euripides may well have followed him in this; and then v. 208 *τὰν Ζηνὸς Θέμιν* would be 'Themis wife of Zeus', and v. 764 *ὦ Ζεῦ Δίκη τε Ζηνὸς* would be 'Dike daughter of Zeus'. Medea is now in the first transports of rage at the discovery of Iason's perfidy. I would therefore propose *ὦ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πόσις*[1], *ἄρτι με λεύσσεθ' ἃ πάσχω*; 'O great Themis and husband of Themis, see ye the usage I have just received?' This is the proper force of *ἄρτι* or *ἀρτίως*, and of *ἃ πάσχω*: Hec. 1114 *ὦ φίλτατ', ἠσθόμην γάρ, Ἀγάμεμνον, σέθεν φωνῆς ἀκούσας, εἰσορᾷς ἃ πάσχομεν*; Sophocles must unconsciously have had this in mind when he wrote Oed. Col. 891 *ὦ φίλτατ', ἔγνων γὰρ τὸ προσφώνημά σου, πέπονθα δεινὰ τοῦδ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως*. Eurip. may however have thought

[1] I have noted at least 6 instances of the vocat. *πόσις* in Eurip. Perhaps *καὶ πόσι γ'*: 'ay and your husband': this would be even closer to the Mss. Soph. Trach. 443 *οὗτος γὰρ ἄρχει τῶν θεῶν, ὅπως θέλει, κἀμοῦ γε.*

of Themis as the daughter of Zeus, in which case we should be as near the Mss. in reading *καὶ πάτερ, ἄρτι με κ.τ.ἑ.* But I would observe that *πόσις* or *πόσι γ'* would well correspond with the emphatic *πόσιν* at the end of the sentence.

Medea 217, 218.

οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἡσύχου ποδὸς
δύσκλειαν ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ῥαθυμίαν.

'*δύσκλειαν* corruptum videtur ex *δυσκολίαν*, qua glossa genuinum expulsum est vocabulum. cf. schol. *ὑπόνοιαν ἔσχον δυσκολίας καὶ ἀργίας*' Prinz. On the contrary *δυσκολίαν* is a silly corruption of *δύσκλειαν*: the sentence is very Euripidean: 'have earned an ill-repute and (a name for) indolence'. Comp. Ion 600 *γέλωτ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μωρίαν τε λήψομαι*: 'I shall get ridicule and (a name for) folly'.

Medea 735—740.

τούτοις δ', ὁρκίοισι μὲν ζυγείς,
ἄγουσιν οὐ μεθεῖ' ἂν ἐκ γαίας ἐμέ,
λόγοις δὲ συμβὰς καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἂν κἀπικηρυκεύματα
οὐκ ἂν πίθοιο· τἀμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστὶ καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

I have given these verses precisely as they were read by the Scholiasts and, before them, by Didymus whom they cite. It is quite clear why our Mss. in v. 4 put a dat. for the accus. which gave the Scholiasts and Didymus so much trouble. Dr Badham in his Philebus (2d ed. p. 129) makes a vigorous, but most untoward assault on the passage. He does not appear to have read the complete scholia. If he had, he would have seen that the very scholium on which he grounds his attack gives an elaborate and correct explanation of the most Euripidean verse which he expels on its authority. Nor does the Homeric *τι πίθοιο* in the least countenance the glaring solecism which he introduces. I also wholly dissent from Mr Verrall's

criticism: the position of *τούτοις* and the somewhat involved but most Greek construction prove to me that *φίλος* and *πίθοιο* are genuine. Nor do I like Kirchhoff's or Prinz's readings. The sole corruption lies in *οὐκ ἂν*, for which I propose *ὀκνῶν*: 'To them, if you are bound by oaths, you will not, when they try to carry me out of your land, give me up; but if you make a mere covenant of words and are unsworn, you might become a friend and, fearing their demands of surrender, might yield'. *ὀκνῶ*, in sense of *φοβοῦμαι*, with an accus. occurs certainly three times in Sophocles and is found in Demosthenes and others.

Medea 1181—1184.

ἤδη δ' ἀνελθὼν κῶλον ἕκπλεθρον δρόμου
ταχὺς βαδιστὴς τερμόνων ἀνθήπτετο,
ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀναύδου καὶ μύσαντος ὄμματος
δεινὸν στενάξασ' ἡ τάλαιν' ἠγείρετο.

Of the two first verses, commented on at such length by Elmsley and others, I will just say that I have followed the Mss. exactly, with the exception of *ἀνελθὼν* for *ἀνέλκων*. Who first may have proposed this simple change, I do not know; but it seems to give just the sense required, if we compare Agam. 345 *κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν*, and Eur. El. 825 and 883. The girl sat silent with her eyes shut as long as a runner took to go up and down the stadium of six plethra or 600 feet: 'A fast goer had come back along the second six-plethra limb of the course and was just seizing the final goal, when, thus long speechless with closed eye, the wretched girl woke up with a fearful moan'. Plato Tim. 69 A *πάλιν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνέλθωμεν*. With *ἀνθήπτετο* comp. Virgil's and Ovid's 'metam tenere': he seemed to seize, perhaps actually seized in a supreme effort the object which marked the limit: the absence of *ἄν* makes the sentence more vivid.

Of course *ἠγείρετο* of v. 4 is the poet's: to alter it is to assassinate the magnificent description. One is as certain that the scribe who wrote *ἀπώλλυτο* was merely dreaming of

v. 277, as if one had been looking over his shoulder when he miscopied ἠγείρετο of his original. Aeschylus at all events has ἐξηγειρόμην, and Eurip. again and again has the passive ἐξεγείρομαι. And ἀναύδου too is undoubted, but it is of course the masc. and femin., not the neuter, as Paley will have it, which would make sheer nonsense. It is that very common idiomatic use of ἐξ, which we cannot, but Milton could translate literally: 'Oh miserable of happy!' There is certainly however something wrong in the rest of the verse; but the change of a letter or so might I think suffice to set it right. We often meet with the following form of the idiom: Eur. Hel. 1021 ἐκ δυσσεβείας ὅσιον εἰ τίθημί νιν: frag. 336 τοὺς δ' ἐκ μέγιστον ὀλβίας τυραννίδος τὸ μηδὲν ὄντας: Rhes. 406. Might we then read ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀναύδου, κἀκ μύσαντος ὄμματος? But I am more disposed to adopt what Porson, I am sorry to say, calls 'prava Barnesii coniectura', as it was what Gregorius Theologus, a much older authority than our Mss., found in his Mss. καὶ μύσαντος ὄμματα. To my ear and judgment the masc. μύσαντος, countenanced as it is by the common form ἀναύδου, is more natural here than μυσάσης. I would not compare it with Agam. 540 δρόσοι τιθέντες, of which Hermann says 'indulserunt talia sibi poetae vel metri vel suavioris soni gratia'; nor with Hippol. 1105 where the female Coryphaeus strangely applies κεύθων and λείπων to herself; nor with Sophocles' fem. τηλικοῦτος. It has more affinity with the masc. plur. when a woman is speaking of herself; it has a still closer analogy with Hipp. 797 οὐκ ἐς γέροντας ἥδε σοι τείνει τύχη, Θησεῦ· νέοι θανόντες ἀλγυνοῦσί σε, of Phaedra alone: Androm. 711 ἡ στεῖρος οὖσα μόσχος οὐκ ἀνέξεται τίκτοντας ἄλλους. As in these passages, a general indeterminate state or condition is described, out of which the girl has now got. Nearer than any perhaps is Alc. 634 παρεὶς ἄλλῳ θανεῖν νέῳ γέρων ὤν, where only Alcestis is spoken of; still the condition suits male or female equally, as in our passage. But v. 1059 Admetus must say ἐν ἄλλης δεμνίοις πίτνειν νέας, as the masc. would here be too ambiguous and inappropriate.

Bacchae 206, 207.

οὐ γὰρ διῄρηχ' ὁ θεὸς εἴτε τὸν νέον
εἰ χρὴ χορεύειν εἴτε τὸν γεραίτερον.

The many corrections which have been made of this passage may be seen in Mr Sandys' edition. I would suggest *χρείη* for *εἰ χρὴ*: the corruption would arise from *χρὴ* being written for *χρείη* and then *ει* added in the margin or above. This optative is common enough, and yet it is constantly corrupted. It occurs six times in Sophocles, and is not once correctly given by the Mss. Oed. T. 162 '*χρείη*] *χρεῖ' ἦ*, *ει* in litura ex *η* facto' Dind. Oed. T. 555 '*χρείη*] Ald. *χρεία*. Aug. *χρή*' Ellendt: and so on.

I am inclined to adopt a similar theory in respect of Ion 602

τῶν δ' αὖ λογίων τε χρωμένων τε τῇ πόλει.

These words contrast with 598 *ὅσοι δὲ χρηστοὶ δυνάμενοί τ' εἶναι σοφοὶ σιγῶσι κοὐ σπεύδουσιν ἐς τὰ πράγματα.* The first *τε*, to say the least, is not wanted. I would therefore read *τῶν δ' αὖ λεγόντων χ. τ. τ. π.* Some letters of *λεγόντων* were omitted and perhaps written above. Badham's *σοφῶν τε* seems to me quite out of place.

Bacchae 506, 507.

Δ. *οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ζῇς οὐδ' ὁρᾷς οὔθ' ὅστις εἶ.*
Π. *Πενθεὺς Ἀγαύης παῖς, πατρὸς δ' Ἐχίονος.*

Here too Mr Sandys will give the many corrections of v. 1, with none of which I am satisfied. I would not, for reasons to be given presently, adopt even Elmsley's *ἔθ'* for *οὔθ'*. Nor do I think *ὅ τι ζῇς* suited to the context or to a general Athenian audience. Persius got his *Quid sumus cet.* from the Porch, not by being led to the Bacchae by his friend Horace. My correction is diplomatically almost as slight as *ζῃς* for *ζῃς*: I would read

οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ζεῖς οὐδ' ὁρᾷς οὔθ' ὅστις εἶ—

ζέω, like *ferveo*, means to boil with passion of any sort. θυμός is generally added, as in Hec. 1055 θυμῷ ζέοντι Θρηκὶ δυσμαχωτάτῳ: Oed. Col. 435 ἔζει θυμός: but not always as Plato will shew: Rep. IV, 440 C, ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται, οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει; Pentheus' answer is anyhow abrupt, not to say somewhat inane. But this inanity is I think increased, if you suppose Dionysus' speech to be complete. I assume it to be broken off by Pentheus' sudden retort. Generally, when a speaker is interrupted in a stichomythia, he afterwards completes his sentence; but not always, as for instance in Alcestis 1088.

Bacchae 859—861.

γνώσεται δὲ τὸν Διὸς
Διόνυσον, ὃς πέφυκεν ἐν τέλει θεὸς
δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος.

It is now generally conceded that ἐν τέλει and ἀνθρώποισι have no meaning here: we want a decided contrast between the enemies, like Pentheus, and the friends of the god. I am not satisfied with any of the numerous corrections of ἐν τέλει, which Mr Sandys enumerates, ἐνστάταις for instance, which, like the others, is too wide of the Mss.: I would suggest with some confidence ἐν ἀτελεῖ: 'who is a god most terrible towards the uninitiated', like Pentheus. This use of ἐν, like the cognate use of *in* in Latin, is idiomatic: Hipp. 1320 σὺ δ' ἔν τ' ἐκείνῳ κἀν ἐμοὶ φαίνει κακός: Or. 754 οὐ γὰρ αἰχμητὴς πέφυκεν, ἐν γυναιξὶ δ' ἄλκιμος: Ellendt I, p. 598, § 4 gives instances from Sophocles.

With ἀτελεῖ comp. v. 40 ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν τῶν ἐμῶν βακχευμάτων: and frag. 889, v. 6: ἀτέλεστος runs parallel with ἀτελής in its various meanings, and is used without a genit. by Plato and others. Comp. now Hym. Cer. 481 ὃς δ' ἀτελής, ἱερῶν ὅς τ' ἄμμορος, οὔποθ' ὁμοίων αἶσαν ἔχει φθίμενός περ ὑπὸ ζόφῳ εὐρώεντι. This is the Ms. stopping: Hermann and later critics, to avoid the hyperbaton, put the comma after ἱερῶν. But as the second clause is a mere amplification or

explanation of the first, ὅς τε cannot anyhow be right, since it would imply a direct antithesis between the two: you want a simple ὅς, or a simple τε or καί. I would therefore propose ὃς δ' ἀτελής, ἱερῶν ὃς ἐτ' ἄμμορος, which improves both syntax and rhythm. In any case Plato will support my ἀτελεῖ, as he must have had this passage of the hymn in his mind when he wrote Phaedo p. 80 F ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς ᾅδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.

For ἀνθρώποισι I ought perhaps at once to adopt Badham's εὐνοοῦσι, and yet I hesitate, unreasonably it may be. The brilliant critic observes: In codicibus ἀνθρώποισι scribitur ανοισι. nota est permutatio α et ευ in vocum initiis. It is true that for many long ages ἄνθρωπος was written ανος: true also that during certain medieval times Mss. confused α and ευ 'in vocum initiis', and elsewhere too[1]. But all this involves a succession of steps, and I am disposed to look on both τέλει and ἀνθρώποισι as very ancient corruptions. I would therefore like something resembling the full ἀνθρώποισι: I would also like a second ἐν. As therefore O and Θ, M and Π are much older sources of confusion than α and ευ, I would suggest ἐν ὁμοίοισι δ' ἠπιώτατος: comp. 1302 ὑμῖν ἐγένεθ' ὅμοιος, οὐ σέβων θεόν: and all through Greek literature, beginning with Homer, the proverb runs, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον. Rhythms like those I have given to the two verses are most appropriate in a late play of Euripides like the Bacchae: similar ones meet the eye on all sides.

In my citation from the hymn I have kept the Ms. reading ὁμοίων: 'never has an allotment of like things': like Homer's ἐλπίδος, λητίδος αἶσα: so in v. 256 of the hymn, οὔτ' ἀγαθοῖο αἶσαν ἐπερχομένου προγνωμέναι οὔτε κακοῖο. Editors wrongly adopt or approve of Voss's ὁμοίως. I think it not improbable that Euripides, like Plato, had this passage in his thoughts, which might have tended to suggest to him ἐν ὁμοίοισι, as well as ἐν ἀτελεῖ.

[1] Iph. T. 45 I would read παρθένοισι δ' ἐν μέσαις ᾄδειν (Mss. εὔδειν); a simpler correction than Markland's or Monk's: see Conington on Geor. IV 345 for maidens and goddesses singing over their looms. Paley misses the real point of the objection to εὔδειν.

Phoenissae 473—476.

ἐγὼ δὲ πατρὸς δωμάτων προὐσκεψάμην
τοὐμόν τε καὶ τοῦδ' ἐκφυγεῖν χρῄζων ἀράς,
ἃς Οἰδίπους ἐφθέγξατ' εἰς ἡμᾶς ποτε,
ἐξῆλθον ἔξω τῆσδ' ἑκὼν αὐτὸς χθονὸς, κ.τ.ἑ.

πατρὸς of v. 1 is certainly corrupt: it contravenes sense and syntax. I propose πάτωρ δωμάτων. Dindorf in Steph. Thes. first recalled attention to the word and gave the following proofs of its existence: Photius πάτορες, κτήτορες: Hesych. πάτορες (Mss. πατέρες), πλούσιοι: Rhad. fr. 660, v. 4, πάτωρ (Mss. πατὴρ) δόμοις. Here we have πατρὸς, as πατὴρ would not suit metre. Ion 675 we have the verb πέπαται, which is not uncommon. 'I in possession of the palace took thought alike for my welfare and his'. The possession of the royal palace and thereby of the treasures and guards was the mark of sovereign power: comp. vss. 482, 486, 547, 1231, 1450, and espec. 68 with what precedes, a comment on our passage: Alcest. 681 ἐγὼ δέ σ' οἴκων δεσπότην ἐγεινάμην κἄθρεψα.

Phoenissae 845—848.

θάρσει, πέλας γάρ, Τειρεσία, φίλοισι σοῖς
ἐξώρμισαι σὸν πόδα· λαβοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ, τέκνον,
ὡς πᾶσ' ἀπήνη πούς τε πρεσβύτου φιλεῖ
χειρὸς θυραίας ἀναμένειν κουφίσματα.

Many indeed are the corrections which have been made of πᾶσ' ἀπήνη, as may be seen in Porson's and other editions; none of them even specious. A corruption there certainly is: 'frustra' says Hermann 'conati sunt quidam explicare quae absurda sunt'. The words are clearly a proverb, and I will try to make all right by the change of a single letter: ὡς στᾶσ' ἀπήνη: 'Since a cart stuck fast and an old man's foot like to wait for the helping lift of another's hand'. ἔστην strictly means 'I came to a stand', στάς 'coming to a stand'—voluntarily or involuntarily. For the former sense comp. pas-

sages like *ἔστην δ' εἰνὶ θύρῃσι θεᾶς καλλιπλοκάμοιο· ἔνθα στὰς ἐβόησα*: for the latter Plat. Phaedr. 245 E *ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι*: Theaet. 153 D *εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν κ.τ.ἑ.* The *ἀπήνη*, a contrast to the *ἅρμα*, and generally drawn by mules, was employed sometimes to carry heavy loads: see Il. Ω: sometimes women; was therefore roomy and heavy, and likely to stick in the mud in a land like Greece with roads such as it had and has.

Bastius tells us that the old ϖ, the π of Mss., is very like a Ms. στ: *ἐπί* et *ἐστὶ* facillime commutantur[1]. Or, if one σ was absorbed by the other, τ would at once pass into π. Herc. Fur. 163

> *ἀλλ' ὃς μένων βλέπει τε κἀντιδέρκεται*
> *δορὸς ταχεῖαν ἄλοκα τάξιν ἐμβεβώς.*

ταχεῖαν has no meaning: Wak. *βαθεῖαν* which is just as unmeaning; for a *wound* may be called a *deep furrow*, not a *phalanx*. Read *παχεῖαν*, which well designates the serried phalanx with its many ranks. I will take this opportunity to correct Helen. 961

> *λέξω τάδ' ἀμφὶ μνῆμα σοῦ πατρὸς πόθῳ.*

Comparing v. 1009 *ἃ δ' ἀμφὶ τύμβῳ τῷδ' ὀνειδίζεις πατρί*, I read *πατρὸς σποδῷ*.

Phoenissae 1113—1118.

> *Ὠγύγια δ' ἐς πυλώμαθ' Ἱππομέδων ἄναξ*
> *ἔστειχ', ἔχων σημεῖον ἐν μέσῳ σάκει*
> *στικτοῖς Πανόπτην ὄμμασιν δεδορκότα,*
> *τὰ μὲν σὺν ἄστρων ἐπιτολαῖσιν ὄμματα*
> *βλέποντα, τὰ δὲ κρύπτοντα δυνόντων μέτα,*
> *ὡς ὕστερον θανόντος εἰσορᾶν παρῆν.*

Long notes have been written on this passage by Hermann and others. Herm. inserts a very bald line after v. 3, because

[1] As I am revising this, I observe in Hermes v. 17, p. 378 a certain correction in a passage of Galen, *πλεῖον ἐπῶν* for *πλείονες τῶν*.

Πανόπτης, he says, must be further defined. I think the context sufficiently shews that Argus alone can be meant, looking at his celebrity and the well-known passage of Aesch. Suppl. But I can get no explanation of the very corrupt 4th and 5th vss. which must represent Argus as opening some of his eyes and closing others. Also βλέποντα and κρύπτοντα, or what they stand for, must surely be masc. accusatives. Then ὄμματα in v. 4 has for me no meaning. To my surprise Herm. goes on speaking of τὰ μὲν—ὄμματα, as if it meant 'some of the eyes', which is surely impossible: an Attic writer can after ὁ μέν or ὁ δέ repeat a noun in a sentence like Thuc. VII 86 ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένην, ...τὸν δὲ κ. τ. ἑ. But that has nothing to do with a sentence like ours, [τῶν ὀμμάτων] τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ κρύπτοντα. Thuc. II 92 can say ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τινὰς δὲ καὶ ἐζώγρησαν: but he could not have said τοὺς μὲν...ἄνδρας ἀπέκτειναν, τινὰς δὲ κ.τ.ἑ. We might say that ὄμματα is a gloss and has ousted αἰθέρος or οὐρανοῦ, but there are other difficulties: βλέποντα must be corrupt. Then why the strange unpoetical particularity of 1118: 'As we were able to observe after his death'? Of course it is a poetical licence to assume that these small devices could be seen from the walls; but the licence is naturally taken in the other descriptions, and the eyes of Argus might be seen at least as easily as the hairs on the lion's skin of Tydeus' shield. Observe now that strange primitive contrivance in 1126, where the Potniad mares are represented as set in motion by means of a pivot or pin from the inner side of the shield. I am strongly disposed to think that Hippomedon's device had the same contrivance as Polynices', and Argus was made to open some of his eyes and close others by a movement of Hippomedon's hand from within. I would therefore suggest

τὰ μὲν σὺν ἄστρων ἐπιτολαῖσιν ἄμματι
λέποντα, τὰ δὲ κρύπτοντα δυνόντων μέτα.

'*Peeling* some of them by means of a loop' or 'noose', moved by Hippomedon's left hand πόρπαχ' ὑπ' αὐτόν, as in 1127. ἄμμα occurs in three other passages of Euripides: λέποντα,

which in such a context would infallibly pass into *βλέποντα*, seems well to express this artificial drawing up of the eyelids. *νευρόσπαστα* were carried to much perfection by the Greeks: Aristot. de Mundo 6 describes the *νευροσπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι*, as setting at once in motion every part and member of a puppet. *ἄμμα* would be much the same as *μήρινθος*.

Hercules Furens 728—731.

ὦ γέροντες, ἐς καλὸν
στείχει, βρόχοισι δ' ἀρκύων γενήσεται
ξιφηφόροισι τοὺς πέλας δοκῶν κτενεῖν
ὁ παγκάκιστος.

For the corrupt *γειήσεται* Pierson, followed by many, *δεδήσεται*, Elmsley *λελήψεται*. Both these forms are, for Euripides at least, very suspicious, and have neither of them otherwise any probability. A simple correction, especially when we consider how continually in Mss. *γ* and *ν* are confused, would be *ἀρκύων ἐνήσεται*: comp. Troad. 1038 *χἡ Κύπρις κόμπου χάριν λόγοις ἐνεῖται*. Herod. v 35 uses *μετήσεσθαι* for a fut. pass. I find no other instance of this passive force in the case of *ἥσομαι* or its compounds; but again and again we meet with isolated cases of such a passive.

The death-scene of Lycus which now follows, the blinding of Polymestor in the Hecuba, and the murder of Medea's children, all imitate more or less closely the famous murder-scene in the Agamemnon. I would appeal to the Hercules and the Hecuba in favour of the old-fashioned against the more recent interpretation, or interpretations, of v. 1344

ὤμοι, πέπληγμαι καιρίαν πληγὴν ἔσω.

What follows in Aeschylus—to which might be added Eur. Phoen. 1431 *τετρωμένους δ' ἰδοῦσα καιρίους σφαγάς*—proves that this line is one sentence and that Blomfield is wrong. Some editors however reject *ἔσω*, while Hermann and Paley interpret it, in the latter's words, of 'a blow within the body', 'a blow

inflicted by steel thrust into it', and their parallels all illustrate this meaning. But Agamemnon was struck down by the blow of a poleaxe. Both Hecuba 1035—1038 and Herc. F. 749—754 are plain imitations of Aeschylus. Now comp. Herc. F. 747 *τὰ δωμάτων ἔσω σκοπῶμεν, εἰ πράσσει τις ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω*: Hec. 1038 *φίλαι, πέπρακται καίν' ἔσω δόμων κακά.* Well, just as Lycus l.l. says *ὦ πᾶσα Κάδμου γαῖ', ἀπόλλυμαι δόλῳ*, so Agamemnon, when he exclaims 'I am struck a deadly blow here within the house', may address, through the chorus, the whole public, and the audience would feel an impulse to rush in to his aid: surely a most powerful stage-motive. The *ἔσω* would mean 'ho! to the rescue here'.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

HORACE *CARM.* I 12 41—44.

> Hunc et incomptis Curium capillis
> utilem bello tulit et Camillum
> saeva paupertas et avitus apto
> cum lare fundus.

Bentley and many others would read *arto* for *apto*. The two words really come to the same thing, and *apto* is the more poetical. Martial, when in a good humour with his farm, says, VI 43 3 Me Nomentani confirmant otia ruris Et casa *iugeribus non onerosa suis:* the *casa* here is *apta*. Out of humour he writes, XII 57 1 Cur saepe sicci parva rura Nomenti *Laremque* villae *sordidum* petam, quaeris? Horace had probably in mind Cato de agri cult: 3 § 1 ita aedifices ne villa fundum quaerat neve fundus villam: quoted both by Columella and by Pliny. Eur. El. 252 *σκαφεύς τις ἢ βουφορβὸς ἄξιος δόμων.* Pepys, 30 Aug. 1667, To Sir W. Pen's: a very bad dinner and *every thing suitable.*

H. A. J. MUNRO.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

II. THE *PARMENIDES.*

§ 1 ch. i—vii: 126 A—135 C.

αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα;

In the hope of ascertaining the stage of doctrinal development which the *Parmenides* represents, and so preparing the way for the study of its dogmatic content, I propose without further preface to summarize the argument of ch. ii—vii, subjoining to my summary of each of its sections a concise statement of the results obtained, but reserving my interpretation of those results until the chapters in question can be considered collectively.

(1)

127 D The discussion takes its rise from the first of Zeno's demonstrations of the non-existence of the many. He has argued that, if existences are many, they must be at once like and unlike; whence it follows, since unlikes cannot be like, nor likes unlike, that the existence of the many is impossible.

128 E Hereupon Socrates refuses to allow that unlikes cannot be like, nor likes unlike. Do you not acknowledge, he asks, the existence of *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of likeness and unlikeness, in which two *εἴδη* you and I and other particulars become participant, (*a*) those particulars which become participant in likeness becoming like by reason of that *εἶδος*, and in so far as they become participant in it, (*b*) those particulars which become participant in unlikeness becoming similarly unlike, and (*c*) those particulars which become participant both in likeness and in unlikeness becoming similarly both like and

unlike? Might not all things in this way become participant in both opposites, and so, by becoming participant in them, be at once like and unlike one another? To maintain that self-likes[1] become unlike or self-unlikes like, that the self-one becomes many or the self-many one, would no doubt be paradoxical: but I see no difficulty in conceiving things which participate in likeness and unlikeness to be like and unlike, or things which participate in one and many to be one and many. For example, I am myself one and many, one man with many members and parts—by participation: sticks, stones, and the like are many and one—by participation. But I do not see, I grant, how any one who attributes a separate, independent existence to εἴδη, such as likeness, unlikeness, multitude, unity, rest, motion, &c, can suppose these εἴδη to be capable of combination and disintegration[2].

Thus, whereas Zeno has assumed, in order to disprove the existence of the many, that unlikes cannot be like, nor likes unlike, the Platonic Socrates meets this assumption with a reference to his own theory of ideas, and in justifying himself states several propositions which that theory includes; (1) there are *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of likeness, unlikeness, multitude, unity, rest, motion, &c; (2) by participation (*μετάληψις*[3], *μέθεξις*) in the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* of likeness, unlikeness, unity, multitude, &c, particulars become, and are, like, unlike, one, many, &c; (3) the *εἶδος* of likeness cannot partake of unlikeness and so become unlike, nor can the *εἶδος* of unlikeness partake of likeness and so become like; (4) particulars however may partake both of likeness and of unlikeness, &c.

(2)

130 A Have *you*, Socrates, Parmenides asks with intention, made this separation between the εἴδη and their participants? Do you think that there is an *αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης* which is distinct from the *ὁμοιότης* in us (*ἧς ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν*)? Socrates assents, explaining however in reply to further questions, that, though he unhesitatingly acknowledges *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* (*a*) of

[1] With *αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, αὐτὰ τὰ ἀνόμοια*, compare *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα Phaedo* 74 B. These phrases are, of course, inadmissible, as the idea is ἕν, not πολλά: but so long as ideas of equality, likeness, and unlikeness are recognized, inconsistency in this respect is perhaps inevitable.

[2] Here then, we have πολλά to which Zeno's argument does not apply.

[3] *μεταλαμβάνειν = μετέχον γίγνεσθαι.*

likeness, one, many, &c, and (*b*) of just, beautiful, good, &c, he has often had doubts about the recognition of εἴδη (*c*) of man, fire, water, and certainly cannot bring himself to acknowledge εἴδη (*d*) of hair, mud, dirt, and things which are contemptible or bad. There was indeed a time when he was troubled by the thought that the same rule ought to apply in all cases; but of late he has been content to direct his attention solely to the two sorts first-mentioned. Parmenides warns him that in the eyes of the true philosopher nothing is mean or despicable: he will think differently when he grows older.

The chief points to be noted in this chapter are (1) that at some former period the Socrates of the *Parmenides* has admitted the existence of *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*, not only (*a*) of *ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, ἕν, πλῆθος, στάσις, κίνησις*, and (*b*) of *δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν*, but also (*c*) of *ἄνθρωπος, πῦρ, ὕδωρ*, and (*d*) of *θρίξ, πηλός, ῥύπος*, and generally *ὅ τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον*; and (2) that he has now begun to have doubts in regard to the third and fourth of these classes, and to neglect them accordingly.

(3)

130 E Parmenides proceeds with his interrogatory. You hold, you say, that there are certain εἴδη whereof particulars (*τάδε τὰ ἄλλα*) partake, thence deriving their names: e.g. things become like by participation in likeness, great by participation in greatness, just by participation in justice, beautiful by participation in beauty. Is it of the whole of the εἶδος, or of a part of it, that each participant particular partakes? for clearly it must partake either of the whole or of a part.

131 A Consider first the former of these alternatives. Do you think that the whole of the εἶδος, without prejudice to its unity, occurs in each of the many particulars? Why not? asks Socrates. Because, replies Parmenides, at that rate one and the same thing will occur simultaneously as a whole in a multitude of things which are separate from it, and consequently will be separate from itself. Socrates does not see why each εἶδος should not occur in all the particulars without prejudice to its unity and identity in the same way in which the day, without prejudice to its unity and identity, is found simultaneously in many places. Or, replies Parmenides, as a single sail may cover many men: that would be a *ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς*, I suppose? No doubt. But, continues Parmenides, you must allow that it is a different part of the sail, not the

whole of it, which covers each man: whence it appears that the εἴδη themselves are divisible, and that the participant particulars will participate in parts of the εἶδος: in other words, it will not be the whole of the εἶδος, but a part of it, which is found in each particular. Socrates assents.

131 C The one alternative having been thus disposed of, next mark the difficulties which attend the other. If the one εἶδος is parted amongst its particulars, will it retain its unity? No, replies Socrates. If, for example, Parmenides resumes, greatness is divided amongst the many things which are great, a thing will be made great by a part of greatness less than greatness itself; if the equal is divided, a thing will be made equal by a part of the equal less than the self-equal; if the small is divided, the self-small will be greater than the subtracted part, so that in this way, the self-small will be made greater, while the particular to which the subtracted part is added will be made smaller. Socrates acknowledges that it is difficult to say how particulars partake of the εἶδος.

131 E Again, your reason for supposing the εἶδος, e.g. the great, to be one, is, that when you inspect several particulars which seem to you to be great, you think you perceive in all of them one and the same ἰδέα. Now if in like manner you consider the self-great together with the particular greats, you must on the same principle assume a new self-great by reason of which the original self-great and the particular greats seem to be great, and this process may be repeated ad infinitum, so that each of your εἴδη will be, not one, but infinite in number.

Having at 130 A hinted a doubt whether Socrates carries out the separation of the εἶδος from its particulars as strictly as he professes to do, in the paragraph here summarized Parmenides criticises in detail his interlocutor's theory of the relation of the particular to the εἶδος. Whether the particular's participation is in the whole of the εἶδος or in part of it, insurmountable difficulties present themselves, of which Socrates has hitherto been wholly unconscious. The theory of the presence of the εἶδος in particulars, which thence derive their common character and their common name, sacrifices the unity of the εἶδος in two ways: (1) it assumes either its multiplication or its division among sensibles; (2) it implies, or ought to imply, the existence of a new εἶδος to account for the resemblance of the original εἶδος to its particulars, and so on ad infinitum. That

these objections are serious, Socrates does not deny; but he still thinks that something may be said for the doctrine of the immanence of the idea.

(4)

132 B Perhaps, says Socrates, each εἶδος is a *νόημα*, existent only in souls, in which case the unity of the εἶδος will be preserved, and the objections raised will fall to the ground. But, replies Parmenides, a thought which is ἕν must be a thought of something, and this something must be an existent thing, namely the one ἰδέα which the thought in question apprehends in all the particulars: now this, if it is eternal and immutable, is the εἶδος as it has been hitherto conceived. Further, on the assumption that particulars participate in εἴδη, if the εἶδος is a thought, each particular must consist of thoughts, and consequently either all particulars are intelligent, or there are thoughts which are not intelligent. Socrates allows the objections.

132 D For my part, he continues, I am inclined to take another view: these εἴδη are as it were models or types (*παραδείγματα*) established in nature, particulars being copies or likenesses (*ὁμοιώματα*) of them; and the particulars' participation in the εἶδος consists in their being made like to it. But, replies Parmenides, if particulars are like the εἶδος, the εἶδος is like the particulars, in so far as they were made like to it: now two like things must participate in the same unity[1], and that by participation in which the likes are like will be the εἶδος itself. Hence there cannot be anything like the εἶδος nor can the εἶδος be like anything else: for, if we suppose the εἶδος to be like particulars which participate in it, there will be another εἶδος to account for their likeness, and so on ad infinitum. But this infinite regress is destructive of the whole theory. It is not then in virtue of likeness that particulars participate in the εἶδος. In short, a new theory of participation must be provided.

In these difficult and important paragraphs Socrates endeavours to save the doctrine of the idea's immanence by explanations or interpretations of his theory of the idea; whilst Parmenides replies, not by impugning these explanations or interpretations of the theory of the idea, but by showing that

[1] Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 132 D. Should not the word εἴδους be bracketed, as a premature anticipation of Parmenides' next question?

they do not meet the objections raised against the doctrine of the idea's immanence.

Socrates' first suggestion is that the εἶδος may be no more than a νόημα. Parmenides hereupon points out that if this νόημα is to be eternal and immutable, its object, the ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσι, must be eternal and immutable also: thus Socrates' defence breaks down, because the νόημα has an object, which object is the εἶδος as originally conceived. Moreover if the εἶδος is a thought, whilst particulars are what they are by participation either in the whole of the εἶδος or in a part of it, either all participant particulars are intelligent, or there are thoughts which are not intelligent: in other words, either all participant particulars are minds, or there are thoughts apart from mind. Neither of these alternatives is admissible. Thus the conception of the εἶδος as a νόημα leaves the doctrine of the idea's immanence still open to attack.

Socrates now offers another suggestion. It is possible that the εἶδος is a natural type, of which particulars are ὁμοιώματα, and that the particulars' participation in the εἶδος consists in their being made like to it (εἰκασθῆναι). To this view Socrates himself inclines. Parmenides makes no objection whatever to the new conception of the εἶδος as a παράδειγμα, but questions the account given of its relation to particulars. You have hitherto maintained, he says in effect, that wherever you find a number of things called in virtue of their resemblance by the same name, you are justified in assuming an αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος by the presence of which they are what they are. If you hold, on the one hand, that wherever you find a number of things like one another you are justified in assuming an αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος by the presence of which they are what they are, and on the other hand that particulars and εἶδος are like one another, the mutual resemblance of the particulars and the εἶδος will be a reason for assuming a new εἶδος, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, though your new conception of the εἶδος as a παράδειγμα secures its unity on the one side, your theory of its relation to its particulars still sacrifices its unity on the other. Parmenides' inference is, not that Socrates' conception of the εἶδος as a παράδειγμα is erroneous, but, that ὁμοιότης is not the basis

of its relationship to its particulars[1]. At the same time he seems to take for granted that a theory of the mutual relations of εἶδος and particular is immediately forthcoming, as he at once proceeds to discuss from another point of view the separate existence of the εἴδη, and in the course of it 133 D makes use of a phrase which recals Socrates' suggestion and apparently implies that the conception of the εἶδος as a *παράδειγμα* is provisionally accepted.

(5)

133 A You do not fully apprehend, Parmenides continues, the difficulty involved in the new doctrine that the εἶδος exists always apart from particulars. If a sceptic argues that εἴδη as we now conceive them cannot be known, you must not hope to persuade him that he is wrong unless he combines empirical knowledge and natural aptitude with willingness to pursue a very laborious course of study. How so? asks Socrates.

133 C It will be acknowledged, Parmenides begins, both by yourself and by any other believer in *αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν οὐσία*, that no such *οὐσία* is to be found in us[2]. Hence any *ἰδέα* which implies relation correlates, not with a *ὁμοίωμα* (or

[1] This limitation of Parmenides' inference is to me of great importance: for, whereas it is generally assumed that these chapters are either purely destructive or prefatory to a restatement of the doctrine criticised, I discover in the words *τὰ εἴδη ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει* the germ of a new theory devised in view of the objections raised in the preceding pages. That the phrase *ἐν τῇ φύσει* does not imply the actualization of the paradeigmatic idea as a concrete particular, is clear from the whole tenour of the passage: compare *Phaedo* 103 B, where the separately existent idea is spoken of as *ἐν τῇ φύσει*, in opposition to the immanent idea *ἐν ἡμῖν*; and *republic* 597 B, where *ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει κλίνη* is the idea, in opposition to the particular *ἣν ὁ τέκτων εἰργάσατο*.

[2] *οἶμαι ἄν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν [αὐτοῦ] ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.* 133 C. Compare 134 B *Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.* Thus the argument of 131 A sqq has worked a complete revolution in Socrates' views. He no longer says a word in defence of the theory of *παρουσία*, which he so confidently advocated at the beginning of that passage. We now see the importance of Parmenides' question 130 B —*αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἅττα χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα*; Socrates had not then, as he has now, strictly carried out the separation of the idea from its particulars.

whatever the thing may be) in us, but with another ἰδέα, and similarly any ὁμοίωμα which involves relation correlates, not with an εἶδος, but with another ὁμοίωμα: e.g. the εἶδος of slavery correlates, not with lord, but with the εἶδος of lordship; while slave correlates, not with the εἶδος of lordship, but with lord. Similarly the εἶδος of knowledge in general correlates with the idea of truth in general, and the εἶδος of any special knowledge or science with the εἶδος of the object of that special knowledge or science; while knowledge in general possessed by us correlates with truth as we apprehend it, and any special knowledge or science possessed by us with the object of that special knowledge as we apprehend it. Hence, as we do not possess the εἶδος of knowledge, we cannot know any εἶδος whatever; for example, we cannot know the self-beautiful or the self-good.

134 C Again, if there is αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, it must be more exact (ἀκριβέστερον) than ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη, and should therefore be possessed by God, if by any one. It follows that, inasmuch as the εἶδος of knowledge does not correlate with τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, the gods do not know what concerns men. Similarly, inasmuch as the lordship of the gods is ἀκριβεστάτη, it cannot be exercised over us.

134 E These consequences being involved in the doctrine of separately existent ideas, if their separation from particulars is a real separation, it is not to be wondered at that the hearer demurs to it, maintaining, firstly, that there are not such things, and secondly, that if there are such things, they are not cognizable by human beings. Indeed, that a man may accept the doctrine of αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν οὐσία, he must have a great natural aptitude, while for the discovery of the εἴδη and the transmission of the knowledge of them to capable pupils positive genius is required. Yet for all that, one who does not upon consideration of the whole case allow the existence of εἴδη of things, each thing having an εἶδος which is determinate, immutable, and eternal, will have no object to which to direct his intelligence, and so his dialectical faculty will be wasted. True, replies Socrates.

Assuming the doctrine of the idea's immanence to have been finally rejected, and accepting provisionally so much of Socrates' reconstruction of the theory of ideas as is contained in the proposition that the εἴδη ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἕστηκεν ἐν τῇ φύσει, Parmenides here 133 A—135 C points out that under the reconstituted theory we are even further removed from knowledge than had been previously supposed. Whereas at the

outset Socrates had imagined either the whole of the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδος* or a part of it to be found in the particular, the separation between particular and *εἶδος* has now been made absolute, and in consequence knowledge possessed by the individual cannot have *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* for its objects. At the same time Parmenides emphatically declares his conviction that the rejection of the theory of *εἴδη* involves the abandonment of all philosophical inquiry, and gives it to be understood that to this he cannot reconcile himself.

It would seem then that the Platonic Parmenides (1) assumes the existence, apart from particulars, of certain eternal and immutable *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη* which are fixed types in nature, (2) acknowledges that we cannot know these *εἴδη*, but (3) conceives that if there are *εἴδη*, something deserving the name of knowledge is possible, while if there are not *εἴδη* neither can there be knowledge. Whither then are we to look for knowledge? This question, which immediately suggests itself to the reader, is raised by Parmenides at the very beginning of ch. viii, and engages the attention of the interlocutors throughout the rest of the dialogue.

We have now reached a point at which it will be possible and convenient to comment upon the results so far obtained.

At the outset of the discussion Socrates propounds with unusual confidence a theory of *εἴδη*, which Parmenides proceeds to criticise with unusual directness. Socrates, who throughout shows surprising docility, not only allows all Parmenides' objections, but also offers suggestions for the reformation of his own doctrine; and, if I am right in my understanding of 132 D sqq, one of these suggestions obtains from Parmenides a partial approval. Thus in the chapters now under examination two distinct interpretations of the theory of eternal and immutable *εἴδη* are recognized, of which the one is clearly formulated and expressly rejected, while the other, however slightly indicated, is, at any rate provisionally, affirmed. It will be worth while to inquire whether these interpretations occur elsewhere.

In his original statement of doctrine the Socrates of the *Parmenides* tells us plainly, (1) that it is by participation in the εἶδος that particulars are what they are 129 A, where by the particular's participation in the εἶδος is meant the presence of the εἶδος in the particular 131 A; (2) that, whereas εἴδη of opposites cannot partake of one another 129 B E, particulars may simultaneously partake of the εἴδη of opposites 129 B C; (3) that there was once a time when he recognized εἴδη, not only (*a*) of likeness, unity, multitude, and (*b*) of just, beautiful, good, but also (*c*) of man, fire, water, and (*d*) of hair, mud, dirt, and indeed of everything; but that he has now begun to have doubts about the propriety of admitting εἴδη of the two sorts last mentioned 130 B—D. It further appears in the course of Parmenides' interrogatory that Socrates has been hitherto unconscious of the serious difficulties involved in the theory of παρουσία 131 A. Let us now turn to the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. The Socrates of those dialogues holds (1) that it is by participation in the idea that particulars are what they are *Phaedo* 100 D, cf. *republic* 476 A D, where by the particular's participation in the idea is meant the presence of the idea in the particular *Phaedo* 102 D; (2) that, whereas εἴδη of opposites cannot partake of one another *Phaedo* 74 B 102 D 103 B, particulars may simultaneously partake of ideas of opposites *republic* 479 A 523 C 525 A, *Phaedo* 102 C 103 B; (3) that there are ideas, not only (*a*) of equality, unity, multitude *Phaedo* 74 C 101 C 101 B, (*b*) of just, beautiful, good *republic* and *Phaedo* passim, but also (*c*) of fire *Phaedo* 105 A, and (*d*) of fever 105 C, and indeed of all general names whatever *republic* 596 A. It further appears that the Socrates of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* is wholly unconscious of the difficulties involved in the theory of παρουσία *Phaedo* ut supra. Thus the Socrates of the *Parmenides* has formerly maintained a doctrine agreeing in all respects with that of the Socrates of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*; but he has begun to have doubts about the rule laid down *republic* X 596 A εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν, and as soon as he is questioned by Parmenides finds himself obliged also to retract the dogma confidently affirmed *Phaedo*

100 D οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία.

The ἔλεγχος does not however leave us in a state of mere ἀπορία. Parmenides has hardly completed his criticism before Socrates hazards the conjecture that the εἴδη are fixed types in nature, particulars being their antitypes. In this way one of the two difficulties insisted upon by Parmenides is disposed of: for, if the εἶδος is no more than a παράδειγμα, its unity is not sacrificed by any distribution amongst particulars. So far Parmenides approves. But when Socrates further conjectures that particulars are fashioned in the likeness of the paradeigmatic εἶδος, Parmenides objects that the theory of the relation of the particular to the εἶδος leaves his other difficulty untouched, inasmuch as to account for the resemblance between the εἶδος and its particulars a new εἶδος must be assumed, and so on ad infinitum. Some other theory of the relation of the particular to the εἶδος must therefore be devised: Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἄλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει. Now on a former occasion I have tried to show that in the *Philebus* the idea is a fixed type in nature, of which particulars are antitypes, related to the idea in virtue of the identity of the material element in both, and the approximation of the formal element of each particular to the formal element of the idea: and it is immediately obvious that this theory is not open to the objection urged at 132 D sqq, as we now recognize a necessary unlikeness between idea and particulars, and a possible unlikeness between related particulars, so that ὁμοιότης is no longer the basis of μέθεξις. It is then possible that the analysis of εἶδος and particulars into their elements, πέρας and ἀπειρία, which plays so considerable a part in the *Philebus*, is the theory which Parmenides here desiderates: but as yet I am not in a position to do more than note the possibility that it is so.

Furthermore, Socrates' suggestion that the εἶδος may be a νόημα, though found to be inapplicable to the doctrine of the immanent idea, is in a manner realized in the system which I have sketched. For as the idea is now the perfect model after which imperfect things were created, and at 134 C is expressly

stated to be the object of God's knowledge, it may be regarded as a *νόημα* (at once *νοοῦν* and *νοούμενον*), not indeed of man, but of God.

Next, let it be observed that Parmenides' criticism is from first to last weighty and precise. It cannot be set aside as captious or trivial. Hence the advocate of the doctrine criticised, unless he is prepared to abandon it altogether, must either meet and overthrow the objections raised, or escape them by modifying his theory. Now that Plato is not prepared to abandon the doctrine, is clearly shown by the emphatic declaration—*εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτω τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ* 135 B, taken in conjunction with the fact that throughout the rest of the dialogue the possibility of attaining to something worthy the name of knowledge is steadily assumed. Which then of the alternative courses indicated above does Plato choose? Does he, either in the *Parmenides* or elsewhere, fairly meet and successfully rebut the objections raised in the early pages of the dialogue against a doctrine which in all respects agrees with that of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*? For myself, I cannot find, either in the *Parmenides* or elsewhere, so much as an attempt to do anything of the sort. On the contrary, both in the *Parmenides*, and in the *Philebus*, where the theory of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* is similarly attacked, the validity of the objections raised seems to me to be unreservedly admitted. I hold then, not only that that form of the theory of ideas which is presented in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* has here received its deathblow, but also that Plato is perfectly aware of the fact. If so, it only remains for us to suppose that, in order to escape from the objections which his own sagacity had discovered, Plato had recourse to a reconstitution of his system. Hence, when I find that under the pressure of the *ἔλεγχος* Socrates suggests a modification of the theory, which modification, when duly qualified, gains Parmenides' approval, I infer that the progress which Socrates, the recognized repre-

sentative of Platonism, makes in ch. ii—vii represents the course of Plato's doctrinal development, and that Socrates' conjecture, that the ideas are fixed types in nature, contains the germ of Plato's new belief.

Of the detail of the later doctrine we have as yet heard nothing: but, as the theory of knowledge, with which the latter part of the dialogue is ostensibly concerned, necessarily rests upon the theory of being, it is possible that we may hereafter discover hints for the reconstruction, or at any rate references directing us to some other dialogue. It will therefore be advisable, when we resume the study of the argument, to look out for such hints or references: and in doing so, it will be worth while to remember that Parmenides is discontented, not only with Socrates' theory of the relation of idea and particular, but also with his account of the contents of the world of ideas.

I apprehend then that, in these opening chapters of the dialogue, (1) a theory of immanent ideas has been propounded, which does not differ from that put forward in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*; (2) this theory has sustained a serious and damaging criticism; (3) a theory of paradeigmatic ideas has been announced; (4) the idea has been declared to be incognizable by man[1].

§ 2 ch. viii, ix: 135 C—137 C.

Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποῖ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;

The first part of the dialogue having ended with an emphatic declaration that, whilst the absolute separation now effected between εἶδος and particulars places the εἶδος beyond the reach

[1] In the foregoing paragraphs I have of necessity emphasized the divergence of the theory of the paradeigmatic idea from that of the immanent idea. As however the doctrine of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* is confessedly tentative and provisional (see *Journal of Philology* x 146—150), while Plato still depends for the attainment of knowledge upon the assumption of immutable, eternal εἴδη, the later system, which modifies what was faulty, defines what was vague, and developes what was incomplete, fulfils, rather than overthrows, the earlier hypothesis.

of human intelligence, dialectical research is impossible unless there are eternal, immutable existences, Parmenides properly asks the question which I have placed at the head of this §.

(6)

135 c Whither then will you turn to look for philosophy, if the εἴδη cannot be known? Socrates having confessed himself at a loss for an answer, Parmenides warns him that, if he would attain to truth, instead of trying to define εἴδη such as καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, he must exercise himself in that garrulity (ἀδολεσχία) of which Zeno has given a specimen. Now I remark that you, Socrates, Parmenides continues, proposed to transfer the inquiry from the region of sensibles to that of intelligible εἴδη. This preference of εἴδη to visibles Socrates justifies on the ground that in the visible region there is no difficulty in showing that things are like and unlike, &c. True, replies Parmenides; but you ought to trace the consequences, not only of the hypothesis that such and such a thing is, but also of the hypothesis that it is not. For example, in studying the hypothesis recently discussed by Zeno, you ought to inquire—

εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, τί ξυμβήσεται τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕν,

εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, τί ξυμβήσεται τῷ ἑνὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά,

εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, τί ξυμβήσεται τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἕν,

εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, τί ξυμβήσεται τῷ ἑνὶ πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά:

and ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, κίνησις, στάσις, γένεσις, φθορά, εἶναι, and μὴ εἶναι ought all to be studied in this same way, the attainment of truth being impossible without this διέξοδος or πλάνη. Hereupon it is proposed that Parmenides shall select a ὑπόθεσις, and give a specimen of the method which he recommends. With some hesitation he consents, and chooses for investigation his own doctrine περὶ τοῦ ἑνός.

The theory of ideas being chiefly, if not solely, important as the basis of the theory of knowledge, any modification of the former of necessity involves a revision of the latter. The question raised at the outset of ch. viii is therefore both relevant and important. At the same time it has here an air of prematurity, since in regard to the reconstituted theory of ideas we at present know no more than, if so much as, that the εἴδη are now fixed types in nature. Plato has however, for reasons

which it is unnecessary here to discuss, a preference for indirect statement. Hence it will be no surprise to us if we find that, in dealing with the new theory of knowledge, he gives us the means of supplying those desiderata of the theory of being which have been noted in the foregoing chapters. Moreover we must not forget the paradox of *ὅμοια ἀνόμοια* with which the conversation began. The intervening inquiry having compelled Socrates to abandon precisely that part of the theory of ideas upon which he had relied in his attack upon Zeno, we may be sure that somehow or other the original controversy will again come into view.

These anticipations find confirmation in the course of the transitional chapters with which I am now concerned. It is obvious that the hypothesis *εἰ ἓν ἔστιν*, upon which Parmenides proposes to exemplify his method, will give Plato, if he is so inclined, an opportunity of reverting to the theory of ideas, either in its original, or in its new, shape, or, it may be, in both: while the paradox of *ὅμοια ἀνόμοια* is expressly recalled at 135 E, where Parmenides pointedly directs attention to Socrates' statement that the supposed paradox is not paradoxical so far as particulars are concerned.

I expect then to find in Parmenides' investigation of *τὸ ἕν*, first, contributions to a theory of knowledge based upon the new theory of ideas announced in the earlier part of the dialogue; secondly, some sort of determination of the contents of the world of ideas; thirdly, some sort of account of the relations of idea and particular; and fourthly, an application of the new theory of ideas to the original paradox of like and unlike, one and many, rest and motion. If I can show that these four matters are dealt with in the second part of the dialogue, I may at any rate claim in favour of my interpretation of the whole, that it establishes an intimate connection between ch. i—vii and ch. viii—xxvii; and if I can further show that the dogmatic element of the *Parmenides* supplements, and is supplemented by, the results which I have previously obtained from the *Philebus*, the evidence in favour of my interpretations of both dialogues will be considerably strengthened.

§ 3 ch. x—xxvii: 137 c—166 c.

ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

Having in the preceding § commented upon the important transitional passage contained in ch. viii and ix, I now proceed to state the *results* which Parmenides obtains from the eight hypotheses successively investigated in ch. x—xxvii, appending to my statement of the results of each hypothesis an abbreviated summary, the use of which will presently appear. In this way I hope not only to determine the positive doctrine which underlies the hypothetical inquiry, but also to account for certain obvious eccentricities in the reasoning.

i *εἰ ἓν ἔστιν.*

137 c If *ἕν* is *ἕν*, i.e. not many, it is not a whole; has not parts; is unlimited and shapeless; is nowhere, being neither in itself nor in another; neither moves nor rests; is neither the same as, nor different from, itself or another; is neither like nor unlike itself or another; is neither equal nor unequal to itself or another; is neither older than, nor younger than, nor coeval with, itself or another, and therefore not in time; not being in time, neither had become nor became nor was, neither has become nor becomes nor is, neither shall become nor shall be; is not in any way; is not one; has neither name nor description; is neither perceived nor opined nor known.

Thus in hypothesis i, (1) *ἕν* is *ἕν* and not *πολλά*, whence it is indivisible, shapeless, neither in space nor in time; (2) *neither* member of the antitheses, like unlike, one many, resting moving, same different, equal unequal, greater less, &c, can be predicated of it; (3) it cannot be named, described, perceived, opined, or known.

ii *εἰ ἓν ἔστιν.*

142 b If *ἕν* participates in being, *ἕν* is one and many; is whole and parts; is limited and unlimited in number; has shape; is in itself and in another; is at rest and in motion; is the same as, and different from, itself and the others; is like

and unlike itself and the others; touches and does not touch itself and the others; is equal and unequal to itself and the others; is greater and smaller, more and less, than itself and the others; partakes in time, and so is, and becomes, older than, younger than, and coeval with, itself and the others; was, is, and will be, became, becomes, will become; can be named, described, perceived, opined, known.

155 E Further, if ἓν ἔστιν in the sense last given to the phrase, so that it is both one and many, neither one nor many, and partakes in time, as one it μετέχει οὐσίας, as not one, it οὐ μετέχει οὐσίας: but it must be at different times that it μετέχει and οὐ μετέχει οὐσίας. There must then be a time when it begins to partake of existence and another when it ceases to partake of existence, and these times must be connected by an instant of transition, not in time. At such instants of transition the one is neither existent nor non-existent, neither one nor many, neither in motion nor at rest, neither like nor unlike, neither great nor small, neither equal nor unequal.

Thus in hypothesis ii, (1) ἕν, which partakes of existence, is divisible and so becomes πολλά and ἄπειρα, has shape, is both in space and in time; (2) *both* members of the antitheses, like unlike, one many, resting moving, same different, equal unequal, greater less, &c, can be predicated of it; (3) it may be named, described, perceived, opined, and known: nevertheless (4) at the instant of transition from one condition or relation to another, *neither* member of the antitheses above-mentioned can be predicated of it.

iii εἰ ἓν ἔστιν.

157 B In order that τἄλλα, which are not τὸ ἕν, may participate in it, they must be conceived as a perfect whole divided into parts which are themselves divisible; τἄλλα are then of their own nature ἄπειρα πλήθει; but they have πέρας both as wholes and as parts, so soon as the parts become parts. Being then, of themselves, ἄπειρα, but, by association with τὸ ἕν, πεπερασμένα, τἄλλα, both as whole and as parts, are like and unlike themselves and one another, the same and different, at rest and in motion, &c.

Thus in hypothesis iii, ἕν being existent, (1) τἄλλα, which of their own nature are ἄπειρα, receive πέρας, both as wholes and as parts, by participation in ἕν, and so become πολλά and

ἕν; (2) *both* members of the antitheses, like unlike, same different, resting moving, &c, can be predicated of them.

iv εἰ ἓν ἔστιν.

159 B ἕν, which has no parts, is absolutely distinct from τἄλλα. It follows that τἄλλα are neither one nor many, neither whole nor parts, neither like nor unlike, neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither γιγνόμενα nor ἀπολλύμενα, neither greater nor less nor equal, &c.[1]

Thus in hypothesis iv, ἕν being existent, (1) τἄλλα are absolutely distinct from ἕν, so that they participate neither in the whole nor in any part of it; (2) *neither* member of the antitheses, one many, like unlike, &c, can be predicated of τἄλλα.

v εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.

160 B τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν, i.e. a ἕν which is determined, not positively as being so and so, but negatively as not being so and so, is known by us, is distinct from τἄλλα, and consequently μετέχει πολλῶν: it is like and unlike; equal and unequal; great and small; existent and non-existent; at rest and in motion; γιγνόμενον and ἀπολλύμενον and neither γιγνόμενον nor ἀπολλύμενον.

Thus in hypothesis v, (1) the μὴ ὂν ἕν, determined negatively as not so and so, exists; (2) *both* members of the antitheses, like unlike, &c, can be predicated of it; (3) it can be known.

vi εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.

163 B If ἕν is not, i.e. in no wise is or partakes of existence, the μὴ ὂν ἕν neither becomes nor perishes; is neither at rest nor in motion; is neither great nor small nor equal; is neither like nor unlike; is neither the same nor different; cannot be named, described, perceived, opined, known.

[1] At 160 B, the investigation of εἰ ἓν ἔστιν being now complete, Parmenides sums up the results thus far obtained in the sentence—Οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστι, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, where πάντα ἐστί seems to represent the results of ii, οὐδέν ἐστι the results of i. We should have expected however corresponding statements in regard to τἄλλα; whence Heindorf, in my opinion rightly, conjectures καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα <καὶ τἆλλα> ὡσαύτως.

Thus in hypothesis vi, (1) the μὴ ὂν ἕν is not; (2) *neither* member of the antitheses, like unlike, &c, can be predicated of it; (3) it cannot be named, described, perceived, opined, known.

vii εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.

164 B τἄλλα which exist must be ἄλλα ἀλλήλων, since, if ἕν does not exist, they cannot be ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός. Further, as ἕν is not, they cannot be καθ' ἓν ἄλλα ἀλλήλων: it is then κατὰ πλήθη, in groups, that they are ἄλλα ἀλλήλων. These groups, which consist of many members, have the appearance, but not the reality, of unity. Hence τἄλλα, i.e. ὄγκοι composed of τἄλλα, appear to be limited and unlimited, one and many, like and unlike to themselves and to one another, the same and different, contiguous and separate, in motion and at rest, becoming and perishing and neither, &c.

Thus in hypothesis vii, ἕν being non-existent, (1) τἄλλα, collected in groups which have an apparent unity, are ἄλλα ἀλλήλων; (2) *both* members of the antitheses, like unlike, &c, are as appearances predicable of these groups.

viii εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν.

165 E τἄλλα exist, but they are not either ἕν or πολλά; nor do they seem to be either ἕν or πολλά; they neither are, nor seem to be, either like or unlike, either the same or different, either contiguous or separate, &c.

Thus in hypothesis viii, ἕν being non-existent, (1) τἄλλα exist; (2) *neither* member of the antitheses, like unlike, &c, can be predicated of them.

166 C Thus, says Parmenides in conclusion, whether ἕν is or is not, ἕν and τἄλλα are and are not and appear to be and do not appear to be all things in all ways both in relation to themselves and in relation to one another.

The abbreviated summaries which I have appended to the foregoing statements of the results obtained from the eight hypotheses successively examined, contain, each of them, either two or three distinct elements. Firstly, we have a diversity of statements about the ἕν or ἄλλα under examination: secondly,

it is ascertained that either (*a*) both members, or (*b*) neither member, of the several antitheses, like unlike, one many, resting moving, equal unequal, greater less, &c, may be predicated of the ἕν or ἄλλα in question: thirdly, in two of the instances in which both members of the several antitheses can be predicated (ii, v), it is inferred that ἕν can be known; and in two of the instances in which neither member of the several antitheses can be predicated (i, vi), it is inferred that ἕν cannot be known. In order if possible to determine the purpose of the hypothetical investigation, I propose to examine these three elements in detail.

Now no two hypotheses have the same first element. In i ἕν is ἕν, is not a whole, has not parts, is unlimited, is shapeless, is neither in space nor in time: in ii ἕν is ὄν, is a whole, has parts, is limited, has shape, is in space and in time: in v ἕν is μὴ ὄν, i.e. determined negatively: in vi ἕν is μὴ ὄν, i.e. absolutely non-existent. In iii τἄλλα, regarded both as wholes and as parts, are in virtue of their own nature ἄπειρα, but derive πέρας by participation in ἕν: in iv τἄλλα are absolutely distinct from an indivisible ἕν: in vii τἄλλα are ἄλλα ἀλλήλων, and have the appearance, but not the reality, of unity, when they are collected in groups; in viii τἄλλα exist, but have neither the reality nor the appearance of unity. In the face of these diverse presentations of ἕν and τἄλλα it seems hardly safe to take for granted that the One here investigated is "die Idee im Allgemeinen, in abstracto, d. h. ihrer logischen Form nach, aufgefasst," and that the conclusion reached is therefore "Mag man den Begriff (die Idee) als seyend oder nichtseyend setzen, so wird das Denken gleichsehr in Widersprüche verwickelt[1]." Rather, I apprehend, the hypothetical investigation is what it professes to be, an inquiry into the relations of ἕν and τἄλλα, as they have been or may be conceived, so that several distinct theories come successively under examination. Accordingly it will, I think, be found that the latter part of the dialogue deals, not only with Platonism, but also with Eleaticism; not only with the theory of ideas enunciated in ch. iii, but also with the modified theory

[1] Zeller *platonische Studien* 168.

which is indicated in ch. vi; not only with the relations of idea and particulars, but also with the relations of kind and particulars, and the relations of class and particulars, all these being cases of *ἕν* and *τἄλλα*. In short, I conceive the first element of the *συμβαίνοντα* to be in each case a statement of the doctrine which is at the moment under investigation[1].

While however all the hypotheses have different first elements, the second element is in each case one or other of two alternative propositions, *ἕν* or *τἄλλα*, as the case may be, being found to be either (*a*) *οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν, κ.τ.λ.*, or (*b*) *ἕν τε καὶ πολλά, ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον, ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον, μέγα τε καὶ σμικρόν, κ.τ.λ.* It would seem then that, starting successively from different conceptions of *ἕν* and *τἄλλα*, Plato inquires in each instance whether the inconsistent attributes can or cannot be predicated of *ἕν* or *τἄλλα* as in that instance conceived, and carefully notes the answer obtained.

Now the list of antitheses, of which both members may be predicated of *ἕν* and *τἄλλα* as conceived in some of the hypotheses, while neither member can be predicated of *ἕν* and

[1] This conception of the purpose of the hypotheses is, I believe, novel. According to Zeller,—whose disquisition upon the *Parmenides*, however little I may agree with its conclusions, I heartily admire,—the trenchant criticisms of the theory of the immanent idea which are contained in ch. iv, v are succeeded in ch. x—xxvii by a series of dialectical exercises leading to *ἀπορία*, from which *ἀπορία* we are hereafter, in the *republic*, to revert to the original doctrine. Strümpell, in his *Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen* 130, sees in the hypotheses the proof "dass schon Platò's Denken in dieser Richtung sich in einen leeren logischen Formalismus verirrt hat," and "kann deshalb auch nicht weder in die grosse Bewunderung, noch in die eine gewisse tiefere Weisheit erblickende Auslegung einstimmen, welche namentlich dem Dialoge Parmenides von Manchem zu Theil geworden ist." That Strümpell should take this view of the constructive part of the dialogue, seems to me strange, as he appeals to the critical part of it for proof that Plato was aware of the defects of his earlier system, and conjectures that he hoped to remedy them by the assimilation of Pythagorean philosophemes.

Similarly Campbell, with whom I agree in so far as he supposes the *Philebus*, the *sophist*, and the *politicus* to be later than the *republic* and sees in the three dialogues first named an approximation to the Aristotelian point of view, conceives that in the *Parmenides* "the result is negative merely." (*Introduction to the statesman* lvii.)

τἄλλα as conceived in others, immediately recals to us the opening argument. In reply to Zeno, who has assumed that like things cannot be unlike, nor unlike things like, Socrates has maintained, as in the *Phaedo*, that, though ideas such as likeness and unlikeness cannot be thus combined, particulars may be at once like and unlike, at once one and many, at once at rest and in motion, explaining the apparent paradox by means of the theory of the immanence in one particular of many and even inconsistent ideas. In the interval he has found himself compelled to abandon precisely that part of his theory upon which this answer to Zeno depends; but there is no sign that he has brought himself to accept his opponent's doctrine. Indeed at 135 E there is a hint that the last word about the original controversy has not yet been spoken. It would seem then that, in the hypotheses, with their ἕν and τἄλλα which are either (*a*) οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, κ.τ.λ., or (*b*) ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον, κ.τ.λ., Eleaticism, which, when strictly interpreted, denies predication as absolutely as Cynicism, and Platonism, which recognizes predication and professes to explain it, meet face to face, and that the paradox of ὅμοια ἀνόμοια is the battle-ground.

The third element, which occurs only in those hypotheses in which ἕν is under investigation, is the statement that ἕν either is (ii and v), or is not (i and vi), capable of being known. Thus under any system or systems to which the first elements of ii and v correspond, knowledge is held to be possible, while under any system or systems to which the first elements of i and vi correspond, knowledge is held to be impossible.

In short, in the eight hypotheses Parmenides passes in review several distinct theories of ἕν and τἄλλα, inquiring in each case (1) what has this theory to say to predication? (2) what has this theory to say to knowledge? Thus the paradox which Socrates handles in ch. ii and iii, and the difficulty which Parmenides urges with so much emphasis in ch. vi and vii, are both of them brought up for judgment.

For convenience of future reference, I will now again tabulate the hypotheses with their results, placing on the reader's left hand those which give the negative result (οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε

ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.), and on his right those which give the positive result (ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.).

i

If ἕν is ἕν, i.e. sole and indivisible, ἕν is neither like nor unlike, &c, and knowledge is impossible.

ii

If ἕν exists as ἕν, πολλά, and ἄπειρα, ἕν both in relation to itself and in relation to τἆλλα is both like and unlike, &c, and knowledge is possible.

iv

If ἕν is absolutely separate from τἆλλα, τἆλλα are neither like nor unlike, &c.

iii

If τἆλλα, being ἄπειρα, receive πέρας and so become πολλά and ἕν, τἆλλα are both like and unlike, &c.

vi

If ἕν is not, i.e. is absolutely non-existent, ἕν is neither like nor unlike, &c, and knowledge is impossible.

v

If ἕν is not, i.e. is negatively determined, the μὴ ὂν ἕν through its positive determinations is both like and unlike, &c, and knowledge is possible.

viii

If ἕν is not, i.e. is absolutely non-existent, τἆλλα are neither like nor unlike, &c.

vii

If ἕν is not, but has an apparent existence since τἆλλα may be regarded as groups, τἆλλα, i.e. groups of τἆλλα, seem to be both like and unlike, &c.

As Parmenides is here directly investigating the very doctrine which Zeno indirectly maintains, while the method adopted is confessedly Zeno's own 135 E, we may fairly expect to find—together with results due to the proposed extension of the range of inquiry—results which Zeno himself would not have disclaimed. It will be well then that we should in the first instance, regarding the ὑποθέσεις from the Eleatic point of view, inquire how far Zeno might have seen in the results obtained a justification of his own position. Now four of the hypotheses—not only iii and vii, where τἆλλα are of course plural, but also ii and v, where ἕν, qualified as ὄν and μὴ ὄν respectively, is pluralized—are in effect Zeno's hypothesis εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν; and as in all four cases the

subject,—whether a pluralized ἕν, or τἄλλα which are plural,—is discovered to be ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον, he would triumphantly infer, on the strength of his axiom ὅτι οὔτε τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι, the non-existence of the Many as here conceived. Thus the first outcome of the ὑποθέσεις is the apparent justification, on Zenonian grounds, of the Eleatic doctrine of the One.

Parmenides however, in whom we see, not Eleaticism proper, but Eleaticism developed in the direction of Platonism, has warned us 136 A not to neglect the ὑπόθεσις, εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά; and accordingly hypotheses i and iv εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, and on examination vi and viii εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν also, are in effect εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, and in all four cases a ἕν or a πολλά is discovered to be οὔτε ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον. Now at first sight this discovery may be thought in no wise to affect Zeno's position, as the incommunicability of τὸ ἕν and the nullity of τὰ πολλά are implied in his fundamental dogma: but on a nearer scrutiny these supplementary inquiries will be seen to carry consequences which Eleaticism itself can neither accept nor ignore. For, in investigating i εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, in other words εἰ πολλὰ μὴ ἔστιν, the Platonic Parmenides has occasion to exclude all the positive statements which the historical Parmenides had made about his ἕν, such as that it is οὖλον 60, πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἐχόμενον 87, 109, οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον 88, πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ 103, τωὐτόν τ' ἐν τωὐτῷ τε μένον 85, ἀκίνητον 98, ὁμοῖον 78, ἶσον 109, ἐόν 43[1]. Thus the founders of Eleaticism are convicted of gross inconsistency, and the system is reduced to a single identical proposition, which proposition is itself questionable. Zeno then may find what comfort he can in the

[1] With these phrases derived from the fragments of Parmenides, compare —Οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν... Ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει. Ἄπειρον. Καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει. 137 D. Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. 139 B. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν οὔθ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἕστηκεν. 139 A. Οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν. Οὐ φαίνεται. Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. 140 B. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν. 141 E.

dogma ἓν ἕν, but to all intents and purposes Eleaticism is an unqualified denial of the possibility of knowledge.

It may be objected however that Eleaticism did not limit itself to the identical proposition ἓν ἕν, seeing that, to say nothing of the other determinations which have been already enumerated, it at any rate asserted the ἕν to be ὄν. This is true: but Plato has guarded against the objection. If ἕν is ὄν, in other words, if ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει, ἕν is, as we learn from ii, not only a plurality, but also ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον; so that Zeno is convicted out of his own mouth, and again the fundamental dogma falls to the ground.

Nor is this all. Not content with overthrowing Zeno in the region of ἐπιστήμη, Plato pursues him into that of δόξα. In vi we find that a μὴ ὂν ἕν, i.e. a ἕν which οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας, neither becomes nor ceases to be, neither rests nor moves, is neither like nor unlike, &c, and cannot be named, described, perceived, opined, known. Now the μὴ ὄν of the Eleatics is a μὴ ὂν ἕν in the sense here given to the phrase: whence it follows that the whole of Parmenides' exposition of τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, and all Zeno's demonstrations of the non-existence of the Many, are inadmissible, inasmuch as πολλά, which according to the Eleatics are non-existent, cannot be subjects of predication.

Thus, when in accordance with Parmenides' injunction 135 E we append to Zeno's investigation of the hypothesis εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν a similar investigation of the hypothesis εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά, we find that it is not so much the predication of inconsistent attributes as predication in general which from the standpoint of Eleaticism is paradoxical, and that when the Eleatic principle is strictly interpreted, it is as complete a denial of philosophy as Heracliteanism or Cynicism[1].

[1] Here I may say a few words about the detail of the first and second hypotheses.

In i, where ἓν ἔστιν is taken to mean ἓν ἕν, all determination of the ἕν is supposed to be impossible,—Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἴναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἓν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. 140 A,—and the several συμβαίνοντα are no more than particular applications of this assumption, set out at length (1) with a view to the comparison of the results obtained here with the results obtained elsewhere, (2) with a view to the demonstration of the inconsistency into which the

Our next task will be to examine the hypotheses and their results in their relation to Platonic doctrine, and first of all

Eleatics fall when they declare the One to be whole, limited, spherical, &c. (Compare *sophist* 244 c sqq, with Thompson's remarks upon the passage *Journal of Philology* VIII 306, 307.) Hence Parmenides' procedure is, I conceive, substantially correct, every one of his inferences being covered by the initial assumption, which initial assumption is in fact the Eleatic dogma interpreted with a strictness to which the Eleatics themselves never attained.

The reasoning of ii is less satisfactory. The argument of 142 c—145 a, where it is shown that, if ἕν is regarded not only as ἕν but also as ὄν, it must further be regarded as ὅλον καὶ μόρια καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει, is indeed consistent with itself: but it is impossible to justify the inference, which follows at 145 b, that the ἕν has shape; Καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.

Now it is plain that, if what I have called the first and second elements of the συμβαίνοντα stand on the same footing, the whole of the succeeding results of this hypothesis are vitiated by the fallacy. If however, as I hold, the first element is in each case no more than an amplification of the hypothesis investigated, a fallacy in the development of the first element will not prejudice Plato's answer to the question, Is the ἕν here under consideration (1) capable or incapable of carrying inconsistent predicates, (2) capable or incapable of being known? In fact Plato is in no way answerable for the development of the first element, if the doctrine which it represents is not his own. Is there then any one to whom we may conjecturally attribute the reasoning here questioned? Remembering that from 144 e onwards the hypothesis investigated is in reality εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, I cannot help suspecting that the fallacy in question actually occurred in the πρώτη ὑπόθεσις τοῦ πρώτου λόγου of Zeno, of which we naturally expect to find an echo in this place. That the fallacy is one into which Zeno might easily fall, is plain from the whole tenour of his teaching.

My conjecture is then that, by means of the paragraph 142 c sqq Plato, arguing Eleatically, connects the ἕν which Zeno asserted with the πολλά which he denied, and so turns his proof that πολλά are ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια, and consequently non-existent, against the ἕν itself. The controversial value of such a procedure is obvious. At the same time I expect hereafter to find that this second hypothesis is not without a positive meaning, and contributes something to that reconstruction of the Platonic system which, if I mistake not, Plato has in view from the beginning to the end of the dialogue.

For an acute examination of the details of this part of the investigation, see Zeller's *platonische Studien* 172—174. The following extracts seem to me especially noteworthy: "Nicht mehr hieraus allein zu erklären ist es dagegen, wenn gefolgert wird, weil das Eins ein Ganzes sey, also Anfang Mitte und Ende habe, so müsse ihm auch eine Gestalt, ein (räumliches) Seyn in sich selbst und Anderem, Bewegung und Ruhe zukommen; hier wird das Eins nicht mehr als Begriff, sondern als Ding behandelt. Und dieselbe mechanische Behandlung der

in their relation to that phase of Platonic doctrine which is presented to us in ch. iii of the *Parmenides.*

According to the statement which Socrates there makes, a particular may be at once one and many, at once like and unlike, at once at rest and in motion, inasmuch as it may simultaneously participate in the ideas of one and of many, of like and of unlike, of rest and of motion: these ideas, though participated in by particulars, are nevertheless separate from them: each idea is then a One, having in its participant particulars a corresponding Many. Let us try to find amongst the eight hypotheses one which presents ἕν and ἄλλα answering to idea and particulars as they have been described above; and when we have found one, let us next inquire whether the hypothesis in question gives the desired result. If it does not,—that is to say, if a hypothesis which presents ἕν and ἄλλα answering to idea and particulars as conceived in ch. iii has for its result that τἄλλα are neither like nor unlike, &c, it will be plain that *this* theory of ideas must be abandoned, inasmuch as, so far from enabling us to dispose of Zeno's paradox, it ignores predication altogether.

Now neither the ἕν of ii, which is divisible, has shape, and is in time, nor the ἕν of vi and viii, which is absolutely non-existent, nor the ἕν of vii, which has an apparent but only an apparent existence in an ὄγκος, nor the ἕν of v, which is μὴ ὄν, i.e. negatively determined, nor the ἕν of iii, by association with which τἄλλα, themselves ἄπειρα, derive πέρας, in the least recals to us the idea as we have known it in the *republic,* in

logischen Begriffe findet sich durchgehends.....Aber doch sind auch diese anscheinenden äussersten Sophismen nur das Ergebniss eines consequenten Folgerns aus der Voraussetzung. So lange nur von einem Seyn des Eins, d. h. einer Wirklichkeit des Begriffs, ohne alle nähere Bestimmung geredet wird, liegt am Nächsten, diese Wirklichkeit so zu nehmen, wie sie hier aufgefasst ist, und von den ersten griechischen Philosophen, theilweise auch den Eleaten, aufgefasst wurde, als die des unmittelbaren Daseyns; der Begriff ist als existirend ein Ding und steht unter den allgemeinen Bedingungen des Daseyns, der Zeitlichkeit und Räumlichkeit." These remarks seem to me admirable: but I should have thought that they would carry with them as their corollary the ascription of the fallacy in question, not to Plato, but to one or other of the philosophers to whom Zeller refers.

the *Phaedo*, and at the outset of the *Parmenides*. In i and iv however we have what we want.

In iv, to which hypothesis it will be convenient to give the precedence, starting from the assumptions (1) that ἕν and τἄλλα are separate from one another—*χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι.* 159 B, and (2) that ἕν has not parts—*Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν.* 159 C, Parmenides argues that τἄλλα cannot contain or participate in either a part of ἕν or the whole of it, and consequently that on this hypothesis τἄλλα are neither one nor many, neither whole nor parts, neither like nor unlike nor both like and unlike, (since, if they were like or unlike, they must participate in a ἕν, the εἶδος of ὁμοιότης or ἀνομοιότης; and if they were both, they must participate in both εἴδη[1],) neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither becoming nor ceasing to be, neither greater nor less nor equal. Now at the outset of the dialogue, Socrates, having maintained that particulars are like, unlike, or like and unlike by participation in the ideas of ὁμοιότης, ἀνομοιότης, or ὁμοιότης and ἀνομοιότης respectively, admits in reply to Parmenides (1) that the idea and its participant particulars are separate from one another—*χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα* 130 B, and (2) that the εἶδος cannot be divided—*Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι; καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται; Οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.* 131 C, which admissions Parmenides shows to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the immanence of ideas[2].

[1] *εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός. ... ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοιν.* 159 E. The occurrence of the word εἶδος in its technical sense is significant.

[2] The investigation of the fourth ὑπόθεσις 159 B—160 B contains a series of echoes of the early pages of the dialogue. In particular, besides the passages quoted in the text—(1) *Οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.* 159 D is the equivalent of *Τίν' οὖν τρόπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;* 131 E. (2) *Οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι [τῷ ἑνὶ] τἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης...Οὔτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτ' ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὔτ' ἀμφότερα τἄλλα.* 159 E is obviously the denial of Socrates' assertion *καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ*

Thus Socrates' admissions in regard to idea and particulars at 130 B, 131 C are the assumptions in regard to ἕν and ἄλλα from which Parmenides takes his departure at 159 B. C. In both cases it is shown that these admissions or assumptions are inconsistent with the theory of the immanence of idea or ἕν in particulars or ἄλλα: but, whereas in the former passage Parmenides stops short at the overthrow of the theory of ideas, in the passage before us he brings us back to the original question —How is it that the same thing can be like, unlike, or like and unlike? and shows that the theory of ideas, as hitherto conceived, affords no answer to it[1].

If however the particular as originally conceived is neither one nor many, neither like nor unlike, neither at rest nor in motion, &c, what are we to say about the corresponding idea? The answer to this question is afforded by the first hypothesis, whence it appears that if ἕν is ἕν, i.e. sole and indivisible, it is neither one nor many, neither like nor unlike, neither at rest nor in motion, &c. Now the idea as originally conceived by the Socrates of the *Parmenides* is a ἕν of this description.

κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα. 129 A. (It will be observed that in my extract from 159 E I have bracketed the words τῷ ἑνί, which have no place here, as they unduly limit the proposition in which they occur. They may perhaps represent a dittograph of the τά or τᾶ of τἄλλα misread as τῷ ᾱ.)

[1] The difficulty raised by Parmenides in the two passages here referred to is energetically insisted upon by Socrates in the *Philebus*. To account for the presence in One particular of Many attributes, Plato has devised the theory of the immanence of the idea: e.g. Simmias is short and tall, shorter than Phaedo, taller than Socrates, by participation in the ideas of short and tall, *Phaedo* 102 B sqq. This theory involves however the multiplication or division of the One idea amongst its Many participant particulars, so that, as we are expressly told *Philebus* 14 C sqq, the paradox of ἕν and πολλά recurs in a new form. It becomes necessary therefore so to modify the theory of ideas that it shall recognize the presence in the particular of various and even inconsistent attributes *Philebus* 14 D, without sacrificing the unity of the idea *Philebus* 15 B. This is clearly aimed at both in the *Parmenides* and in the *Philebus*. Nevertheless a certain difference is discernible in regard to the manner of presentation: the difficulty which in the *Parmenides* is drawn out at length, is in the *Philebus* summarily stated as if it were already familiar. It would seem therefore that, though the two dialogues belong to the same period, the *Parmenides* is prior to the *Philebus* in the order of exposition.

His assertion that the idea cannot τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχειν 129 C, is therefore confirmed by the hypothetical investigation: but we learn further, that, whereas it had been assumed in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* that knowledge of the idea is attainable, the idea cannot be named, described, perceived, opined, known. It is in fact no more capable of being apprehended than its counterpart the Eleatic One, a conclusion for which we have been prepared at 133 A sqq.

Thus the theory of the immanent idea and its participant particulars, in which the Socrates of the *republic*, the *Phaedo*, and the opening pages of the *Parmenides* had seen an explanation of the paradox of the One thing and its Many attributes, is found to be inconsistent with itself, whilst the cherished hope that that theory might be made the basis of a higher logic is rudely dashed to pieces. We have in fact reaffirmed the conclusions to which we were led in the first seven chapters of the dialogue.

Two theories of the relations of ἕν and τἄλλα,—the Eleatic theory of the existent One and the non-existent Many, and the Platonic theory of immanent ideas and participant particulars—having been overthrown, it remains for us to inquire what material the hypotheses afford for the construction of a more satisfactory system.

Now in viii, starting from the hypothesis that τἄλλα are, ἕν is not, we discover that in this case τἄλλα neither are nor appear to be either one or many, either like or unlike, &c. That is to say, so long as there is no ἕν in which two or more particulars may meet, there can be neither predication nor knowledge. A unity of some sort is then indispensable, if our expectations are to be realized.

What is this unity to be? That it is not the ἕν of i, needs no demonstration. Let us turn then to vii. Here τἄλλα in the absence of ἕν, attain to a semblance of unity by congregation in a group, and, so regarded, seem to be, but are not, one and many, like and unlike, &c. But what is this group, this ὄγκος ἄνευ ἑνός, εἷς φαινόμενος ὢν δὲ οὔ? It is, I conceive, a class, arbitrarily constructed and consequently liable to alteration. Such ὄγκοι, being infinitely variable, cannot, any

more than the infinity of dissociated particulars, be known. Nevertheless they seem to be, though for want of fixity they are not, one and many, like and unlike, &c. These ὄγκοι then, which are the foundations, not of ἐπιστήμη, but of δόξα, may find a place in our system, but they are not what we are now seeking.

So far we have considered only hypotheses which do not give the desired result. Let us next examine ii and iii. In ii, ἕν, as here conceived, is found to be like and unlike, &c, and to be capable of being known. Now the ἕν of this hypothesis, ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας κεκερματισμένον, is πολλά and ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. It is πολλά, inasmuch as ἓν ὄν (and therefore ἕν) may be regarded in a multitude of aspects. It is ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος, inasmuch as these aspects are capable of an infinity of combinations. Again in iii, τἄλλα, as here conceived, are found to be like and unlike, &c. Now the ἄλλα of this hypothesis are by nature ἄπειρα πλήθει, but by κοινωνία with ἓν μόριον and ἓν ὅλον receive πέρας, and become πολλά and ἕν. Thus as in ii ἕν becomes πολλά and ἄπειρα, so in iii ἄπειρα become πολλά and ἕν. In fact these two hypotheses represent one and the same theory, ii exhibiting the descent from ἕν through πολλά to ἄπειρα, iii the ascent from ἄπειρα through πολλά to ἕν, where by ἄπειρα must be meant the infinity of particular existences, by ἕν the genus existence, and by πολλά kinds of existence, differing from ἕν in so far as they are plural, and from ἄπειρα in so far as they are numerically finite.

Now whereas we have seen in i and viii respectively that ἕν as ἕν, sole and indivisible, and ἄπειρα as ἄπειρα, infinitely many, are neither like nor unlike, &c and cannot be known, we find in ii that when πολλά mediate between ἕν and ἄπειρα both predication[1] and knowledge become possible. How then do these πολλά or 'kinds', which in ii and iii make knowledge

[1] Nevertheless, at the moment of transition from being to not-being, from one to many, &c, ἓν κεκερματισμένον is neither existent nor non-existent, neither one nor many, &c. But this moment is not in time, and therefore the case here considered cannot be regarded as an exception to the rule laid down in the text. Such, and such only, is, I think, the drift of 155 E—157 B.

possible, differ from the ὄγκοι or πλήθη of vii, which do not? They differ in that the former are, the latter are not, determinate. Fixity, permanence, or stability is, it seems, the characteristic in virtue of which πολλά make knowledge possible.

We have however in v another sort of group or class. Here, a μὴ ὂν ἕν, i.e. a ἕν characterized, not as so and so, but as not so and so, is found to partake of πολλά, and consequently to become and to cease to be, to be like and unlike, &c, and to be capable of being known. Thus a group which is negatively characterized may become knowable in connection with πολλά positively characterized, but is not knowable in virtue only of its negative characterization[1]. Hence the 'kinds' must be positively characterized.

So far then we have ascertained that the πολλά of ii and iii, which by mediating between ἄπειρα and ἕν make knowledge possible, do not include the negatively characterized groups of v; that they are to be distinguished from the indeterminate groups or ὄγκοι of vii; that they are kinds of existence; and that fixity, permanence, or stability is characteristic of them. Can we add anything to this? Now at 135 B Parmenides has hinted that, though ideas, i.e. permanent types in nature, cannot be known, knowledge is possible if there are ideas, knowledge is not possible if there are not ideas. Plainly this important declaration must somehow or other be connected with the results which we have now obtained, and we shall secure the connection desired if we suppose that each kind or permanent group has an idea or natural type attached to it.

And now I may attempt to formulate the theory which underlies hypotheses ii and iii. Things or particular existences, which, as particulars, are ἄπειρα πλήθει, and as existences, i.e. members of the summum genus existence, are ἕν, are also πολλά. That is to say, they are members of kinds: which kinds, though many, are not infinitely numerous; are positively, not negatively characterized; and are fixed and permanent, not

[1] Of the μὴ ὂν ἕν of hypotheses v and vi I shall have something to say on another occasion.

arbitrary or variable. The kinds are in fact, not conventional, but natural. Their stability is due to the relationship (hereafter to be more precisely described) which subsists between the *γιγνόμενα* of a given kind and the corresponding idea, i.e. an existent type, eternal, immutable, which serves as the model for an infinity of particulars. Each kind finds its perfect realization in the separately existent idea, to which the particular members of the kind more or less closely, but never exactly, approximate.

Now if we knew the ideas, and therefore the kinds which correspond to them, the whole field of science would lie open to us. But we have already learnt that the knowledge of the ideas is beyond our reach. If then we cannot know the ideas, and through them the kinds, is there any way by which we may know the kinds, and through them the ideas?

That the procedure recommended by the Platonic Parmenides is akin to the Socratic method is implied in the precept *ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας.* 135 D; that it is akin to the Zenonian method, is distinctly asserted—*Τίς οὖν ὁ τρίπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;* *Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν, ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.* 135 D; that it includes the selection of a *ὑπόθεσις*, and the development of its consequences and the consequences of the contrary *ὑπόθεσις*, not only as regards the thing examined but also as regards other things, we are expressly told 135 E sqq; that it is an *ἀμήχανος πραγματεία*, a *πολὺ ἔργον*, a *διὰ πάντων διέξοδός τε καὶ πλάνη*, we are persistently assured.

Taking these statements into account, I conclude that Plato hopes by the study of a series of hypothetical or provisional classifications to arrive at one in which nature's distribution of kinds is approximately represented, and so to attain approximately to the knowledge of the ideas. But, whereas in the *republic*, and even in the *Phaedo*, though less hopefully, he had sought to convert his provisional definitions into final ones by tracing their connection with the summum genus, the *ἀγαθόν*, here in the *Parmenides* his aspirations are less ambitious. It is, I conceive, by the laborious examination of particulars that

he now hopes to bring his provisional classification of things into approximate accord with nature's classification, and so to attain to an approximate knowledge of ideas. In short, whereas in the *republic* and in the *Phaedo* he had dreamt of passing through ontology to the sciences, he is now content to pass through the sciences to ontology.

And now we must inquire—How are the members of a natural kind related to the idea or type in which it finds its perfect expression? For an answer to this question we must turn to iii. Here *τἄλλα* are of themselves and in their own nature *ἄπειρα*; but, in so far as they partake of unity, *ἕτερόν τι γίγνεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα.* That is to say, things are capable of resolution into two elements; an element of *ἀπειρία* which is their proper nature, and an element of *πέρας* by which they are made members of this or that kind. Plainly this analysis of the particular into *πέρας παρέχον* and *ἄπειρον* is too concisely stated to be by itself satisfactory or even intelligible. It is however declared with sufficient precision to justify us in identifying it with the similar analysis in the *Philebus*, where, as I have tried to show in a former paper, the particular is related to the idea through the *ἄπειρον* and the *πέρας ἔχον* into which they are severally resolved. Now it has been previously remarked p. 297 that the theory of the relation of the particular to the idea which appears in the *Philebus* is not open to the objections raised against the doctrine of *παρουσία*, and that it *may* therefore be the theory which is desiderated at 133 A. When then we find at 158 B sqq an unmistakeable echo of the *Philebus* so far as the particular is concerned, it may, I think, be fairly inferred that, as in the *Philebus*, so in the *Parmenides*, it is in the analysis of particular and idea into *πέρας* and *ἀπειρία* that Plato finds a solution of the difficulties in regard to the relation of particular and idea which are raised at the outset of both dialogues.

Two of the four matters which I indicated at the end of my second section—the theory of knowledge, and the relation of idea and particular—having duly reappeared, it is time that we inquired whether the hypotheses throw any light upon a third, namely, the original controversy between Zeno and Socrates.

The whole discussion, it will be remembered, has arisen from one of the arguments by which Zeno seeks to disprove the existence of the Many: if existence is manifold, he says, the Many must be at once like and unlike; now this is impossible, for unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike. The Platonic Socrates replies with an appeal to the theory of ideas: it is true, no doubt, that likeness or the idea of like cannot be unlike, nor unlikeness or the idea of unlike like; nevertheless a particular may be at once like and unlike by participation in, i.e. by the immanence of, the corresponding ideas. As however in the interval the doctrine of the immanence of the idea has been overthrown, whilst an allusion at 135 E echoed at 159 A[1] shows that the original controversy has not been forgotten, it would be strange indeed if it were not now referred to.

Now the hypotheses, one and all, perpetually remind us that a thing is like or unlike, one or many, at rest or in motion, greater or less, older or younger, &c, according to the *relation* in which it is viewed. It is by comparison with one thing that Simmias is tall, and by comparison with another that he is short; so that, properly speaking, it is not *the same thing* which is like and unlike, &c. Hence Zeno's paradox ceases to be paradoxical; and the theory of the immanence of the idea, put forward in the *Phaedo* 102 A sqq and again in the *Parmenides* 128 E sqq to explain it, becomes from this point of view superfluous. It is then, I conceive, because the recognition of the relativity of likeness, unlikeness, &c, enables us to dismiss the original issue, that the dialogue ends with the words *Εἰρήσθω τοίυυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτά καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.* Ἀληθέστατα. 166 C: i.e. whether we start from the hypothesis that *ἕν* is, or from the

[1] *πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι. Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.* Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. 135 E. *Καὶ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.* 159 A.

hypothesis that ἕν is not, whether our conclusion is that ἕν and τἄλλα are or that they are not like and unlike, &c, or that they appear to be or that they do not appear to be like and unlike, &c, what is in each case asserted or denied is a relation.

I suspect however that the concluding sentence carries with it something more than the resolution of the Zenonian paradox. If, as we are plainly told, whether ἕν exists or does not exist, ἕν and τἄλλα are, both in relation to themselves and in relation to one another, like, unlike, &c, it would seem that like, unlike, &c, are, not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη, but universal predicates[1]; in fact, that the reconstituted system does not recognize 'ideas' of like, unlike, &c.

Now at 130 B, Socrates, who has already abandoned the dogma of the *republic*, that there is an idea wherever a plurality of particulars is called by the same name, unhesitatingly acknowledges αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη (*a*) of ὁμοιότης and ἀνομοιότης, of ἕν and πολλά, of στάσις and κίνησις, and the like, and (*b*) of δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν, and the like; but (*c*) he has doubts in regard to ἄνθρωπος, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, and (*d*) he denies εἴδη of θρίξ, πηλός, ῥύπος, and ἄλλο ὅ τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον; whereupon Parmenides warns him that he is still young and disposed to pay too much attention to what the vulgar think; when philosophy gets a firmer hold upon him, as one day she will, he will think nothing mean or despicable.

[1] So Campbell, of the μέγιστα γένη of the *sophist*: "Thus Being, Sameness, and Difference, to use Aristotelian language, are universal predicaments, or categories. Everything, of which we can speak, exists, is the same in one relation, different in others, and is either at rest or in motion or both in different ways." xvii. Thus far I cordially agree: but whereas he seems to regard these categories either as ideas or as superseding the ideas, I conceive the μέγιστα γένη, which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, to be *contrasted* with the αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη which are the true analogues of the ἰδέαι of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. In fact when Aristotle says that orthodox Platonism did not recognize ideas of τὰ πρός τι, I conceive him to refer to this conversion of στάσις κίνησις κ.τ.λ. into categories.

It will be observed that, whereas the earlier doctrine assumes all εἴδη to be αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ, the later doctrine distinguishes εἴδη which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά from εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά. No doubt εἴδη frequently stands for αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη. (Compare, for example, *metaph.* Δ 9. 990 b 16 ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος with 991 b 6 ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἴδη εἶναι.) But it must not be taken for granted, wherever the word εἶδος occurs, that an αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος is meant.

Let us consider this obviously careful statement in the light of the results which have been obtained in the interval. In the first place, we notice that while Socrates unhesitatingly acknowledges ideas of *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀνομοιότης*, *ἕν*, *πολλά*, *στάσις*, and *κίνησις*, we have now seen reason to reject precisely those ideas: in the next, we reflect, that, if the ideas are to be *παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει ἑστῶτα*, *ἄνθρωπος*, *πῦρ*, *ὕδωρ*, about which Socrates doubts, can hardly be omitted from the list. Would it not seem then that Socrates' preconceived theory is now to be reversed, and that henceforward there are to be ideas, not of *πάθη*, but of *οὐσίαι*? At any rate we shall be justified in asserting that Plato is moving in that direction[1].

Thus the investigation of the hypotheses *εἰ ἓν ἔστιν*, *εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν* satisfies the expectations which the study of the opening chapters had led us to form, all the desiderata which I enumerated at p. 301 having now been, more or less completely, supplied.

The results obtained in this § of my paper are then briefly as follows. Having previously shown, first, that the theory of ideas needs revision so far as concerns the relation of particulars

[1] Whereas modern critics for the most part discredit Aristotle's account of the contents of the world of ideas, the *Parmenides*, as I read it, justifies all his most remarkable statements. Orthodox Platonism, we are told in the *metaphysics*, recognizing ideas of *ὁπόσα φύσει* only Λ 3. 1070 a 18, does not acknowledge ideas (1) of such things as *οἰκία* and *δακτύλιος* Δ 9. 991 b 6, nor (2) of *τὰ πρός τι* Δ 9. 990 b 16, nor (3) of *ἀποφάσεις* Δ 9. 990 b 13. Accordingly in the *Parmenides* (1) we find that ideas are *παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει ἑστῶτα*, whence it is a fair inference that there are no ideas of *σκευαστά* such as *οἰκία* and *δακτύλιος*; (2) we see reason to exclude *τὰ πρός τι*, i.e. *ὁμοιότης*, *ἀνομοιότης*, *μέγεθος*, *σμικρότης*, *ἰσότης*, *ἀνισότης*, *κ.τ.λ*; (3) *τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν* as such is not recognized as a kind, and therefore there are no ideas of *ἀποφάσεις*.

It is to be observed further that the *Parmenides* not only confirms Aristotle's statements about the list of ideas, but also enables us to account for the rectification which it has undergone as the necessary consequence of a radical reconstruction of the system. Whether Plato carried the rectification as far as he ought,—whether, for example, he sacrificed the ideas of *ἀγαθόν*, *καλόν*, *δίκαιον*,—is a question which, not being directly raised in the *Parmenides*, may for the present be left open.

and idea, and the contents of the world of ideas, and, secondly, that the ideas cannot be known by man, Parmenides asks at the beginning of ch. viii Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποῖ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; and at the end of ch. ix undertakes to exemplify his notions of philosophical procedure by an examination of his own hypothesis εἰ ἓν ἔστιν, warning us however that it will be necessary also to investigate the hypothesis εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν. The eight inquiries which are now successively instituted bring before us five distinct conceptions of the relations of ἕν and τἄλλα. If with Zeno we assume the existence of the One and the non-existence of the Many, predication is paradoxical and knowledge is impossible. If with the earlier Plato, the Plato who is represented in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, we assume the idea to be at once separate and immanent, we are landed in hopeless confusion. If with the Cynics we recognize only the infinity of things, there is no predication and knowledge is impossible. If with the historical Socrates we are content to regard τὰ καθόλου as πλήθη or ὄγκοι, δόξαι i.e. propositions about sensibles are admissible, but ἐπιστήμη is beyond our reach. If however in fashioning the infinity of particulars the creator took as his models certain eternal and immutable types, finite in number, resident in his own mind, a natural classification of things becomes possible. This natural classification we cannot hope accurately to determine; but we may hope by the careful study of particulars to approximate to it, and so to approximate to the knowledge of the ideas, in which the natural kinds find their perfect expression. Thus in working out his example Parmenides answers the question—What is the theory of knowledge which is to be based upon the doctrine of the paradeigmatic idea? Meanwhile we discover incidentally that idea and particulars are related through their στοιχεῖα, πέρας and ἀπειρία, and that henceforward ideas of ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον, ἴσον, ἄνισον, μέγα, σμικρόν, κ.τ.λ. will no longer be recognized. Finally, we are provided with an answer to the Zenonian paradox from which the conversation arose.

§ 4 *The* Parmenides *and the* Philebus.

οὐδετέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον...ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα.

As I am at present concerned, not so much with the development of my own view of the later theory of ideas, as with the interpretation of the *Parmenides* and the determination of its doctrinal content, I have made it my rule to refrain from all appeals to other dialogues. To this rule I have however admitted one exception. Having in my previous paper given reasons for assigning to the *Philebus* the same position in regard to the *republic* and the *Phaedo* which I now find cause to assign to the *Parmenides*, I have thought myself justified in supplementing from the first-named dialogue the incomplete account of the relation of particular and idea which occurs in the dialogue last named. It will be well then that I should forthwith say something about the relations of the two dialogues and so connect the results of the present paper with those of its predecessor.

In the *Philebus*, starting from the theory of ideas as it is conceived in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, Plato objects to it that the doctrine of the idea's immanence involves the sacrifice of its unity, and by way of meeting, or rather of escaping, this objection, propounds the novel doctrine that the idea and its particulars are related through the *πέρας ἔχον* and the *ἄπειρον*, the elements into which they are severally resolvable. We now find him in the *Parmenides* starting from the same position, raising the same objection, and meeting or escaping it by the same device. Thus so far as concerns the ontology the two dialogues are in perfect accord. The theory of ideas is however in Plato's eyes valuable only in so far as it can be made the basis of a theory of knowledge[1], and we shall therefore expect to find that the question *Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι;*—which in the *Parmenides* is distinctly raised, and, if I mistake not, answered,—is not altogether overlooked in the companion dialogue. This

[1] It is as the basis of a theory of knowledge that the theory of ideas is advanced in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*: see *Journal of Philology* x 132 sqq, and compare pp. 295—7 of the same volume.

expectation is not disappointed. On returning to the *Philebus* fresh from the study of the *Parmenides*, we observe that Socrates, after he has stated his difficulty in regard to the immanence of the idea, and before he proceeds to enunciate the doctrine of the idea's relation to its particulars through their elements *πέρας ἔχον* and *ἄπειρον*, introduces an episodical exposition of the method which he proposes to pursue. This exposition, which is connected with the ontological theory, not only by Socrates' declaration that it is prefatory to the subsequent argument, but also by a significant allusion to *πέρας* and *ἀπειρία*, is so important that I now subjoin a summary of it.

> The method which I recommend, says Socrates, 16 B, is one which, though I have always affected it, has frequently left me in the lurch : it is one, which, though easy to indicate, is difficult of application. On the assumption that everything which is said to exist (1) may be traced to a One and a Many, and (2) contains in itself *πέρας* and *ἀπειρία*, the right course, when we wish to investigate anything, is, first to look for a single *ἰδέα* therein contained; next to make two, three, or some other definite number of divisions in it; and then to subdivide these divisions, repeating the process, until we have not only assured ourselves that the original One is *ἕν*, *πολλά*, and *ἄπειρα*, but also ascertained how many it is, i.e. determined the whole number of the *πολλά* which intervene between *ἕν* and *ἄπειρα πλήθει*. This is the true dialectical procedure, which has for its note or mark the careful study of *τὰ μέσα*.
>
> For example, speech is at once One and Infinite in number: it is not however the knowledge either of its *ἄπειρον* or of its *ἕν*, but the knowledge *πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα*, which makes us *σοφοί* in respect of grammar.
>
> Similarly, it is not the knowledge of particular notes, nor even that of the distinction between *βαρύ*, *ὀξύ*, and *ὁμότονοι*, but that of *τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν*, which makes us *σοφοί* in respect of music.
>
> [When the time comes for applying these remarks to the matter in hand, Protarchus expresses Socrates' precept in the sentence—*εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως*. 19 B, and accordingly the *classification* of pleasures and cognitions occupies a large part of the ensuing debate.]

The general drift of this episodical exposition is unmistakeable. We cannot be said to have scientific knowledge, Plato tells us, so long as we content ourselves with the observation of particulars, which, being ἄπειρα πλήθει, leave the observer ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάριθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα 17 E; nor are we any the wiser if we proceed by a leap from the ἄπειρα πλήθει to the ἕν. If we would have scientific knowledge, we must proceed gradually from the ἄπειρα to the ἕν, from the ἕν to the ἄπειρα, through the πολλά which mediate between them; in other words, we must enumerate and define the species[1].

We have then in the *Philebus* an exposition of a dialectical method which is based upon the dogma that 'whatever is said to exist may be traced to a One and a Many, and contains in itself πέρας and ἀπειρία.' This method is opposed on the one hand to one which takes account only of ἄπειρα, and on the other to one which takes account only of τὸ ἕν. Now (1) the method which takes account only of τὸ ἕν, i.e. the method of the Eleatics, and the method which takes account only of ἄπειρα, i.e. the method of the Cynics, are respectively tried and found wanting in the first and last hypotheses of the *Parmenides*: (2) the dogma upon which the dialectical method of the *Philebus* is asserted to rest—ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων—is a compact but precise statement of the ontological doctrine which is conveyed in the second and third hypotheses: (3) as in the *Philebus*, so in the *Parmenides*, it is the recognition of πολλά, mediating between ἄπειρα and ἕν, between ἕν and ἄπειρα, which makes knowledge possible. In short, the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* contain a series of echoes, which would seem to justify us, not only in assigning the two dialogues to the same stage of development, but also in regarding them as twin compositions intended to be studied side by side.

This view of the relationship of the two dialogues receives confirmation when we take account, not only of their resemblances,

[1] See Thompson's admirable and important 'Remarks on the *Philebus*,' *Journal of Philology*, XI 14.

but also of their differences. Both are concerned with the theory of being and the theory of knowledge, and in essentials the two presentations of these theories agree. But whereas the *Philebus* is mainly concerned with the theory of being, the theory of knowledge being treated episodically[1], in the *Parmenides* the theory of knowledge and its connection with the theory of being are insisted upon to the comparative neglect of the theory of being. Similarly, when we look into the detail of the theory of being, we find, on the one hand, that the *Parmenides* contains an ample criticism of the earlier doctrine, while the *Philebus* has only a summary statement of the principal objection, and, on the other hand, that the *Parmenides* barely indicates the new doctrine of the relation of idea and particulars, while the *Philebus* handles it at length. Thus the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* stand to one another and to the later system in the same sort of relation in which the *republic* and the *Phaedo* stand to one another and to the earlier system[2].

§ 5 *Concluding remarks.*

A few sentences of summary may fitly conclude this lengthy paper.

Zeno having argued the non-existence of the Many on the ground that, if the Many are, they are both like and unlike,

[1] Hence in my paper upon the *Philebus* I found it convenient to ignore the hints for a theory of knowledge which that dialogue contains, deferring the examination of them until I should come to the *Parmenides*.

[2] See my paper 'On Plato's *republic* VI 509 D sqq', *Journal of Philology* X 132—150, especially pp. 136—138, 147—150.

I hope hereafter to say something about the chronology of the Platonic writings in general. For the present I am content to note that my interpretation of the four dialogues in question carries with it three propositions affecting the chronology: (1) the *republic* and the *Phaedo* represent the same stage of development; (2) the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* represent the same stage of development; (3) inasmuch as the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* refer to, and reject, the doctrine of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, the *republic* and the *Phaedo* are anterior to the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*. Hence, so far as concerns the 'Reihenfolge' of these four dialogues, I agree substantially with Strümpell and Campbell, though my conception of Plato's philosophical position, both at the earlier and at the later date, differs, I imagine, from theirs.

which is impossible, Socrates, herein echoing the Socrates of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, replies that, though the idea of like cannot be unlike, nor the idea of unlike like, the same particular may nevertheless partake of both ideas, and so be at once like and unlike.

Hereupon Parmenides institutes an examination of the theory of ideas as stated by Socrates, and elicits three important results: (1) the idea cannot be immanent without sacrifice of its unity; (2) the list of ideas has not been finally determined; (3) if the idea is separately existent, we cannot know it.

The Platonic Parmenides does not however reject the theory of ideas. Acquiescing in Socrates' suggestion that the idea is perhaps a type established in nature, he emphatically declares that, unless there are eternal, immutable ideas, dialectic is impossible.

But, if the ideas, though existent, cannot be known, whither are we to look for knowledge? To this question Parmenides offers no direct answer. He is however persuaded to give a specimen of the long and laborious process by which knowledge is to be obtained, and chooses for the purpose his own doctrine of the existence of the One.

It will be necessary however, he premises, to examine, not only the hypothesis that the One is, but also the hypothesis that the One is not; and these hypotheses must be studied, not only in regard to the One, but also in regard to the Others. Moreover it is found that, in this particular case, each of the four hypotheses thus marked out for investigation may be interpreted in two ways. Consequently eight hypotheses have to be considered.

In fact Parmenides proposes to develop the consequences, not only of his own theory of the existent One and the non-existent Many, but also of any other theories of ἕν and τἄλλα with which he is acquainted. Now the Eleatic theory rests upon a misapprehension of the nature of predication, while one of the rival theories, that of Plato, is intended to serve as the basis of a theory of knowledge. Accordingly each hypothesis is considered, firstly in regard to predication, secondly in regard to knowledge.

We may now tabulate the hypotheses and their primary results as follows:

(1) in i and vi the Eleatic doctrine of the existent One and the non-existent Many is reduced to the single identical proposition ἓν ἕν, all other predication and all knowledge being denied;

(2) in i and iv it is shown that the earlier Platonism, the Platonism of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, denies all predication and all knowledge;

(3) in viii Cynicism is found to deny all predication which is not identical and all knowledge;

(4) in vii we are reminded that the Socratic Universal belongs to the region of δόξα and cannot be known;

(5) in ii and iii it is discovered that, if things, though of their own nature ἄπειρα, are reducible to πολλά and ἕν by the introduction of πέρας, the demands of predication and knowledge are satisfied; while in v the case of classes negatively determined, important in consequence of the misconceptions about μὴ ὄν which have hitherto beset both Eleaticism and the earlier Platonism, is shown to be covered by the general theory.

That Plato prefers the doctrine which is stated in ii and iii and supplemented in v and vii to the doctrines of i, iv, vi, and viii, is immediately obvious. This is not however the sole outcome of the hypotheses. In exemplifying his method the Platonic Parmenides has made some positive contributions towards the resolution of the difficulties raised in the prefatory chapters: that is to say, (1) likeness, unlikeness, &c, are shown to be relations between one thing and another, or between a thing and itself, and in this way the Zenonian paradox of ὅμοια ἀνόμοια is disposed of; (2) certain significant sentences in the investigation of the third hypothesis warrant us in looking to the *Philebus* for a more complete account of the relation of particular and idea; (3) some way is made with a revision of the list of ideas, inasmuch as ideas of πρός τι, σκευαστά, and ἀποφάσεις are to all appearance rejected; (4) we are given to understand that, though ideas cannot be known by us directly or absolutely, we

may approximate to the knowledge of them through the natural kinds with which they are associated.

In short, in the *Parmenides* Plato (1) criticizes Zeno, Socrates, Antisthenes, and himself, (2) modifies and supplements, but does not abandon, the theory of ideas, (3) bases upon the modified theory of being a new theory of knowledge. Both in criticism and in reconstruction the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* agree; and as the latter confirms and explains Aristotle's statement that Plato regarded the στοιχεῖα of ideas as the στοιχεῖα of things, so the former confirms and explains the assertion that orthodox Platonism did not recognize ideas of τὰ πρός τι, σκευαστά, ἀποφάσεις. These results would seem at any rate to justify the prosecution of the inquiry[1].

[1] As on former occasions, I have to thank my friend Mr Archer-Hind for invaluable criticisms and suggestions. In particular he has largely influenced and improved my statement of the theory of the knowledge of the paradeigmatic idea.

HENRY JACKSON.

18 *September*, 1882.

THE USE AND MEANING OF *LICEO* AND *LICEOR*.

Supposed Transitive use of liceo. In Lewis and Short's dictionary we find given as one of the meanings of *licere* "II Transf., of the seller, *to offer for sale, to fix the price, to value* at so much (only post Aug.)—Plin. N. H. 35, 10, 36, § 88, Mart. 6, 66, 4"; and similar statements appear in the older dictionaries as also in Georges. Diomedes 398, 25 (Keil) may be added to the instances which they give.

Now I believe it may be made very probable that this use is not only 'post-Augustan' but imaginary, and that we need not assume an intermixture or confusion of the proper contrast between *licere* 'to be knocked down' and *liceri* 'to bid.'

The last two passages need only be quoted in full to refute the notion that *licere* is transitive in them. In Mart. 6. 66 a scene is described where an auctioneer's officiousness and eagerness to sell frustrates itself.

> Famae non nimium bonae puellam,
> quales in media sedent Subura,
> uendebat modo praeco Gellianus.
> *paruo cum pretio diu liceret,*
> dum puram cupit approbare cunctis,
> attraxit prope se manu negantem
> et bis terque quaterque basiauit.
> quid profecerit osculo, requiris ?
> sexcentos modo qui dabat, negauit.

In the line in italics it is clear at once that *liceret* is used in a *passive* sense and that the "valuing of the seller" is a sheer blunder. But an additional word of explanation is needed.

liceret is not here used quite in its ordinary sense of being 'knocked down' to a person but in a perfectly intelligible variation of it 'when for a long time the bidding *stuck* at a small price,' 'when she stayed at a small figure.' In the passage from Diomedes the assumption of a transitive use is just as gratuitous. It runs—'Ex his quoque non impersonalia at diuerso sensu eadem et personalia sunt et ceteris similia ut cum dicimus placet mihi, id est, uidetur. item placeo places placet, id est, potestatem habeo et liceo lices licet dicimus cum ad pretium referimus, id est, liceo denariis totidem.' Here too the transitive use of *liceo* is a pure and, as I think, mistaken inference due to attaching too much importance to the particular words *denariis totidem.* The ordinary use is quite sufficient for the requirements of the passage. However, let this be as it may, Diomedes is no evidence for the use in Pliny of which I shall now speak.

The passage from Pliny is a wellknown anecdote of Apelles buying Protogenes' pictures. It runs 'Apelles et in aemulis benignus Protogeni dignationem primus Rhodi constituit. sordebat suis ut plerumque domestica percontantique *quanti liceret opera effecta* paruum nescio quid dixerat. at ille quinquagenis talentis poposcit famamque dispersit se emere ut pro suis uenderet.' The following is the authority for the reading taken from Sillig's edition '*liceret BVRdh* N^1T (marg. Vict.), *licitaretur* $N^2\beta$, *licitarentur* Gron. obs. eccles. p. 69 quod postea ipse est aspernatus. mihi Plin. *licerent* scripsisse uidetur.' From this it will be seen that *liceret,* although undoubtedly the MS. tradition, has given trouble to the scribes and editors; and that Sillig himself suspects it. The palaeographical difference between *liceret* and *licerent* is of the slightest; and the mere mistake of supposing *opera* to be a singular might also induce the corruption. Hence I firmly believe that Sillig is right in reading the plural.

Meaning of liceo. There is, I believe, a tolerably widespread idea that in spite of the apparent contradiction in the form, *liceo* and *liceor* are to each other as *passive* and *active,* the first meaning 'I *bid*' and the second 'I *am bid* for.' But this I am confident is erroneous. The two words are really distinct and have even been drawn together but little by the form. Neither

of the words is very common; but *liceo* is surprisingly rare. Besides the above-quoted passages it occurs in Plaut. Men. 3, 3, 25 'ut quantum possint quique *liceant* ueneant,' ib. 5, 9, 97 'uenibunt quiqui *licebunt* praesenti pecunia.' In both these cases the final, the selling price is referred to. They are to be sold for what they will 'fetch'. Another passage Suet. Cal. 39 is also quite clear—'Auctione proposita relliquias omnium spectaculorum subiecit et uenditauit, exquirens per se pretia et usque eo extendens ut quidam immenso coacti quaedam emere ac bonis exuti uenas sibi inciderent. nota res est Aponio Saturnino inter subsellia dormitante ne praetorium uirum, crebro capitis nutu nutantem sibi, praeteriret; nec *licendi* finem factum quoad tredecim gladiatores sestertio nonagies ignoranti addicerentur.' It is clear here also that *licendi* means that a number of gladiators were 'knocked down' to Aponius. So far as the form goes it might come equally well from *liceo* or *liceor*. Cicero Att. 12, 23, 5 presents a difficulty. Cicero is speaking of the gardens which he wished to purchase for the purpose of placing in them a monument to his daughter Tullia: 'De Drusi hortis quanti *licuisse* tu scribis, id ego quoque audieram et, ut opinor, heri ad te scripseram; sed quanti quanti bene emitur quod necesse est.' Now here there can be no question of bidding or knocking down: for the gardens were not sold by auction, or indeed at all on this occasion. Drusus wished to dispose of them by private treaty, and we find them subsequently in the market: Att. 12, 31, 2 'Si uenales (i.e. Silius) non haberet, transirem ad Drusum uel tanti quanti Egnatius illum uelle tibi dixit,' ib. 33, 1 'Ego, ut heri ad te scripsi, si et Silius is fuerit quem tu putas nec Drusus facilem se praebuerit, Damasippum uelim aggrediare.' It is obvious then that the price referred to is only the price which Drusus wanted for them and for which he was prepared to sell them. Here too the general use of *licere* of some *final* arrangement agrees better with the requirements of the passage than that of a passive *liceri* to be bid for. Still, looking at the passage in reference to the other two that I have quoted, I cannot resist the suspicion that after all *licuisse* here may have nothing to do with *liceo* but be simply from *licet* and that *emere* is to be supplied. I may add that *liceo* (unlike *liceor*)

occurs nowhere else in Cicero. The only other passage that I know of where the word occurs is from Horace Sat. 1, 6, 13

> Contra Laeuinum, Valeri genus, unius assis
> non umquam pretio pluris *licuisse*, notante
> iudice quo nosti populo.

Here too the selling price is regarded, but the expression has passed into the metaphorical region.

Meaning of liceor. I now come to *liceor* which, as already said, means to 'bid at an auction.' The lexx. generally recognize this very obvious sense. But in one passage they give it a twist in the wrong direction. Thus Lewis and Short (s. v.) have "II Trop. *to appraise, estimate, value:* tunc auidi matronam oculi licentur, *appraise her, reckon at what price she may be deprived of her honor* Plin. 14, 22, 28, § 141." But the drunken man who is meant is in no position to make a calculation or appraisement. On the contrary it is a greedy and excited *bid* that his eyes betray.

The object of this paper is lexicological and not etymological: and I shall therefore not enter into the question of the derivation of these two verbs[1]. It may be maintained—and I shall not dispute it here—that their origin is the same though their usage has been differentiated. So I shall content myself with recapitulating the results of this paper which are (1) The use of *liceo* in a *transitive* sense is *without authority;* (2) *licere* is used of a thing to *fetch* a price in the *final* offer, whether from buyer or seller, which closes a transaction; (3) *liceri* is used of a person to make a *bid* at an auction or elsewhere.

J. P. POSTGATE.

[1] I may be permitted however to say that I shall discuss it in a forthcoming number of the *American Journal of Philology*.

HORACE CARM. I 13 1—3.

Cum tu, Lydia, Telephi
cervicem roseam, cerea Telephi
laudas bracchia.

cerea all Mss., the scholiasts, Servius: *lactea* Caper. Is *lactea* genuine, or a mere slip of memory? the authority of Bentley has given it vogue. Comp. now Varro Menip. 432 Buech.: Chrysosandalos locat sibi amiculam *de lacte et cera Tarentina* quam apes Milesiae coegerint ex omnibus floribus libantes... puram, putam, proceram, candidam, teneram, formosam. Comp. too Mém. de Grammont p. 319 (éd. 1812): Cette dame étoit ce qu'on appelle proprement une beauté tout angloise; pétrie de lis et *de roses,* de neige et *de lait quant aux couleurs; faite de cire à l'égard des bras et des mains, de la gorge et des pieds.* I unhesitatingly accept *cerea,* and this explanation of Hamilton.

Ibid. III 26 1—4.

Vixi puellis nuper idoneus
et militavi non sine gloria:
nunc arma defunctumque bello
barbiton hic paries habebit.

Some critics adopt Franke's *duellis* for *puellis.* But it seems to me certain that Ovid, while giving a different turn to the thought, had this stanza in his mind when he wrote Am. II 9 23 Me quoque, qui totiens *merui sub amore puellae, Defunctum* placide *vivere* tempus erat. He also read then *puellis,* which is equivalent to *puellari bello:* 'a match for the girls'. 'aptus ad *pugnam*' is the usual turn; but Caes. B. G. v 16 has 'nostros minus aptos esse ad huius generis *hostem*': *puellis* are Horace's *hostibus.* So in Quintil. II 3 1 idoneos *rhetori* pueros = i. rhetoricae arti p. In Epist. I 20 24 'solibus aptum' is much more elliptical, yet surely genuine.

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